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OF ARCHERS, SLINGERS AND OTHER LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN 
GREEK WARFARE FROM THE MYCENAEAN PERIOD TO 362 B.C." 
PRESENTED BY C. S. THOMSON, M.A., FOR THE DEGREE OF 
M. LITT. AT THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.
The above is a study of various types of light-armed 
infantry from the Shaft-grave Period to the battle of 
Mantinea in 362 B.C. The work is comprised of the following 
chapters:
1. "Archers, Slingers and Other Light-armed Infantry 
from the Mycenaean Period to the End of the Dark 
Age With Particular Reference to the Homeric Poems".
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7./
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The thesis also contains introductory and concluding 
sections.
ABBREVIATIONS
AA Archaologischer Anzeiger (supplement to Jd I)
AAA Archaiologica Analecta ex Athenon
AAG A.M.Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (1967)
ABFV J. Boardman, Athenian Black Figure Vases (1975)
ABV J. Beazley, Attic Black-figure Vase - painters (1956)
AD Archaiologicon Deltion
AE Archaiologice Ephemeris
Ahlberg G. Ahlberg, Fighting on Land and Sea in Greek
Geometric Art, Acta Instituti Atheniensis Regni 
Sueciae, Series in 4°, XVI (1971)
AJA American Journal of Archaeology
AM Mitteilungen des deutschen archaologishen Instituts,
Athenische Abteilung 
ANEP J. B. Pritchard, The Ancient Near East in Pictures
Relating to the Old Testament (1954)
AO R. M. Dawkins et al., The Sanctuary of Artemis
Orthia at Sparta (JHS supp. 5 - 1929)
ARFV J. Boardman, Athenian Red Figure Vases (1975)
ARV J. Beazley, Attic Red-figure Vase - painters (1963)
AWBL Y. Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands (1963)
BCH Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique
Best J. G. P. Best, Thracian Peltasts and their
Influence on Greek Warfare(1969)
BM British Museum
BSA Annual of the British School at Athens
Burn A. R. Burn, Persia and the Greeks (1962)
CAAP P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian
Athenaion Politeia (1981)
CJ Classical Journal
CQ Classical Quarterly
CVA Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum
CW Classical Weekly
Delbriick H. Delbruck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im
Rahmen der politischen Geschichte Vol I (1920)
EGAW A.M. Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour and Weapons (196 4
EGW P. A. L. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare(1973)
Foss C. Foss, A Bullet of Tissaphernes, JHS 95 (1975)
p. 25f.
GHI R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek
Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth 
Century B.C. (1969)
GMS H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers - From the
Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus (1933)
GR Greece and Rome
Grundy G. B. Grundy, The Great Persian War (1901)
GSW W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War (I - IV)
HCT A . W . Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides
(I - V - 1945 - 1981; Vols IV and V by Gomme, 
Andrewes and Dover)
Hignett C. Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion of Greece (1963)
HM H. L. Lorimer, Homer and the Monuments (1950)
HW W. W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus
(I - II : 1912)
JAI
Jdl
JHS
Korfmann
Lazenby
MTPAX
NMA
PM
REG
S and A
SGH
Vos
WACG
West
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
Jahrbuch desdeutschen archaologischen Instituts 
Journal of Hellenic Studies
M. Korfmann, The Sling as a Weapon, Scientific
American, 229, 4 (October 1973), pp. 35 - 42.
J. F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (1985)
J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in
the Age of Xenophon (1970)
National Archaeological Museum of Athens
A. J. Evans, Palace of Minos (I - IV - 1921 - 35)
/
Revue Des Etudes Greques
D. A. Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry, Vol I - Sappho 
and Alcaeus (Loeb Classical Library, 1981)
N. G. L. Hammond, Studies in Greek History (1973)
M. F. Vos, Scythian Archers in Archaic Attic Vase- 
painting (1963)
V. D. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical 
Greece (1983)
M. L. West, Iambi et Elegi Graeci (I - II - 1971 - 7 2 )
I N T R O D U C T  I O N
Introduction: Light-armed Troops and Their Weapons
Let us begin with a survey of the various types of light-armed troops 
and their weapons:
i. Archers ('toxotai')
Archers ('toxotai'), who are almost always portrayed in Greek represent­
ations as light-armed (since the archer needed two hands to draw and hold the 
bow he could not carry a large shield or wear armour which would restrict his 
movement)! appear to have been used in warfare in Greece throughout our period 
of study. They appear to have used two main types of bow: the self bow made
out of one material, usually wood, and the composite bow made out of several 
materials bonded together.
A very problematic question is the range of ancient bows. Firstly let 
us consider the range of the ancient Greek self bow: the English long-bow,
which was made of yew, had a target range of 220 metres but the smaller Cretan 
type of self-bow depicted on Greek vases, which was probably made of cedar or 
yew, cannot have matched this ranged In the 1920s self bows from Californian 
anthropological collections were tested and it was found that the best ranges
4
attained by wooden self bows fell within the limits of 155-190 metres. W. 
McLeod estimates the extreme range of the Cretan bow of self-type as about 
175 metres, although he comments that its effective range will not have been 
so greatr
The detailed studies of McLeod show that the effective range of the 
composite bow was greater than that of-the self bow. He suggests that archers 
armed with composite bows were most accurate against specific targets at a 
range of up to 55-60 metres and he defines their -effective range as being
r
"at least 160-175 metres, but not as far as 350-450 metres" . 0 Flight shots 
in competitions with composite bows and light arrows could attain a greater 
range: an inscription from Olbia, dating to shortly before 300 B.C., records
2a shot by a certain Anaxagoras of 500 metresJ This was an extreme rather 
than an effective range and the archer used a special arrow and did not aim 
at any specific target. The effectiveness of ancient bows is reflected by 
the instances of casualties caused by this weapon in ancient texts, by the 
deep arrow-wounds recorded by medical writers ("Nothing penetrates so easily 
into the body as an arrow, and it also becomes very deeply fixed". Celsus,
De Medicina VII.5.2 [W.G. Spencer-Loeb]), by depictions of men wounded by 
arrows in Greek art and by skeletons which have been found with arrowheads 
deeply imbedded in their bones.
ii. Javelin-throwers (1akontistai' and true 'peltastai')
The throwing-spear was most probably used throughout our period of study 
in Greece. Peltasts, 'akontistai' and also some more crudely trained (if 
they were trained at all!) light-infantry were armed primarily with the javelin; 
the javelin in general was not a suitable weapon for a heavily-armed foot 
soldier because the thrower had to have the ability to run fast, twist his 
body and extend his arm fully and heavy armour would have inhibited him in 
these roles. The javelin was a fairly cheap weapon in the Classical Perioc - 
an Athenian inscription of 415 B.C. gives two drachmas as the price of a war 
javelin (at this date Athenian hoplites received about a drachma a day plus 
an allowance for provisions); it was therefore used as a weapon by men who
o
could not afford a very expensive panoply. Another point in favour of using 
the javelin was that it could be thrown with a relatively small amount of 
practice - an ideal weapon for smallholders and landless labourers who spent 
much time cultivating crops and had little time for weapon practice. The 
fact that it is often shown on Greek pots being used against wild animals 
would suggest that it could not only be used by hunters but also by paStOral-
Cj
ists protecting their flocks from predators.
From Archaic and Classical evidence it would appear that the javelin
used in warfare had a wooden shaft and varied in length from somewhat shorter
10than the height of the javelin-thrower to considerably longer. Archaeolog­
ical and ceramic evidence furthermore shows that the javelin was almost
always tipped with a leaf - or barbed-shaped metallic head. Pindar twice
/ 11
calls a javelin 'bronze-cheeked' ( o ^  ) - this epithet suits
best the head of a war or hunting javelin since the metal tips of athletic
javelins depicted on Greek vases were extremely small and narrow and seem
only to have continued the taper of the wooden shaft. We also hear occasion-
12ally in literature of a spiked butt which was fitted to the javelin. The
javelin was a fairly light weapon and in Lucian's Anacharsis it is noted
that the flight of the javelin could be affected by wind in contrast to
13heavier spears which flew straight. The javelin was almost always hurled
with the help of a thong ( c x y k o X * y  , Lat.amentum), which was generally
14 > / \fastened near the centre of gravity of the javelin. The k u  was 
a leather thong and would appear from depictions on Greek vases of javelin­
throwers holding an o < y k o \ ^  loose in one hand and a javelin in the other 
to have measured approximately one foot in length. In the case of the war 
javelin, it was always bound and fixed securely to the shaft in such a way 
as to leave a loop of 3 or 4 inches long in which the 'akontistes' inserted 
his first, or first and middle fingers. In war quick action was often
needed and the c t f y k ^ X ^  was permanently fastened to the shaft so that
15precious seconds would not be wasted trying to fasten it. We often find in
depictions that the javelin used in war had its thong positioned nearer the
tread than its counterpart used in athletic competitions (which generally had
its bound behind the centre of gravity to give increased distance
to the t h r o w ) . I t  is generally agreed that the purpose of the £*ryk*o\^
was to increase the range and penetrative power of the javelin by both the
additional leverage which the thong gave and the rotatory motion which it
imparted. It is, however, disputed whether the thong increased or reduced
17the accuracy of the javelin.
4The war javelins were almost always thrown with a run and in the great 
majority of cases, hurled overarm, although an underarm method is apparently 
occasionally depicted on Greek vases. With the overarm throw the javelin 
is mostly held horizontally in warfare, whilst in athletics the javelin is 
depicted as being pointed slightly upwards at the moment of hurling.1^  The
"i , /\
range of the ancient javelin without an may have been slightly
more than 20 metres; the range of the javelin fitted with the ocyK.'JA^ 
is still not known for certain. Harris, an unskilled javelin-thrower, only 
managed a maximum 25% improvement in range when his javelin was fitted with 
a thong, whilst General Reffye in experiments for the Emperor Napoleon recorded 
throws of up to 80 metres for a javelin hurled by means of a thong. Juthner, 
another inexperienced 'akontistes', increased his throw from 25 to 65 metres 
when he used a thong. It seems probable that the heavier war javelin with 
fixed thong could attain a range of approximately 25-45 metres. 1:7
iii. Slingers (1sphendonetai1)
There is some evidence for the use of the sling throughout our period.
Slingers ('sphendonetai'), whom we may presume in the vast majority of cases
to have been lightly-armed (due to the fact that heavy armour would have
impeded the movement necessary to operate the sling), were armed with the
sling ('sphendone')?  The normal hand sling consisted of two strips of leather,
plaited sinews, linen, horse hair or wool, each about three feet long and one
01
inch in width, with a leather pocket to hold the bullet. M. Korfmann hypo­
thesises that one end of the sling was actually tied to the thrower's hand.
The sling was fired by whirling it around the head three or four times and 
then releasing one end so that the missile flew off by centrifugal force. 
Pebbles made smooth by water were perhaps always the most common type of 
siing-bullet, although man-made bullets of clay and lead were manufactured.
The reason for making bullets of approximately uniform weight and shape was
5so that the slinger did not have to compensate for differences in weight 
at every cast. Bullets were produced in a stream-lined almond shape to 
increase accuracy, velocity and range; this shape of bullet also fitted into 
the sling-pocket snugly and was less inclined than a normal stone to fall out 
of the pocket and fly off at random. The speed of the bullet when being 
shot from the sling could easily have exceeded 100km per hour and Korfmann 
comments that "If one assumes that a 25- gram missile had that velocity when 
it reached the target, the force of its impact would be equivalent to that 
of a golf ball falling from the top of a seven-story building. The energy
90
of heavier missiles, of course, would be proportionately greater". The
potential of the sling was frightening: sling-bullets could kill horses and,
23 < f nas Onasander notes, penetrate deep into unprotected human bodies: ^ ae
that the sling had a greater effective range than a composite bow and that
this effective range may have been more than 400 metres, although it may
only have been used accurately against specific targets up to a range of
about 200 metres. The only ancient evidence we have as to the range of the
sling comes in Vegetius1 Epitoma Rei Militaris which was written between 383
and 450 A.D.; in this work Vegetius recommends that slingers should practice
25at a target placed 600 feet (178 metres) away.' It seems likely that long 
slings could propel bullets with such velocity that they could strike objects
>€^~T(.V O ”T fe. y< 
\  OCvOci v'e.L 4 y c
T w v  TTo\e^U.ti/J\/
(The General, 19.3).
What was the range of the sling?^ 4 The general consensus of opinion.is
6great distances away, although perhaps not as far as 400 metres - the modern
world record for firing a sling-shot is 350 metres.^ The sling, unlike the
javelin, needed much practice to master, and a proficient slinger probably
71learnt the art from childhood.
The sling seems to have been associated with pastoral farming from an 
early date;*® it is an ideal weapon for warding off wild animals from a 
distance and Korfmann notes that it is used to this day by herdsmen in back­
ward parts of the world. It is highly probable that this weapon was used 
by herdsmen and hunters in ancient Greece also: on one Greek vase we find
pq
depicted two men who use the sling against a wild boar. We also find on a 
Black-figured amphora, a depiction of Heracles shooting at the Stymphalian 
birds with a sling - it is possible that the sling was used also in Ancient 
Greece to drive birds away from the fields at sowing time, just as in Medieval 
England. As we shall see, slingers came mainly from the less-developed parts 
of the Greek World such as Acarnania, Aetolia and Thessaly; the general 
consensus of opinion is that it was the hunters and shepherds of these areas 
who were slingers. ^ 1
iv. Stone-throwers (1lithoboloi1)
The stone was almost certainly used as a make-shift missile at all periods
of ancient Greek history. In Classical Greek literature, as we shall see,
we find crude forms of light-armed troops using the stone as a weapon, and
also that it was used by hoplites on various occasions. On Attic Black-
figured and Red-figured vases and also on Attic White-ground lekythoi we find
most often that it is light-armed troops (who wear various types of soft caps
[piloi and broad-brimmed sun-hats], tunics, .cloaks, animal skins or are even
32naked) who are depicted as stone-throwers. Stone-throwers naturally did not 
have to be trained and could pick up stones on the battlefield or carry them 
in a bag - camp-attendants and men used for building military structures,
I
7untrained in the use of and unprovided with heavy arms, could ideally have 
been used in the role of 1lithoboloi'. These troops had to be used in 
fairly large numbers to lay down a concentrated barrage of rocks and stones. 
The effectiveness of large numbers of stone-throwers should not be under­
estimated: even today stone-throwers can cause many casualties among police
equipped with protective riot gear and it is probable that a rock thrown
from close range at the head of a hoplite could have caused him concussion 
even if he was wearing a metallic helmet; the unprotected parts of his legs 
and arms would also have been vulnerable points. Stone-throwers must always 
have been used for skirmishing attacks since they could not have put up any 
effective resistance to heavily-armed infantry in a close-fought battle. j 
A stone large enough to do some damage could probably have been thrown from 
a maximum range of about 200 feet.
v. Terms used Collectively to Describe Various Types of Light-armed Troops
The first Greek writer to use a collective term for various types of 
1 ight-infantry was Tyrtaeus: in frag. 11.35 (West) he refers to y uAav'^ \T€-<7
who were stone-throwers and javelin-throwers and in P. Oxy. no.3316.14 he 
refers to who were armed with javelins. The next writer
to use a blanket term to describe all types of light-armed troops was 
Herodotus: in his account of the battle of Plataea he calls the Greek light-
infantry (Herod.IX.28.1, 29.2, 30, 61 .2 and cfVII.158.4).
Let us consider the derivation of the terms 'gymnetes', 'gymnomachoi' 
and 1psiloi1. The root 'gymn-' is found as early as Homer and is used - 
mainly in the specialized sense of 'without armour and arms' or 'stripped of
M389, TT 312,TT400). Less often in the Homeric poems the root 'gymn-' has
t I
a more general meaning of 'naked' ( y o ^ o v  . x 11 ad X510; :
armour' or 'laid bare' ( y  . niad p]22  ^ p693) (£50, x 124
P711; Y 2. 21; M428; yu^u^Bevro^
y ^ :Od.x 1). In the works of Hesiod we also find the root 
'gymn-': on three occasions we find yu/^vuu ©e\/Tc< meaning 'without
34armour', 'unprotected' or 'exposed' (Shield of Heracles, 334, 418, 460).
We also find the term ^ u |o.v u >©£\/t c < in Tyrtaeus meaning 'without
armour' or 'stripped of armour' (West 10.25). The root 'gymn-' is used
by other Greek poets in the general sense of 'naked' (Archilochus 265 (West)
[probably], Hipponax 62, Sophocles 4.2). The historian Herodotus never
uses the term 'gymnetes' to describe light-armed troops but words containing
the root 'gymn-' are found in the general sense of 'naked' (Herod.I.8 , 10,
11, 11.130, VI.67). Only once in Herodotus do we find the adjective 
/
Y°/uvo<? meaning 'without arms' (Herod.II. 141). Thus we find that as early 
as Homer the root 'gymn-' had a specialized meaning of 'without arms and 
armour', as well as the general meaning of 'naked'.
Let us now consider the derivation of the term 'psiloi'. The term
is never used in a specialized sense in the Homeric poems to refer to soldiers .
We do, however, find the adjective with the meaning of 'bare',
'smooth', and 'naked' (see e.g. 11.1580; Od.^421, v437). Hesiod may also 
have used the word ' ' (or ) ip a general sense
(frag.54.3). The word is not used by the Early Greek poets. Herodotus is 
the first Greek writer to use the term 'psiloi' to mean light-armed troops.
Thus the term 'gymnos' in the early works of Homer and Hesiod had a 
specialized meaning of 'without armour' or 'stripped of armour', as well as 
the general meaning of 'naked'. In contrast, the term 'psiloi' did not have 
a specialized military usage before Herodotus.
The later historian Thucydides, as we shall see, frequently uses the 
term 'psiloi' to refer to all types of light-armed troops (e.g. in IV.32.3-4, 
Thuc. uses the term 'psiloi' to cover archers, javelin-throwers, stone- 
throwers and slingers and in VI.69.2, to describe stone-throwers, archers and
9slingers). He also uses the term y  o^AN/^TeeoC to describe Syracusan 
light-armed troops (Thuc.VII.37.2) - Athenian light-infantry are never 
termed 'gymneteia' or 'gymnetes' in the narrative of Thucydides and consequently 
it seems probable that the historian only used the term y  to
describe Dorian light-armed troops (Syracuse was a Dorian community founded 
by Corinth). The historian Diodorus also uses the term 1psiloi1 to describe 
light-armed troops in general (see e.g. Diodorus XII1.109.3,.111.1-2).
Although the historian Xenophon does use the terms 'psiloi' (Hell.II.
4.33; Oeconomicus VIII.4 and .6) and 'gymnetes' (Hel1.II.4.25-26; Anab. IV. 
1.16) to describe various types of light-armed troops, we find that most often h 
uses the term 'peltastai' collectively to describe these troops (see e.g.
Hell.II.4.33; Anab.I.2.9. 7.10, 8.5, 10.7, VI.2.16; Cyrop.VI.3.26).35 
Thucydides in contrast always uses the term 'peltastai' accurately to describe 
troops armed with true peltast equipment and never uses it in the collective 
sense (see e.g. Thuc.IV.32.2 and IV.93.3).
Thus in the works of the main sources which we will study there are 
several terms which are used collectively to describe a wide range of missile- 
troops: 'gymnetes', 'gymnomachoi', 'psiloi' and 'peltastai'.
C H A P T E R  O N E
ARCHERS, SLINGERS AND OTHER LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY 
FROM THE MYCENAEAN PERIOD TO THE END OF THE DARK 
AGE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE HOMERIC POEMS
i. The Homeric Poems as History:
I will begin my study of light-armed troops by considering their role 
in the Homeric Poems (our earliest coherent Greek texts), and in particular 
the Iliad, and by examining the relative Early Greek archaeological material 
which may be used to clarify the information which we may glean from the 
Homeric Epics. Firstly, we must address ourselves briefly to two vital 
questions: 1
1 Does the Iliad record a historical expedition against Troy or 
is it purely fantasy and not to be believed in the slightest?
2 Does the Iliad contain allusions which can be dated to one 
particular period, or to several?
The first question, despite the results of the excavations on the mound 
of Hissarlik, cannot be answered with certainty. Using later allegories, 
such as the Anglo-Saxon 'Beowulf', the Teutonic 'Nibelungenlied', the 
'Chanson de Roland' from the time of Charlemagne,and sagas from the Viking 
age and Russian and South Slavic poetry, most commentators suppose that 
there is always a certain amount of historical fact in oral poetry and hold 
the view that Iliad did record a Greek expedition, which did in fact take 
place, against a city called Troy. Before examining the second question, 
we must consider when the Iliad was composed: although some historians,
such as Snodgrass, think that it is not possible for us to date Homer at all 
accurately, the general consensus of opinion among commentators is that the 
Iliad was composed in the second half of the eighth century B.C.- If 
archaeologists are correct in associating Homeric Troy with Troy Vila on 
the mount of Hissarlik and in dating its destruction to around 1250 B.C., 
this will mean that Homer was attempting to describe warfarewhich took place 
roughly 500 years before his own time. ^ Archaeological evidence can be used 
to show that some objects and practices mentioned in the Homeric poems
probably date to the Mycenaean Period and others to the Dark Age; the 
majority of objects andpractices cannotjhowever^ be dated with any certainty. 
The following objects are ascribed to the Mycenaean Period: the tower-like
body-shield of Ajax (H  219), which dates to before c.1200 B.C.; the silver- 
studded sword, which became rare towards the end of the Mycenaean Period and 
was apparently not used again till the early Archaic Period; the boars' 
tusk helmet (K261-5), for which we have archaeological evidence,and the cup 
of Nestor (A632-5). The assumption that bronze, and not iron, is the metal 
which is in general use would also seem to be a Mycenaean element. It is 
also supposed that there is an element of late-Mycenaean political geography 
in the catalogue of Greek forces in the second book of the Iliad. 4
There are a number of features which would seem to date to the Dark Age - 
the pair of throwing-spears may possibly be an allusion to the warfare of 
this period, although this is not certain. The references to Phoenician 
ships around the Aegean in the Iliad and Odyssey are thought to date to the 
ninth century B.C. Archaeological evidence would also suggest that cremation 
of the dead began in the early Iron Age and went out of fashion by the end of 
the eighth century B.C.
Between the end of the Mycenaean Period and the eighth century B.C., lay 
an age of obscurity in which the old Mycenaean script was forgotten and the 
stories of the past kept alive in popular memory. It was only in the eighth 
century itself, when the Greeks borrowed the alphabet of the Phoenicians, that 
literacy reoccurred. We can therefore imagine the poet of the Iliad in the 
later eighth century B.C. keeping alive in his work the popular memories of 
the past and also using some allusions to the more recent past or to the 
present. Some different portrayals of fighting in the Iliad probably also 
should be attributed to different periods: there are frequent allusions to
the superiority of individual heroes in battle, yet the Locrian slingers
12
and archers are described as breaking the Trojan ranks with their fire.^
It is often impossible to ascribe with any certainty various fighting 
practices to definite periods but in some cases, as we shall see, there is 
some external evidence which may possibly justify us doing so. Bearing in 
mind the uncertainties inherent in the use of the Homeric Epics as historical 
sources, let us now move on to consider the role of missile troops in these 
poems.
1 Archers and Archery in the Iliad of Homer
In her introductory paragraph on the use of the bow in the Homeric poems 
Lorimer states that "archery plays an insignificant part in the Iliad" and 
that the Homeric bow was used "with so little effect that we must conclude 
the poet to have had only the European (i.e. 'self'-) type in mind". She 
further would lead us to believe that the heroes carried bows primarily for 
hunting and aristocratic contests: "The heroes, however, seem to have
possessed bows, presumably for hunting and aristocratic contests". ^
Although the bow is used in the Iliad for hunting and contests of
• i
shooting, it is portrayed foremost as a weapon of war of both the laoi and 
the heroes and furthermore as a weapon which could inflict severe and often 
fatal wounds.® The fact that arrow wounds are frequently mentioned would 
suggest that Lorimer is wrong in minimizing the effect of the bow in the 
Iliad. 9 In A 132 - 140,Pandarus wounds Menelaus by firing an arrow through 
tiis belt, outer thorax and inner apron:
, \ V > ^  , w /N «/
j T r j  d w o t  lO o v fc V  } O'
Utf'tLOL )<oc\ SI­
X ’ &TT £.«"£. c*i
oc K o v f
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<■/ c .  ^ y C \ Cv '/ \r| ol rtX<c(.<rTo^ e.^ puTo'c)(-o<TTy3o 6e to Koa
• >,/ C> »/ > •» \ • ,/ / ,  /.o C K ^ T c i C T o v  d oy> 0(.<3"T0<7 fcTTfcy^oc \^/'fc y^ j>oc< (f}U>To<>
C*UTcko< ^ ocij^u KeXoccv/fe^e^ 4 ^
In £  95 - 100 Pandarus shoots an arrow at Diomedes with such force 
that it pierces the plate ( y ^ \ o v  ) of D i o m e d e s 1 thorax and passes on 
into his body:
C •> c ^  > /  A  / ? \ \ c VlOV d ui<^ O O V  e.VOr^tffe / ^OKoCCVO^ C*YAC^O^
O o v o v t  * TTt^toV TTjio k.\oveoVT<* c|>c<\o<yyoc ^ ,
cx.l'y’ 4 t u  T u S X ' %  l - n  To^cv/fcTO kcx^TTuXo* T ^ c x i j  
 ^ Q /  \  ^ C Yl \ Okc*<. p<X A  CTTcrtC 5 T u ^ v 1 kc/Ta' <3££L0\/ U O ^ 0^,
©uj^vjko^ Yucrt^ov JjTTrfTO TTCKpo^
o(VT 6^ <£. 9 TToc\e<: d'tftTo cl c7c^c/Tc_ 0 w  f \ b
In E 1 1 1  - 3 we learn that Sthenelus had to push an arrow right through
10a wound both because it had penetrated so deeply and because of the barbs; 
the Homeric physicians frequently had to cut arrowheads out of shallower 
wounds and push them through deeper ones if they were not liable to pierce 
a vital part of the body.11 An arrow which hit an unprotected part of the 
body could pass right through it and the result was in many cases immediate 
d e a t h . 12
It would appear,t h e n ,that Lorimer was mistaken in her hypothesis that 
the Homeric bow was of little effect and in her conclusion that the poet 
must have had only the self-type in mind.12 Archaeological evidence proves 
that early composite bows could propel arrows with such velocity that they 
could penetrate armour and inflict deep wounds such as those Homer described: 
among the reliefs on a chariot found in the tomb of King Thutmose IV (XV111th 
Dynasty - 1411 - 1397 B.C.) is a charioteer with coat of metal scale-armour 
penetrated by an arrow which has been fired from a composite bow.14 In a 
Mycenaean grave on the site of Ugarit was found a skeleton which had an
14
1Farrow transfixing two of its dorsal vertebrae. During the excavations 
of the 1930s by the Welkome-Marston Archaeological Research Foundation on 
the site of Lachish,there were found a number of Assyrian arrowheads which 
had penetrated deeply into thick potsherds and lodged themselves in bricks - 
we know from reliefs that the Assyrians of this period used the composite 
bow.^ Depictions of men wounded by arrows occur frequently in the battle 
scenes on Attic Late Geometric pottery - both the self- and composite-bows 
are depicted on this type of pottery. ^
Indeed,the view that the Homeric bow was a powerful weapon is confirmed 
by line 718 of the thirteenth book (N) of the Iliad,where the Locrian archers 
and slingers are described as actually breaking up ranks of the Trojans with 
their missile fire;^® this passage would incline one to believe that the 
Locrians were equipped with the powerful composite bow. The fact that there 
were organized bands of archers at all contradicts Lorimer's view that archery 
had little part to play in the Homeric battle.
Let us now examine the question of who used the bow as a weapon in the
i i
Iliad. The bow appears on several occasions to be a weapon of the laoi of 
both sides:
B 771 - 775 (Achaeans,practising shooting with the bow)
O yiAfeV «^ »\/ TT<WTO tfo/
W -tlrr*  i n o ^ V i  A .y tfy A e y u L V 'c v 'i. T\ l \ ckOj v
St jA.'l'Sl. G«\c<66^
~rd.j>TV o VTO K cA  o/v.ycXV’e  
“TO "5 Outftv' ©
p  79 - 80 (Achaeans)
T ^  tTTt T o ^ c <  ^ 6\/TO u s A , ^ c « £ l . O C )
Tfc Ti To voc t ’ eLp>o\\<^ \/ .
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0  312 - 14 (Both sides)
i> T T ^ fe c v "o < \ /  2 y > “rc  u o t ^
«!yA (j) o T  Gy> to 6  feV  ^ c*TTC> \Z£o^>^c|dl cA-
© p  d> f l 'K o v '  ’
TT 359 - 361 (Achaeans)
O c)€ noXfe^-COLO^
> />^ ___ _  / \ f y / >/
<Xtf"TTtcK ~Tctfuy>eAr^ kfc l<«* A uyAyA G \/0 ^  £ U | i £ ^  u J y u o o ^ j
/  \  ^ a c  ^V v C ^ _  > / .^ K & r r T e .T  o c < t t u j v  t e  ^ o l ^ o v  K « f c  a o o r r o ' /  o < k o \ / t i o i / .
n  111 - 775 (Both sides)
T i o X X ^  N/r^ V 0^>4.cA SoOy>c<
CCL T G  TT_T6.|>0/e v T 4 ^  c^ TTo  ,
n  o\\of ^ fe >^yA «S  <. c< yAG y c ^ V  tx<rnCSof^ g 6 t  o ^ e X t^ o c v /
/ > i > ) 1 .JJyU j>\/Ol p\€VLA\/ Cijyify oCoTOV
X 194 - 198 (Trojans; attempt to cover Hector with their fire from the 
walls and towers).
Otf'&'oCfc.l S  Oy>y\A«q <**£(. e T T o V c X tO v '  ^i«*y>^c<v'l.c£vOV'
C&VTtO '/ ci £ e <S 6<XL 3 €VJclyAv^ TOU^ OTTO 1 T O p Y OU<>)
€.J/  T T u )^  o l  K c< 0  Qev  < U \ c ^ \  kO L  G.V £ g \ g £ < s v  cV,
T o t f t f ^ i u  yu,<v -rr^oTT<x^ot&ev/ c x t t o t ^ e'vj/'oc^'kG T T c ^ c ^ e o c ^
\ •» \ t \ \ /\ / • , > /
TT^o^ T T G d to V  ? o f U T o ^  £ £  T TO TL  T TT O  A (.o ^ TTfe-yeT <*(.£(..
X  205 - 207 (Achaeans; Achilles forbids his own soldiers from sniping 
at Hector with their 'bitter darts').
\eKoTd'i\/’ ^ ofVfeVfcUfe kcxy>*Y*Tc A ^ t X \ e o ^ ,
O u V  € «  ley4  6Vo<(. £ n l  E kTO j>L  T T c k ^ X  j^fcXeyAV'c^
*Tt^ O^OC-TO O ^G ^GOTGj5®^ e\©oc.
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Homer further gives the impression that there were organized bodies 
of archers:
1 Philoctetes and his followers: B716 - 720.
O l  1 A  Qiovry' keCl 0  c* oj^oc k.cvy/’ o\/TO
k.o<L ^ olo^\/ €.yo\f koO. 0 \< .^ £ jv c <  T ^ v ^ c to c v ’,
T w v  Sfe ^ t X o k T ^ T r j ^  g ^ e v j T o ^ u jv  i u  e lS u o ^
c \ - ? /  ^ ’ ’ « / ^ /€T\Tc< ve.oov ey?€.Toa a cv/ e k < x ° f fc'] tt€n/*t^ kovTcx
oC<fc*\/j TO ^U JV  £0) e.*Lbo-rey T(f>c yucx^£<^ ©oa .
2 Pyraichmes and the Paionians: B848 - 850. ^
«*C?Toy5 1 1 up cxC y^ jjL ^  <3y6 T T *u o v < y ^  cxyK .u \o T 0^ 5  ° ° >  
T r j\o © e .\z  £.^ J \ j j^ J h C b v o y , « "n J e.<!y>b j i e o v T o ^
(.<TTO\/ ucJoo^ sTfc IccSvWToci cxlc<\/ .
3 The Locrians, the followers of the Lesser Aias, were armed with 
bows and slings: N712 - 722.
O u V  oy^ ( X \ j . « S y  j/\.ok.y>o\. ^ j t o v t o *
oo  yc*^  <s’ h^  d'-rcx^c^ u<Syi\uv’>y youy^tfe. c|)l\ ov ^*gp
oo y«^> Koy>u©c*^ ^<x\k.»^y> cuTToScxtf'e/cx:^}
o o i1 <X (TTTifcioc^  ( cU kukX oU^ k«C yL\e(\t.V/0( O^Vj>C< }
C * W  oyjcX "^O^OCdcV k.«\ £ o  e<j)6? OcX^ oTU>TU>
\ > < / > < ■ /  * / ji_LA<“OV ^c<j> <*yA. G.TTOVTo TTfeTTOl.ecTe^ J otrfiV £TTecTcX
Tc< £«* X X o V T e ^  T r  douov y>^y*vUVTO <|)o<r\'xyycx^ •
T O ^  CH. JJLGV *TTy>©6©fe ^ O V  tv/Tt^c ^<y<-^cx\£ OLdcV
jU « P V o c V T O  -Tfe k < * V  C/£ t lO ‘<y><* ^ c A f c o k o ^ o t f - r  ^
o l  d O T l i  © e v  J S c x W o v T e ^  £ \o < v  ©ex'/d  v  * o o S e  t l  vd<y>yu.y<y
~ / * \. / N '- * >C*-r 4d'K.OVTO ffOVfe k .X o  V&OV Y 04/3 O L f iT o l. .
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The bow is also used by several of the warrior chieftains on both
the Achaean and Trojan sides. On the Achaean side we are specifically
told that Teucer, Odysseus, Meriones and Philoctetes were on certain
occasions armed with the bow and on the Trojan side Paris, Pandarus,
21Dolon and Helenus. Out of all the occasions in which we are told that 
heroes were armed or used certain weapons, we find that the bow occurs in 
12.9% of all instances (on 34 occasions), the spear 68.5% (181 occasions), 
the sword 13.6% (36 occasions) and the stone 4.9% (13 occasions) 22 Thus 
in the Iliad of Homer we find that the heroes most commonly used the spear, 
less often the sword and bow, and only occasionally threw stones.
I i
Thus,we have found that the bow was used both by the laoi and several 
of the heroes. Let us now examine in what roles the archers among the 
laoi and chieftains were used. We have only one passage in the Iliad which
• i
might suggest how archers among the laoi were used in open battle: in
N712 - 722 we are told that the Locrians, the followers of the Lesser Aias, 
could not enter into the close combat because they had none of the convent­
ional heroic arms and armour but rather trusted in the bow and sling. In 
N721 we learn that they shot their missiles unseen from behind the normal 
infantry and in N718 that their fire was so effective that they actually 
broke up the ranks of the Trojans.
Thus, the Locrian archers and slingers operated as an effective body 
by shooting their missiles over the heads of the infantry positioned in 
front of them. Commentators have been confused as to why Homer has let 
these missile-troops influence the course of fighting; Leaf comments:
"It i-s quite unlike the Homeric view to make the sudden change of the . 
course of battle, even to 'a sorry repulse from ships and huts' (N723), 
depend not upon the doughty deeds of individual heroes, but solely on the 
effect of a body of archers concealed in the rear. Of such soldiers Homer 
always speaks in a slighting tone, and nowhere else do they exercise the
23
least influence on the course of a fight".
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We find in Ancient Greek art individual archers operating from behind 
more conventionally armed infantrymen: the archer on the Lion Hunt Dagger
from Shaft-grave IV is represented shooting his bow from behind two infantry­
men with large shields and spears and a crude terra-cotta group from Cyprus, 
which dates no earlier than the seventh century B.C.,depicts an archer
O/j
drawing his bow from behind an infantryman who protects him with his shield; 
but we never find massed units of archers operating from behind infantrymen 
in Early Greek art. It is only in Assyrian reliefs from the palace of 
Sennacherib (704 - 681 B.C.) at Nineveh that we find a massed force of archers, 
used in conjunction with slingers, shooting high over the heads of the infant­
rymen positioned in front of them. We must, however, reckon with the
difficulty of representing massed archers and massed infantrymen in Early 
Greek Art; the Assyrian reliefs were on a huge scale which allowed these to 
be depicted - we only have archers depicted on knife blades, pots and small 
seals etc. in Early Greek art, which did not have a very large surface area.25 
In Classical Greek literature we find that it was only in exceptional circum­
stances that archers were positioned behind infantry or fired high trajectory 
shots over their heads2- the danger of hitting one's own men in the back is 
obvious and is perhaps best exemplified by the plight of the English at 
Bannockburn when their own archers fired their arrows too short and killed 
many of their own infantry.2^ The military author Onasander, who wrote in 
the first half of the first-century A.D., realized this danger and comments*.
S e   ^ o c k o v T u < 5 T o C < 7  k c A  t o ^ o t o c ^  k .< * \ < s < ^ e v § o v  
ny>urrou^ TTpo T v ^  KcxToTTlv ^Cev y&p
ovTt^ TrXetovo< k c T o u j  iScouj ^  Tou^ ttoX
(The General, XVII). He also realized that high trajectory shooting from
behind one's own ranks could be very ineffective and advocates that archers 
should be used to shoot horizontally at specific targets: ... ot' -re "to^otca.
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TTpcx.ovTe^ ^ f e V  T u j v /  c k X X u W  otl)7o<. ~To( <5u0j^ \oC~Xo( k .c *L
fcc*-TOC ( T K o Tt X v  e.t<To^GiJOOc-(. T^< , yM.e>Tc< SeTo^c,
X o ^ O U ^  r j  e v  C < U T o l^  J^£(SOL<j o V t g ^  GL^ L)\fO<j T o ^  €  U O O <5 <-V?
U)<TTG T"1"/5®'? yUGV "T^v C<vt0 (j> 0 j3 c * \/ T o v o y  G ^ G L V  T o  j*>l\o<j , 
c x 3 © c ^  S e , k c * v  K c < t «  r T i r i T - |  T u W  TToXeyLciXov/, L\<\e~
Xu<5*0 cxl \<oo. ^  iTc^v/u Tc Xuttgu/ Tou^ e^0p>ou^ (The General, XVII).
Is it possible that the positioning of a massed force of archers and 
slingers behind a force of ordinary infantry is a non-Greek feature of the 
Iliad which has been influenced by Assyrian practice? The Assyrian reliefs 
from the palace of Sennacherib at Nineveh would perhaps suggest this.
Cyprus was subjugated in 712 B.C. by Sargon II and in the following rebellion 
by the cities of the Philistine coast,the lead was taken by Ashdod and her 
adopted Greek king. During these years many Cypriots and some Greeks of 
other communities on the Mediterranean coasts must have witnessed Assyrian 
troops and tactics. It seems possible,then,that the Locrian passage is 
influenced by Assyrian tactics and dates possibly to around the last decade 
of the 8th century B.C. 28
A force of archers could ideally be used to defend a fortified position; 
in Iliad X194 - 198,we find Trojan archers positioned on the towers and 
battlements of Troy,giving covering fire to Hector as he flees from Achilles.-9 
It has been suggested by K. Muller that certain parts of Mycenaean fortific­
ations were specially built with the fire of defending archers in mind and, 
in particular, it is his opinion that certain features of the west staircase 
at Tiryns were designed to enable archers to protect the line of communic­
ation with the most probable source of water s u p p ly .2° Although the use of 
missile troops to defend fortified positions is a timeless feature of Greek 
history, it is worth noting that archers on Egyptian and Assyrian wall- 
p'^tings, reliefs and metal-work are frequently depicted in this role.
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We might have expected that the Achaean archers fired arrows at the 
defending Trojans in their attacks on the walls of Troy, yet Homer does not 
mention them in this role - the fact that Blegen found in the Troy Vila 
stratum a small bronze arrowhead of a type which is very similar to a LHIIIB 
example from mainland Greece might suggest that they did33 We have a 
depiction of an archer on a LMII fragment of a vase from Knossos shooting 
high, almost certainly at the walls of a city; Egyptian and Assyrian archers
oo
are also depicted in this role.
Let us consider how the heroes who were armed with bows operated in the 
Iliad of Homer. We find that unlike the Locrians, the heroes always snipe 
at specific targets, often close at hand, which they can see - this means 
that they must have shot horizontally at their targets and did not employ 
high trajectory shots which could only have been effective against a body of 
men spread over a wide area. In many respects Homer's depiction of these 
chieftain bowmen is too stylistic to reflect reality - they always wound or
i i
kill other heroes and never turn their bows against the laoi, just as no hero 
is ever killed by an insignificant man .34 They also often operate at an 
extremely short range from their targets; I find it very hard to believe 
that this reflects reality since the main strength of the bow lay in the fact 
that an archer could wound an enemy with it from a distance and so with 
impunity - it would rather defeat his purpose to advance so close to an enemy 
that he could be wounded or killed by a spear-thrust or stone-throw.33 Thus 
in N594 - 5 we find Helenus equipped as an archer advancing so close to 
Menelaus that he was wounded by his spear in the hand and in <E> 327 Teucer 
is so near to Hector when he draws his bow that Hector can hurl a rock at him 
and crush his shoulder. If the archer did, as Homer would suggest, on 
occasion enter into the melee of the infantry, there would have been no good 
grounds for him to have received the rebuke of cowardice in the Iliad. 36
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In other respects Homer's account of the archery of these heroes is 
less stylized: the wounds they inflict are graphic and Teucer's method of
operation in conjunction with the spearman Telamonian Aias is quite striking:
T s u Kpo<j eivo<To TTo<\cvTOVcx: To^oc TiTc^LVujV,
S' <jTT' f\ LocVTO^ <^c*k fiL r~Te\o<|-LtOVi.cx^c<o.
W A> A V  ^  ^ C/lt/evtl urre.jecpe^ev/ <5c<ko^ c^yr«j> o ^
/  * — '  > ;  /< ? C / \rtofTTT^v'c<<^ ; ferTte cy> Tiv OL^Teu^«<^ ev oyn<.AuJ 
o yotfev' u TjG l Tre^uJV c<rro os/ <3
\ t /TN , / / <\ c \ /  ^/OcoTc^p O c*C»TC^ LOJVj TTctL^  oo^ u ITO , dO^ICfe^
A.”c<v9>' o S t  y^ uv/ fS'oclcfcd k.j>oTT-rc<<^ k.6 <|}c<£ivCo.
(Iliad@266-272).
In A  113 we are also informed that Pandarus was positioned behind his
companions' protecting shields when he was taking a shot at Menelaus. As
Leaf rightly notes,this mode of fighting with an archer acting in conjunction
with one or several infantrymen is characteristically Oriental, and more
33particularly Assyrian. Single Assyrian archers operating from behind the
protective shields of infantrymen are depicted on the carved orthostats from
the palace of Ashurnasirpal II (883 - 859 B.C.) at Nimrud, on reliefs from
the palace of Tiglath - pileser III (745 - 727 B.C.) at Nimrud, Sargon II
(721 - 705 B.C.) at Khorsabad, Sennacherib (704 - 681 B.C.) at Nineveh and
Ashurbanipal (c.668 - 630 B.C.) at Nineveh.00 As mentioned previously,we
also possess a terra-cotta group from Cyprus of an archer who is shielded
by an infantryman while he holds out his bow to fire. The find dates to no
earlier than the seventh century B.C. and Lorimer notes that the figures'
high peaked helmets and facial features indicate an Eastern influence,
possibly Assyrian. 40 Cyprus was subjugated by Sargon II in 712 B.C. and in
his advance to the Mediterranean coast the Eastern Greeks would have learned
41about Assyrian modes of combat. Along with the Locrian passage (N712 - 722),
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the piece in which the archer Teucer and the spearman Telamonian Aias act 
in conjunction is possibly influenced by Assyrian practices and may date to 
the late 8th century B.C.; although this hypothesis is attractive, we should 
bear in mind that the archer on the Lion Hunt Dagger aims his bow from 
behind the protection of the shields of the two more conventionally equipped 
men. The situation is timeless: an archer, since he needs both hands to
draw his bow, cannot carry a shield and therefore ideally needs a shield- 
bearer to cover him while firing; thus Homer may simply be describing an 
Early Greek rather than an Assyrian practice.
i i
As well as being used by the laoi, the bow was, as we have seen, used 
by the warrior aristocrats Teucer, Odysseus, Meriones, Philoctetes, Paris, 
Pandarus, Helenus and Dolon on certain occasions and in the majority of the 
passages in which they use the bow there is no hint that it was regarded as 
a disreputable weapon. Note that Dolon is regarded by Homer as a very 
wealthy man because he owns much gold and bronze ( Trc\o^'xko^ 
K315), yet he chooses the bow as a weapon(K333;K459). However, there are 
echoes in the Iliad of the timeless belief that archery was cowardly and 
that a man could only show true valour by fighting hand-to-hand with spear 
or sword. Inherent in the tactics of the archer was combat at a distance 
from the enemy and it was this feature which throughout the ages was felt 
most to smack of cowardice.^ We find Diomedes pouring scorn on Paris1 
archery ai
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T o u  de. y  uv'txit.uc.o^  t 1 S^uc|do^ <bL&L rfocpe^oiLj
T\c*l^£C^ ^  Oj><|) Ots/LROC ‘ 0 0^ CX<!^ A.O(TC yo^UOCV G^fe69u)V
TTue^Tac^ OLLO\/OL St TT<y>l T r X ^  Y^v/oTuc.e<j .
(A385 - 395).
Note the idea that Diomedes' arrow-wound does not pain him over-much 
but that sure death awaits anyone who is struck by his spear.
In A  242 Agamenmon rebukes and in S  479 the Trojan Acamas taunts the 
Greeks as shirkers by calling them to^ j^ l . Although the derivation 
and sense of the word are not certain,it seems highly likely that it is a 
word of rebuke relating to the use of arrows in place of 'heroic' weapons.
In both the Iliad and Odyssey we find ^ L e a f  notes that the 
analogy of makes it probable that the first element of the
word is lip (an arrow) though this always has T in the Homeric poems 
(but cf. oc< in Pindar, Pythian H.9.). Leaf further notes that
> f y t—i-ey is probably equal to L<shoc , the Sanskrit 'ishus', 'so that we may
*\ / ^  p— /I/Icompare the Attic t6o^ by «-<5oc? from K'^roc, jhe second element
is quite uncertain, but some possible derivations are:
1 yM.GyD , to think of, 'thinking of arrows' i.e. devoted to fighting with
the bow.
2 /*<*/> of , 'fighting with arrows'.
3 the Sanskrit muras, stormy, eager, earnest-so 'eager with arrows'.
i i
There are hints,then,that although the bow was widely used by-the laoi 
and a number of warrior chieftains in the Iliad its use was not accepted by 
certain heroes who thought that it was an unmanly weapon. Influenced 
probably by a later Cretan tradition, the bow receives a more kindly treat- 
ment in the Odyssey.
In conclusion,we may say that the bow was fairly frequently used in
i i
the Iliad both by certain nobles and by the laoi, a section of whom repres­
ented organized groups of archers (e.g. the Locrians, Paionians and followers
24
of Philoctetes). The bows of Pandarus in the Iliad and Odysseus were 
almost certainly of the composite type and throughout the Iliad the potential 
of the bow is stressed by the penetrative power of the arrow and by the
archers and slingers who operated by firing their missiles over the heads of 
the infantrymen positioned in front of them; this mode of combat is portrayed 
as being very effective because the Locrians are described as breaking up the 
ranks of the Trojans with their fire. The description of the Locrians is 
possibly based on some knowledge of Assyrian tactics. Forces of archers 
were also positioned on the walls and towers of Troy, presumably to ward off 
attacks in normal circumstances (cf. Iliad X194 - 8). The picture is con­
fused by the aristocratic archers who do not operate from behind their 
infantrymen but act on their own or with single infantrymen, who cover them 
with their shields, and snipe, often at very close range, at specific targets. 
The picture is also highly stylized: heroes always wound or kill other
i i
heroes but never turn their bows against the laoi, just as no hero is ever 
killed by an insignificant man. The acceptability of the bow as a weapon by 
the heroes is also confused - the warrior aristocrats Teucer, Odysseus, 
Meriones, Philoctetes, Paris, Pandarus, Helenus and Dolon quite merrily twang 
away with their bows, whilst Diomedes, Agamemnon and Acamas used the words 
and as taunts and rebukes.
2 The Sling in the Iliad of Homer:
In the Iliad there are two possible references to the sling.^ In 
N598 - 600ythe wounded Helenus requires a sling for his arm and an attendant 
produces <xtoTo<, which is then explained to be a ^
fairly large number of casualties caused by the bow.^ It is clear that a
i v
section of the laoi, such as the Locrians, were organized into forces of
A.yrjvuy>
> I o ■» \
I £ U < T t P fe<p6(. CKOS <XU)Tul
e^e ttoi
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We also learn that the Locrians, the followers of the Lesser Aias, 
were not equipped with the conventional heroic arms and armour but followed 
their master with bows and 1 t i f f T 0 co«> <£u>tuj' (N712 - 717).45 
We furthermore learn that they were positioned behind the normal foot 
soldiers ( ol otti©£v (&<*VXovt€.^ i\ocv$oc.\jav , N721) and that 
their missile fire was so effective that it actually broke up the Trojan 
ranks (N718).
The meaning of the o l o r u s T o ^  has confused modern commentators 
but it seems to have been taken for granted by Pausanias that it referred 
to slings: E.X\^<rtv' o u  o o k
^  “To^eue.LVp f\.oWj>ov<^ "To J^5> O t t o o v i l o u ^  oirXiTeu-
C VT<X^ T o< C<S'^dVrJ OUJ, ^TTOIkj-
tf6v c^ t^ cyLAC'/oi, T o k . < * c  d<j?€v^ovc<^ LOV/ eXeot&N/ (1.23.4).
1 J ,  ^ ? N •) / I
It seems best to take the phrase c o 6 T^tj>ti o<_o^ o^wtuj to refer 
to slings made of well-twisted wool. It is impossible for it to refer to 
bowstrings made of wool because wool - however tightly wound - lacks the 
elasticity needed for a bowstring and almost certainly cannot stand the 
strain of a self-bow,let alone one of composite type. The elasticity of 
the sling-cord is, however, not important since the sling-shot shoots off 
at the same speed as the rotary motion of the sling - it does not matter 
whether the sling-cord is made of tough, thick leather or more supple sinews, 
the bullet will fly at the same speed.50 Despite some commentators' misgivings, 
it would appear that a sling-cord made out of well-twisted wool is a distinct 
possibility. 51
Our archaeological evidence would suggest that slings were used at a 
very early date in Greece: stone sling-shots have been found at Neolithic
sites in Thessaly, Macedonia and Central Greece and these finds have led 
V.G. Childe to suggest that the sling may have been a major weapon in Pre­
historic Greece, while the bow may have played a minor role, if any, in
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52warfare. Sling-shots have also been found at Troy dating from the Middle
Helladic II Period (from c.2500 - 2200 B.C.): Schliemann excavated a
large number of objects which he regarded as sling-bullets from Troy II
and Troy III at the mound of Hissarlik.5^ These objects, which are made of
hematite or diorite, are roughly the shape of a cylinder with convex sides
and flattened ends and many of them are about 6.5 cm long - just under the
normal breadth of a human palm; some of these objects were quite heavy -
the largest example found weighed 1130 grams, whilst the second largest
weighed 520 grams. Although Schliemann was convinced that these finds
were sling-bullets, G. Fougeres thinks that they were more probably amulets. 54
On Crete there have been excavated at Pseira stones which are supposed to
have been intended for the use of very early Cretan slingers: one of the
buildings excavated at Pseira (which first expanded in the Early Minoan II
Period [c.2500 - 2200 B.C.] and developed fully in Late Minoan I times
[c.1550 - 1450 B.C.]) was found to have three of its rooms filled with
beach pebbles and these have been identified by the excavators as sling-
55stones and the building as a primitive arsenal.
Sling-shots dating to the Mycenaean Period have been found at Mycenae 
and Knossos. At Mycenae, outside a tomb of the Acropolis, was excavated a 
large sling-stone, apparently made of limestone. 55 At Knossos, Evans made 
a startling discovery when he found two crude lead siing-bullets (lead 
bullets are common in the Classical Period, but are not found before this 
date) 6 metres down a pit near the Shrine of the Double Axes "in a medium 
which excludes any possibility of later intrusion" .57 Beside the two bullets 
in the LMIII stratum were found cups and pottery i dentist to those found 
in situ in the Shrine of the Double Axes. These two bullets are quite 
unlike the later examples, often inscribed, which have been found on the 
site of the Graeco - Roman city - Evans notes that they are heavier, more 
round in section, and that the slight ridge on the sides shows a less perfect
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method of casting; the surface of the bullets is rough and they bear no 
inscriptions. A point has also been carved out at each end of the bullets 
with a knife, presumably to increase their penetrative power - this practice 
seems quite unique. Evans hypothesises that the last Minoan occupants of 
the Palace site were driven out under a hail of such bullets fired by invad­
ing Achaeans. It would seem that these LMIII lead sling-bullets remained 
an isolated phenomenon and one which seems to have had no connection with the 
Classical development of lead bullets since no such Classical bullet which 
can be dated with any certainty to the period before c.401 - 395 B.C. has ever 
been published.^®
Sling-bullets have been found at two Dark Age sites: stone sling-bullets,
which were almond-shaped and had a length of 6.5 cm (exactly the same length 
as many of the objects classed as sling-bullets by Schliemann), were found 
in Tholos Tomb V at Marmariane in Thessaly; clay bullets of the same shape
cq
were also found in Tomb V. Clay sling-shots were also found in Dark Age 
contexts on Thera. ^
From our limited archaeological evidence from finds of sling-shots, it 
would appear then that slingers, using bullets of stone and in some areas of 
lead, were in existence in the Mycenaean World and probably had their origins 
in the Neolithic Age. We also have evidence that there were slingers using 
stone and clay bullets in the Dark Age Period.
Let us now examine the equipment and mode of combat of the Locrian 
slingers to see if they may be compared to the few early Greek depictions of 
slingers which we possess. We are told that the Locrians were equipped with 
neither bronze helmets, nor round shields^nor spears^but only with bows and 
slings (N714 - 716) and as for their mode of fighting, we are informed that 
they did not enter the melee ( ^  ,N713) but were positioned
and fired their missile weapons from behind the conventional infantry forces
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( oc a o m © e v /  »^o<XXovrTfc^  eXc*/0cc/-o^  N721); furthermore,their fire 
was so intensive and accurate that they broke up the Trojan ranks (N718).
Now let us consider our limited number of early Greek depictions of slingers: 
our only Mycenaean depiction of slingers comes from two of the four surviving 
fragments of the famous silver Siege Rhyton excavated from Shaft-grave IV
r 1
at Mycenae. On the main fragment an army is portrayed in the act of 
fending off an attack on a fortified town. There are three slingers in 
the defending force who stand upright with their slings poised above their 
heads in the starting position for the whirling motion, whilst behind them 
and to their sides are positioned five a r c h e r s . Behind the main group of 
three slingers and four archers are depicted two more conventionally armed 
warriors with large shields and spears advancing shoulder to shoulder. On 
another fragment (Lorimer, H.M., Fig.4,b) we have the incomplete body of a 
slinger who holds a stone in his left hand while he whirls the sling above 
his head with his right; on the same fragment two men are shown, probably 
also slingers, stooping down to pick up stones. Note that in the main frag­
ment the slingers appear to be acting in conjunction with the archers in 
front of the infantrymen armed with shields and spears and that there are no 
missile troops positioned on the walls of the city, only alarmed women. The 
archers and slingers, like their Locrian counterparts in the Iliad, have no 
helmets, shields or spears but are depicted naked - they carry no secondary 
weapons, only their slings and bows; their nakedness has led Snodgrass to 
suppose that the archers and slingers were barbarian auxiliaries but his 
reasons for this supposition are unclear.55 it has been suggested, since the 
archers are kneeling or crouching and there are stones strewn around the 
ground beside the warriors, that their enemies possessed a force of slingers.54
There are no surviving depictions of slingers from the Dark Age but we 
possess two later depictions dating to the sixth century B.C. which may be
used for comparison to the slingers on the Siege Rhyton. A slinger wearing
29
no armour is depicted on an Early Corinthian alabastron, while on a Spartan 
moulded pithos fragment a slinger, wearing helmet, leopard's skin and sword 
over his shoulder, is shown operating behind an infantrymanP on both these 
Archaic vases the slingers are depicted operating singly and we have no
Archaic portayals of slingers acting as a coherent group such as we found on
the Mycenaean Siege Rhyton.
We must also examine Assyrian reliefs in which slingers are portrayed, 
to see if their use bears any similarity to that of the Locrians in the Iliad. 
In the reliefs from the palace of Sennacherib (704 - 681 B.C.) at Nineveh of 
the attack of the Judaean city of Lachish, a force of Assyrian slingers, in 
well ordered ranks, are depicted operating from behind a body of archers who 
in turn are positioned behind a force of more conventionally armed infantrymen 
The archers and slingers act together as a combined force of missile-troops 
and direct their concentrated fire over the heads of their own infantrymen 
at the enemy. They are presumably positioned behind the archers because 
their sling-shots could carry a greater distance than the arrows shot from
composite bows.67 The mode of employment of the Assyrian archers and slingers
is strikingly similar to that of the Locrians and it seems very possible that 
Homer had some knowledge of Assyrian tactics (Assyrian slingers are also 
depicted attacking and defending city walls) . 68 Only the equipment of the 
Assyrian slingers is different from that of the Locrians - as well as having 
the sling, they also possess helmets, cuirasses and swords.
Thus the pictorial evidence of the Siege Rhyton would suggest that 
forces of lightly-equipped siingers ^were present in battles of the Mycenaean 
Period and that they were used, along with archers, as skirmishers. It is, 
however,only in Assyrian reliefs that we find massed forces of slingers.and 
archers operating over the heads of infantrymen and it therefore seems very 
possible that Homer was influenced by some knowledge of Assyrian tactics in 
his description of the fighting mode of the Locrian contingent (although
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admittedly, as noted previously,,the Assyrian reliefs had a far larger 
surface area on which massed bodies of troops could be portayed than most 
Early Greek works of art).
3 The Laoi in the Iliad
In the Iliad we find that heroes of both sides were normally armed
with sword and either one or two spears, which could be used for both
thrusting and throwing, and, for protection, were equipped with plated
cuirass, bronze helmet, greaves and shield.^ The heroes fought in highly
stylized and unrealistic battles in which one single hero could turn the
great mass of his opponents to flight;^0 Jasper Griffin comments: "All
attention is focused on the clash of heroes, and everything which could blur
or detract from their encounter is as far as possible stylized away. All
this is, in a sense, unrealistic, and that effect is intensified by the way
71in which the heroes are presented as superhuman". With the exception of 
the organized forces of Locrian archers and slingers, we learn next to 
nothing about the masses (laoi), whom we might suppose at this early period 
to have been armed as 1ight-skirmishers,on both the Achaean and Trojan sides.
We are given next to no information as to how the 'laoi* were armed and 
equipped. In relation to this question,it would be worthwhile for us here 
to examine the passages in which heroes are armed and equipped unconvention­
ally: in r  15f, Paris is described as advancing in front of the other Trojans
armed with bow, sword and two spears and clad in a panther's skin: 
o\ ^ o T t  err c*.
T V u x A v  yu.lv v ^ d o ^
r r o ^ o A l r i V  J i /A c n ^ v  k.«<. l< o ^ T rd X  <*
OCVJT O SoZpt. c>OUJ k f e k o p o  6 y U . fe V «  ^ c A k C i )
TT<*>>XujV ... ( r  15 - 19).
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Odysseus in K260 - 265 is armed for a night scouting expedition with 
a bow and sword and wears a leather skull-cap reinforced with boars' tusks:
In K333 - 336 the Trojan Dolon, on a similar task, is armed with bow 
and throwing-spear and wears a wolf pelt about him and a cap of marten's hide:
Although Homer does not attempt to describe the equipment of the masses 
with whom he is largely uninterested, could the wild animal skins of Paris 
and Dolon (P17; K334) and the hide caps of Odysseus and Dolon (K261 f ; K335) 
and the bow (P 17; K260 (quiver here); K333), sword (P18; K261) and javelin 
( P 18 (note a pair); K335) reflect the dress and arms of light-armed 
skirmishers? They most certainly are very different from the normal heroic 
weapons and equipment - as we have noted, the hero usually wears a bronze 
helmet, plated cuirass and bronze greaves and most often uses his spear as 
his primary weapon. We must bear in mind the roles of Paris, Odysseus and 
Dolon when they are equipped thus: Paris is skirmishing,or advancing,in front
of the other Trojan troops ( n y > < y ? T  16) and Odysseus and Dolon 
are both engaging in a night scouting expedition in which speed of foot and 
silence were vital. As we see on the Siege Rhyton and find later in Tyrtaeus 
and Thucydides, it was an accustomed role of light-armed troops to operate in 
front of their more conventionally armed soldiers and, as we find in the
L VO V
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Classical historians, to take part in night expeditions and to scout out 
positions - could the three heroes have equipped themselves with the dress 
and arms of the skirmishers from among the laoi' for their special r o l e s ? ^  
Paris in front of his own troops was in a vulnerable position and Odysseus 
and Dolon, who were both going to approach enemy positions in the dark, were 
in danger also and it must have been vital for them to be able to run away 
quickly if attacked by superior numbers; heavy bronze arms and armour 
would have severely hampered them in this and it would have been most 
expedient for them to adopt the dress and arms of light-armed skirmishers.
On the Francois vase and on the interior of a Black-figure kylix in the 
British Museum we find javelin-throwers, and on an Archaic pithos fragment 
a slinger, clad in animal skins and,in the case of the javelin-throwers on 
the Francois vase,also wearing leather s k u l l - c a p s . ^  interestingly,
Pausanias describes the dress of some'psiloi' on the side of the Messenians 
in their wars against Sparta: "Not all of the light-armed troops had a
breastplate or shield but those who lacked them were protected with the 
skins of goats and sheep; some of them, particularly the Arcadian mountain- 
dwellers, had the skins of wild beasts, wolves and bears" (IV.11.2f) . '7"4 It 
would seem,then,very possible that the dress and equipment of Paris, Odysseus 
and Dolon in these three passages reflects that of the light-armed skirmish­
ers from among the masses.
Best's study of Thracian dress and equipment in the Iliad is very 
interesting and it may well be that Euripides, who projected in the Rhesus 
fifth century types of Thracian troops,including peltasts and akontistai* 
into the distant past, was closer to the truth than he imagined/ 5 Best
tries to show that the Thracian peltast of Classical times was a relict from
the Prehistoric Period which Homer described,by his comparison between the 
arms and dress of Thracian peltasts on sixth and fifth century vase-paintings 
and the Thracian troops in the Iliad. Although the fighting methods of the
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Thracian troops in the Iliad do not differ much from those of other peoples -
we are told that chariots were popular among the Thracians;7®the Paionians
used long thrusting-spears as well as bows^ the similarity between Homer's
description of the dress worn by certain heroes and the clothing of the
Thracian peltasts on Attic vases is striking. The Thracian alopekis, as
Best points out, is very like the skull-cap of oxhide or marten mentioned by
Homer/® just like the Thracian peltasts,the Homeric heroes wore a cloak over
the chiton and it was made of a woollen material and folded in two and
79fastened with a brooch - Best notes that on vase-paintings the Thracian 
zeira is often clearly folded in two and fastened together with a brooch at 
the neck.®0 He further supposes that 1 X o<. 1 in Homer represents
a type of shield and that the epic formula ' ^ u k u k X o o ^
\ o£l«s-v^ lc>c -t<l TTTt^oevTo< in Homer refers to a wing-shaped shield like 
the p el teP There is in fact archaeological proof that such a shield was used 
in the Late Mycenaean Period: the marching infantrymen on the Warrior Vase
from Mycenae are shown carrying this type of shield which is believed by 
several historians to be related to the Thracian pelte of the Classical 
Period. ®2 Furthermore,the <j}/<5yc*voV © p ^ t k c o v  used by the Paionian 
Asteropaeus reminds one of the machaira used by the Thracian peltasts in 
Classical tim esP he also uses two throwing-spears when he fights with 
Achilles - this too reflects Classical practice as Thracian peltasts are 
shown on several vases holding two javelins®4 However, Best's suggestions 
about the presence of troops dressed and possibly armed exactly like the 
Thracian peltasts of the Classical Period in the Iliad, although attractive, 
must remain hypothetical.
Archaeological evidence may throw new light on the existence of javelin­
throwers in the Geometric Period: from about 900 B.C. onwards we find that
the practice of including two or three spearheads with a burial became common
85in Greece and on the island of Crete; in many cases no secondary weapons,
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such as swords or knives, were found. The critical question is whether 
these multiple spearheads represent throwing- or thrusting-spears.86 The 
smaller heads, such as those found in certain Mycenaean tombs and in two 
later tombs at Athens (Agora, grave XXVII - Late Proto-geometric; Dipylon 
grave - Late Geometric), are very likely to have come from javelins. ^  
Snodgrass hypothesises that larger spearheads which have a socket which is 
long in proportion to the size of the head may also have been used as 
javelins.® In the majority of cases listed in my note 86 we find one small 
head occurring along with a larger head - it seems most likely that the small 
head belonged to a javelin which the warrior threw when at a distance from 
the enemy and the large head to a thrusting-spear which he used for close 
combat. ®
In the Iliad we frequently hear of spears being thrown and warriors 
carrying a pair of spears - it is very likely that these (or at least one 
of them, if a pair is indicated) are to be identified as javelins. In 
Late Geometric vase-painting also, the warrior holding two spears is a
Qf)
common recurrent motif, in these Geometric scenes we also find figures 
wounded by spears, although no enemy is standing near them, and men holding 
spears at such an angle that they must be about to throw them. 91 Thus it 
would seem extremely likely from weapon finds and depictions on Late Geom­
etric pottery that the javelin was used in battle during the Geometric Period 
and possibly in Mycenaean times also.92 We may furthermore hypothesise that 
some of the spears thrown by heroes in the Iliad were javelins which were 
fitted with either small heads or fairly large heads with proportionally 
long sockets.
Is any opinion expressed about the masses in the Iliad? There are two 
passages in which heroes express their feelings about the'laoi'. In B198 - 
204, when Agamemnon comes upon a man of the rank and file running to the ships, 
he strikes him with his sceptre and scorns him as unwarlike and weak and
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counting for nothing in war or in the council:
Ov \ 0 (0  ErjyACL' &(v^y30C cScl j^O O U W TC * 6-VJ |30C ^
T o v  G " k . v ^ T T - r £ - \  C& C5-o( <r k  feV o y j i o k \ ^  d 'o (6 lc £  T £  | J . 6 G lo
^o(cya.o\/c  ^ ciT^feyUec^ ^ (fO  k o a  c<X\uoV yu.u6>ov <* k o o t ,
ol d'eo <j?ey3TepoL e c ^ c > (5*o X cxTTToXeyj.0^ kod tx v < * \k c ^ ,
V \ / 1 /'/*v V ■> > \ n \ ^O U T t TFOT ev TToXejUuJ e.VCX^'-cy-UOj OUT €.VC p o u  A ^ .
ou ^.£V tt<*vtgl<> ^  cxtfkXe u<5 o^ o,ev i v O ^ ’ A ^ © ^ o c .
00 K ocyc*0ov TTo\u kOL^DoCV'- <y *
In A225 - 228,Achilles taunts Agamemnon that he does not possess the 
nerve to arm himself for normal battle along with the masses or to take part 
in an ambush with the captains of the Greeks - this piece would seem to 
imply that only the officers were regarded as having enough courage to dare
i i
to take part in an ambush, although the laoi could be used in regular combat:
O L V O ^ o < p > £ ^ } k o v o ^  O ^ A y ^ o tT 1 c y ^ u j ' / ,  k p o c ^ L ^ v  cl5 L\o< 0 ( 0 ,
O O T G . T T O T ’  i,<y T T C CXyOCv \oc u3 0  u j p  v-j ^  r j V ^ C
OuTfe Xcs^ov/cb* I t V o ((. ( fo v  oCyO l6 T»yfc-^6t-v/ Ay^cXCuJV
TfcTV ^kcX ^  ©o/uu> ‘ TO St "COL k'Xys Gl <F fcTc^ c. €.lvoCL .
Thus it would appear that, with the exception of some specialist light­
armed troops such as the Locrians, Homer tends to depreciate the military
value of the troops of the masses.
In conclusion to the Homeric Poems.,we may say that Homer refers
frequently to archers but only once to a corps of slingers. The potential
of the bow in the Iliad, and to a lesser extent in the Odyssey, is stressed 
by the penetrative power of the arrow and by the number of casualties caused 
by the bow. The bow was used on many occasions in the Iliad both by certain 
nobles and by the masses (laoi), a section of whom represented organized 
groups of archers (e.g. the Locrians, Paionians and followers of Philoctetes), 
Only once does Homer make clear how he thought that the archers and slingers
from among Min masses were used in a normal battle: he describes the
organized corps of Locrian archers and slingers as being positioned behind 
the conventional infantry and firing their missiles over the heads of these 
troops; this mode of combat is portrayed as being very effective because 
the Locrians are described as breaking up the ranks of the Trojans with 
their fire. From Iliad X l 94 - 8_,we can infer the presence of archers 
positioned on the walls of Troy. The portrayal of the aristocratic archers 
is very different from that of the Locrians - they do not operate from behind 
their own infantrymen but act on their own or with single infantrymen, who 
protect them with their shields, and snipe, often at very close range, at 
specific targets.
We learn next to nothing about the arms, equipment and organization of 
the masses, whom at this early period we might suppose to have been armed as
t i
skirmishers. We can, however, detect a feeling in the Iliad that the laoi, 
as with the archers, were regarded by some of the heroes as cowardly and of 
little military value. Although it is impossible to date with certainty 
the various features of combat in the Iliad, the Locrian passage (N712 - 722) 
and the passage in which Telamonian Aias is described as operating with the 
archer Teucer ( €> 266 - 272), may show some knowledge of late eighth century 
Assyrian modes of combat and the references to the heroes using a pair of 
throwing-spears may be a Dark Age element, although this is far from certain.
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Appendix 1: The Archaeological Evidence for the Use of the Bow from the
Shaft-grave Period to the Late Geometric Period
1 Archery in the Mycenaean World
i. The Shaft-grave Period (16th century B.C.): Before the 16th century
B.C.^the Egyptians, Anatolians and Assyrians had begun to develop a composite 
94type of bow; this bow consisted of three materials: (1) a wooden stave.
(2) strips of horn which were fitted to the inner face (or 'belly') of the 
wooden stave Q) sinews which were moulded to the outer face (or 'back') 
of the wooden staved Such a bow had the potential to fire an arrow with 
much greater velocity than a bow consisting of a single stave of wood 
(a 'self'-bow) or of two or more staves of similar materials (a 'compound' 
bow). No Ancient Greek bow fragments have survived but from the few rep­
resentations of bows in Mycenaean art dating to the Shaft-grave Period we 
can be fairly sure that the Mycenaeans of this period used the self-bow made
from a single stave of wood. 90 An archer on the Lion Hunt Dagger from Shaft-
97grave IV is represented shooting horizontally with a self-bow; the archer 
depicted on a gold ring from Shaft-grave IV shoots what appears to be a self­
bow .98 The archers on the silver Siege Rhyton, yet again from Shaft-grave IV, 
also appear to have been equipped with the simple self-bow. 98
On Crete, representations of the self-bow with an inward curve at the
100
handle have been found dating to the Middle Minoan Period, but by MMIII 
(c.1700 - 1500 B.C.) the self-bow is apparently superseded by a single-curved 
composite type with reflexed tips, which is first portrayed on the disk of 
Phaistus;101but note that what appears to be a composite bow (only part of 
the bow is visible) is depicted on a Late Minoan clay sealing.102 The 
Cretans may have learned about the composite bow from immigrants or traders 
from North Africa and Anatolia. Note Snodgrass hypothesis that the Middle 
Minoan bows which have double curves but no reflexed tips are not composite 
but self-bows.
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Finds of arrowheads in interments also testify to the use of the bow
in the Shaft-grave Period. Many arrowheads of flint, obsidian and bronze
were found in the Shaft-graves, especially graves IV and V, and in one of
them was found an 'arrow-shaft-polisher'Snodgrass supposes that the
large number of arrowheads found and the possible importation of the flint
arrowheads from Egypt indicates "an interest in archery perhaps too intensive
to be explained in terms of sport or food-gathering" - on the Siege Rhyton
105the bow is certainly used for war.
ii. The Palace Period (c.1450 - 1350 B.C.): Finds of flint, obsidian and
bronze arrowheads dating to the Palace Period are fairly numerous and it 
would appear that archery in this period was flourishing.100 a startling dis­
covery relating to the use of the bow in Crete at this period was made in a 
palace out-building at Knossos: a group of clay sealings with arrow-ideograms,
which had been used to secure chests full of bronze arrowheads, was found with 
a broken tablet which, if correctly deciphered, alone recorded over eight and 
a half thousand arrowheads. A large number of these arrowheads were found 
nearby in two large deposits and Evans hypothesised that this was the armoury 
of the palace.107 The fact that such a large number of arrowheads were care­
fully sealed in chests and recorded on clay tablets would suggest that they
1 flQ
were for public use, presumably for warfare rather than hunting. Other 
tablets were excavated from 'The Armoury' which had inscribed on them a pair 
of horns of the Cretan wild goat; the outer flexible sheath of keratin, which 
encloses the central core of the horn, was used to make the inner face ('belly') 
of a composite bow - Pandarus' bow in the Iliad is made from a wild goat's 
horns(A  105), Odysseus' bow in the Odyssey, is made of horn (cj? 395) and in a 
Ugarit text Aqhat promises to supply Anat with the necessary materials for 
making a composite bow and specifically mentions horns from wild goats. 109 
Do these tablets then record composite bows or the raw materials used in 
the»r manufacture? Note that we found probable representations of the 
composite bow in Crete in the Late Middle Minoan Period (MMI11).110
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We have very few representations of bows which date to the Late Minoan
Period and only one of these is large enough for us to examine the bow:
this bow is portrayed in the hands of an archer on a LMII (1450 - 1400 B.C.)
fragment of a steatite vase from Knossos.^ The bow appears to have been of
the self-type, although it is hard to be certain since only the lower half
is preserved. It seems, as Lorimer notes, that the archer is taking part in
some combat as he disembarks from his boat; he shoots high, possibly aiming
at a defender on a city wall. Lorimer argues from the archer's dress and
beard that he is not a Minoan but a Mycenaean and thus this depiction does
not invalidate the hypothesis that the composite bow was used in Crete from
113the Late Middle Minoan Period. An archer is also shown on a signet ring from 
Cydonia which dates to the Palace Period, but his bow is so small that one 
cannot be sure if the artist was trying to depict a real bow. 114
The Late Mycenaean Period (13th century B.C. to around the middle of the 
12th century B.C.): Archaeological evidence for archery in the Late Mycenaean
Period is extremely limited. Only one crude depiction of an archer has, as 
far as I know, survived from this period: the archer is shown in a line of
marching soldiers on a fragment of a vase of the late thirteenth century B.C. 
from Iolkos in Thessaly. 115 The bow which the archer holds is crudely painted, 
but appears to have been of the self-type. There is evidence that the 
Mycenaeans in this period adopted a new type of arrowhead with a large blade 
and thick tang < a few examples of arrowheads of similar shape, but with a 
hollow socket instead of a tang, have been found) —  Snodgrass thinks that the 
Mycenaeans copied this head from a type from Asia Minor. ° However, the simpler 
form of flat arrowhead made of bronze is still the most commonly found variety.
It was in the Late Mycenaean Period;in around 1250 B.C., that the city 
identified as Troy Vila,on the mound of Hissarlik, which has been associated 
by archaeologists with Homeric Troy, fel 1J^ Among some fallen stones just
west of the main street Carl Blegen found a small broad arrowhead of barbed
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type, with its sides curving in a convex line from point to tips of barbs.
The arrowhead stem is solid and circular in section and, as Blegan suggests, 
probably fitted into a socket hollowed out in the arrow-shaft.1^  A comparable 
arrowhead, attributed to Late Helladic 111B, has been found at Nestor's 
Palace in Western Messenia and this leads Blegen to hypothesise: "One may
wonder if the arrowhead found in street 710 - a point of a type known in the 
contemporary Mycenaean world on the Greek mainland - was not perhaps a missile 
discharged by an invading Achaean". ^
2 Archery in the Dark Age (From the Middle of the 12th Century B.C. to
circa 700 B.C. ) : 120
There is little evidence for archery in the Greek world from the beginn­
ing of the Dark Age to the end of the Middle Geometric period. I have found 
only one depiction of archers dating to this period - this is on an early 
tenth century hydria from LefkandiJ^ The two archers on the hydria are shown 
shooting at each other from close range; the depictions of the bows are quite 
crude and it is impossible to tell of what type they are. Only a fairly small 
number of arrowheads have been excavated which probably date to this period.
The findspots of these arrowheads are widely geographically diffused: the
Peloponnese, mainland Greece, Northern Greece and certain islands in the 
Aegean. Only on Crete, however, do we have archaeological evidence which 
would suggest that archery continued throughout the Dark Age.
On mainland Greece arrowheads dating to this early period have been 
found at Athens:
i. A Protogeometric barbed and tanged arrowhead, which has no boss,
122was excavated in the Kerameikos.
ii. A single Early Geometric arrowhead, which was similar to one found 
at Corinth, was excavated in the Agora.
They have also been found on two sides in the North-East Peloponnese, 
namely Corinth and Tiryns:
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i. An iron arrowhead was found under the western shops of the later
agora at Corinth in an early 9th century burial. An iron spearhead and
knife were found along with it. The arrowhead is very similar to the one
iPdfound in the Agora at Athens.
ii. Two obsidian arrowheads have been excavated from a grave of about 
900 B.C. at Tiryns.1^
In Northern Greece at Verghina a group of four arrowheads of the barbed 
and tanged type, without a boss, were found in the tumulus cemetry. These
1 nc
heads may date back as far as the early 10th century. In an outlying part
of Ialysos on Rhodes an iron arrowhead was found with a warrior's cremation
urn which dates to the 9th century B.C.; along with the arrowhead were
127also found a spearhead and sword. On Crete two Protogeometric arrowheads
have been found at Karphi and Kofina (Panagia). Three bronze heads found
at Karphi are of 'boss-and-barb' type and were found in levels dating to no
128later than 900 B.C. Iron arrowheads of a cruder form than those from 
Karphi have been found at Kofina in an eary context. 139
Arrowheads which can be dated with some degree of certainty to the
Middle and Late Geometric Periods have been found at Argos, Asine, Pherai
in Thessaly and also on Crete at the sites of Fortetsa, Kavousi, Dreros and
Arkades. An iron head from Argos comes from a grave which dates to about
130720 B.C. and it is leaf-shaped and without a tang. A spurred and socketed
i i
bronze head, which is very like the Scythian type of head, was found at Asine 
and it is almost certainly of Middle or Late Geometric date. 131 It is imposs­
ible to say if this head was used by a forerunner of the Scythian mercenary 
archers. 132 Six iron arrowheads were found in a grave at Pherai which dates 
to the Late Geometric Period.133
The heads from Fortetsa and Arkades, which are mostly of iron, are
134barbed and have a long tang and no boss; Snodgrass hypothesises that
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this is the type of barbed head depicted in Attic Geometric A r t . ^  Late 
Geometric heads of the 'boss-and-barb' type have also been found at Kavousi, 
Dreros and Arkades.
Arrowheads which have not been securely dated but which almost certainly 
belong to the Geometric Period have been found on Crete at the Idaean Cave, 
the Dictaean Cave and Prinias and some are housed in the Giomalakis Collection^ 
A mould for making arrowheads of the 'boss-and-barb' type has been found in
1QQ
a Geometric level at Samos.
From about 750 B.C. illustrations of archers begin to occur on Attic 
139Late Geometric vases. The archers on these vases appear to hold three 
different types of bow; 140
1 The 'self'-type.
2 The single-curved'composite type with reflexed tips.
3 The double-curved bow.
The bow appears most often in the double-curved form and Snodgrass
hypothesises that although this type bears a marked resemblance to the
Scythian composite bow,it is more likely to have been a simple self-bow
141with an inward curve half-way down the bow stave. ' Note that in many cases 
the portrayal of the bow is too crude for us to come to any definite con­
clusion as to its construction and type.
Archers are found in Geometric portrayals of both land battles and sea­
borne landings,143 From the recurrent motif of the beached ship,it would seem 
that sea-borne raids, in which archers took part, were fairly common in the 
Geometric Period.143 The archers are frequently depicted carrying a sword at 
waist level - this would only have been used if the archer was forced into 
close combat.
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Uncatalogued fragments of Geometric Ware (from the second half of the 
8th century B.C.) in the National Museum in Athens, from Argive workshops, 
show archers carrying bows of both the self- and double-curved types. An 
archer is also depicted on the Archer Seal from Argos; this stone seal dates 
to before 700 B.C.^ One of the decorated sides of the seal portrays a mythical 
scene in which an archer holding what appears to be a simple self-bow aims at 
a centaur who raises a branch in either hand. Thus archers were depicted 
by Attic and Argive artists in the Late Geometric Period, but unfortunately 
we have no depictions of archers from other parts of Greece dating to this 
period.
In conclusion,I would say that few arrowheads dating to the Dark Age 
have been found when compared to the large number of Mycenaean heads which 
have been excavated; Snodgrass hypothesises that this may be because arrow­
heads were not usually included in graves, which form our primary source of 
information J 4^ The fact that arrowheads have been found at Crete dating from 
throughout the Dark Age would suggest that archery continued in Crete through­
out this period.146With the exception of the tenth century hydria from Lefkandi, 
we have no depictions of archers in the Dark Age until Attic and Argive 
artists begin to depict them from the middle of the 8th century B.C. In 
Attic Late Geometric vase-painting,archers are shown taking part in both 
ordinary land battles and in combat around beached ships.
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Appendix 2 : The Type of Bow in the Homeric Poems.
In the Homeric poems only the bow of Pandarus in the Iliad (Iliad 
A  105 - 126) and the bow of Odysseus in the Odyssey (Odyssey 4> , passim) 
are described in any detai1.147The two bows came from different regions - 
Pandarus was a Lycian of Asia Minor and his bow almost certainly was 
produced in this region; the bow of Odysseus was given to him by Iphitus, 
king of Oechalia, which was probably located in Thessaly (0d.(j)31 - 33) - 
we are not told how Iphitus came to be in possession of the bow. Thus we 
know that the bow of Pandarus was almost certainly of Western Asiatic origin 
and that the bow of Odysseus had been derived from a mainland Greek source,, 
although we cannot be sure where the bow was actually manufactured.
Let us firstly consider what Homer says about the bow of Pandarus; it 
was of great size ( yxeyo<. nro^ov ,A124) and was manufactured from the 
horns of a wild goat ( o^yoc, j xypLoo, 105 - 106) which
were sixteen palm-breadths in length ( ; A  109 i.e.
about four feet); we furthermore learn that these horns had been put to­
gether, polished and fitted with, gilded tips by a skilled craftsman in horn 
(A110 - 111) and that the bow was kept in a bow-case (A105).1^ T h e  bow 
string was made of ox-sinews ( £>oeccx ? A  122) and when drawn
the bow almost assumed the shape of a circle ( -ro^ov
C T 6LV€V  ^ A  124).
Now let us examine the information Homer gives us about the bow of 
Odysseus in the twenty-first book of the Odyssey: it is also of large size
( / ^ r 04 T ^ o v j ^ 7 4 )  and was kept in a bow-case ( } <p 53-54).
Like the bow of Pandarus the only material mentioned in connection with its 
construction is horn ( k&fcx } (j> 395). The bow itself is described as 
TTcx\Cv~rovo<y  ^ and Ko^.ttu\o< (back-bent and curved) and
well-polished (eo^oo\/ ) .149 /\s the suitors found out, the bow was very
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difficult to string - even when Antinous and Eurymachus had the bow anointed 
with fat and heated it to make it supple they were unable to string it.15()
The bows of both Pandarus and Odysseus are said to have been constructed 
out of horn. The construction of Pandarus1 bow is described in much greater 
detail than that of Odysseus by Homer in Iliad A. 105 - 113 - it was made 
from the horns of a single wild goat which were each about four feet in 
length: these horns were polished, joined together base-to-base, almost
certainly by means of a centre piece, and fitted with golden tips. Such 
a bow manufactured soley out of horn would have been of little use since the 
horns of the Pasang, the Persian wild goat which is kept in Western Asia 
Minor, are almost unbendable - after all, if they were flexible, they would 
be of no use to the goat, who needed them to attack an adversary or to defend
himself
It is also unlikely that staves of sufficient thickness and width could 
have been cut from the marginal ridges of the horns from a single goat to 
make a bow - the weapon would have been extremely weak. In India and Java 
bows have been made completely of staves of horn - but these have been cut 
from the huge horns of buffaloes, from which staves of far greater stoutness 
can be cut than can be obtained from any type of goat horn; these bows are 
relatively powerless and quite easy to string.
Bows made of staves of bone reinforced with sinews on the inner surface 
have been manufactured in several a r e a s t h e s e  bows are more effective than 
bows made solel^out of horn because, when they are drawn, the elasticity of 
the sinew-backing gives a strong rebound which increases the potential velocity 
with which they can propel an arrow.
By introducing a central wooden stave with strips of horn fitted to its 
inner face and sinews moulded to its outer face, the Egyptians, Anatolians 
and Assyrians developed a true composite bow which was much more effective 
than the bow made of horn 'backed' with sinews. Balfour notes that with
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Manchu, Chinese, Korean, Central Asiatic and Turkish bows, although the
sinew-'backing' is covered with a protective material^the horn 'belly'
154remains exposed and is quite conspicuous; we must remember that Homer was 
a poet and probably had little or no knowledge of the complex nature of a 
composite bow - had Homer seen a composite bow on which only the shining horn 
was visible since the sinews and wooden stave were covered by some protective 
material such as leather and did he then presume that the whole bow was made 
of bone? Vividness of expression must have concerned Homer more than 
accuracy in detail. ^
There are other details in the Homeric Poems which lead one to believe
that the bows of Pandarus and Odysseus were of the composite type. Although
the adjectives tt^ i'v t o v q ^ j <*yk6\©<. and »co^Tr6\e< could be
applied to a simple self-bow as well as to a bow of the composite type, a
bow of simple structure would break under the strain if drawn almost into a
circular shape ( k 'To^ov (L'-recvt ? Iliad A124);
although 1 k<j kVo-Te^e^* is no doubt a poetic exaggeration, only a composite
bow could be bent with the high degree of curvature described in the passage
166which has been quoted above.
The bows of Pandarus and Odysseus were both kept in bow cases (Iliad 
A105; Odyssey 53 - 54). Composite bows need to have their sinew- 
backing and central wooden stave protected from damp and insects as much as 
possible so that a protective case is very necessary. We know from depict­
ions that the Ancient Egyptians kept their composite bows in cases!5  ^ Balfour 
notes that bow-cases are always employed by the Eskimo, American Indian and 
Asiatic peoples who used composite bows but that the bow-case is only rarely 
associated with single-stave bows.15^  Note that Odysseus examined his bow 
carefully to find out if insects had eaten into the horn (Odyssey^ 395); 
Balfour comments: "If one may judge from the remains of ancient composite
bows found in Egypt, the horny portions of their structure were specially
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liable to insect attacks. In some instances the horn has been entirely 
eaten away. The sinews also, though to a lesser extent, were attractive 
to insects, the wood alone seeming to have resisted their attentions".^
The bow of Odysseus was very hard to string without prior knowledge 
of the special mode necessary - Telemachus, Leiodes and Eurymachus all 
strained hard in their attempts to string it but were unable to accomplish 
the task.^ Odysseus obviously had the knack and "just as when a man skilled 
in playing the lyre and in singing, easily stretches a new lyre-string round 
a peg, fastening at either end the twisted sheep-gut, just so, without any 
effort, did Odysseus strung the mighty bow". (Odyssey§> 406 - 409).
Note especially that Odysseus probably strang the bow, and certainly shot the 
arrow, sitting on a chair (Odyssey (J> 420) - there was a special technique 
used in stringing a composite bow and it involved the archer either sitting 
or kneeling down. The simple self-bow could be strung without the same 
exertion and in the standing up position, as we seen Egyptian archers doing 
on a wall painting from Beni-hasan (c . 1900 B.C.).1^
It appears then from the details given about their construction and 
other features, that the bows of Pandarus and Odysseus in the Homeric poems 
were most probably meant to be interpreted as bows of the composite type; 
certainly, as Lorimer points out, there is exaggeration and inaccuracy in 
Homer's description of the bows - but we must bear in mind that Homer was 
a poet and not a technical writer who had to be exact in every detail.1^  If 
we accept that the two bows were of the composite type, let us now examine 
our limited archaeological evidence to try to define the earliest period 
with which our two presumed composite bows can be associated. Note that 
only Odysseus' bow was derived from a mainland Greek source, whilst that of 
Pandarus was almost certainly produced in Asia Minor. From the small 
number of surviving depictions of Mycenaean archers from mainland Greece, 
we find that there is not one single portrayal of the composite bow in the
Shaft-grave Period, the Palace Period or the Late Mycenaean Period -
1 FAall bows are of the simple self-type. Only in Crete by the end of the 
Middle Minoan Period do we find the first Greek depictions of what appear 
to be composite bows. On mainland Greece it is not until the Late Geometric 
Period that we find what may be depictions of single-curved composite bows
Afjfl
with reflexed tips. Was Homer influenced by the type of bow used at the 
end of the eighth century B.C-.or by some knowledge that the Cretans at an 
early date used a bow constructed in part out of horn, in his description of
1fi7the bows of Odysseus and Pandarus? Or was he influenced by a non-Greek
model - the composite bow was used at a very early date by the Egyptians,
16ftAnatolians and Assyrians? All these hypotheses are possible but we simply 
do not have enough evidence to be able to judge which one (or combination of 
several) is correct.
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Appendix 3 : The Type of Arrowhead in the Homeric Poems.
In the Iliad and Odyssey, the arrowheads are regularly described as 
being made of bronze ( and )1P  only the
arrowhead of the Lycian Pandarus was made of iron )J70 Some
heads are described as ~ryp < - Y ^ X L^ - this must mean 'with triple cutting 
edges' or 'with triple barbs'.^1
Firstly, let us examine the material of manufacture: in five out of the
six cases in the Homeric poems,where the material of manufacture is stated,
we are informed that the arrowheads were made of bronze. The vast majority
of Mycenaean arrowheads were made of bronze and these bronze heads have been
found in numbers at the sites of Mycenae, Thebes, Kakovatos, Prosymna (The
Argive Heraeum), Knossos, Asine, Dendra and MalthiJ7^ we are informed that
the arrowhead of the Lycian Pandarus was made of iron - although iron
Mycenaean arrowheads from the Greek mainland are extremely rare (I have only
173come across one example,which has been excavated from the Kerameikos), this
need not be regarded as a late feature as it may represent Anatolian practice:
iron arrowheads which date to the beginning of the Iron Age have been
174excavated from Anatolian sites. Note, however, that a small number of iron 
heads have been found in Dark Age contexts in mainland Greece and on the 
islands of Crete and Rhodes. 175
On several occasions in the Iliad, arrowheads are described as'trig-
i
lochis; three-edged barbed arrowheads,and in fact barbed arrowheads of any 
type,are extremely rare from Near Eastern sites and probably originated in 
Greece, although it has been suggested that they may have been introduced 
to Greece by Scythians or Thracians!7^ The true triangular barbed head is not 
found until the Archaic Period, when it appears on sites such as Perachora, 
Delos, Olympia and Cyrene, but it did have a precedent in the Bronze Age 
three-cornered 'arrow-plates'J77 The bronze arrowhead found by Blegen in the
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Troy Vila stratum,and which he suggested was Achaean,is certainly not of a 
three-edged type.178 In all probability the Trojans and Achaeans used various 
different forms of arrowheads and among these it is possible that there was 
a three-edged type such as that described by Homer.
C H A P T E R  T W O
LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE WORKS OF THE EARLY GREEK 
ELEGIAC AND LYRIC POETS
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1 Archilochus:
Archilochus of Paros is generally regarded as the earliest lyric poet 
and it seems likely that he lived and wrote roughly in the period c.680 -
i
640 B.C. Telesicles, the father of Archilochus, led a colony to Thasos 
and Archilochus also went there as Thasos is frequently mentioned in hisA
surviving fragments (West 89, 91, 92, 93a, 102 - 4).2 Archilochus took 
part in warfare with the neighbouring inhabitants of Thrace (West 5, 42, 92, 
93a), probably over the gold-mines of that region, and he also refers to 
warfare in Euboea (West 3) and fighting in which Naxos apparently took part 
(West 89). Plutarch asserts that he was killed in a battle (De Sera Num. 
Vind. 17).
Lorimer (The Hoplite Phalanx with Special Reference to the Poems of 
Archilochus and Tyrtaeus, BSA 42(1947), pp.114-5), Forrest (Colonization 
and the Rise of Delphi Historia 6 (1957), pp.163-4), Snodgrass (EGAW,p.179) 
and Greenhalgh (EGW,p.90) think that we should probably infer from the spear 
of fragment 2 (West) and the shield of fragment 5 that Archilochus fought 
as a hoplite. John Boardman (Early Euboean Pottery and History BSA 52 
(1957), p.29) and 0. Murray (Early Greece,p.103) are doubtful, rightly I think, 
about this, and suggest that he may have lived in a transitional period when 
soldiers were equipped with only some pieces of the hoplite panoply.
Let us now examine the fragments of Archilochus in which light-armed 
troops or their weapons are referred to. The most important fragment is 
West no.3I4
,/ , \  \  t 1 N / V  / )  ^\  /N \
O u T C K  t t o X X  G n t  t o  w  T o < v o 0 <~><i€. £70*^14
<5"<j)Gv5>oVcyL t €.6t1 ex'/ efov/ocyyi
£y  r r e .^ c i-o c  £ L O /  ^ 6 . T T o \  o  (J T C V o V  £(f6£~TO£<- G-J>
— ' v „ ? / t * (io( OT^ yc<j> K g-lV ol
EG.<s'rro/T&a E u ^ o l ^  \oop c k \ u  f o i-.
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This fragment appears to be saying that few, if any, bows and slings
will be used in a coming conflict by the Euboeans and that the battle will
be fought in close-combat with the sword. The true context of this poem is 
not known: it may simply refer to a conflict which took place in Euboea in
Archilochus' time. In spite of the future tenses, several historians think 
that the poet is looking back and is describing some conflict in the Lelantine 
War, which possibly took place in the last thirty years of the 8th century
B.C.^ Strabo records an agreement between Chalcis and Eretria not to use
missile weapons ( ) jn a war 0ver the Lelantine Plain:
"Now in general,the cities of Chalcis and Eretria were at peace with one 
another, and when differences arose concerning the Lelantine Plain they did 
not completely break off relations with one another so that they waged the 
war in the manner they each wished, but they made an agreement as to the 
conditions under which they were to fight the war. This agreement forbidd­
ing the use of missiles, is recorded on a certain pillar in the Amarynthium" 
(Strabo 10.1.12). It would seem possible;then;that Archilochus and the 
inscription on the pillar in the Amarynthium are both referring to the same 
agreement made in the Lelantine War forbidding the use of missile weapons.6
Why should certain states in Euboea have come to an agreement not to 
use missile-troops? Note that in line 3 of the fragment we are told that 
the Euboeans will battle it out with the sword (on the apparent inconsist­
ency of the ^<-4>eu>v of line 3 and the S o u ^ l kAuto! of line 5, see 
Renehan, The Early Greek Poets: Some Interpretations, HSCP 87 (1983) pp.1 - 
2 - he concludes: " in Archilochus is not a general epic
epithet but a specific allusion to the Homeric account of the Abantes".); 
as Boardman points out (EEPH, p.29), the use of the sword, for which the 
Euboeans were famed, may indicate heroic and aristocratic combat: were
archers and slingers not used by the Euboean 'despotai' because they were 
regarded as men of low social and military standing?"7
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P.A.L. Greenhalgh (EGW, pp.90 - 93) offers another interpretation of
i i
this agreement: he suggests that the spear-famed Lords of Euboea were in
fact the aristocratic Eretrian Hippeis and Chalcidian Hippobetae - these
'cavalrymen' dominated their states militarily (Aristotle, Politics, 1289
b 39; Plutarch, Moralia, 760 - 1). He argues that if the Hippeis and
Hippobatae used their horses for warfare, either for the charge or as a
means of conveyance, they would have been the chief sufferers from a missile
barrage and it was to save these prized animals of war from being maimed 
• *
that the telebola were banned. As we shall see in Thucydides' history, 
cavalry could be very vulnerable to large forces of archers and slingers.® 
Unfortunately, Archilochus never mentions cavalry once in any of his 
surviving fragments and this makes Greenhalgh's suggestion, as he himself 
admits, "little more than hypothetical".9 Also, is it really plausible that 
if one side thought they could gain the upper hand in a battle by using miss- 
ile-troops, they would not do so because of an agreement? - we must bear in 
mind the fact that warfare was not a game and that the lands of a city and
the lives of its inhabitants were at stake.
We have no archaeological evidence, in the form of arrowheads, sling­
shots or depictions of archers or slingers, from Euboea which might be used
» * i i
to prove that the Euboeans used toxotai or sphendonetai. A small number of
sling-shots and arrowheads dating to the Dark Age have, however, been found
in other areas of Greece and archers are depicted in Attic Late Geometric
10vase-paintings. IU Archers are also depicted on vases of the seventh century,
such as on a Middle Protocorinthian aryballos from Lechaion and on a Proto-
11Corinthian aryballos from Perachora. We also possess a seventh century
12depiction of a slinger on an Early Corinthian alabastron. Thus we have 
archaeological evidence for the use of the bow and possibly also of the 
sling in the eighthcentury (when the Lelantine War was probably fought) and 
in the seventh century (when we assume that Archilochus was writing).
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There are several other fragments of Archilochus which refer to the 
weapons used by light-armed troops. Fragment 98 (West), found inscribed 
on two stones of Parian marble dating to the first century B.C., describes 
an attack on a city tower (L.9 nu^yo<, ; L.15 nJ^yov/ ; 1.16
[ r e s t o r a t i o n ] ) I n  line 5 there is a reference to brandish­
ing or throwing spears and in line 10 there is a reference to lithoi, which 
were probably thrown from the hands of soldiers positioned on the towers.
In line 19 quivers (pharetrai') are mentioned. In fragment 98 (W), then, 
it would seem that we have references to stone-throwers positioned in the 
towers of a city and also to archers. In two very fragmentary pieces of
Archilochus we have references to a javelin (frag.113 (West), line 7 -'akontis)
14and the sound made by javelins (frag.139 (West), line 6 - 'akonton doupon1). 
Note that John Boardman suggests that the two spears which are carried by 
the warriors on a Late Geometric Eretrian vase (he thinks that the vase was
1C
made in Eretria) were javelins rather than thrusting-spears.
Thus,we have evidence in the fragments of Archilochus that the poet had 
knowledge of a wide range of missile-troops: archers, slingers, javelin-
throwers and stone-throwers.
2 Tyrtaeus:
Tyrtaeus was an elegiac poet of the seventh century B.C. who composed
poetry about the Spartans' wars with the Messenians. He was most probably
a Spartan citizen and may have been a Spartan general. He probably produced
his martial poetry to inspire the Spartan warriors to fight in the Second
Messenian War, which may have started in the 650s, although Pausanias dates
it to the period 685 - 668 B.C., and may have dragged on until nearly the
17end of the seventh century. The general consensus of opinion among histor­
ians is that we should place Tyrtaeus in the middle of the seventh century 
B.C., although some have suggested that he may have been writing his poetry 
towards the end of that century. ^
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Most historians agree that the conventional troops which Tyrtaeus 
described were equipped as hoplites. These Spartan soldiers were equipped 
with spear, sword, helmets with crests, breastplates and large round convex 
shields; no mention is made of g r e a v e s . T h e  fact that there were hoplites 
in Sparta from about the middle of the seventh century is substantiated by 
archaeological evidence. A large early deposit of lead hoplite figurines 
has been excavated from the Artemis Orthia sanctuary and John Boardman in his 
study of the stratum (Lead I) and the pottery in it (Laconian I) comes to the 
conclusion that the pottery, and hence the stratum, should not be dated much 
before 650 B.C?1(an ivory seal, again from the Artemis Orthia sanctuary, 
which depicts three hoplites marching in line and which dates to c.650 B.C., 
has also been found).^ Thus we know for certain that by about 650 B.C. votive 
hoplite figurines were being produced in large numbers at Sparta. The main 
question, however, which has divided historians is not whether Tyrtaeus was 
describing troops equipped with hopla, but whether he is portraying them 
fighting in a primitive unorganized fashion or in phalanx formation. Along 
with Lazenby (The Spartan Army,p.76), Greenhalgh (EGW, p.94), Salmon 
(Political Hoplites? JHS 97 (1977),p.91) and others, I am of the opinion
that Tyrtaeus was describing hoplites operating in phalanx formation rather 
than in a confused melee (however, the Spartans who fought in the First 
Messenian War, c.735 - 715 B.C., were probably not equipped with full hoplite 
armour and probably did not fight in phalanx formation).^ Although Tyrtaeus1 
elegiac poetry is coloured by Homeric vocabulary and idiom, his attitude to 
fighting in battle is very different from that of Homer: Homer's heroes
fight duels for themselves and their own glory and dominate the battle, in 
which the masses are portrayed as taking no effective part. Tyrtaeus, in 
contrast, addresses his warriors as a group (cf. West, 11. 7-14) and exhorts
i i
them as a body to show arete by standing close together in their battle line 
and not fleeing. As Oswyn Murray notes, Tyrtaeus' view of valour is very
different from that of Homer (Early Greece.pp.128 - 131):^ in a Homeric
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battle heroes frequently advance in front of their own line of soldiers and 
each hero challenges an opposing hero to a duel (e.g. Iliad P 19 - 20,
E 627f, Z 119f, N 445f, N 809), but Tyrtaeus repeatedly exhorts the Spartan 
troops to stand firm beside one another (West 10.15: 11.11) and to give
encouragement to the men standing beside them (West 12. 15 - 20). It seems 
very likely,then,that Tyrtaeus was describing hoplites fighting in phalanx 
formation.
Although Tyrtaeus in his poetry concentrates on the heavily-armed 
infantry,he also refers in three of his fragments to light-armed troops and 
to missiles which were presumably used by these troops (West frag.11, lines 
27 - 28 and 35 - 38; frag.19 and lines 19 - 20 and P.Oxy. Vol.47 (1980) 
no.3316, pp.1-6). Firstly,let us consider West frag.11: in this fragment
Tyrtaeus exhorts the 'neoi1, who are equipped with large shields (Is.23-24), 
heavy spears (1.25) and helmets with crests (1.26), to come to grips with 
the enemy and not to fear the barrage of missiles as they approach them:
Missiles (belea 1.28) must have been used against the Spartans by their 
enemies; Tyrtaeus1 exhortation would suggest that a barrage of missiles 
struck fear into the hearts of even heavily-armed troops.
After an exhortation of 25 lines (Is.10-34) addressed to the'neoi', whom 
I assume were probably hoplites arranged in phalanx block, Tyrtaeus exhorts 
the 'gymnetes1, the lightly-armed troops, in four lines:
\ t Jo > u t t ’ cxSvcCboy cxW oOtv
LysoCd'L T e  £  €6-  T  o t  <S C\/ c < ( c o V T C  J o V T ^
"TCK<St TT cxv/QTT \ o l  1<ST c *yA € .V O C (35 - 38)
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This is our first literary reference to light-armed infantry being 
25termed 'gymnetes1. They are also termed 'gymnomachoi1 in another fragment 
which we shall examine shortly.^ There has been some confusion among histor­
ians about the meaning of the above passage and its importance in the context
i i
of understanding what type of formation was used by the neoi - Snodgrass 
comments: "Yet in general spirit the poems, particularly 8 (E. Diehl, 
Anthologia Lyrica Graeca (Teubner text, Leipzig, 1925) no. 8 = West 11), 
leave much to be desired as exhortations to hoplites fighting in the phalanx. 
The presence of light-armed men with javelins and stones is not incompatible 
with hoplite tactics; but when it is clear that the heavy-armed warrior has 
the choice of fighting bravely among the promachoi or else of skulking behind 
out of range of missiles, and that the gymnetes are apparently to take cover 
behind the hoplites1 shields, one may well ask what kind of phalanx this is". 
However, the point of the exhortation seems fairly clear: the hoplites must
not fear to charge on through the shower of missiles fired at them.
Let us now consider how the gymnetes were armed in this fragment: the
Spartan ‘gymnetes' are in turn exhorted to let fly with their smooth javelins 
and big stones. The 1 ^ ' may well simply have
been stones thrown by hand, such as most commentators take them, but we should
bear in mind the possibility, as Greenhalgh suggests, that Tyrtaeus was
referring to stones used as siing-bullets.^ Some stone sling-shots could be 
fairly large, but possibly not large enough to be described as 1 
A moulded pithos fragment, dating to the sixth century B.C., has been found 
at Sparta which depicts a slinger. Only the stone is shown in relief but 
the position of the warrior's hands makes it certain that the sling was 
painted in. The slinger, who is also equipped with a sword and helmet and 
is clad in a leopard's skin, operates from behind a hoplite - this makes Wace 
suppose that the slinger is the squire of the hoplite.^ The stone which the 
slinger uses seems to be larger, if the scale is correct, than later Classical
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lead bullets and seems to have been about the size of a tennis ball - is
this big enough to be termed mega? Javelins, being cheap to manufacture
and easy to use, were a favourite weapon of light-armed troops - it is
probable that the Spartan light-armed helots in the Persian War of 480 - 79
31B.C. were also equipped with javelins. Note that Tyrtaeus in this fragment 
only mentions javelin-throwers and stone-throwers/slingers; contrary to the 
view of Pritchett, Tyrtaeus never mentions archers in any of his fragments.^ 
There is, however, archaeological evidence which would strongly suggest that 
the bow was used from the middle of the seventh century into the sixth 
century B.C. at Sparta. Many early lead figurines of kneeling archers 
(Lead I) have been excavated from the Artemis Orthia Sanctuary.^ The figur­
ines are small, of poor quality, and their execution is sketchy. The archers 
are depicted naked, apart from the crested helmets which they wear, and they 
appear to hold two different types of self-bow, one of which is small, the 
other quite large like the English long-bow. ^  They always take horizontal 
aim with their bows. Archer figurines were commonly found in the early 
Lead I and Lead II deposits, but only rarely in the later Lead III - IV 
deposits. In the sixth century the composite bow appears as the weapon of 
a goddess in lead figurines; there are also lead figurines of Heracles 
carrying his quiver, in the Greek fashion, at shoulder height?^ There is 
further archaeological evidence which would suggest that the bow was used at 
this early period at Sparta in the form of arrowheads which have been 
excavated there and which most probably date to the Archaic Period. The 
pithos fragment, although of a later sixth century date, also shows an archer 
equipped with what appears to be a self-bow, operating from the rear of a 
hoplite.^ It seems strange, given our strong body of archaeological inform­
ation for the use of the bow at Sparta, that Tyrtaeus never mentions archers 
in any of his surviving fragments. Pausanias does,indeed, assert that the 
Spartans used a force of Cretan mercenary archers in the early Messenian Wars,
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but much of his narrative of these wars is of extremely dubious historicity.*^
Let us now consider how the'gymnetes' were used in relation to the more 
heavily-armed troops in fragment 11 (West). Tyrtaeus urges the light- 
infantry to hurl their missiles "crouching here and there under the shield"
( utt1 ei<STr£$o^ <U\\o ©fc.v &\\o<y /TrT i'Ns-<? 0 '/“f (1S. 35-36)
and "standing in close proximity to the soldiers equipped with a full panoply"
( Tottft tt o<vott\o l (S'lv t t\ ^6 ‘£ov t <s t  oij+evo l (1.38). The
first problem is to whom does the shield (aspis) referred to in line 35 
belong. Snodgrass (EGAW,p.182, but cf. AAG,p.67) and Cawkwell (Philip of
V »
Macedon (1978),p.152) suggest that the aspis belonged to a heavily-armed
i I
soldier and that the gymnetes crouched for protection behind the shields of 
their own hoplites. If their own hoplites did fight in a phalanx formation, 
as I have suggested, it seems unlikely that the light-armed troops would have 
operated from behind the shields of the hoplites in the front ranks during 
a close-range phalanx battle - they would have created much confusion in 
their own ranks by getting in the way of the hoplites and would have loosened 
the cohesion of the phalanx block and thus presented a fragmented front to 
the.enemy. It is possible, however, that light-armed troops did crouch 
behind the shields of the hoplites of the front ranks and throw their missiles 
but then withdrew, either to the wings or the rear, when it appeared that the
OQ
phalanx blocks were about to engage. The alternative possibility, suggested 
by Lorimer (The Hoplite Phalanx;p.127) and followed by Pritchett (GSW IV,p.40 
with n.131), is that the 'aspis' may refer to some type of shield which the 
'gymnetes' carried. Pritchett thus thinks that the light-troops crouched 
behind their own shields and translates the phrase *t ©T<s-l TT«von\oitfiv 
n X ^ d - i o v  Lts-rciyu.evoL as "keeping your position near the hoplites"
and takes it to mean that "the light-armed were to be on the flanks or 
behind the hoplites, but not intermingled with them". I would follow Prit­
chett's suggestion that the 'gymnetes'were not intermingled with the hoplites -
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in order to throw a stone or a javelin for any distance, the light-armed 
troops would have needed a run-up and it seems very unlikely that there was 
any room at all for this in a phalanx block - but I think we should bear in
' i
mind the possibility that the gymnetes, as the Scythian archers on Attic
vase-paintings of the later sixth century are sometimes portrayed as doing,
may have operated under the protection of hoplites in front or possibly on
the wings of their own phalanx block. Lazenby's interpretation of lines
35 - 38 seems strained:40he argues that these lines indicate that the light-
r
armed troops could have performed no independent role, but, as Pitchett/\
argues, the phrase ttcxvottX o l ^ lv ttV ^ co v L
may simply mean that the light-armed troops (equipped with their own shields) 
were positioned near the hoplites, possibly on the wings, and could well have 
played their own active role of protecting the flanks of the hoplites.41
In another very fragmentary passage of a poem by Tyrtaeus missiles, used 
presumably by light-armed troops, are referred to (West, frag.19):
1v €.l^ o m ["£Vo i k
' ' (lines 2 - 3 )
CXi urt'o ^  ^a. C.e.y'oc'^ u)\/
^ o u ^ ( i i n e s  19 - 20)
V
Note that there is nothing to support Pitchett1s view (GSW IV, p.38) that'N
archers are referred to in this fragment. In line two we have a reference
i i
to stones which must have been thrown by lithoboloi and the advance of these 
troops seems to be compared to a group of creatures - Pitchett suggests an
4 i /ip
ethnos of wasps. Lines 1 - 2 possibly describe the large numbers of stone- 
throwers (and other light-armed troops?) used in a battle. In lines 19 - 20 
of the same fragment we are told about the clanging noise made by bronze 
helmets when struck by large stones. The stones were probably hurled by 
missile-troops at the heads of the hoplites because a large stone had the
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20
potential to cause even a helmeted warrior to suffer from concussion.
The last piece of Tyrtaeus which we shall examine comes from a papyrus
43from Oxyrhynchus which has been recently published 
11
Y  \  e m  K. UOTT l ^  ©  <«> [yl oL T■'j ^  oCty [.O'-0 A c 1-0 ^  -
T T o W o l  S e ^ o ^ T o'lcTl v  cX K o V T l ^ L
^ u y u V o j-ic & ^ o c  T T j > o 0 e [ o ]
7A ^ y feLU,vu e-t 1  t
I c ^ f c V  xiotpot, T&cp(CJ C
3 <*p yt-
J '\|Tc<'/T C J Tc<(j)^o L
TTc$:v t ] c<^  ^ fc V  K T e V e o u ^ C
-r^^ieuDv o r t o d o o ^
©IT L 6" ui <£> e/j y ov Tc<  ^ c<C
In these elegiacs, which are ascribed to Tyrtaeus,'gymnomachoi' are
described as taking part in what appears to be an imminent campaign - the
only surviving main verb, k T e v e o u ^ Q c  , is in the future tense. This
piece is almost certainly set in the Second Messenian War - in line 21 we
have Spartans mentioned and in line 15 Argives and also possibly Arcadians
$. I? • |oCP‘ 360
(according to Strabo (Tyrt.fr.8 West) and Pausanias (IV.15.7) the Arcadians
as well as the Argives helped the revolting Messenians in the Second Messenian
War). In line 16 there is mention of a wall ( L  ) and in line 19 a
ditch ( TDc())po[_ ) - these clues would lead us to suspect that a battle is
about to take place around a position which is protected by a ditch and a
fortification wall. Pausanias in IV.17.2 and .17.7 describes a battle in
the Second Messenian War in which the Spartans fought with a trench at their
44backs and gained a victory over the Messenians. Tyrtaeus also in other
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fragments described a battle in which the Spartans had a trench at their 
backs so that they could not run away (frag.9 West, and cf. T<*(j>[in 23.5; 
in frag.23 there are also references to a T t ^ o c ,  in lines 3 and 7).4^
It is probable that Tyrtaeus and Pausanias are referring to the same battle - 
Rhianus in his Messeniaca may have preserved a true tradition about this
battle, based probably on the verses of Tyrtaeus.
Let us now consider the light-armed troops who are referred to in this 
papyrus fragment: in line 14 we are informed of light-infantry
p i y o L  ) who are described as running forward ( rrpoe^CoW-rec, ),
I V
presumably in front of their more heavily-armed troops. Gymnomachoi is 
almost certainly the correct reading and this is the first occurrence of the 
word;4^ in the other fragment of Tyrtaeus (frag.11.35 West) where light­
armed troops are mentioned, they are termed 'gymnetes'. We are given no 
clue as to whether t h e ‘gymnomachoi1 belong to the Spartan side or to their 
opponents. The‘gymnomachoil in this fragment were probably armed with the 
smooth javelins ( o T <r<.v ock.ovit^ C. ) of line 12 - note also
that in Tyrtaeus fragment 11.36 - 37 (West) the'gymnetes are urged to throw 
their smooth javelins and large rocks. The evidence of the recently dis­
covered papyrus fragment would suggest that light-armed infantry engaged 
either other enemy light-armed troops or the front ranks of enemy hoplites 
at a distance by running in front of their own hoplites and showering them 
with javelins; being lightly-armed,they probably took no part in the hand- 
to-hand fighting in which the heavily-armed infantry excelled; when it looked 
as if the hoplites were about to come to grips in close combat, the light­
armed troops must either have withdrawn to the flanks or rear of their own 
hoplite formation. They may possibly have continued to operate from the 
flanks, but if they were positioned in the rear it seems unlikely that they 
would have thrown missiles over the heads of their own hoplites because of 
the danger of hitting their own men in the back.47
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In conclusion,we may say that the fact that Tyrtaeus mentioned light­
armed troops twice (termed*gymnetes1, 11.35 West; 'gymnomachoi', P.Oxy. no.
3316, line 14) and their missile weapons in six lines (telea: 11.28 (West); 
lithoi: 19.2; 'chermadioi': 11.36, 19.19; 'akontia: 11.37 and P.Oxy. no.3316, 
line 12) in the few fragments of his poems which we possess, would suggest
that he did not dismiss their effect on warfare as negligible. Unfortun­
ately we have no evidence about the size of Sparta's light-armed infantry
force or as to whether the Spartans, as Snodgrass asserts, were the first
48Greeks to organize such a corps; Lazenby may well be wrong in suggesting 
that it was very small and unimportant since there may be in West 19.2-3 
a reference to the large number of these troops.49
Although we are not specifically informed in any of Tyrtaeus1 fragments
whether the Spartan light-armed troops were true Spartiates or of an inferior
social group, I think that A.J. Toynbee (Some Problems of Greek History
(1969), p.256 n.17) is mistaken in accepting F. Kiechle's view (Lakonien
und Sparta (1963), pp.192 - 3) that the 'gymnetes' were Spartiates: would
full Spartan citizens, who claimed to be equals (homoioi) and who could
afford heavy arms (hopla were valuable and must have reflected a warrior's
status), consent to fight as light-armed troops with missile weapons, which
50the Spartans appear to have despised throughout the Classical Period?
In primitive societies are we really to expect the elite to arm themselves 
lightly, when they have the wealth and position to acquire heavy arms and 
armour? I think not, and would suggest that the light-armed troops in the 
Spartan forces were not true Spartans but men of inferior social groups.
We have limited information about the military role of the light-troops 
used by the Spartans. In fragment 11.38 they are described as standing
near to the hoplites, crouching down behind either their own shields or
those of the hoplites. In the Oxyrhynchus papyrus fragment (3316, line 14)
they are described as running forwards in front of their own ranks. Although
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their role in warfare was almost certainly subordinate to that of the 
hoplites (this may be reflected in the fact that the'neoi'of fragment 11 
are exhorted for 25 lines, whereas the1gymnetes' are exhorted for only 4),
there is no evidence to support the theory of Lazenby that they were of
i 51neglibit military value.
3 Callinus:
Callinus, an elegiac poet of Ephesus, probably composed his poetry 
around the middle of the seventh century B.C., when the Cimmerians and 
Trerians (frags. 4 and 5a West) were attacking Phrygia, Lydia and Ionia 
(Strabo 627,647)?^ Fragment 5(a) (West) must have been composed soon after 
the fall of Sardis, which can be dated by the records of Ashurbanipal to 
652 B.C. Callinus also referred to the destruction of Magnesia on the 
Maeander by the citizens of Ephesus (Athenaeus 525c).
In one of his surviving fragments (West 1) Callinus mentions javelin- 
warfare:
T£0 KoiTaktlf 06.) kot' QujM.OV,
UJ V £ O L  , OIJC 0 C L d £ L  (XUCfX-TTejOL K - T
\ / A / 7 7 / ^ ^
u j de .  6 . 0 t e v T f e ^  ) e v  o o K e c T e
^  6 ,  oC-To<j> rro\&j^KO<j y ' o a c ^ V  C< TTC<<Soi\/ e ^ e i
(1 - 5)
koCL Tl^ 0<TToGv^ (TJCUJV/ o(K,OV'Tl(fc(Tu.
TToWo<k»t k&u ^oorrov' oCK o v t w v '
€.y>^£T©4l t €.V ^ OUCWl yHoy>C< Q<XVC$TOUt
c k W 1 o yU£V o^k; ayu.-n*^  ^ <£>t\o<j tto&£(.v>o<> (14-16)
The exact context of this poem is not known: Snodgrass (AAG,p.64) and
Pritchett (GSWIV,p.35) think that Callinus is exhorting the Ephesians to 
fight against the Cimmerians, but we should bear in mind the suggestion of
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D.A. Campbell (Greek Lyric Poetry) (1967),pp.161-2), based on Strabo
\Lf . \ • L+O
(Callinus 3 West), that he may be exhorting them to combat with the Mag- 
nesians.
Callinus refers twice in this poem to javelin-warfare ("And let each
man hurl a javelin for the last time as he dies" (line 5) / "Often will he
escape the battle-strife and the whizz of javelins" (line 14)). Javelin-
heads have been found at Old Smyrna and Paphos and it seems likely that
' 153these were used by Ionian akontistai. Some commentators take lines 9 - 1 1
to refer to hoplites advancing in phalanx formation, but this inference is
hardly justifiable: Callinus merely mentions soldiers equipped with spears
54and shields advancing. J. Latacz in his discussion of the poem 
(Kampfparanese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der 11ias, bei 
Kallinos und Tyrtaios. Zetemata 66 (1977), pp.229 - 232) thinks that
Callinus refers to hoplites in phalanx formation armed primarily with the 
javelin . However, it seems to me very unlikely that hoplites arrayed in 
phalanx formation would have used the javelin as their main weapon: a
javelin , to be thrown with any effect, needed a run up and it is certain 
that there would have been no room for this in a close-packed phalanx form­
ation; the phalanx would have been a very awkward and unsuitable formation
\ i
for akontistai since it would not have allowed any space for this run or for
the throwing action of the arm. A javelin also would not have been a very
suitable weapon for a true hoplite to use since his full panoply of helmet,
cuirass, greaves and any other weapons with which he may have been equipped,
55would have severely inhibited movement. ‘ It seems most likely to me that 
Callinus was not describing hoplites in phalanx formation armed with javelins, 
but rather men armed with javelins or spears, some of whom were equipped with 
shields, operating in a loose formation. It is possible also that Callinus 
was describing a transitional phase, apparently depicted on a number of 
early vases, in which the Ephesians had adopted some pieces of the hoplite
66
panoply, such as the shield and thrusting-spear, but still fought mainly 
with the javelin in loose formation.55
Mimnermus and the Siege of Smyrna
Mimnermus, an elegiac poet of Colophon and Smyrna, probably composed 
his poetry towards the end of the seventh century B.C.57 Two surviving 
fragments of his works portray warfare (West 13a and 14). Pausanias 
(9.29.4) informs us that his war-poetry described fighting between Smyrna 
and Gyges, king of Lydia - this fighting probably took place at some time 
in the period c.675 - 660 B.C. Fragment 13a describes Lydian troops charg­
ing and covering themselves with their shields, whilst fragment 14 deals 
with a story told to Mimnermus by his elders about a hero who routed bodies 
of Lydian troops on the plain of Hermus; we are further informed that this 
man was armed with a spear ( c()ootcx ) and that he rushed at
the Lydians without fearing the bitter missiles ( t t c Vc^oc ) which
they fired.5  ^ There is a strong epic tinge throughout fragment 14 and we 
cannot tell if the Smyrnian spearman was a hoplite and have no information 
as to whether the Smyrnians fought in phalanx formation. 60
0. Murray and J.M. Cook suggest that fragment 14 was sung as an encour- 
agment to the Smyrnians in their war with the Lydian king Alyattes at the
A
end of the seventh century B.C.51 Herodotus in 1.16 narrates Alyattes1 march
against the Greek cities of Smyrna, Colophon and Clazomenae and against 
R?Miletus in 1.17.1. The excavations on the site of Old Smyrna by the British 
School at Athens in the 1950s provide us with useful archaeological inform­
ation about the archers and other missile-troops who were present on both 
the Lydian and Greek sides at the siege of Smyrna in c.600 B.C.5^ To the 
north-west of the impressive fortification system of Smyrna the archaeolog­
ists found the remains of the massive siege mound constructed by the attack­
ing Lydian troops out of earth, branches of trees, stones, bricks and
timbers from houses which had been demolished. The excavators dug probes 
in and around the siege mound and discovered a quantity of stone sling­
shots and arrowheads of various types, manufactured mainly out of bronze. ^  
The sling-shots were confined to rounded stones and no metal bullets were 
found; it is uncertain whether they were used by the Lydians or the Greek 
defenders and since even the identification of these was a rather subjective 
matter it was not possible to obtain statistics for them.*® The bronze arrow­
heads which occurred both in the mound and the city were of four main types:®
(a) A small hollow-socketed type with three flanges on its blade, referred
to by Nicholls as a 'triangular' head. This type is not of Greek or local
Anatolian origin and was used primarily by the Scythians and Persians. It 
has been found on the battlefields of Marathon and Plataea and on the north 
slope of the Acropolis.®
(b) A small socketed variety with a leaf-shaped blade and a single barb 
projecting from the socket. Nicholls refers to this type as a 'leaf' head.
It is extremely common in Greece and Anatolia.*®
(c) A small socketed type with four flanges on its narrow blade. It is
referred to as a 'diamond' head by Nicholls. Only a very few examples of 
this type were found and its origins and associations are obscure.®
(d) A large and heavy, barbed and tanged, type which Nicholls refers to 
as a 'barbed and tanged' head. Many Classical examples of a similar type 
have been found on Crete and this type of head is depicted on Cretan coins7® 
Seven heads of this type were found in the destruction stratum in the temple 
area. 71
From a fairly small number of probes into the main body of the siege 
mound to the north of the city walls;26 arrowheads of the 'leaf' type were 
found and only a small number of arrowheads of other types. This must 
represent fire directed against the mound by the Greek defenders and would 
suggest that the Ionians were using arrowheads almost entirely of the 'leaf'
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type. Probes into the mound-spill material to the west also produced a 
predominance of arrowheads of the 'leaf' type.
In the probes made inside the city directly opposite the Lydian siege 
mound arrowheads of the Eastern 'triangular' type were found to be predom­
inant, although a smaller number of leaf-shaped heads were also found. The 
latter may have been washed in with the mound spill or could have been Greek 
ricochets which had rebounded off the Lydian mound. It would appear that 
the Lydians were using arrowheads of primarily the 'triangular' type.^
Further inside the city far more heads from thrusting-spears and javelins 
were found than arrowheads. However, in an undisturbed area of about 10m2 
in the temple pylon were found 7 arrowheads of the 'barbed and tanged' 
variety, 12 of the 'leaf' type and 10 of the 'triangular'.^
All these findings would suggest that there was much use of archers
(and probably also slingers, although it is uncertain whether by one or both
sides) by both sides during the building of the siege mound. It has been
suggested that the mound was first started at some distance from the wall
to give the Lydian construction parties some protection against the deadly
fire from the Greek archers?4 Nicholls suggests that in the early stages of
the building of the mound the Lydian archers played little part but that when
it had been raised to a height which placed them on an equal level with the
75Ionian defenders their role increased. When the siege mound overtopped the 
defensive wall of Smyrna and the Lydians managed to bridge the gap between 
the wall and mound, their assault parties rushed across the path into the
city. From the finds inside the city it would appear that both sides then
engaged each other in a desperate struggle in which the thrusting-spear and
javelin were used far more than the bow.
The great volume of weapons found in the temple area led Nicholls to 
conclude that they could not all have been votive offerings but probably
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indicate that heavy fighting took place in this position.7  ^ His suggestion 
that the temenos area with its massive enclosure walls to the south could 
have been used as an inner fortress with the help of an additional barricade 
on the west is very attractive. It was probably here that the Ionians 
made their last stand, with their archers, javelin-throwers and troops armed 
with the thrusting-spear, all fighting desperately to drive the Lydians from 
the walls.77 The Lydians, under the protective fire of their own archers, 
must have taken the inner sanctuary in hard combat. 78
Although the hypothesis that the finds of barbed and tanged arrowheads 
at Smyrna may indicate the presence of Cretan archers (mercenaries?) may 
seem far fetched, I think we should bear it in mind as a possibility.79 
The archaeological information gained from the excavations at Smyrna and 
Paphos sheds new light on the bare narrative of Herodotus and gives conclus­
ive proof that some of the Ionian Greeks used the bow in the defence of 
their city walls in the Archaic and Early Classical Periods.88 From the 
finds of relatively small javelinheads at both sites and from a fragment of
Callinus (West 1.5), it would seem probable that the Greeks of Ionia also 
«1
used the javelin.
4 Alcaeus
The poet Alcaeus was probably born in c.620 B.C. and in the period 
c.600 - 570 B.C. wrote about the aristocratic faction -fighting which took 
place on the island of Lesbos.82 In the surviving fragments of Alcaeus 
there are only two references which are of immediate interest to us: one
to the bow (fr.124,Campbell, S. and A.) and the other to greaves which are 
described as a protection against powerful missiles (fr.140,Campbell, S. 
and A.).
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In fragment 124 (=Pap.0xy.1788 fr.7) there is a solitary reference 
to the bow - rtjn-u T o ^ w  . In fragment 140 Alcaeus describes the weapons 
and armour which are in a great house: horse-crested helmets, shining bronze
greaves, linen cuirasses, convex shields, Chalcidian swords, belts and tunics 
(it is curious that there is no mention of the spear)83 The bronze greaves 
are described as - "a defence against
on
the powerful missile". This is one of the first references to metal greaves 
and it is clear that their special function was to protect the wearer against 
missiles such as arrows, javelins and stones (whether hurled from hand or 
fired from a sling).® Usually the thursting-spear was aimed at the neck and 
abdomen; the archer, who must have been comparatively ineffective against 
the shielded bodies of hoplites, generally aimed at their legs so as to provide 
crippled victims for the heavily-armed troops on his own side.® There is no 
evidence as to which parts of the body javelin-throwers, slingers and stone- 
throwers aimed at,but it seems likely that they also would have fired at the 
legs, and possibly also the face and spear-arm, when set against hoplites.
The Lesbian hoplites, then, must have been subjected to missile fire and it
87was as a protection against these weapons that they wore metal greaves. The 
fact that Alcaeus refers to the bow in fragment 124 may indicate that the 
Lesbians had forces of archers.
In conclusion to this chapter, we may say that the early Greek lyric and 
elegiac poets Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, Callinus, and Alcaeus all refer to Greek 
light-armed infantry, or to the weapons or missiles used by these troops. 
Archilochus of Paros (fI.e.680 - 640 B.C.) shows a knowledge of a wide variety 
of missile-troops: archers, slingers, javelin-throwers and probably also
stone-throwers. Tyrtaeus of Sparta (fl.middle of seventh century B.C.) 
refers to 'gymnetes' and 1gymnomachoi1 who were apparently armed with javelins 
and stones and are described as running forwards in front of their
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own ranks in one fragment and as standing near to their hoplites, crouching 
down either behind their own shields or those of the hoplites, in another. 
Callinus of Ephesus (fl.middle of seventh century B.C.) refers to javelin- 
throwers, who were most probably Ephesians. Although Mimnermus of Colophon 
and Smyrna (fl.end of seventh century B.C.) does not specifically mention 
any Greek light-armed troops, there is strong archaeological evidence which 
would suggest that the inhabitants of Smyrna used archers, and possibly also 
javelin-throwers and slingers, in the defence of their city against the 
Lydian Alyattes in c.600 B.C. Alcaeus of Lesbos (f1.c.600 - 570 B.C.) 
probably also witnessed Greek missile-troops in action - in one fragment 
he refers to the bow and in another he describes the greaves as a "protection 
against the powerful missile". Anacreon of Teos (born c.575 B.C. and died 
c.490 B.C.) does not mention Greek light-armed troops in any of his surviving 
fragments, but only a crook-bowed ( « y k o ^ o T o ^ w v /  ) race of people, 
who were probably Sintians or Scythians (West 3). These references to 
Greek light-armed infantry, their weapons and missiles, in the surviving 
fragments of the early Greek elegiac and lyric poets would lead us to believe 
that the effect of these troops on the warfare of the seventh century and 
early sixth century B.C. was not negligible. Archaeological evidence 
confirms the fact that missile-troops must have played a part in the battles 
of the seventh century B.C.: we have seventh century depictions of archers,
stone-throwers, javelin-throwers and of a slinger.^
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE FORCES OF THE TYRANTS 
PEISISTRATUS AND HIPPIAS AT ATHENS AND POLYCRATES
ON SAMOS
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Light-armed troops under the Peisistratids at Athens (c.560 - 510B.C.)
i. Warfare under the Peisistratids:
The literary sources for the period of the Peisistratids give us 
little information about the composition of the tyrants' military forces 
but do shed some light on the campaigns they waged. We learn that 
Peisistratus had been a successful general and had won renown in a war 
against MegaraJ He was head of the hill faction and in the stasis which 
was then current between the faction of the coast and that of the plain 
he tried to set himself up as a tyrant with the aid of a force of club- 
bearers (c.561 - 560 B.C.).2 After a short time Peisistratus was driven 
out by the other two faction leaderSjMegacles and Lycurgus.2 Peisistratus 
returned for a second time but was again driven out and it was probably 
not until 546/45 B.C. that he established himself as tyrant at Athens by 
defeating his enemies at the battle of Pallene.4 In this final coup 
Peisistratus1 Athenian supporters were supplemented by 1,000 Argive 
mercenaries (Herod.I.61; Ath.Pol.XV.2), troops supplied by Lygdamis of 
Naxos (Herod.I.61; Ath.Pol.XV.2), Thracian mercenaries (Ath.Pol.XV.2) and 
possibly by Theban and Eretrian soldiers, although these are not specified 
by our sources. Although Peisistratus1 rule was on the whole peaceful 
(Ath.Pol.XVI.1), we do know that he took part in some fighting over Sigeion
5
and that he captured Naxos.
Peisistratus died in c.528/7 B.C. (Ath.Pol.XVII.1) and was succeeded 
by his son Hippias. It was almost certainly under Hippias that the 
Alcmeonid exiles, with the help of other exiles,fortified Leipsydrium and 
more than once- attempted in vain to return by force to Athens. The 
Alcmeonids were besieged by the tyrant's troops and many noble Alcmeonids 
lost their lives in the fighting.6 It appears that in 519 B.C. the 
Athenians, under Hippias, fought a war with Thebes over Plataea. Our
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sources refer only casually to this battle: Herodotus (VI.108) mentions
this war as the origin of the alliance between Athens and Plataea, in 
order to explain the presence of Plataean troops at the battle of Marathon. 
Thucydides in III.55.1 explains why the Plataeans became allies of Athens, 
and in III.68.5,in connection with the destruction of Plataea, says that 
this event took place in the 93rd year after the beginning of its alliance 
with Athens, which is thus dated to 519 B.C. The last major fighting 
which we hear about is during the two Spartan expeditions against Hippias 
which led to his expulsion in c.510 B.C. The first invasion was defeated 
by a force of 1,000 Thessalian cavalry at Phalerum; the force was led by 
the Thessalian king Cineas, who was an ally of the Peisistratids (Herod.V.63); 
Ath.Pol.XIX.5). In the second Spartan invasion Cleomenes defeated the 
Thessalian cavalry and while he was laying siege to the Peisistratids on 
the Acropolis he managed to capture their sons and force them to withdraw 
from Attica. / The warfare of the period c.520 - 510 B.C. is reflected by 
the number of surviving Attic stelai depicting hoplites which can be dated 
to these years.®
ii. Thracian Peltasts used by the Peisistratids:
Our sources do not mention any light-armed troops in the forces of the
Peisistratids. However, we are informed in the Athenaion Politeia that
Peisistratus before his final coup received financial resources and
mercenary soldiers from the regions around Mount Pangaeum in Thrace (Ath.Pol. 
g
XV.2). The native soldiers of Thrace had probably been armed as peltasts 
at an early date and these troops were often sought as mercenaries by Greek 
-city states in the 5th century B.C. 10
We possess archaeological information which can be used to supplement 
and clarify the testimony of Ath.Pol.XV.2. There are in existence several 
Attic vases dating to the period after 550 B.C. on which peltasts are
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portrayed, and in at least ten cases we can judge from their dress
11(zeira and alopekis) that they are most probably Thracians. Our earliest
portrayal of these peltasts on Attic vases comes from the exterior of a
Little-Master cup signed by Epitimus which can be dated to just after
550 B.c J 2 on it are depicted two peltasts, equipped with javelins and
peltai, who operate at a considerable distance from one another; each of
the peltasts has already thrown one of his javelins, which has hit, but
not penetrated through, his opponent's pelte and each is about to throw his
second javelin - the peltast with the high cap throws with an overarm action,
the bare-headed peltast possibly with an underarm action. The painter of
the pot has portrayed clearly the throwing-loops attached to the javelins
which have been thrown and the peltasts with their fingers in the loops of
the javelins which they are about to hurl.14 When peltasts could fight at
long range , it may be expected that they would never have closed in hand-
to-hand fighting with more heavily armed infantry; this is confirmed by
the fact that these early peltasts are never portrayed with a secondary
weapon such as a dagger or axe. Both the peltasts on the cup are wearing
boots and a chiton under a chlamys and both carry wicker-work shields.
One of the peltasts has a small pointed beard and a strange high cap which
1 5probably indicates that he is a barbarian. The other peltast shows no 
foreign features and is probably Greek.
Our first certain depiction of Thracian peltasts comes from an Attic
a r
amphora which dates to about 540 B.C. On the amphora is depicted a battle 
scene in which two peltasts use their javelins at close range as stabbing 
weapons; also present in the scene are an archer, a cavalryman and a 
fallen warrior.- The peltasts both wear caps and the typical Thracian 
geometrically patterned cloak or zeira; they both carry peltai and hold 
their javelins in a thrusting position.17 The peltasts on the amphora are 
drawn in much greater detail and with much greater accuracy than those on
the Little-Master cup and it seems likely that the artist of the amphora
had a closer aquaintance with Thracian peltasts. The amphora was painted
around the time of the battle of Pallene and Peisistratus1 final coup and
it is very likely that the peltasts depicted on it were the Thracian
mercenaries from the region of Mt. Pangaeum which are mentioned in the
Athenaion Politeia as having been recruited by the tyrant before the battle.
Best regards both the archer and cavalryman as Thracians, but this I feel
19is far from certain. The only distinctive barbarian feature which the 
cavalryman and archer have is the pointed cap which they wear, neither of 
them wear the typically Thracian zeira in which the two peltasts are clad.
In the period c.550 - 490 B.C. true peltasts equipped with crescent­
shaped peltai and javelins or spears are generally depicted ; whereas 
after that date, until the last decades of the fifth century, the warriors 
are almost always simple spearmen who are not equipped with peltai. It 
seems probable, then, that there were no true peltasts in Athens after 
c.490 B.C. - certainly Herodotus mentions no Thracian troops fighting on 
the side of the Athenians at Marathon in 490 B.C. It has been suggested 
by Best that with the Persian.occupation of the Thracian coastline in 
492 B.C., the flow of Thracian mercenary peltasts to Athens ceased, but 
since the land was not held down by garrisons it would have been difficult 
for the Persians to stop the flow of m e r c e n a r i e s . ^  The reason why Athens 
had no Thracian peltasts by the time of Marathon is unknown. Note well 
the chronology: Thracian peltasts still appear on Attic vases after Hippias'
fall in 510 B.C. until about 490 B.C. It seems as if the Thracian peltasts 
continued to be used by the Athenians after Hippias1 fall. One might argue 
that this does not agree with reality and that after 510 B.C. the Thracian 
peltasts had in fact left Athens, but that the Attic vase-painters did not 
forget these striking barbarians with their strange caps, curved shields 
and distinctive geometric cloaks and continued to draw them on their vases.
But if the Thracian peltasts had formed part of the Peisistratid body­
guard or their personal mercenary force and in 510 B.C. had disappeared 
from the scene as the tyrants' henchmen, it is very unlikely that the 
Athenian vase-painters would have continued to portray these unpopular 
troops - they would have found few customers to buy the pots on which 
peltasts were depicted! The logical solution, I think, is to consider 
the Thracian peltasts as a regular part of the Athenian army. They must 
have fought well and been accepted as useful by the Athenians, otherwise 
they would not have been kept on in Athens after the fall of the tyrants 
in 510 B.C. It may be that the peltast force received no new recruits 
after 510 B.C. (for an unknown reason) and its numbers declined until by 
490 B.C. there was no recognized force of Thracian peltasts in the Athenian 
army.
We know little about the tactics and deployment of these Thracian 
peltasts. Our literary sources give us no information and we must rely 
heavily on archaeological evidence in the form of vase-paintings which may 
contain stylistic features which do not reflect reality. On the Little- 
Master cup of c.550 B.C. the peltasts are portrayed as throwing their 
javelins at each other from a considerable distance, whereas on the amphora 
of c.540 B.C. the Thracian peltasts close in hand-to-hand fighting with 
their javelins in a melee in which an archer and a cavalryman are also 
present. Although the depiction of the peltasts on the amphora is more 
detailed than that of their counterparts on the cup, the portrayal of their 
mode of combat seems artificial and inaccurate - the peltasts fight too 
close to one another (note that they are not equipped with a sword or dagger 
for close combat) and although they apparently use their javelins for stabb­
ing., they do not grip them with their full fists but hold their fingers as if 
they are placed through the throwing-loops ready for a cast rather than a 
thrust. The artist of the amphora wished to portray a coherent group of
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warriors which was artistically pleasing and thus portrayed peltasts fighting 
at a closer range than they were accustomed to do in reality. The portrayal 
of the two peltasts fighting at a distance on the cup is more likely to 
reflect accurately the normal peltast mode of combat and accords well with 
the descriptions of peltasts in action in Thucydides and Xe no p h o n .^ 1
Note that the peltasts are never depicted fighting along with hoplites, 
as the Scythian infantry archers frequently are.^ They may possibly have
run in front of their own phalanx block and either engaged with enemy hoplites
pp
from a distance or other light-armed troops - this would explain why the 
archer is in the melee and also the cavalryman who, as we shall see in the 
narratives of Thucydides and Xenophon, was well suited to combat light- 
infantry in scattered formation, especially on flat exposed positions.
On which of the campaigns mentioned on pages 3 might the peltasts 
have been used? It is probable that they were recruited initially to aid 
Peisistratus in his third attempt at tyranny and that they fought at Pallene^ 
although Herodotus makes no mention of them in this battle. Peltasts were
well suited to operating on hilly or uneven ground and it is possible that
they took part in the attack against the Alcmeonids and their supporters in 
their high fortified position of Leipsydrion. We frequently hear in the 
histories of Thucydides and Xenophon of peltasts being used in storming 
parties to take walled positions?4 Peltasts could have been utilized in 
normal hoplite battles where they could have harried the less organized 
enemy light-infantry and the front ranks of the opposing phalanx before the 
two main armies of hoplitesengaged. They may also have been positioned on 
the wings to prevent a flank attack. For maximum effect the peltasts of 
the Peisistratids would have been used in large numbers,either in conjunction 
with archers or cavalry. Indeed, on the Attic amphora of c.540 B.C. the 
Thracian peltast on the left is supported by a cavalryman and an archer.
Did Hippias use the Thessalian cavalry in conjunction with Thracian peltasts
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to defeat Anchimolius and his Spartan army at Phalerum? In the Peloponn­
esian War peltasts were used on ravaging attacks and overseas expeditions: 
the Thracian peltasts in the army of the Peisistratids could possibly also
have been used in ravaging attacks and on the overseas expeditions to Sigeion 
25and Naxos.
iii. Scythian Archers used by the Peisistratids:
We have no reference in our sources to the use of foreign mercenary
archers by the Peisistratids at Athens and it therefore comes as a surprise
to find that there are in existence well over three hundred depictions of
what appear to be Scythian archers on Attic vases of the period c.530 -
490 B.C. The first accurate depictions of these Scythian archers occur
in the period c540 - 530 B.C. and from q 530 B.C. onwards they appear in
great numbers, the greatest number lying in the period c.520 - 500 B.C.
After c.500 B.C. there are comparatively few representations of Scythian
archers and these representations are generally inaccurate. M.F. Vos has
studied in detail the depictions of Scythian archers on Attic vases in her
work entitled Scythian Archers in Archaic Attic Vase-Painting (1963) and
I must confine myself to considering the role of these foreign archers on
the battlefield.^ Firstly, however, I would state that I follow Vos in
assuming that these archers were Scythians and not, as A. Plassart supposes,
Athenian citizens dressed in Scythian a t t i r e . i  also assume that
Peisistratus recruited these archers for his regular army in c.530 B.C. and
28that they were not the personal servants of individual hoplites. °
It is possible for us to hypothesise from Attic vase depictions of the 
period c.530 - 500 B.C., which on the whole appear to be very accurate, how 
the Scythian archers were used and where they were positioned in relation to 
their hoplites. They appear, from the vase-paintings, to have been posit­
ioned in the first or possibly the first two ranks of their own phalanx,
often covered by the shields of their own hoplites, and shot horizontally 
at their targets. They are always depicted singly or in small groups^ 
acting in conjunction with hoplites^and are never shown operating as a
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coherent unit on their own.
The Scythian archers are never portrayed as operating from behind a 
phalanx or shooting their arrows high so as to rain down upon their opponents 
as Assyrian and Egyptian archers are sometimes depicted doing and as the 
Persians are described doing in Herodotus? The light Scythian arrowheads 
would have simply fallen as a rain on the bronze helmets and bronze or linen 
cuirasses of the enemy hoplites and since they would have no greater force 
than that provided by their own weight, they would not have had much penet­
rative power. It is apparent that the Scythian archers took horizontal aim 
both from the pictures where they are shown shooting thus and, as Vos notes, 
from others in which they are depicted checking their arrows for straightness 
There would have been no point in checking their arrows if they did not 
intend to shoot them at a particular target since if they were about to 
shoot high at a body of troops so that their arrows rained down upon them, 
the slight deflection caused by an arrow not being totally straight would 
not have mattered.
If, as they are so portrayed on several vases, the Scythian archers were
positioned in the front ranks of a phalanx,this would obviously have loosened
32the cohesion of the close-packed infantry block; the Scythians would have 
got in the way of the hoplites, who were trying to lunge overarm with their - 
spears, by attempting to gain protection behind their shields. They were 
totalLy unsuited to fighting in the front ranks of a phalanx beside hoplites-: 
their secondary weapons, the battle-axe and dagger, would not have been 
efficient against troops who could lunge at them from a distance with 
thrusting-spearSjand the unwieldy long-handled Scythian battle-axe would have 
posed a grave danger to the hoplites standing at either side and behind the
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Scythians in the phalanx block.33 The fact that Scythians could not stand 
up well to hoplites in close battle is reflected by the recurrent motif of 
a dead or wounded Scythian lying at the feet of battling hoplites.34
It is obvious that the Scythian archers were used with single hoplites 
to operate either in front of their own phalanx or to pick off enemy troops 
from their positions in the front ranks of their own phalanx when they 
approached within firing r an ged When the two phalanxes were about to join, 
the Scythians must have retired either to the wings or the rear of their own 
phalanx and left their hoplites unhindered to fight with their spears in 
close formation. At the end of a battle it is probable that the Scythian 
archers, being very mobile, were used either to pursue a routed enemy or to 
protect the rear of their own fleeing hoplites. 36
It is possible that in the period of the Peisistratids no other Greek 
state had a force of Scythian archers and consequently an organized and 
fully trained corps of these troops would have given the tyrants at Athens 
a military ascendancy over their enemies who very probably lacked forces of 
efficient missile troops.
Appendix: Scythian Archers at Athens after the Fall of Hippias in 510 B.C.
Scythian archers continue to be depicted on Attic vases in large numbers 
in the period c.510 - 500 B.C. after Hippias had been overthrown from his 
tyranny. It is only after c.500 B.C. that depictions of Scythian archers 
decrease dramatically and after c.490 B.C. we find that there are hardly any 
accurate depictions at all. As with the depictions of the Thracian 
peltasts on Attic vases,we find that Scythian archers continue to be 
portrayed until the period c.500 - 490 B.C. and since Herodotus specifically 
states that the Athenians advanced without the support of archers at the 
battle of Marathon we must assume that there were no Scythians left in Athens 
in 490 B.C.38 The fact that the Scythian archers are portrayed in large
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numbers in the period c.510 - 500 B.C. probably indicates that the Scythians 
had fought well in the army of the Peisistratids and the Athenians felt that 
they should be kept as a contingent in their forces. ^
The reason why there were no Scythians at Athens in 490 B.C. is a
mystery. As in the case of the peltasts, the disappearance of these archers
was probably not connected with the fall of the Peisistratids and it is very 
unlikely that the Athenians would have abandoned them in the period of
worsening relations with Persia. It may be that during and after Darius'
expedition against Scythia inc.514 B.C. the Scythians needed all the troops 
they could muster and could not have afforded to send any more new archers 
to Athens. 40 The Scythians may also have become hostile to the Greeks 
because some Greeks of Ionia, including Miltiades,had taken part in this
41attack against their country. After the burning of Sardis in c.498 B.C. 
the Persians would have tried to stop the Athenians recruiting mercenaries 
who might be used against themselves in any future retaliatory action which 
the Persian king might take.42 Thus because of either one or a combination 
of these factors it may have been difficult for the Athenians to replace 
Scythian archers who had been killed in action or died of illness or natural 
causes. The force of Scythian archers may have become so small that it was 
of no military value or had ceased to exist by 490 B.C.
We are next informed about Athens recruiting Scythian archers by 
Andocides who asserts that the Athenians acquired a body of 300 mercenary 
Scythian archers during the period of the Thirty Years Peace of 446 B.C. 
with Sparta (On the Peace with the Lacedaemonians, 5).^ This passage of 
-Andocides is, however, riddled with historical inaccuracies and we cannot 
be certain if the Athenians really did recruit Scythian archers at that 
period. 44
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Archers in the Forces of Polycrates of Samos (c.538 - 522 B.C.):
Not long after the Persian conquest of Ionia, Polycrates set himself 
up as tyrant of Samos, with military aid from Lygdamis of Naxos.4  ^ Poly­
crates was militarily ambitious and wished to make himself master of Ionia
AC
and the Aegean islands. Herodotus informs us that he organized a fleet 
of 100 pentekoners and a force of 1,000 archers ( ^ k t ^ t o  Ve nc-A^kovTe.^o^ 
Tfe ^KoiTox/ 'To^>o/To£<> [III.39.3] ).
In Herodotus III.45.3 we further learn that the archers were both 'misthotoi' 
and 'oikeioi1.
The force of one thousand mercenary archers would have been useful for
Polycrates in his ravaging expeditions against the other Aegean islands and
the cities on the Ionian mainland4- during the Peloponnesian War the
48Athenians frequently sent archers on sea-borne expeditions. They probably 
would have been useful in sea-battles also. In c.525 B.C. the Samian 
exiles, Spartans and Corinthians made a joint attack against Polycrates.49 
Herodotus does not specifically inform us that the mercenary archers took 
part in the fighting, but it is most probable that they did,as Polycrates 
needed every man to help to repel the large enemy force. However, in 
IIL54.2 Herodotus does mention Polycrates1 'epikouroi' as a separate group
from his many native Samians - were the epikouroi' in fact his mercenary
50 1 1archers? In the fighting around the walls of Samos when the epikouroi
and many Samians sallied out of part of the city's defensive system which
stood on a ridge of some high ground, they held their own against the large
Kl
Spartan force before they gave ground." Was this because the high ground 
was rough and ill-suited to the Spartan phalanx formation but well suited" 
to the mobile light-armed archers of Polycrates? In the rout which 
followed, the Spartan troops inflicted heavy losses on the Samians - was 
this because some Samian light-armed troops stood their ground and tried
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unsuccessfully to fight on with their missile weapons against the Spartan 
hoplites? It is very frustrating that Herodotus does not say more about 
the Spartan and Samian troops and their modes of combat.
Were Polycrates1 mercenary archers native Samians or foreigners?
Herodotus calls them 1oikeioi1 (III.45.3) and this term is explained by
52some as 'native1, but by others as 'household' troops. W. Helbig infers 
that Polycrates hired Scythian archers from a fragment of Anacreon (D.A. 
Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry (1967) p.68, no. 356(b) ) in which the poet 
describes Scythians shouting drunkenly - we know that Anacreon spent some 
time at the court of Polycrates and Helbig suggests that it was here that 
he gained knowledge of Scythians who acted as household troops.^ This 
hypothesis is possible, but by no means certain: bear in mind that after
Polycrates' death Anacreon went to Athens and he might have got to know the 
Scythians there. ^  The fact remains that Polycrates' archers may well have 
been native Samians and indeed there is archaeological evidence that the 
Samians produced the Greek 'boss-and-barb' type of arrowhead in the Geometric 
Period and another bronze tanged type in the Archaic Period.
There has furthermore been some speculation that pairs of hoplites, 
whose shield blazons show marine-associated symbols, and Scythian archers 
represented on Attic vases of the last quarter of the sixth century B.C., 
may represent the troops of Polycrates, but there is no good reason to accept 
this theory. On CVA USA 10; 3He,pl 5,1 there is portrayed an old man in 
front of whom stand a hoplite and a Scythian archer; another hoplite stands 
behind the old man. The blazons on the hoplites' shields represent a ship's 
prow and a fishing fork. Smithin the CVA suggests that these are troops 
belonging to Polycrates: but shield blazons which represent marine-related -
objects are quite numerous and they cannot all have been associated with 
Polycrates.^
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In conclusion we may say that the tyrants Peisistratus and Hippias 
at Athens included forces of specialist barbarian missile-troops, who were 
almost certainly mercenaries, in their army. It seems probable that 
Thracian peltasts and Scythian archers helped to give the Peisistratids a 
military ascendancy over their enemies (note that we never hear of the 
Peisistratids being beaten in battle once their tyranny had become estab­
lished). Polycrates, a tyrant of Samos, also had a large force of 1,000 
archers who were probably native Samians, although there is a possibility 
that they may have been Scythian mercenaries.
C H A P T E R  F O U R
GREEK LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF THE 
PERSIAN WARS (499 - 479 B.C.)
85
1 The Ionian Revolt (499 - 494 B.C.)
Herodotus in his narrative of the Ionian Revolt never mentions the
use of archers or light-armed infantry by the Greeks of Asia Minor or of
the islands off its coast in their fight against the Persians.^ The
excavations of Palaepaphos in 1950 - 53 have however shed some new light
on the presence of Greek light-armed troops, at least in the case of Cyprus,
in the Ionian Revolt. In Cyprus the anti-Persian parties headed by
Onesilus gained control and in 498 or 497 B.C. a Persian fleet landed an
2army at the Karpass peninsula. In the following battle in the plain of 
Salamis the Cypriots fought well until Stasanor, the King of Courion,
3
betrayed the Greek cause; the Persians gained a great victory. Although 
Herodotus does not specifically mention unconventional Cypriot infantrymen 
in his account of the battle, their presence may possibly be inferred from 
the fact that Onesi1 us1 Carian shield-bearer (hypaspistes) was armed with a 
curved sword or scythe (drepane), a weapon which was not used by hoplites.4
Although the Ionians won a sea battle over the Phoenicians off Cyprus 
they sailed away home when they saw that the city of Salamis was about to 
surrender and thereafter the resistance of the Cypriots ended with a series 
of sieges (Herod. V.115). One of the cities which was put under siege and 
has in part been excavated is Paphos (the modern Kouklia).^ The excavators
found from the position of the siege and counter-siege works that the Persians
had chosen to attack the northeast gate of the fortification walls on the 
Marcello Hill. The gate itself had very shortly before been remodelled, 
probably with the purpose of intensifying the possible missile fire of the 
defenders in mind. Any attacker had to fight his way through the narrow 
gate passage (2.9m wide) with its sharp double bend and the gate could 
effectively be defended by the crossfire of missile-troops posted on the gate 
bastions.
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Directly outside the northeast gate and the neighbouring walls were 
found the remains of the massive siege-ramp which was constructed by the 
Persians out of stones, soil, rubble, wood and architectural and sculptural 
fragments.0 In addition there were found in the mound vast quantities of 
weapons: as well as helmets and large spearheads, there were found hundreds
of smaller spearheads, presumably from javelins, and arrowheads of various 
types made out of both iron and bronze. The hollow-socketed bronze arrow­
head with triangular section, used especially by the Scythians and Persians, 
was found in large numbers;7 this arrowhead is of a traditional NecurEastern 
type and, as well as having been excavated at many sites in Asia, has been 
found on the battlefields of Marathon and Thermopylae and on the north slope 
of the Acropolis.® The longer tanged arrowheads with triangular section 
are almost certainly Greek; other similar tanged heads have been found on 
other Greek sites on Cyprus. y No opinion is expressed by the archaeologists 
as to whether the javelinheads were Greek or Persian - the javelin was of 
course known to both nations.10 There were also found many enigmatic large 
stones which had one of their sides flattened - these were probably too heavy
to be used as sling-shots and may have been shot from catapults.11
To judge from the large quantities of fire-damaged arrowheads and 
javelinheads and fire-blackened stone missiles and fragments of burnt bones, 
severe fighting took place, in which missile-troops played a large part, 
during the building of the ramp. The Persian attackers, despite the intense 
crossfire of the defending Greek archers from the parapets, must have fought 
their way through the passage of the northeast gate and either burned or 
broken through the wooden doors and taken the city.
Archaeology .then,can show that Paphos fell after a desperate struggle
in which the defending Greek archers and possibly also javelin-throwers rained 
their missiles down on the attacking Persian troops. Herodotus says nothing 
about this stout defence by the Greek missile-troops. It is thus very
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possible that other Greek states on the side of the Ionians had forces of
archers and other missile-troops in their revolt against Persia and that
1?
Herodotus has omitted to mention them.
2 The Campaign of Mardonius (492 B.C.) and the Battle of Marathon (490 B.C.)
We are informed by Herodotus that a Persian expeditionary force under 
the command of Mardonius met reverses in 492 B.C. when the fleet was caught 
in a north-easterly gale rounding Mt. Athos and the army was routed by native 
Thracians called Brygians.18 Herodotus describes in VI.45 how the Thracian 
tribe attacked Mardonius1 army at night and caused many casualties. It seems 
very possible that the Brygians were equipped as peltasts, although we are 
not specifically told this; the javelin and small wicker shield were probably 
used in mountainous areas of northern Greece at a very early date. 14 In
later Classical times, as we shall see, Thrace is specially noted for its
peltast troops and it appears from our sources that these troops often attacked 
at night.18 The victory of the Thracian Brygians was short lived as they were 
soon subjugated.
In 490 B.C. the Persian commanders Datis and Artaphernes were sent by 
Darius with a large sea-borne force to punish Eretria and Athens for their 
part in the Ionian revolt. 18 After successfully sacking Eretria the Persians 
sailed from Euboea and landed at Marathon. 1^  The Athenians marched out to 
Marathon to meet the Persian threat. In preparation for battle the Athenian
and Plataean front had to be extended to the same length as that of the
Persians to ward against a turning movement on their flanks; the Athenian 
centre was, of necessity, only a few ranks deep, whilst both wings were kept 
strong.18 The Greeks advanced at a run towards the Persians, using the same 
tactic as the Greeks were to use at Cunaxa to reduce their losses from the 
Persian archers.19 The Persians prepared to meet their attack, thinking the 
Athenians mad to advance without the support of either cavalry or archers
ooTe T o  On both wings the Athenians
and Plataeans were victorious, but their centre was broken by the Persians; 
in what was probably a pre-arranged plan, the two wings then converged and 
routed the Persians who suffered very heavy casualties.
Note that Herodotus in his account of the battle mentions no Athenian 
or Plataean light-armed infantry and specifically tells us that the Persians 
were amazed when the Athenians advanced without the support of archers. 
Assuming then that the Athenians had no archers in their force, we must 
now examine any literary and archaeological evidence which may throw new 
light on the presence of other types of light-troops at Marathon. The main 
literary source which suggests that slaves, almost certainly armed with 
non-hoplite weapons, were present and fell in the fighting is Pausanias:
At the end of the nineteenth century Schliemann and Staes excavated 
parts of the Soros, which is situated near the beach and is now generally
for our purpose,Marinatos in 1970 discovered and excavated part of a tumulus 
which is most probably to be identified as the tomb of the Plataeans and
situated at the end of the Vrana valley, H  miles south-west of the main 
Soros. The pottery found in the excavations is identical to the pottery 
finds from the Soros, both in size and shape, and is approximately datable
has been excavated there were found 9 burials and 2 cremations and this has
(5 l f^ XoCL I (X O V O ^ a :  i oC I cX TTo G k v 'O n/ T cOV KcXTcX
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agreed to have been the burial mound of the Athenians. More interestingly
slaves. ^  The tumulus, roughly 30 - 35m in diameter and 3m in height, is
to the period 500 - 490 B.C/2 In the eastern third of the tumulus which
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led Marinatos to hypothesise that the mound may cover 20 - 30 burials or 
cremations. All of the 9 skeletons were males and 7 of them were aged 
between 20 and 25. Professor Breitinger, Director of the Anthropological 
Institute of the University of Vienna, has tried to reconstruct part of the 
face of one of the cremations from bone fragments and suggests that these
oo
are the remains of a 25-year-old man. Hammond thinks that the two 
cremations are of Plataean hoplites and the inhumations are of slaves:
"The two forms of burial are what we should expect: cremation for the
Greeks and inhumation for slaves. The skeleton of a small boy was 
evidently that of a slave, taken by his master to the field of the battle. 
The small number of cremations - only two - may be understandable, if the 
remains of some Plataean dead were taken to Plataea'. This hypothesis 
of Hammond is far from certain.28
There have also been stray finds of Greek lead sling-bullets which 
purport to be from the plain of Marathon. Information about these bullets 
seems to have been derived solely from Athenian antique dealers of the 
19th century who might well have claimed that the missiles came from 
Marathon to raise their value. It might be quite attractive to believe 
that one sling bullet in the Ashmolean Museum, supposedly from the field of 
Marathon and with what is probably an abbreviation of B o i Q T a  N  
inscribed on it, was used by a Plataean slave armed with a sling, but since 
it is so difficult to date sling-bullets and even to prove their authent­
icity it is important for us to be cautious about the inferences we draw 
from such dubious objects. 27
Let us now try to evaluate the supplementary literary information of 
Pausania.s and the archaeological finds. Most modern commentators accept 
the testimony of Pausanias (1.32.3) that slaves fought in some capacity in 
the battle of Marathon,28 although Hammond notes cautiously (presumably from 
Herodotus' silence) that some light-armed troops may have been held back to
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defend Athens.29 It seems likely that both the Athenians and Plataeans 
used slaves in the battled and since a hoplite's equipment was very expensive 
and only men who owned a sizeable plot of land could have afforded to buy 
a panoply,it seemscertain that the slaves and other landless Athenians 
and Plataeans,if they did fight, fought as light-armed troops, possibly 
equipped with the sling, javelin or dagger (or whatever crude weapon they 
could lay their hands on!) but probably not the bow (Herod.VI.112.2). It 
is very unlikely that the hoplite class would have given slaves and retain­
ers training with heavy arms, not only because of the expense of such weapons 
as noted above but also because of the obvious danger to the state if these 
men decided to better their position with their new found military skill and 
because most of the time they were needed to farm the land and look after
flocks, and thus I would conclude that they formed a crude light-armed force
31which had little or no training in the use of their weapons.
How then were these light-armed troops utilized in the fighting? Burn
thinks that the light-armed troops could play no useful part in the battle
and comments "Like Bruce at Bannockburn, Miltiades ordered his 'small folk'
3?to the rear". The only useful task he can see the Greek light-armed 
performing is defending wooden stockades which according to Cornelius Nepos 
(Life of Miltiades.5) were put up when Miltiades and his troops gradually 
advanced their position. He suggests that the slaves were killed while 
guarding their camp and presumably also the stockades - but Nepos is a poor 
source and Herodotus nowhere in his account mentions a fight near a camp or 
any stockades.^ I follow Hammond in suggesting that the light-armed troops 
probably took part in the actual battle (c.f. of Pausanias
1.32.2), although I am dubious about the manner in which he asserts they were 
utilized; he comments: "It is likely that the slaves fought not as a
separate unit in the line but each in support of his master, since a 
religious tie existed between free and slave within the family".^ If slaves
or free retainers armed as 1ight-infantry fought alongside their hoplite 
masters this would have significantly weakened the cohesion of the phalanx 
formation and we should note that we never in Classical Greek history find 
light-armed infantry interspersed in a phalanx block; the slaves and 
retainers could only have fought beside their masters if they themselves 
were armed with and trained in the use of hoplite weapons and equipment,and, 
as I have argued above, this is extremely unlikely. Burn, Hammond and 
other commentators fail to perceive a vital role which the light-armed 
troops could have performed, bearing in mind the fact that the Persians had 
a large numerical superiority and consequently could have extended their 
line to a greater length than that of the Greeks? it seems probable to me
i i
that the Athenian and Plataean light-armed troops, like the Boeotian psiloi 
at Delium in 424 B.C., were positioned on both wings to prevent a dangerous 
outflanking movement by the Persian force.^ As D.M. Lewis points out, if 
the Athenians did set up their camp with their backs to Mt. Pentelikos they 
may have swung their left wing,on which the Plataeans were posted, forward 
across the Vrana valley.^ It seems very possible that a mobile battle was 
fought to a certain degree up and down the valley and that the Plataean 
slaves who fell defending the flank of the left wing were buried with the 
Plataeans in the tumulus which is situated at the end of the Vrana valley.^
If the Athenians did have a force of crude light-armed troops, it was 
probably positioned H  miles away on the extremity of the right wing near 
the Soros and the beach.
There are two pieces of evidence which would suggest that the Athenians 
suffered badly at the hands of the Persian archers at Marathon and consequently 
afterwards realized the potential of archers and also modified in one respect 
the hoplite panoply to combat the effect of enemy archers. Firstly, if we 
are to believe the report of Ctesias, the Athenians soon after Marathon 
recruited a force of Cretan a r c h e r ? © e ^ c 6 T o k . \ f c x > ^  Ao^v/cxcoo Koa
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Op<*Kc<AoUv' text KcxC l tcxpcXyc'/OV'TtXC
Certainly by 479 B.C. the Athenians had a corps of archers.4^ *
Secondly, we find the first representations on Attic Red-figure vases 
of the shield-apron after about 490 B.C. This was a rectangular piece of
i i
leather or cloth which was fastened to the lower edge of the hoplon by means 
of studs or rivets and hung down almost to the ankles; the object of these 
shield-aprons was to spend the force of arrows before they hit the parts of 
the legs not protected by the greaves. Shield-curtains are a fairly common 
phenomenon on Attic Red-figure vases in the period of the Persian invasions 
and of the Athenian counter-offensive in Asia but very rare thereafter. 41
3 The Great Persian War (480 - 479 B.C.)
In the list of the contingents in the army of Xerxes (Book VI1.61-96) 
the forces armed in what How and Wells term the Anatolian fashion are of 
particular interest to us.^ Let us first consider some of these Anatolian 
troops: the Paphlagcnians carried small shields and were armed with javelins
and daggers and wore boots.43 The Phrygians were armed and equipped in like 
fashion.^ The Mysians carried small shields and javelins.^ The Mares and 
Colchians carried small shields made out of hides and javelins or small
* • A C
spears, and the Colchians were also equipped with the machaira.w  The 
Cilicians had small shields made out of raw hides and two javelins and a 
sword like the Egyptian'machaira.47 The Lycians had bows and javelins.48 
The equipment of these peoples is very like that of the Thracian peltasts on 
Attic pottery.49 We further learn of a Thracian tribe, who were then called 
the Bithynians, who were clad and armed in exactly the same way as the
r . v \ ,
1 >
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Thracian migrations to Asia Minor are assumed to have taken place in
the early twelfth century B.C.60 Homer places two Thracian tribes, the
Mysians and Phrygians, in Asia Minor.61 Later writers seem to regard the
52Bithynians simply as Thracians and there is a great deal of evidence for
the use of peltast arms and equipment by various tribes living in Asia Minor
Best hypothesises that the Greek colonists in Asia Minor who dwelt near
Thracian tribes, had adopted the method of fighting used by the Thracian
peltasts.6^ We possess an Attic oinochoe of about 510 B.C. on which are
55depicted peltasts who are most probably from Asia Minor, two light-armed
* i
men are shown equipped with peltae and kneeling between an altar and a palm 
tree. Best is fairly certain that the palm tree indicates that the scene 
"did not take place in Greece but somewhere in the East".66
In 481 B.C. the patriotic Greek states, realizing that the Persian
invasion was imminent, sent an unsuccessful embassy to Gelon the tyrant of
57 * ‘Syracuse to gain military assistance; Gelon had large forces of toxotai,
i ( i  *
sphendonetai and hippodromoi psiloi and these would have been of great use 
to the Greeks who appear, with the exception of the Athenians, to have 
lacked organized and fully trained forces of light-armed troops.66 An
embassy was also sent to Crete but the Cretans gave no military aid due most
probably to their fear of the Persian navy.6^ Were the Greeks especially 
anxious either to gain a force of archers or to supplement any which the 
Athenians or other states may have had?
In 480 B.C. it was first decided to stop the Persian advance on land 
around the Tempe Pass.60 A force of 10,000 hoplites and,as far as we know.
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no light-armed troops,was sent to guard the Tempe Gorge and possibly also 
the steep path to Gonnos. The attempt was of course abandoned,possibly 
because the Greeks had hoped for help from the neighbouring highland peoples 
which was not forthcoming and because the defence line was too broad: not
only would the Greeks have had to guard the Tempe Pass and the mountainous 
pass over Gonnos but also another western route which led from Oloosson to 
L a r i s s a . The Greeks must have realized that at least part of the defence 
of the Tempe line would depend on their ability to repulse the invader on 
uneven and hilly terrain; it seems almost incomprehensible then that they
did not take a large number of light-armed skirmishers with them,such as
CO
were present at the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. This leads one to the 
conclusion that either the Greeks showed a distinct lack of good sense or 
Herodotus omits to mention the presence of these troops.
The Patriotic Greeks, after abandoning the Tempe position, attempted to 
save Central Greece by defending the pass of Thermopylae which was bordered 
on one side by the foothills of Mount Callidromos and the waters of the 
Malian Gulf on the other; the Greek fleet was to be positioned on the north­
eastern shore of Euboea (at the temple of Artemis) to guard against a Persian 
landing on northern Euboea and to stop the Persian navy sailing into the 
Malian Gulf or round the east coast of Euboea. In Herodotus' list of the 
Greek troops sent to guard Thermopylae no mention is made of any light­
armed troops or helots.^ However, in his narrative of the battle of
Thermopylae Herodotus mentions the presence of helots on two occasions: 
in VII.229.1 we learn that the blinded Spartiate named Eurytus had a helot 
who led him to the battlefield and then ran away: c*XX^< yvu>/^ ry
c i i - e v e i ^ 0 e v T ^  jj& v  t t oQo^tvo^ T T e ^ L o e k w
c<{t  ^ <soc^ru T£ T <x onXcx ^vSov'Tcx e/yeO ctfUTov KeXeotfc* i_
Tov fccXooTcK dc, Too*} o cvotov/ v-yytxye ^
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In VIII.25.1 we learn that the bodies of the helots lay on the battle­
field intermingled with those of the Lacedaemonians and Thespians:
£c<xntpc<(.ujQt.vTe^ Se "roue, vb k^ouc,'
^irt<3"T^c<To Too^ k.€A^A6vou^ e lv t f i  TTc^vTcy^ YVc^ke^ctt^ovioo^
i  ^ /""\ t c '  \  U \
K cX l (B l^ c r 'T H e c ^ ^  j  Oj>OJy/ \ C y  KoC c \ o u ^  6c X u i \ (X ^  .
Why does Herodotus not mention these helots in his list of the forces 
which were present at the battle? Burn thinks this was because just before 
Herodotus visited Sparta there had occurred the earthquake of 464 B.C. and 
the helot rebellion and consequently internal relations between the 
Spartiates and helots were not good.® Perhaps the reason was more simple - 
Herodotus probably regarded the unorganized mass of helots as being of 
little worth in battle.
In spite of How and Wells who seem to regard the helot as simply a 
camp servant who carried the baggage and shield of the Spartan, we learn
from Herodotus (VIII.25.1) that helots actually fell on the battlefield.®
In Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. helots are 
mentioned four times in active roles supporting the Spartans on the Greek 
right wing and in IX.29.1 we are informed that every one of the 35,000 
helots was armed for w a r .67 It seems almost certain that they fought not 
as hoplites, as Burn asserts, but as non-specialist light-armed skirmishers ®  
the helots on the Spartan right wing at the battle of Plataea are described 
as psiloi on three occasions.® There is no evidence whatsoever that 
Sparta armed helots as hoplites at this early date. The dangers inherent 
in arming and training the subservient helots with heavy arms are obvious, 
especially in view of the fact that helots may have revolted just before 
the Persian expedition of 490 B.C.;70it would also have been very expensive 
to produce panoplies for a large number of helots.
There is no truth in How and Wells' statement that light-armed
71helots "would be useless at Thermopylae owing to the nature of the ground". 
Light-armed troops could be used effectively on both flat and high ground.
It could be argued that in the narrow pass of Thermopylae, which in places 
was only about 50 feet wide, the flanks of the Greek phalanx would have 
been protected on one side by the waters of the Malian Gulf and on the 
other by the foothills of Mt. Callidromos and therefore there would have 
been no need of light-armed troops to protect them, but the fact is that 
even in the Middle Pass, the lowest parts of the foothills are not over 
steep or rough,and light-armed troops could well have been utilized here to 
protect the southern flank of the phalanx from a turning movement by the 
Persians. One would also have thought that light-armed troops would have 
been useful to reinforce the Phocian hoplite contingent guarding the 
Anopaea Path, but Herodotus does not mention their presence;7^ light - 
skirmishers would surely have been more suited to a battle on a rough 
mountain track than heavily-armed and less mobile hoplites who formed a 
sitting target for the Persian archers. Light-armed troops could also 
ideally have been used to guard the steep pass which led under the citadel 
of Trachis to Phocis, the route of the modern road from Lamia to Brallos, 
Gravia and Amphissa, but again we are not told by Herodotus of their presence 
Perhaps Leonidas hoped for help from the native Malians, who are mentioned
• i i  i
by Thucydides as having akontistai and sphendonetai in 424 B.C., in the 
guarding of these two positions, but we are given no indication of this 
in Herodotus. 74
Attempts have been made to judge the size of the helot force at 
Thermopylae. How and Wells and Lazenby, inferring it probably from the 
single helot of Eurytus (Herod.VII.229.1), suggest that each Spartan was 
accompanied by one helot;75 1 think that we should take 300 as the minimum 
figure for the number of helots present at Thermopylae. In Herodotus'
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account of the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. we are repeatedly told that 
there were 7 helots to each Spartan hoplite. Grundy supposes that there 
were 7 helots to each Spartan at Thermopylae also and this gives us a total
force of 2,100 helots7^ This, I think, should be our maximum.
We are told that the bodies of helots were seen lying intermingled 
with those of the Spartans and Thespians (Herod.VII1.25.1). Let us try to 
reconstruct a hypothetical casualty list: the total number of Greek dead
is given by Herodotus in VIII.25.2 as 4,000 men and we know that the 300 
Spartans, 700 Thespians and possibly also 80 hoplites from Mycenae were 
wiped out to a man;^the Greeks obviously suffered casualties in the first 
two days of fighting, although probably fairly light, and some of the
Phocians must have been killed by the Persian archers near the Anopaea Path
and some of the Thebans in the final battle before the majority of their
70
number surrendered - these casualties I would estimate (with some reserve) 
at about 400 men. If we add on the hypothetical 2,100 helots of Grundy 
we arrive at the following list:
300 Spartans
700 Thespians
(uncertain) 80 Mycenaeans
(uncertain) 400 Early casualties; Phocians and Thebans
(uncertain) 2,100 helots
Total 3,580 casualties (estimate)
This grand total of circa 3,600 men is not far off the 4,000 of
Herodotus; more men may have been killed in the first two days of fighting
79and more Thebans may have fallen than I have allowed for. However, I do 
not have much confidence in such juggling with the numbers given by Herodotus 
and the total casualty number of 4,000 men (Herod.VII1.25.2) is probably 
derived from the (which I feel must be inaccurate)
on
of the inscription to the Peloponnesians (Herod.VI1.228.1). Herodotus 
enumerates only 3,100 Peloponnesian troops as being present at Thermopylae
and Burn suggests that tne deficit is to be made up by 900 helots_, but I
feel that How and Wells must be right in commenting: "But it is unlikely
that the 4,000 Peloponnesians of the epigram are to be made up by adding
Helots, whom neither the inscription nor the historian would be likely to 
82include". It is impossible for us to tell how many helots were present 
at the battle of Thermopylae.
In 1939 Marinatos excavated part of the small hillock where he thought
that the remaining Greeks had made their last stand.^ In the sandy subsoil
among Roman and Byzantine foundations he found hundreds of bronze arrow­
heads of various Oriental types, one spearhead (probably Persian) and one 
spike, described as 'probably Greek', which could have come from either a 
spear - or javelin - butt; if indeed it can, after more study, be identified 
as from a javelin butt, it might be that we possess part of the weapon used 
by a helot as he fought beside his master on the last-stand hillock.84
We gain some insight of the Spartans' view of the Persian archers at
the time of the battle of Thermopylae by the sneering remark of the Spartiate 
Dieneces to a fellow from Trachis who informed him that the multitude of 
the Persian arrows would obscure the sun itself: "All the better!" quoth
Dieneces, "We'll be able to come to grips with those Persians in the shade"?^
The Persians advanced on Athens and when they found the Acropolis held
by a body of what Herodotus terms 'poor men' ( Trew^Toc^ cxv&p^Trooc. ^
began to bes*e.ge it.88 The poor men, who were probably crudely armed with 
whatever weapons they could lay their hands on, put up a stout resistance 
and sent boulders down at the invading Persians, but their defence was in 
vain and the citadel was taken. We next learn about the presence of light­
armed troops at the battle of Salamis: although Herodotus does not mention
• i
the presence of Athenian toxotai on the ships, we learn from Plutarch and 
the Troizen Inscription that there were 4 archers on each ship.8"7 Aeschylus 
in his Persae would suggest that a force of archers and stone-throwers landed
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with Aristeides' force of hoplites on Psyttaleia, although neither Herodotus 
nor Pausanias mentions their presence.®3 We do not know if these archers 
were Athenian citizens or possibly Cretan m e r c e n a r i e s . ^  The fact that we 
have the first occurrence of the Greek title 'toxarchos' in the Persae 
(472 B.C.) would suggest that Aeschylus even at this early period knew of 
one or more 'commander of the archers' and transferred this Greek title 
which was already in existence, to the Persian Xerxes.^ If there was one
» •  i i
toxarchos or perhaps several toxarchoi in command of the Athenian archers 
during the invasion by Xerxes this would suggest that the force of archers 
was well organized.
In December 480 B.C. Chalcidice revolted against the Persians and 
consequently Artabazus acted against the insurgents, among whom were the 
Olynthians (Herod.VI11.1 2 7 ) Tanged arrowheads, some of which are very 
similar to Cretan heads, have been excavated at Olynthus from the ash-layer 
of the south hill and the fill from the granaries and it may be supposed 
that they were used by Greek defenders of the city, most probably in the 
Persian siege of late 480 or early 479 B.C.93 Persian arrowheads of the 
small hollow - socketed triangular type, again associated with the siege, 
have also been found at Olynthus.93 It is surprising that Herodotus does 
not mention these Greek archers who fought in defence of Olynthus. Does 
this Cretan type of head indicate tht the Olynthians employed Cretan 
mercenary archers (cf. Ctesias, Persica, 26) or simply that their own archers 
manufactured or had manufactured for themselves arrowheads based on a Cretan 
model? ^
We are furthermore informed by Herodotus (VI11.128) that Timoxenus, 
the general of the Scionaeans, was equipped with a bow with which he shot 
arrows containing messages to Artabazus; this story makes it seem very 
probable that some of the Greek defenders of Potidaea were armed with the 
bow (Timoxenus would have aroused suspicion if he was the only one of the
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defenders who possessed a bow), but yet again Herodotus omits to mention 
their presence. Archers were well suited to defending fortified positions 
and we should have expected to hear of archers defending the Acropolis of 
Athens and the besieged cities of Chalcidice. From the archaeological 
evidence from Olynthus,and the reference to Timoxenus equipped with the bow,
I would suggest that archers did in fact take part in the defences of some, 
at least, of the cities of Chalcidice and that Herodotus fails to mention 
them.
The Battle of Plataea (479 B.C.):
There were present at the Battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. very large forces 
of light-armed infantry (psiloi); let us examine the passages in Herodotus' 
account of the campaign of Plataea in which these troops occur:
C"* . * i
1
Here we learn that the ephors sent out 5,000 Spartiates and appointed 
7 helots to each.
We are informed in this piece that there were 10,000 Lacedaemonians 
and that 5,000 of these were Spartiates (i.e. there were 5,000 perioikoi, 
presumably armed as hoplites); there were 35,000 light-armed troops (psiloi) 
from among the helots and seven of these were assigned to each Spartan man.
p  c< 6 o e v 'T e  o o o £ V  ' i c x < 5 l  cA y y e X o c  6 k  io ( _ 6 \ .  a i m  y y k e v / O L  <5 l
c ^ iT o  T to V ' T T o X ' u u v  ? v ^ k T o ^  e T t 6 k T T 6 / u T T o U 6 L  T T e V T  
/ L  TTcX. p  T <- * y f £ u J \ /  K o a  £ T T T < X  T T e p ^  k<c<6Toy/ T o d ^ c x W T e )  T u J V  el\(xrtu ) ^ .  .
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3 IX.29 - 30 o o t o -. , t t V ^ v T ujv e n T T e p < .  eKoCcryov'
T e T c - iy  pA £\/uW  2_TTc^pTt^jTj|6t^ ^<5c/V OTi X  m <X l  ^ 5 j v  oOT c W T e c ,
^ o \ /T e ^  c^ptG ^oV  Tpe i<p  T 6  K °u  o K T w j  ^cXtoiSe^
k o a  dKo(TOv/T^§fc^ £ t t t o ( . o tt 'X c tc < l pxev' c>l iTo^v/Te^ S o X x e y e ' / T e ^
€fTc t o n / p a p ^ o c p o v  I^crc^v' T o ^ o u T o t ^  Y k X u W ^ e  t t X ^ O o j ^>y
T o ^ e ? T^c, Jj^ev ^ n o c p T ^ T t k ^  T o T ^ic^ T T e v T c X k L ^ V o L  K<*t 
-r. / 1/ ^  c ~> * N c/
T ^ c d y u .u ^ c o i c t ^ d p t ^  u>^ £ c w t u \/ g t t t o c  rrept e k c x ^ T o v  cy v d p a ^
V^ oll TooTujv/ TTo<^ ~^c(7 T T c x p ^ ^ T ^ T O  *Jo^ ^  TTo'Xfc^AoV* CX ^  "Tti>V 
X o O T u lv  /\c *k fc S c *L y u o V C u W  ko(e  E X X ^ v ^ v '  '^/cXoc^ Jb<, £ i£  TTepH.
^ ->\ °/ T / \ /v \t-Ko(6T O V  £ u )V  o l 'JO p C ij  fTeVTaiCO d'toc ICoU T € T f > o l \ < t 6 ^ L \ t O L  K tfX
^  v a \ 0 \ _ ^ r_ I /
T^>l^ a o ^>Co l  iq £ cW  * A u W  ^ujfcV \ui\/ c* TTcxvTu)v u W  ^\/
T o  n X ^ G o c , ^  16 yuuyDicX^e^ K o fi £ V \ / e o (  ^ iX tc X ^ C ^  Ks<XC
ekcyTov/fctSec, 11 ev~r&  ^ T o O  S e  v't o ^  c E X X * y x E o O  T o o
60 V/^XGoVTOC , I I \ < * T o ( U X ^  d o v  T  6 o t t X c t ^ ^ x  k c A
'l^ T tX o c  <5\ T o" 6 l ^Aci^wyu 0(.<5»- fcVcfekoC yLAoy^twciSe^ SjtS'oiV^ ^ ( . c ^
\ccxSo<y  ^ TTyOo  ^ §fe o k  1 c< l<o5uov; a v h p ^ s  k o t T c x b to J & U i . .  <$0 \ /  ^)e 
©60frceuj\/ T o i6c JTap^oo6i € ^ e u \ ^ p o u \ / j o  cA  e v S e k f *  yuu^tc*Se^%
T T ^ t r j ^ v /  ycy* k<A Q e6u te^ v  CV Tuj 6~rpUTot\tckp cx TTepieov'Te^ o( ptOjaoV
> » / \ . / . c /  C v o Q 5 ?1 ^
o k T t x ic o t fo o o c ,  k o io  Xoouc, o n \ c x  o e  o c 6  c u T ol 6 l^ o n / .
In chapter 29 we are told yet again that the Spartan force included
« i
35,000 psiloi,with 7 of these being assigned to each Spartan; all of these 
Spartan light-armed troops were equipped for war. For the hoplites of the 
perioikoi' and of other states there was about one light-infantryman (psilos) 
to each of them. The total number of psiloi' in the Greek force amounted to
qc
69,500 men. In chapter 30 we are again told that the light-armed troops 
were equipped for combat ( *\fcXo?6c nroltfv. pKcty^jxo^cl ) and that 
1,800 Thespians, without heavy arms (i.e. 1 ight-armedX joined the f o r c e d
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4 IX.61.2 obtu_' 6y-^ ^AoUv'a'Gev rcy /VaKtoc/i^ovaca Koa. (eyer^o^c-tovTe^ 
<5uv 'Y i\o ? 6 T . <fyK0^AOV oc y^ev tt^v 'tcxki£ /au^?col^Teye *yTo<c Se c X i o e  
( ooto^. Y^p oc/^cxjuoc ^Tretf^L^ovTo (Jn'D Aocice^ou^Aov'uON/ )■>...
We learn in this passage that the whole Lacedaemonian force amounted
to 50 000 men - 5,000 Spartiates with 35,000 light-armed helots and 5,000
‘ 1 Q7perioikoi with 5,000 light-armed retainers. The Tegean force amounted 
to 3,000 men - 1,500 Tegean hoplites with 1,500 psiloi!
i I
Some modern historians find it hard to believe that a force of psiloi 
amounting to as many as 69,500 men (adding the 1,800 Thespians gives a 
grand total of 71,300) could have been present at Plataea; most controversy 
has surrounded Herodotus’ statements that there were 35,000 helots on the 
battlefield. Lazenby comments: "It is very unlikely that there were really
35,000 helots at Plataea, despite what Herodotus says - apart from anything 
else, there hardly seems room for them on the battlefield or in the complic­
ated manoeuvres that took place, and at most we should probably assume one
Cf>
batman to each hoplite". Did Herodotus merely make a rough guess of the 
number of helots present? But the fact that Herodotus repeatedly states
in four passages (IX.10.1; IX.28.2; IX.29.1; IX.61.2 - inferred from 
total) that there were seven helots to each Spartan would suggest that he 
was stressing a fact which he believed to be true and that this information 
is more than mere conjecture on his part. Why should Sparta have sent so 
many helots with the Spartan army to Plataea? 99 Hignett, I think rightly, 
concludes that this must have been through fear of a helot revolt and 
comments: "The position of Sparta in the Peloponnese was more precarious 
than the outside world was allowed to realize, but its insecurity was mainly 
due to the ever-present threat from the helots, and in the summer of 479 B.C. 
Sparta countered this particular menace by sending an unusually large force 
of helots out of the Peloponnese in the army of Pausanias".100 I think then 
that we should accept Herodotus’ testimony that there were 35,000 helots and
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‘ 101and a very large number of psiloi from other states present at Plataea.
How then were the helots and other 1ight-infantry armed and what, if 
any, role did they play in the battle? Herodotus classes the helots and 
the other light-troops as psiloi (IX.28.2; IX.29-30; IX.61.2) and 
informs us that they were all equipped for fighting ( \Cbv fjCev^ -j&v 
&rrcxv'Tu.n/ (IX.29.2);
(IX.30)) but never mentions specifically how they were armed. Historians 
have suggested that they were armed with a variety of different weapons:
Delbruck suggests that all the psiloi' carried at least a dagger or a hatchet 
and possibly also a long spear, Burn thinks that they were armed with 
javelins, and Hignett hypothesises that some of them may simply have thrown 
stones.10^  The ineffectiveness of the helots as light-armed skirmishers may 
be inferred from Herodotus IX.60.3 in which Pausanias, when his hoplites 
were suffering badly from the attacks of Persian archers, called for the 
aid of the Athenians and in particular of their archers. Pausanias' own 
massive force of light-armed helots must have been inefficient at warding 
off the Persian archers^presumably because they were armed either with close- 
combat weapons or because their missile weapons (javelins, stones etc.) did 
not have a sufficient range to be useful against the Persian bowmen.10^  It 
would seem extremely unlikely from Herodotus IX.60.3 that the Spartan helots 
were armed with the bow. According to Plutarch the Persian cavalry 
commander Masistius was killed by a Greek, probably an Athenian or Megarian 
light-armed infantryman, who struck him with the spike of a javelin 
C i<ovt^cu <5'TviyDo<K‘- ) through the eyehole of his helmet.10^  The 
javelin was an ideal weapon for crude light-infantry - it was probably cheap 
to make, required only a little practice to throw and could be used at a 
distance (thus not committing the light-infantryman to close combat with 
hoplites).105 It would seem likely, as Burn suggests, that many of the Greek 
'psiloi' were armed with javelins.
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How then was the vast force of Greek light-armed troops utilized? 
Herodotus says next to nothing about how these troops were used in battle, 
and this has led some historians to minimize their military value, and made 
Lazenby and Hignett believe that such a huge force cannot have taken part 
in the battle; ^ t  has seemed probable to some that a section of the light­
armed were not on the battlefield but were used to protect the supply lines 
and to guard the passes.19*7 But note that just before the final battle the 
Lacedaemonians are described as having their'psiloi* with them (Herod.IX.61.2) 
and that the helots, who were presumably killed in the final battle, were 
buried in a separate grave or mound (Herod.IX.85.2); it is obvious from 
these two passages that light-armed troops, particularly the helots, did 
take part in the fighting.
IfXD
Where were the helots then positioned?IUD It is impossible that the 
seven helots allotted to each Spartan would have fought around him in the 
phalanx block since they were neither trained to fight as hoplites nor 
equipped with hoplite arms.199 Hignett's suggestion that they were positioned 
at the rear and threw stones over the heads of the hoplites also seems 
unconvincing. 110 It seems most probable that the light-armed troops were used 
to protect the flanks of the various phalanxes and I would suggest that the 
light-armed troops of the Spartans and Tegeans were used thus in the final 
battle;111 the 1ight-infantry could also have rushed on in front of the 
victorious Spartan phalanx, using their speed of foot to cut down the fleeing 
Persians.11^  After the battle the helots were used to collect the spoils of 
victory: TTofoaotv/t^c, Se Kv^poy^aa: YTou^ 6c/yuev/oc>
c x t t £6 ©occ > tf^yfco/^u'^eiv eK.t'Xeoe t o o ^  £c\u5tc*.'<^
Tc< (Herod.IX.80.1).
It is incomprehensible that Herodotus does not mention the actions of 
such a huge force of psiloi'during the campaign and final battle of Plataea - 
was he, or were his sources, biased in regarding the final battle as solely a
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fight between hoplites and light-armed barbarians? It is very probable
that Herodotus and his sources, not having foreseen the potential of
i i
specialized light-armed troops, regarded the psiloi., both socially and 
mi 1itarily,as of little account.
It is in his account of the battle of Plataea that Herodotus mentions
for the first time an Athenian force of archers, possibly the only special-
113ized corps of light-armed troops in the Greek army; the Megarians, who
were in an exposed position and in trouble due to the incessant attacks of
the Persian cavalry, sent a messenger to request aid urgently and accordingly
«• \
the Athenians sent 300 picked troops and a body of archers: o
T c< u  \ u  < k u r j y y e \ \ e ^  c y fT e T T e c ^ o c T o
TuJ/ 6.C Ttve.^ 6 G c X ol£\/ Ov/Tc/C
i€VoCL T e  6 T o v  yubj>ov T o u t o v  kcxc T<x6'6e<5'0o(L
M e  yo^>£U<tt_ ? O &  poo\ Cj-i6 V'uJv' S e  T u ) /  S 'XXuO v'
’A 0 n  v/ oJ o l  O T T f c S e ^ a v T o  k < * (_  * A  ©  o l  L c
^ATT LO^ uOj>o<y C /[ cXyuTTwOv'cC,.
^   A '  ^    ^  ~  , 2 U \ .o  1 ^ y / v c  \ ^ "v v \o o t o l  Oc. "Te o i t o / ol ico^c oC TTpo cxaawG'/
Two/ TToy e oVTuov £ X\ r^\Ao/ EyuOyc^ To^ cTac, JT^oe eXdjxeslci.
(Herod.IX.21.3 - 22.1).
In Herodotus IX.22.1 we learn that Masistius1 horse was shot by an
arrow which was probably fired by an Athenian archer (although, of course,
it may have been a stray Persian arrow). The Persian horsemen then
retreated as far as two stades and it has been argued that the extent of
the withdrawal was dictated by the range of the Athenian archers - thus
D.J.F. Hill suggests that the archers of the Athenian force had an effective
114range of somewhat less than 335 metres.
When the Spartans and Tegeans were suffering badly from the attacks of 
the Persian archers in the final phase of the battle, Pausanias sent a 
messenger to the Athenians asking for their assistance and saying that if
they were unable to come en masse, they were at least to send their corps
We are not told by Herodotus whether the archers in the Athenian force 
were native Athenians or Cretan mercenaries. How and Wells suggest that 
they were Athenian citizens of the Thetic class but Ctesias (Persica, 26)
Cretans almost certainly were unable to promise military assistance to the 
Greek embassadors in 481 B.C., not because of an oracle as Herodotus asserts,
After the decisive Persian naval defeat at Salamis in September 480 B.C. 
the Cretans would no longer have been in such great fear of the relatively 
small remnant of the Persian navy and may have felt confident enough to send
the Athenians had hired Cretan mercenary archers before Xerxes' invasion.
How large was the Athenian force of archers? Herodotus does not inform 
us of its numerical strength but Rawlinson hypothesises from Herodotus IX.21.3- 
22.1 that for the Athenian select force to have been of any practical use,a 
large force of archers, possibly as many as 3,000, must have supplemented 
the 300 Athenian hoplites.118 The fact also that the Spartans specifically 
requested the assistance of the corps of archers would lead one to believe 
that it was not a unit of negligible numerical size. Herodotus, after 
describing the advance of the Greek army from Cithairon to the south bank of 
the Asopus, gives an account (Herod.IX.28.2 - 6) of all the twenty-five 
contingents in the army from right to left and the number of hoplites in each 
contingent. The total number of hoplites, including Spartiates, comes to 
38,7000; we are further informed that each of the hoplites from all the 
states, with the exception of Sparta (7 helots to 1 Spartan), were accompanied 
by one light-armed infantryman. The number of hoplites, minus the 5,000
k c<nr c* ke
(Herod.IX.60.3).
of archers
(Jv'cxT ov Tc
A  f
115informs us that the Athenians had obtained some Cretan mercenaries. The
but because Xerxes had a massive navy with which he could threaten Crete.118
out archers to help the Greeks of the mainland.11'7 It is also possible that
Spartiates, comes to 33,700jbut we are told by Herodotus that the total
number of 'psiloi, excluding the 35,000 helots, amounted to 34,500. Where
do the extra 800'psiloi*come from? Hauvette, Meyer, Munro, Macan and
Hignett suggest that the extra 800 light-armed are to be found in the
119regiment of Athenian archers.
Munro hypothesises further: he believes that the Athenian archer
force at Plataea numbered 800 and points out that at the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War these archers numbered 1,600 (Thuc.II.13.8; Arist. Ath. 
Pol.24); he then suggests that during the Persian War of 480 - 479 B.C. 
also,there was a body of 1,600 archers at Athens - 800 with the army 
(see above) and the other 800 with the fleet (there were around 200 ships 
in the Athenian navy before the battle of Salamis and it is probable that
4  OTV
there were 4 archers on board every ship). However,the suggestions that 
the Athenians had 800 archers at Plataea and the same number on board their 
fleet cannot be proven and must remain speculation.
Let us now try to consider what military value we should attach to
the Athenian corps of archers and how they were possibly used in battle.
Wardman takes the view that Herodotus tries to portray the Athenian archer
corps as an effective unit and also that he stresses the foresight of the
121Athenians in forming such a force to counter the Persian archers. His 
interpretation of Herodotus' narrative is strained and although the 
Athenians do appear to have been the only Greek state to organize a force 
of archers to meet the Persian threat, the historian does not positively 
emphasize the effectiveness of the Athenian corps of archers and certainly 
not the foresight of the Athenians.122 He also asserts that Herodotus gave 
the "corps of archers a large part to play".123 What does Herodotus in fact 
tell us about the value of the archers in the two passages where they are 
mentioned? The 300 Athenian hoplites and force of archers, who were 
positioned in front of the Megarians, failed to beat off the subsequent
108
Persian cavalry attack and were suffering badly until the rest of the
Greek army came to their aid (Herod.IX.23). The address of Pausanias to
the Athenians (Herod.IX.60),in which he requests the aid of the Athenian
archers, although probably tainted with pro-Athenian bias, may feasibly be
124true due to the Spartan lack of troops armed with the bow. However, even 
if this message can be interpreted as showing that the Athenian archers 
were highly valued by Pausanias because he had no troops of this arm in his 
army, we have no evidence that the archers played any part in the final 
battle: the Athenians,as they moved towards the Spartans in their attempt 
to fill the gap which the centre had left,were checked by the Medizing 
Greeks (Herod.IX.61.1). There is no evidence that the Athenian archers 
played a large role in the actual fighting at Plataea, although IX.21.3 and 
IX.60.3 would suggest that both the Athenians and Spartans were aware of the 
potential value of these troops in combating their Persian counterparts.
How were these archers deployed? Yet again Herodotus tells us almost 
nothing about this question: we may infer from XI.21.3 that the archers
were to be used in conjunction with the 300 Athenian hoplites and this has 
led Burn to suppose that the combined unit of archers and hoplites formed a 
"taskforce specially adapted for advanced - guard action".^ Did they operate 
interspersed among the hoplites of the front rank, crouching behind their 
shields for cover, or did they act as a coherent unit on their own protecting
4 nc
the weak points of the phalanx such as the wings?
We thus learn even less about the Athenian force of archers at Plataea 
from Herodotus than we do about the 'psiloi' - he gives us no direct 
information about their numbers or position on the battlefield in relation 
to the Athenian hoplites or role in relieving the Megarians. We must,I
i i
think,by these omissions5conclude, as we did with relation to the psiloi,
• i
that Herodotus and his sources regarded the toxotai mi 1itari l^ ,and possibly
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also socially, of little standing - I can see no truth in Wardman's
hypothesis that Herodotus emphasised the worth of these archers. The
saying of the Spartan Callicrates as he lay dying with a Persian arrow in
1?7his side again gives us an insight into the Spartans' view of archers:
c/ \ / 1
t o ^  e  o  0 e V >  Vcou i o v  jbeov £  k'X^trrtov/^
e ^ X ^ y e v  j  o u  jJLe\h jj^oi T o o T o  o t l  o ? t T o Q &  
o (  X\7 o T c  U T T o  y u w c S o ^  T o ^ o T o u  T T p o ^ o t ^ .
In the only other major battle of the Persian War of 480 - 479 B.C.,
Mycale, Herodotus is silent about the presence of any light-armed troops 
in the Greek forces. ^
In conclusion to the period of the Persian Wars we may say that although
• 1
there were certainly Greek archers and probably akontistai present in the 
defence of Paphos during the Ionian revolt, it is not until the battle of 
Thermopylae in 480 B.C. that Herodotus gives us any indication that there 
were active light-armed troops (here helots) in the Greek armies, although 
Pausanias informs us that slaves fought at Marathon in 490 B.C. (almost 
certainly, if they did fight, as light-infantrymen who were not equipped 
with the bow). We are not told by Herodotus that archers defended the 
besieged Acropolis or the cities of Olynthus or Potidaea but, as we have 
seen, it is probable that archers took part in the defence of the two last 
named cities. At Plataea in 479 B.C. we learn that the Greeks had a massive 
force of 71 ,300 psiloi in their army, each one of whom was equipped for 
fighting. Although we learn that some of their number were killed (helots), 
Herodotus does not mention them in his narrative of the fighting and he gives 
us no indication of how they were armed or utilized. We also learn from 
Herodotus that the Athenians, probably the only Greeks who had a specialized 
corps of light-armed troops in the battle, had a force of archers at Plataea., 
although he gives us no information about its composition, numerical strength, 
or mode of combat. Perhaps the most striking omissions by Herodotus are in
his accounts of the forces sent to defend the Tempe position and the Anopaea 
Path - one might have expected that light-armed troops would have been 
ideally suited to help to defend such rugged places but we do not learn of 
their presence in either of these instances, although we are informed that 
some Phocians (light-armed?) attacked the Persians from Parnassus (Herod.IX. 
31.5). Why then did Herodotus omit to mention or give very few details 
about Greek archers and other light-armed troops in the period of the Persian 
Wars? It seems probable that Herodotus and his sources regarded them as 
militarUyyand also probably socially, of little worth. The sayings of 
Callicrates at Plataea^and Dieneces at Thermopylae^must indicate that Spartans 
at this period despised troops who fought at a distance with missile weapons.
One final note about the defeat of the Persians which is important with 
respect to our understanding of successful light-armed tactics: the Persian
archers, who were light-armed compared to the Greek hoplites, succeeded in 
harassing the Greeks and causing them many casualties and3so long as they 
kept their distance from their enemies^held the upper hand since the Greeks 
had few light-armed missile-troops who could equal them in range; the reason 
why they were defeated at Marathon, Plataea and Mycale and suffered badly at 
Thermopylae was that they committed themselves to hand-to-hand combat in 
which the Greeks by reason of their arms, armour and close-packed battle 
formation were bound to excel them; the greatest strength of light-armed 
troops, whether they were Persian or Greek, was their ability to operate from 
a distance and not to commit themselves to a close fight with their more 
heavily armed adversaries - if for some reason they did enter into close 
combat with hoplites in phalanx formation, their fate was sealed.
C H A P T E R  F I V E
LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF THE PELOPONNESIAN 
WAR (431 - 404 B.C.)
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Book One of Thucydides: Preliminaries to the Outbreak of Hostilities
in 431 B.C.
Our first reference to light-armed troops in Thucydides lies outside 
the earlier limit of this chapter but will be examined here. In 460 or 
459 B.C., while Athens was engaged in military operations against the 
Persians in Egypt, the Corinthians advanced into the Megarid but were event­
ually defeated by an extraordinary force of Athenians, many of whom were
above and below the regular military age, led by the general Myronides.
« r \ / /
On the Corinthian retreat Thucydides comments: o'* 6c. vikuyAtvoc uv^
(1ithoboloi); they were able to pelt the Corinthian hoplites with impunity 
since the Corinthians were surrounded by a large ditch which hampered them
hoplites who were in the enclosure without, as far as we know, any casualties 
to themselves. Rocks, when thrown at close range, had the potential to kill 
or badly wound even hoplites if they hit a particularly vulnerable part of 
the body. We also learn from an inscription on a fragmentary marble stele 
found in Athens that four citizen archers from the Erechtheid tribe fell in
YVo'/T€C> k*c<T£< TT^ po<r oJTTov/ T€ ott X <-T c< X<xi,
TTe^K <5"T ^  (Sc* ^i\ou^ rrctfv/Te*^  ~TC)b
&oVT(X.<j t K o i l  TlctGoCj y ^ / ^ o c  T o o X O  O i ^  e y 4 v e T O
Tt\^0o^ o Lk o <j (Thuc.I.
106.1-2).
We learn here that the Athenians’ lpsiloi* acted as crude stone-throwers
from attacking their light-armed adversaries. These tactics were extremely
t i
effective: the Athenian psiloi managed to wipe out all the Corinthian
the fighting
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rA X c  eO<5l v U J  A  A ;  ytvei. of this period. £
A fragmentary inscription on a marble slab, copied by Fauvel, may 
possibly have recorded a force of archers; the slab, which was found on 
the Acropolis near the Erectheium, is now lost. Although we know that 
the inscription set out regulations for the Ionian city of Erythrae, its 
exact context is shrouded in obscurity. Meiggs and Lewis suggest that it 
may date to the year 453 - 2 B.C. and that we should infer from the text 
that the Athenians had expelled a medizing faction from Erythrae, set up a 
democracy and installed a garrison in the city to protect the Erythraeans 
and their new constitution. On the military affairs, we have two refer­
ences to a garrison commander ( " lines 14 and 15), who was
presumably an Athenian, and Fauvel, in the fortieth line of his text, gives 
us a reference to T O p r ]  > who must have been in the garrison. 
However, I have little faith in Fauvel's restoration and Meiggs and Lewis 
are certainly right in pointing out that the closing section of the text 
(lines 37 - 46) is too uncertain to be restored.
We learn in Thucydides' narrative of the naval engagement off the bay 
of Cheimerion in 433 or 432 B.C. that the ships of the Corinthians, Megarians 
and Ambraciots on one side, and of the Corcyraeans and Athenians on the 
other, had many toxotai' and akontistai', in addition to their hoplite forces, 
posted on their decks.^ Thus we know that both sides in this battle had 
large forces of archers and javelin-throwers, although we cannot tell if all 
the states mentioned contributed these troops or whether it was only one 
state on each side which did. Thucydides further informs us that this type 
of naval battle in which hoplites, archers and javelin-throwers fought it 
out from deck to deck, rather than the ships being used for manoeuvring and 
ramming, was of a sort which had an ancient history in early Greek naval 
warfare. On Attic Late Geometric pottery we frequently find scenes in 
which archers are portrayed on the decks of ships or taking part in seaborne 
landings.5
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Also in 432 B.C. we learn from Thucydides' narrative that during the 
revolt of Potidaea both the Corinthians and Athenians had light-armed troops 
among their forces. The Corinthians sent off a force which contained 400 
1psi1oi1 to aid the Potidaeans.^ The Corinthians, Peloponnesians and Potidaeans 
fought a battle near Potidaea against an Athenian army, but were defeated; 
no mention is made of the Corinthian'psiloi1 in the engagement. The Corinthians 
then retreated towards Potidaea, harassed by the missiles of their enemies.'7 
It comes as a surprise to learn that some of the Athenian troops were using 
missile weapons ( ) against the retreating Corinthians since
Thucydides has not previously mentioned any missile-troops in the force of 
Athenians.
Book Two of Thucydides: The Outbreak of the War; The Battle of Sparfolus
(429 B.C.); The Battle near Stratus (429 B.C.)
In 431 B.C., before the first invasion of Attica by Archidamus, Pericles 
addressed the Athenian assembly and informed them, among other things, of 
their military strength: iTrrrec*:^ oCLVG.
^uv/ CtttTO T O ^ O  } K.a^’cou'v, loxt
) k.Ot(. ~Tj>L^ p^ L<y Tl\oJ«yUlO Kjy Tyn 0C<°6<-0<<j (Th UC .11.13.8).
I |
Note that there was a number of hippotoxotai, probably two hundred, and
i i $
a corps of 1,600 ordinary toxotai in the Athenian army. ~ No force of Athenian 
'psiloi' is mentioned, almost certainly because such troops were untrained, 
crudely armed and not organized into formal units. The'toxotai'were a 
properly organized and trained unit of specialist light-armed troops: they
had regular unit commanders and in funerary inscriptions are recognized as 
a separate entity from other troops.9 According to Thucydides' figures, the 
toxotai1 formed 5% of all the Athenian troops in 431 B.C.; in the Aristotelian 
Athenaion Politeia, which probably reflects the period before mobilization, 
they represent 30% of all the Athenian troops.
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In most of the occasions when we are told by Thucydides that there
were archers present in Athenian forces, we are not informed whether they
11were Athenian citizens, allies or mercenaries. They are specified as being
Athenians on only 2 occasions (Thuc.111.107.1; V.52.2) and the'tochsotai' on
12the stelai of the Erechtheid tribe were certainly citizens. On three 
occasions they are specified as being non-Athenians (IV.28.4 [ c<\\o &(l.v ];
VI.43 [Cretan]; VIII.98.1 [barbarian]). There is a certain amount of inform­
ation which supports the view of Vos that barbarian, and in particular Scythian,
archers may have formed part of Athens' archer force and may have fought for
13her in the Peloponnesian War. Andocides, a fairly untrustworthy source, 
asserts that Athens provided herself with a force of 300 Scythian mercenary
14archers during the Thirty Years Peace of 446 B.C. ' Several fragments of 
stelae which mention barbarian archers and date to the period of the Peloponn­
esian War have been found in Athens.
One fragmentary inscription on pieces of Pentelic marble, which were 
found in the Kerameikos, records barbarian archers who fell in Thrace; the 
date of the inscription is very uncertain, but it may belong to the first 
years of the Archidmaian war:
vacat
[ T]c^<foToCt
[N]
£k.c<] \ \ l
A fragment of Pentelic marble which seems to record barbarian archers
has been found at a modern level east of the southern part of the Odeion.
The fragment has been badly damaged but the surviving letters have been very
well cut and suggest a date in the 430s.1  ^ Another fragmentary inscription,
probably dating to the Decelean War, has been found in Athens which records
17barbarian infantry archers as well as mounted archers:
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Frag.e.(Stele C ) , Col.II
N  L -   ------- 1
O ToCL J 
a J]
l<C ^ ^  II ~ ~ - 3
^  l_^ AO v C - - 0
N  c KO £ [ - - - - J
vacat
K c t t t t o
A \  e^<r L -  -  - 3
Light-armed troops are mentioned on several other occasions in Thucydides 
narrative of the year 431 B.C.: the Athenians sent a force of 1,000 hoplites
and 400 archers in an expedition round the Peloponnese.^ Nymphodorus was 
appointed by the Athenians as their representative in Thrace with the task 
of securing an alliance with Sitalces, king of the Thracians. He managed 
to persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian army of peltasts and 
cavalry and in 429/8 B.C. Sitalces led an abortive invasion of Macedonia.
In 431 B.C. the Athenians under the command of Pericles also marched into 
the Megarid and ravaged the countryside - included in the expedition were a
» i
considerable number of psiloi whose main purpose must have been to ravage the 
land; as Victor Hanson notes,1ight-armed troops were well suited to such 
a role.20
In 429 B.C. took place the battle of Spartolus.21 An Athenian army of
2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry was sent against the Chalcidians in Thrace 
and the Bottiaeans and began by concentrating its attack on the land of the 
Bottiaean town of Spartolus. The Chalcidian hoplites with their auxiliary 
troops sallied from Spartolus, but were defeated and retreated into the city.
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Thucydides specifically notes that in the battle, the Chalcidian cavalry 
and psiloi had defeated their Athenian counterparts: 0t *tu>v
K.ckL *TOu<^  T<-o\j /\©«^ v/o<(fu)\/ (.TCTTG*^  Kc<l 'V^ T<-\ou^
(Thuc.11.79.3). It comes as a surprise to us to learn that there were light­
armed troops (psiloi) in the Athenian force since these are not included in 
Thucydides1 enumeration of the Athenian army in 11.79.1. Gomme supposes 
that the Athenians must have recruited some peltasts from cities situated near 
Spartolus, but if they had recruited only true peltasts Thucydides would have 
termed them peltastai1 rather than'psiloi'.22 The Chalcidians, in addition to
i i
their ordinary psiloi, had a small body of specialist peltasts from Crusis 
and shortly after the engagement an auxiliary band of peltasts came from 
01ynthus.23 Encouraged by their reinforcements and previous victory over the
t t
psiloi of the Athenians, the Chalcidian light-armed troops,with the support 
of their cavalry, again attacked the Athenians while they were retiring. 
Thucydides describes their mode of combat: Kao. orrl-re. jjX v
£tt L O c £ V  at ' A s  % &  ogotv ) oiVoi ou<5"c *  ev/fe.K€-LN/To
k < ^ t  e ^ k o v T ^ o v  .  o c  t& -r£w ^ t T e u o v T e )
^  TTpc, € e J*s c x W o v  } 1c<Kl ^k<-6-re< 6*o<:v/T&<,
£ "iy>e tou^ " A  Kctt. € T t e ^ ^ ^ ot>/ feTtt ttcXo (Thuc. 11.79.6).
Note that the Chalcidian light-armed troops used classic skirmishing 
tactics - retreating when the Athenians attacked them and pursuing when they 
retired and raining javelins all the time at them from a distance. When the 
Athenians finally broke and fled, the Chalcidian light-armed pursued them for 
a considerable distance: pursuit was another role for which 1ight-infantry
were well suited. The Athenian losses were heavy: 430 men and all their
generals.24 It is clear from Thucydides1 account that the battle took a 
favourable turn for the Chalcidians when they used their specialist peltasts
i i
and ordinary psiloi in conjunction with their cavalry. The Chalcidian 
cavalry played an important part in the engagement: they prevented the
117
Athenian cavalry from attacking their own light-armed troops and pressed 
home the attacks of their light troops in the places where they succeeded in 
fragmenting the phalanx block of the Athenians with their javelins. Best 
probably rightly emphasises the importance of the peltasts from Olynthus 
and Crusis, who were almost certainly better trained, organized and equipped 
than the cruder lpsiloi1 who were present in both armies?^ The Athenian'psiloi', 
whom we hear of being defeated in the first battle, apparently took no part 
in defending their own hoplites in the second engagement; probably they were 
totally outclassed by the peltasts on the Chalcidian side. Two points which 
should be particularly noted with respect to this battle are, that it was 
fought on comparatively level ground, and that, as mentioned above, the 
victory was probably due to the use of light-armed troops in conjunction with
cavalry.
Also in 429 B.C., the inhabitants of the Acarnanian city of Stratus 
defeated a force of Chaonians by using the sling against them.'17 The 
Chaonians formed part of a Peloponnesian force which was sent to invade 
Acarnania and capture the largest Acarnanian city, Stratus. The Chaonians, 
being over confident in themselves, rushed towards the city of Stratus, but 
fell into ambushes which the Stratians had laid; the Chaonians and other 
allied barbarians rushed back into the Peloponnesian lines and when their 
forces had joined together, they were attacked by the Stratians who used 
their slings against them from a distance: x.e.WTo
i
< 5 ~ T p o < T ^ T T £ ^ < X  < * 6  T O O V
) ) / \ / A ^ / \ \  ^ / \
o u ic .  lO V T ^ v  T«o >/ ^ T ^ T c u j v  dec*' T o
k , o c p \ / ; o^ TT^ f^e.v v Cj v t UsJv
<y T\Oj> CCa'v \C.o£&L f'TcliV T ^ K J o o  oiV£.<J KtV/^O'jVoK
\  _ V \  (_ •> A ^ ^
Q Q K O U < T (. 4  <= o c  /A  < o (^  v  oC k. p  o O ft T o  <. €  Lvo<C T o Q  TO T T o C € lV .
(Thuc.II.81.8).
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Note that the Acarnanian slingers were used in ambush and that their 
efficiency with the sling was so great that only men equipped with hoplite 
defensive armour could move out of their camp.23 Stratus was situated on 
a hill two miles west of a ford over the Achelous; it will become apparent 
that the sling was used by several peoples inhabiting hilly areas. 23
Book Three of Thucydides: The Siege of Plataea (429 - 8 B.C.); Demosthenes'
Campaign against the Aetolians (426 B.C.); Military Operations in Amphilochia 
(426 B.C.)
Before considering the three main actions in which light-armed infantry 
took part, we must examine briefly some miscellaneous references to these 
troops in the first part of book 3. In 428 B.C., vpsiloi1 were taken along 
with a Peloponnesian army under the command of Archidamus for the purpose of
on
ravaging the Attic countryside. The Athenian cavalry were used to combat
 ^ ■> 
these troops: Koa rrpotf-jB>o\aa } yvo^ro t w v
C rr TTeU>V OTT 13 T r ; |<.OU T o v  H XfeCfToV 6^ 1l \ o V
^  V / \  ^  \  \  ^  /  r \ C / \  V "3 \
T ujv/  Y ' - A ^ v  T o  TT^ o € T u >v  OTTjkco V T<=<
TT^Xeu^ K  d K o o p y e Z v  (Thuc.III.1.2).
As we shall see, cavalry were very useful for combating light-armed infantry.
Also in 428 B.C. Lesbos revolted from Athens with the encouragement of
Sparta and Boeotia. Thucydides informs that the people of Lesbos were
waiting for archers from the Pontus region.31 These'toxotai'were Scythian
mercenary soldiers from the northern shore of the Black Sea. It is possible
that the Athenians had a force of Scythian archers in their army during the
period of the Peloponnesian War, although these are not specifically
mentioned by Thucydides.32 A short time before the surrender of Mytilene
in 427 B.C. we are told that the Spartan Salaethus issued heavy armour and
weapons to the demos of Mytilene which is described as 'psilos1; 'psi1 os1
33here seems simply to mean 'without heavy arms' rather than light-armed.
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In 428 B.C. during the blockade of Potidaea we are informed that every 
one of the hoplites engaged in the siege received two drachmae a day, one 
for himself and one for his'huperetesf^ The motif of a light-armed man, 
usually carrying two spears (javelins?), and wearing a tunic and cloak and 
often a soft cap or broad brimmed sun-hat, either standing or fighting beside 
a hoplite, is a very common motif of Attic Red-figure vases; it is almost 
certain that a hoplite would have been unwilling to buy an expensive panoply 
for his servant and the ceramic evidence would also suggest that the servant 
of a hoplite was light-armed.
The Siege of Plataea:
In 431 B.C., when war was about to break out, a Theban force marched 
against Plataea, but after gaining possession of the city for a short time 
the Theban advance party was shut in and captured. We are informed that one 
of the Plataeans managed to shut and fasten the city gates which were open 
by using the spiked butt of a javelin, which he thrust into the bar instead
oc
of the pin. We may infer from this that the Plataeans had some troops armed 
as javelin-throwers.
In 429 B.C. a Peloponnesian force put the city under siege. The 
Peloponnesians constructed a circumvallation and the Plataeans were forced 
to build a makeshift wall and put a defensive covering of skins and hides on 
it to protect the woodwork and their own workmen from the fire-arrows shot by 
the attackers: S ly otuioiy t cx
yiy v ^ f e v o v  elv/oa t o  o t K o ^ o ^ ^ j u ^  , ko«rc rryo
^ d.f> f&u-y K&a s , ^  <5"re t o u <^  G ^ y o c ^ o k<*c t c <
jJi^ |Tfe 0y30L^ olSToi^ £V <x o(.\ e I T £. fcLv/^ C.
(Thuc.II.75.5). This is
the first reference which we have in ancient Greek literature to fire-arrows 
being used by Greek archers. It was not till after the disaster of Sphacteria 
in 425 B.C. that the Spartans raised a force of archers of their own, so the
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archers firing these arrows must have belonged to Sparta's Peloponnesian
allies?'7 We can infer from the repeated use of the verb c -t o ^ u o v
(III.23.2 and.23.4) and the 0f ni.24.2 that the defending
Plataeans also had a force of archers. Rustow and Kochly argue that since
the Piataean defending force included archers, the Peloponnesians took care
38to locate their circumvallation out of range of the Piataean arrows. As the
individual bricks of the wall were visible, they think that the wall was no
39further away than 100 metres; it has been argued from this that the range
of the Piataean archers could not have been as great as 100 metres. McLeod
depreciates, I think wrongly, the value of the defending archers and asserts 
without any firm evidence, that they used single-stave (i.e. non-composite) 
bows. ^
In 428 B.C., when it was evident that no help was coming from Athens, 
a group of Plataeans decided to attempt to break out of their besieged city.
The men who set out to cross the Peloponnesian circumvallation were all 
light-armed: troops of this type were almost always used to take fortific­
ations by surprise because they were silent (no clanking heavy arms) and
\ i
swift. When it was dark and stormy, twelve psiloi, armed with daggers and
wearing breastplates, climbed the ladders which they placed against the
circumvallation and after them went more'psiloi'with spears; shields for the 
shock troops were carried by other men who mounted the ladders. The Plataeans 
succeeded in climbing the walls and sent missile-troops up to the top of the 
towers to shoot missiles down at the besieging garrison, while another group 
of Piataean missile-troops were positioned at the foot of the wall to fire 
missiles up at them. As each man got across, he formed up with the others 
at the edge of the ditch, and from there the archers and javelin-throwers shot 
their missiles at all who came up along the wall to prevent them crossing over. 
As the Plataeans who had occupied the tower came down, the Peloponnesian 
garrison fell upon them but since they were carrying torches in the darkness
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they presented perfect targets for the Piataean archers and javelin-throwers,
who shot at them where their bodies were exposed. All the Plataeans in the
group, with the exception of one archer who had been taken on the outer
41ditch, managed to get away safely owing to their agility.
We shall find many other occasions in the writings of Thucydides and 
later Xenophon in which light-armed troops were used to take by surprise 
fortified positions. Note especially the diversity of arms with which the 
1ight-infantry who took part in the operation were armed: there were men
armed with bows and javelins and other'psiloi'amongst the assault party who 
were armed with daggers and equipped with breastplates or simply carried normal 
spears; some of these troops were also equipped with shields. Note that 
although some of the'psiloi'had spears and shields, none were equipped with 
the full hoplite panoply.
In Thucydides1 narrative of the period between the end of the siege of
Plataea and the Aetolian campaign, there are two references to light-armed
troops: at Notium in 427 B.C., the Athenian commander Paches had his archers
42shoot down Hippias, the general of some Arcadian mercenaries. During the 
civil strife in Corcyra in 427 B.C., there was some fighting at long range 
with missile weapons.^
The Aetolian Expedition (426 B.C.):
In 426 B.C. the Messenians in Naupactus persuaded the Athenian general 
Demosthenes to attack the territory of the neighbouring Aetolians who were 
their enemies they furthermore told Demosthenes that the Aetolians would be 
easy to subdue since their troops were only lightly-equipped (
)55 Demosthenes agreed to attack the Aetolians probably because 
he wanted to safeguard the city of Naupactus which was situated in a vital 
position on the Corinthian Gulf, and ultimately to attack Boeotia from the 
rear.
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The Acarnanians, who were Athenian allies and might have contributed 
valuable light-armed troops, were angered by Demosthenes' refusal to block­
ade Leucas and sent no troops. Demosthenes set off with his army of
i 146Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians and 300 Athenian epibatai. Although
v i
it had been arranged that the Ozolian Locrians, who were akontistai and 
familiar with the Aetolians1 countryside and methods of fighting, were to 
join the Athenian force, Demosthenes decided not to wait for these reinforce­
ments, in spite of his lack of light-armed troops, and marched into Aetolia 
towards the hilltop city of Aegitium.4  ^The Aetolians had learned beforehand 
about the coming Athenian attack and had collected together to meet the 
threat. Demosthenes attacked and captured Aegitium, while the Aetolians 
fled and took up position on the tops of hills overhanging it. The Aetolians 
then ran down the hills and pelted Demosthenes' force with javelins on ground
which must have been very unsuitable for hoplites: CL Se cu
*-|k. o r  /\ly^ TLO\/ )  TTy3 0£5'£.y*>o<\\ov'
T o t e ,  A e - ^  | < £ * l  T K&TOC B&ovrej  CXTTb Tcov'
Xocj) oo v c< W o e  c » < \ \ o 0 € . v  k c ic  g r ^ k o V T  o v  } |< o a  o T e  Itt coc
T o  T u W  Bryo(.Cvjv <5~\j^ ocr o r r e S o v  j  u n  cJyO o o  v/^ c< v < y ^ u y > o u  <$l
€TT fe K  v /T O  * l<c<C ^  v- £TTl 1To\ o  T o c o CvJ T ^  "T
v c f t  '7' ’ i / 'S' , t
k o a  t-'TT o( y ujy'OfC } OL<y & jA(y> O T  € j> <5oCv/ Oc
/\.O^voiloL.  (Thuc. III.97.3).
The position of Demosthenes' force was perilous: his hoplites were
i i »
becoming worn out in their attempts to pursue the swift akontistai on ground 
which was unsuitable for them and their formation must have become increas-
i i
ingly fragmented. Only a corps of hitherto unmentioned toxotai in the 
Athenian force managed to fend off disaster for a time but when their arrows
i i
were spent and their toxarchos had been killed, they scattered and left the
hoplite army open to full force of the Aetolian attack: l o Sv
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c T' / ' r> / \ , ^ \. o  '
OL 1 0 ^ 0 7 « ( .  £1 y o v  T €  T  c< y & £ A ^  OCUTO^S V£e*<. OLQi- T  6= «^6oZ\/
y ^ j > ^ e r & c < L  4 ol civT6LN^ov ( T o ^ e u c y ^ e v o L  ycxy° ot A ^ T l ° ^ ° S'-
( X v O y s o o n o L  <. \  (A. C* V  £  <S"T £  W o V T o ) ’ e T T € t ^  ^ £  “rc:)^  T <=-
T o ^ y X °  O CXTTO &o<\/ O V T o y  o  U T O ( .  A g .< £ ‘ 1 < 6 ^ < * £ '6 > .^ o < u ' I< cxT C o ( U T o c
^K £K ^A  ^ k.etf'cXV' ko<\ C n\ TToKu TuJ OCUT UJ TTOVuJ ^UV€.^OyneVOL ;
*1 /\ » \  ^ / N > / */ r v>
O L  T £  / ^ L T  W A o t  S .V 6 .K G .L V  T o  j<c<L £ ^ k o v T ( . S O V  j O ^ T w  c> ^
T^ocrro^evoc £cj)euyov/, kc<\ £^rTtnTovT€<j T£ ^oy3«^P«<j cxvGkj&oJ'Tov^
l<cA yuj^toc £)V ouK <^$o<v/ €ycATT€tyOOL Set(j?0 GLyDOVT O ' (Thuc.III.98.1).
The swift-footed Aetolians chased after the hoplites and killed many
with their javelins; many of them got lost and wandered around in the woods
which the Aetolians set alight. Forty percent of the Athenian force was
slaughtered and the casualties of their allies must have been about the same
percentage.48
Note that the Aetolian javelin-throwers used the classic light-armed
tactic of retreating and then attacking to wear out the Athenian hoplites
and were extremely efficient in the final pursuit. The hilly and forested
terrain of Aetolia was probably one of the worst places Demosthenes could
have taken hoplites - they could not have hoped to form a regular phalanx on 
49such ground. The Athenian force of archers played a vital role in fending
off the Aetolians during the main engagement; the fact that they were
commanded by a'toxarchos1 would suggest that they were a well organized unit
50and possibly Athenian citizens, although we are not specifically told this.
This is the first occurrence of the word 'toxarchos' in prose; there is, 
however, an earlier reference to the noun 'toxarchos' in the Persae of 
Aeschylus.^ The defeat of the Athenian hoplite force was severe, but 
Demosthenes learnt from his expensive lesson and put the Aetolian tactics to 
good use at the battlesof Olpae and Sphacteria.
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Military Operations in Amphilochia (426 B.C.):
In 426 B.C., the Ambraciots descended into Amphilochian Argive territory
and seized the fort of Olpae, which was situated on a hill near Amphilochian 
52Argos. The Acarnanians sent for Demosthenes and the 20 ships which were 
coasting off the Peloponnese. Eurylochus and his Peloponnesian army marched 
through Acarnania and advanced towards Argos, joining with the Ambraciots at 
01pae.53 Demosthenes arrived in the Ambracian Gulf and brought with him 200 
Messenian hoplites and 60'toxotai'who were Athenian citizens (e^Kov-rcx. $4.
A©^v/oo^v' ) ^  Gomme suggests that these archers may have 
been part of the permanent garrison of Naupactus.After five days of in­
activity, both armies drew up for battle and Demosthenes, seeing that the 
Peloponnesian army outnumbered his own and fearing that his own flanks might
i i
be surrounded, laid an ambush with 400 hoplites and psiloi, by placing them 
in a deep lane overgrown with brushwood which was situated at the rear of 
the enemy.56 Both armies prepared to engage; Demosthenes, with the Messenians 
and a few Athenians, held the right wing, while the other was held by the
l iC7
Acarnanians and Amphilochian akontistai. In the fighting which followed, 
Demosthenes' wing was outflanked by the superior numbers of the Peloponnesian 
troops and was in great danger. The Acarnanians realized his predicament 
and came rushing out of their ambush behind the Peloponnesian force; the 
Peloponnesians who were facing the Athenians fled in terror without striking 
a blow and the rest of their left wing followed their example. The 
Ambraciots and other troops on the Peloponnesians' right wing managed to 
rout their opponents but were later defeated by Demosthenes' Acarnanian troops 
who drove them back to Olpae.
The Athenian victory over the numerically stronger Peloponnesian force
i i
was due to the surprise attack of the 400 Acarnanian hoplites and psiloi.
Gomme supposes that the Athenian'toxotai'were with the 400 in the sunken road,
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but Thucydides makes no mention of their part in the fighting.58 Hammond 
believes that Demosthenes' force consisted mainly of light-armed troops:6  ^
the Amphilochians, who were used to protect the flank of the left wing, are
i \
said to be akontistai in Thuc.111.107.4; some of the Acarnanian troops who
were set in ambush were'psiloi‘and we can probably infer from Thuc.111.111.3
finthat some of their number were equipped with javelins.
After this victory, Demosthenes learnt that the Ambraciots with all 
their forces were advancing towards him and, bearing in mind the disastrous 
experience which he had suffered at the hands of the Aetolians, in whose 
territory he had failed to take the necessary precautions, he now sent part 
of his army to lie in ambush along the roads and to occupy strategic positions 
The main Ambraciot force reached Idomene (there is some disagreement about 
which mountain we should identify as Idomene) and encamped on the smaller 
peak, while Demosthenes' men had already secretly occupied the larger one 
at night.61 Demosthenes himself took half of his army to the pass between 
the hills at dusk,while the other half travelled through the Amphilochian 
mountains. At dawn he attacked the Ambraciots in their sleep and slaughtered 
a great number of them, whilst the survivors fled into the mountains. The 
swift Amphilochian javelin-throwers were used to pursue and lie in wait for 
the Ambraciot hoplites and managed to kill a great number of them:
nyao k,oi~T £t\ £\/UJV T u W   ^140ft CKfu^ oL T w V  ^ 6 ^  A^A<|h\O^oo\/
t ii ^  c i~\ v \    X C \  /
&JXTT oVtwv ea*'JTcov' K-c-ct o\\ XL T<*<^  }
T^>v ©fTTfctjx-oN/ 14CXC fT ^ ^ o V C o V  0 / rr*^ c£.TT uWTcVL ^
€ C m  ov/te^ K ocl tc<^ TT^o\fe\o^^M<rVc<<'
l i.ecf>Oe^o\r-ro . (Thuc. 111.112.6).
There are striking similarities between the defeat of Demosthenes in 
Aetolia and that of the Ambraciots in Amphilochia: in both cases the
heavily-armed hoplite in unfamiliar hilly countryside appears to have been
CO
entirely defenceless against the light-armed soldier. In the Amphilochian
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campaign we find light-armed troops fulfilling many important roles: lying
in ambush behind enemy lines and in other suitable positions, occupying 
dominant positions, taking part in dawn attacks and pursuing a routed enemy. 
Demosthenes' defeat in Aetolia had taught him a lesson which he could not 
forget and he used light-armed troops in battle to good effect both in the 
campaign in Amphilochia and on Sphacteria.
Book Four of Thucydides: Pylos (425 B.C.); Nisaea (424 B.C.); Delium 
(424 B.C.); Campaigns in Chalcidice (424 - 423 B.C.)
Pylos and Sphacteria (425 B.C.):63
In 425 B.C., Demosthenes was sent to accompany a fleet of 40 ships,
under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, which was ready to set off for
the West. Demosthenes wished to establish a military post in the western
Peloponnese and pressed the commanders to put in at Pylos, on the coast of
Messenia, and to fortify the headland of Coryphasium. The main fleet went
on its way, leaving Demosthenes with five ships to hold Pylos. The Spartan
army under Agis had invaded Attica, but returned early, probably because of
news of Pylos. Demosthenes, confronted by a body of Spartan troops, sent
two of his ships to overtake the fleet and beg Eurymedon to return to help
him. The Spartans wanted to blockade Pylos and were moreover afraid that
the Athenians might use the island of Sphacteria as a base for military
operations, and accordingly Epitadas occupied Sphacteria with 420 Lacedae-
64monian hoplites and their helots.
The Spartans then prepared to take Pylos by storm before help could come 
to the Athenians. Demosthenes dragged his ships into a stockade and, to 
meet the emergency, armed his oarsmen as crude psiloi'with wicker shields of 
poor quality;65 he then posted the greater part of his light-armed troops 
( a o n X o o v  ) and hoplites ( <-<5yM.lvujv j to guard the northern line
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of defence and the south-eastern corner of the promontory of Coryphasium, 
while he himself, with 60 hoplites and some'toxotai1, protected the edge of 
the south-western shore, where the Spartans were about to try to land?^ The 
Spartans attacked on two days but failed to make a landing. The force of 
Athenian triremes then arrived and attacked the Peloponnesian fleet on the 
shores of Navarino Bay, possibly near the Gialova river; the Athenians 
succeeded in gaining a substantial victory which consequently enabled them 
to blockade the Spartans on Sphacteria. The Spartans lost their whole fleet
of 60 ships in the truce which followed.
The siege became protracted and the Spartans on Sphacteria managed to
get supplies by means of helots who swam across from the mainland with
provisions. The Athenians at home grew impatient; in the assembly Cleon 
came forward and said that he was not frightened of the Spartans and would 
sail against them without taking a single man from Athens, only the Lemnians 
and Imbrians (who may have been peltasts) who were already in the city and 
the peltasts who had come from Aenus to offer their help and four hundred
' i  c y
toxotai who were available from other quarters. Thucydides' observation that 
Demosthenes intended to give the most important tasks in his plan of campaign 
to light-armed troops from the beginning probably indicates that Cleon brought
C O
these troops to Pylos at Demosthenes' request. The fact that some men in
the Athenian assembly ridiculed Cleon's promise that he would defeat the
Spartans with these specialist troops shows that they had no notion as yet of 
how effective light-armed men could be in certain conditions. Note well 
that Cleon proposed to use specialist light-troops obtained from sources out­
side Athens: peltasts from Aenus in Thrace, troops from Lemnos and Imbros,
i i
two northern Athenian colonies, and allied or mercenary toxotai who came 
from outside the city.
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Before Cleon arrived at Pylos, the forest on Sphacteria had been 
destroyed by fire; many commentators suppose the fire was started deliber­
ately by the Athenians to burn the thick undergrowth and so make landing 
easier. Best suggests that the Spartans could have used the thick under­
growth "to launch surprise attacks from all sides" and thus they would have 
been "able to defeat an enemy unfamiliar with the thickly wooded terrain, 
even if they were outnumbered".^ I am dubious of this suggestion: the
heavily armed, less mobile, Spartan hoplites would have found great difficulty 
in using such tactics on rough terrain against Athenian light-armed troops.
They were trained to fight in a phalanx block and the tactics which Best 
supposes they might have employed would have been strange to them. Did 
Demosthenes fear such tactics, not from the Spartan hoplites, but from their 
lightly-armed helots and consequently order an advance party to set light to 
the undergrowth? ^
Cleon and Demosthenes, after an appeal to the Spartans to surrender had 
failed, landed all their 800 hoplites at two different points on the island 
with orders to destroy the first Spartan observation post and to provide a 
bridgehead for the rest of the Athenian army.71 The hoplites accomplished 
their task and at dawn the rest of the Athenian force went ashore on Sphacteria:
5y ^  ^  1 v C 5 / \ \  » . /
d £  |cc* i .  o  o c a a o c ,  t
The light-armed forces, then, consisted of 800 archers and 800 peltasts, 
who were fully trained specialist troops, and the majority of the sailors 
from over 70 ships who were armed with whatever weapons they could lay their
t
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hands on and acted as crude psiloi. How many light-armed sailors did the
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ships produce? The lowest rank of sailors (Thalarnioi), sixty in number to 
each ship, were excluded from the military operation, only the sixty 'Zugitai' 
and fifty 'Thranitai' in each ship were utilized. Thus 70 ships would have 
produced 7,700 Zugitai and Thranitai, but we must bear in mind that Thucydides 
informs us that the crews (excluding the Thalarnioi) of more than 70 ships 
landed; Wilson assumes that there were over 80 triremes with the Athenian 
force at this time - this gives us a maximum total of 8,800 for the number of 
Zugitai and Thranitai who could have landed.74 If we add 8,800 crude'psiloi' 
to the 1,600 archers and peltasts, we come up with the incredible total of 
10,400 men for the light-armed force which landed on Sphacteria. Little 
wonder that the 420 Spartans were overwhelmed.
Demosthenes formed his light-armed troops into units of roughly 200 men
and ordered them to attack the Spartans on all sides, using the typical attack
then retreat tactics which were common to skirmishers: I\
Tv _ / v r # . v t
voc^u>poutfcv eTTeicew-E<Thuc. IV.32.3-4). Note that Thucydides uses the
slingers. We know that there were two forces, each numbering 800 men, of 
archers and peltasts, but who were the men who threw the stones and operated
oi v~c 5 uon/ToCl c<
ev/ol
term psiloi here to cover archers, javelin-throwers, stone-throwers and
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with slings7 One would expect that the oarsmen, who were armed with 
whatever weapons they could lay their hands on, may have picked up stones 
and hurled them at the Spartans. Pausanias asserts that there was a corpsI 1 7 r
of Messenian sphendonetai present in the Athenian force/3
The main body of the Spartan troops, who were posted in the northern 
part of Sphacteria, when they saw that their first guard-post had been over­
whelmed and that a force was advancing upon them, formed up and advanced 
towards the Athenian hoplites, wishing to get to grips with them in close 
combat. They probably assumed that, as in most battles, the light-armed 
troops were insignificant and that the battle would be fought between their 
own phalanx and that of the Athenians. However, the Athenian hoplites 
stayed where they were, probably on one of the hills at the southern end of 
the island, near where the Spartan guard-post had been stationed, and mean­
while their light-troops advanced against the Spartans, showering missiles 
at them from on their flanks and in their rear.78 The Spartan hoplites 
tried unsuccessfully to attack their light-armed foes, who took to their 
heels, when they saw an attack developing; the Spartans were hampered in 
pursuit both by their heavy equipment and by the terrain which was extremely 
rough and difficult.7'7
/ \ ^  \
Thucydides then states in IV.34.1: ysj>o'sov o u v  tin/cx
OV oUTtJ ** ^l<Y>ojB©\iVoW T O  . In the 
preceding chapter, Thucydides describes the Athenian'psiloi1 raining missiles 
on the Spartans, then the Spartans charging and the light-troops running 
away. This type of fighting could well be defined as a ‘skirmish1 in 
English, but the Greek verb cx k p o ^ o X  c^oyucxc does not seem to have a 
general meaning of ‘skirmish1 but rather it specifically implies using missile 
weapons such as the arrow, javelin, s1ing-bu1 let or stone at a distance from 
the enemy/8 The aorist third person plural of the verb c*kpo 
would mean that some troops on the Spartan side were also fighting with long-
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range weapons - if not, how are we to explain n  \\ \ o o ^ ?
Hoplites were not equipped to operate with missiles since their heavy armour
and large shields would have inhibited the movement necessary to fire them,
so that we can safely assume that it was, as we should suppose, their helot
attendants who fought with missile weapons. As we have seen in the Persian
wars, helots fought and died on the battlefield of Thermopylae and a huge
force of helots, whom Herodotus specifically terms'psiloi1, were present at
79the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C.
We know that there were helots present on Sphacteria (Thuc.IV.8.9) and 
it seems likely that it was these who acted as light-armed missile-troops.
We do not know how large the force of helots was which was present on the 
island. Lazenby thinks that "each Spartan hoplite was accompanied by his 
own batman" and Wilson comments "I do not believe that there were more than 
one or two helots per Spartan";^0 there may feasibly have been more than two 
helots to each Spartan, but not many more because water and food supplies 
were very limited on the island.
In the fighting in which the Athenians rained missiles at the Spartans 
and then ran away, one would have thought that the support of the light­
armed missile-troops, however crudely equipped, would have been vital to 
help to ward off such attacks; indeed,I fail to see how the Spartans could 
have been able to withstand the ferocious attacks from all sides of the
• i
numerically superior Athenian psiloi unless their helots were in some way
trying to ward off their attackers. Wilson comments: "the prolonged Spartan
resistance against such overwhelming numbers is hardly intelligible if we
81picture 420-Spartans on their own, with no helot assistance". The helots 
must have protected the rear of the Spartans which was attacked by the -
< i
Athenian psiloi and given some support in the retreat to Mount Elias and in 
the final defence of the hilltop.
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Although I believe that the helots helped to prolong the Spartan 
resistance, I am forced to conclude by Thucydides' silence that they could 
not have severely hampered the Athenian light-armed, probably because they 
were vastly outnumbered, ill-equipped and untrained - certainly no match for
However, we must also bear in mind the possibility that Thucydides does not 
mention the part played by the helots in the fighting because he regarded 
them as socially and militarily insignificant. Thucydides' main interest in 
the battle was the surrender of the Spartan hoplites.
The fighting with missile weapons lasted for a relatively short time and 
the Athenian light-armed troops' incessant attacks began to wear out the 
Spartan hoplites who became unable to counter them with much force. The
> i
psiloi, being confident owing to their own large number and success, attacked 
all the more fiercely; they rushed upon them showering them with stones, 
arrows and javelins.88 The predicament of the bewildered Spartans is described
casualties and Thucydides informs us that the felt caps ( ) of the
Spartans were no protection against arrows and that-javelins broke off in
and made for the fort on Mount Elias at the northern end of the island, 
pursued clo-sely by the Athenian Tight-armed"troops who killed any Lacedaemonian
Once the Spartans gained the stronghold, the Athenians were unable to 
surround them and this meant that the battle was conducted face to face;
the large specialist bodies of archers and peltasts in the Athenian force.8 ^
the bodies of Spartans who had been hit. The Spartans closed-their ranks
who could not keep up with the main body. 85
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the Spartan hoplites then showed their prowess by driving off the incessant 
Athenian attacks for the rest of the day. It was only when a number of 
archers and light-armed troops led by the commander of the Messenian contin­
gent reached a higher position behind the Spartans that the battle was
decided;®^according to Pausanias the contingent of'psiloi'were Messenian 
87slingers. Now, when the Spartans were being harassed on two sides, they 
were compelled to give up their positions and retreat from the advancing 
Athenians; their situation soon became hopeless and Cleon and Demosthenes 
stopped the engagement and accepted the Spartan surrender. The Spartan 
casualties were heavy: 128 of the 420 Spartan hoplites were killed. The
Athenian losses were slight: although, if I.G. 1 2949 is a stele recording
the Athenian dead at Pylos, we know that out of the light-armed troops at
I | Q O
least some toxotai had fallen.
Demosthenes had used the very same tactics which were used against him 
by the Aetolians to win a brilliant and relatively bloodless victory over 
the Spartans. The skirmishing tactics of his large forces of archers,
» i
peltasts, slingers and other cruder psiloi in the rough terrain had totally 
baffled the Spartan hoplites, who could find no way to join battle with them. 
The victory was probably due more to the well organized and equipped forces 
of archers and peltasts than to the makeshift oarsmen-psiloi'who were armed 
with whatever weapons they could pick up (possibly with knives, hatchets and 
spare spears and some at least carried wicker-shields) or possibly even just 
threw rocks and stones. Demosthenes' relatively large body of hoplites 
appear to have played no part in the main battle, though they did serve the 
purpose of focussing the attention of the Spartans, and presumably were in a 
position to carry out a crushing attack if the Spartans had attempted to 
break into smaller parties to deal with the Athenian light-armed troops.
The Spartan hoplites evidently despised the tactics of the Athenian 
missile-troops and the sneering answer of one of them, when asked if all the
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brave Spartans had fallen, typifies this: "The spindle (meaning the arrow)",
quoth the Spartan "would indeed be a valuable weapon, if it picked out the 
89brave". After the battle both Athens and Sparta must have realized that 
light-armed troops had great military potential, whether they approved of 
their skirmishing tactics or not. 90
After their defeat on Sphacteria, the Spartans raised a force of 400 
cavalry and a corps of archers to meet the swift ravaging attacks of the 
Athenian psiloi and hoplites: *• - icea r r ^ T ^ ^ o S t N /  £<^2:^
<r~r TTc.\e^oo icoO. cJlT^O ^ u \ c < K T O U  , dj fTfe
S ^ I / / /  ^ V  /
rroc^oc t <$ e i.w 8o<j m rre o c ^  T e T ^ c x K ^ t ^ T ^ ^ r o  Kcu To£ot<*<
(Thuc.IV.55.2). This passage of Thucydides is very important as it implies
that before this measure the Spartans had no archers in their own army.
It also implies that the helots were not armed with bows and arrows; this
accords well with Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C.,
when Pausanias, who already had a large force of light-armed helots, specif-
91 rically requested the assistance of the Athenian corps of archers. It the 
helots on Sphacteria did in fact 'skirmish1 with missile weapons, it seems 
probable that they used javelins and stones, but not bows; this explains 
why the helots did not carry out an effective role against the Athenian
* i \ i
light-armed force which contained toxotai and sphendonetai, who could operate 
from a much greater range. We are not told if the members of the Spartan 
archer corps were Spartan citizens,'perid^koi1, or helots.
Todneet attacks on the Peloponnese by the Athenian fleet the Spartans 
also placed garrisons round the coast, but there were in most cases insuff­
icient numbers in a particular area for action. The attacks of the Athenians 
on the Peloponnese were particularly effective because they used swift-footed 
'psiloi1, who were difficult to bring to battle, to ravage land and these were 
backed up by hoplites. If the Spartans had raised a much larger body of 
cavalry, which could have been split up into sector-forces for the coast,
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they might have had a strong weapon to counter the ravaging attacks of
In 425 B.C., we also hear of archers taking part in the stasis at 
Corcyra; members of the Corcyraean popular party murdered a number of the 
oligarchs by shutting them in a building, dismantling the roof, and shooting
Corcyra who were armed with the bow.
Megara and Nisaea (424 B.C.)
After the Spartan defeat on the island of Sphacteria, the Athenians
undertook a bold attack against Megara. In 424 B.C., stasis had erupted
at Megara which led to the expulsion of a faction who seized the port of
Pagae; the opponents of the exiled faction wished to gain the support of
Athens and offered to betray Megara and the harbour of Nisaea. They agreed
to help the Athenians to take the Long Walls which extended from Megara to
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Nisaea, where a Peloponnesian -garrison was positioned.
The surprise attack was well planned: the Athenian general Hippocrates,
with 600 hoplites, took up his position not far from the_-Long Walls in a 
trench.- A second division of the Athenian army, consisting of'psiloi'of the 
Plataeans and other 'peripoloi[ under the command of Demosthenes, lay in 
ambush at the temple of Enyalius, which was situated very near to the Long 
Walls.95 Although we have very little evidence about the‘peripoloi’at this
Athenian psiloi. In Thucydides IV.56.1, we hear of a Spartan garrison which 
did make a stand against some Athenian psiloi1, but was driven off by their
supporting hoplites: <[>^ou^oc , rr^\
1<C. OT bj^ -XoCs/ Koo. ( j>po^cTtc<v } T o V  T u W  ' \^fc\c3v'
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arrows down at them.^3 It is worth nothing that it was the lower classes in
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period, it seems probable, as Parke suggests, that they were light-armed
96troops and that they were used in frontier duties and for garrisons. By 
a trick on the part of the pro-Athenian party in the city, the Plataeanvpsiloi' 
and the'peripoloi'succeeded in leaving their hiding place just before daybreak 
and running towards the gates which had been opened. At that, their Megarian 
supporters cut down some of the guards, while the Athenian light troops over­
powered the Peloponnesians who stood in their way and secured the gates for 
the entrance of the Athenian hoplites: !<©<«. t c j > ^ * t o v  jX & v  o c  T T tp v  t o v
^^ jLA O  T 6 KjcA i r e p i / T T o \o C  08 v u v
t o "rp0-nou^v i<sTi. j <Lv-vo^ tu>v tt «j\£v C^<rOov"ro
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Ttp O °C TT\o< KoU To?^  T^V Ae
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Demosthenes had planned this attack well, using a contingent of light­
armed as shock troops to capture the gate, and the hoplites to consolidate 
the occupied positions. The operation took place at night to ensure the 
maximum amount of panic among the opponents. The 'psiloi1 were ideally suited 
to spearheading this surprise attack since they were swift and unencumbered 
with heavy, clanking armour. After the Long Walls and Nisaea had been 
taken, a Spartan and Boeotian force came to relieve Megara, which the Athenians 
had not captured, and the Boeotian cavalry carried out a surprise attack on 
the'psiloi'of the Athenians, who were scattered over the plain,ravaging the 
Megarian land, and routed them, driving them to the se<v . Light-armed 
troops on flat land were always very vulnerable to cavalry attack.^ The 
Athenians failed to take Megara. _
The Battle of Delium (424 B.C.):
Athens was very confident after the recovery of Nisaea in 424 B.C. and 
this success led Athens to try to crush the power of Boeotia. The Boeotian
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government was to be threatened on three sides by a synchronized attack: 
Demosthenes and his force of Acarnanians were to secure Siphae, the port 
of Thespiae, Hippocrates and an Athenian forcetyerz to fortify the temple of 
Apollo at Delium as a base, whilst Chaeronea was to be seized by a democratic 
faction. The Boeotians, however, organized resistance to Demosthenes and 
he did not try to take Siphae and the democratic faction in Chaeronea failed
QQ
to gain control of the city. Hippocrates' attack went ahead: he called
out the whole army of Athens, metics as well as citizens and all the 'xenoi' 
who were then in the city (the majority of the metics and'xenoi'were probably
QQ I ^
armed as light-infantry). A massive force of psiloi accompanied the hop- 
lite force: 6omm^s assertion that they were primarily taken on the expedit­
ion for the rapid construction of the fortifications around the temple of 
Delium is probably correct.100
When the work of fortifying the temple precinct was almost finished,
the Athenian army retired a short distance from it, while the majority of
101the light-armed troops proceeded on their march home. Under the influence
of the Boeotarch Pagondas, the Boeotians marched with a large force, which
consisted of 7,000 hoplites, more than 10,000'psiloi', 1,000 cavalry and
102500 peltasts, against the Athenians. In the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (11.4) 
it is stated that each of the eleven divisions into which the Boeotian 
confederacy was divided (at the beginning of the 4th century B.C.) had to 
produce 1,000 hoplites and 100 cavalry. With this in mind, P.A. Seymour 
suggests that the 7,000 hoplites and 500 peltasts in the Boeotian force at 
the battle of Delium in 424 B.C. represented two thirds of the total force 
from ten divisions and the full force from the Tanagra division. I have 
little faith in Seymour's hypothesis: he“seems to regard the peltasts as
equivalent to hoplites, but the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia makes no mention of 
peltasts or any other light-armed troops.103 We are not told if the peltasts 
in the Boeotian force were native Boeotians or mercenaries from elsewhere.
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Thus the Boeotian army had a large force of over 10,500 light-armed troops 
(amounting to over 56.8% of the whole force), five hundred of whom were 
specialist peltasts. We are further told that the Boeotian cavalry and 
light-arrned troops were placed on the wings of their army, almost certainly 
to hamper attacks on their own flanks or to initiate attacks on those of the 
Athenians.^
Thucydides recounts again the Athenian force under Hippocrates: they
had 7,000 hoplites and a force of cavalry which were stationed on the wings 
of the Athenian phalanx. He then gives us some very important information
about the Athenian psiloi': 'l(Ti\©c T r o ^ o ^ k t u ^  yu£\/ J»n\<.^evoi
)/ / /-^ )<  ^ A /\ . ^
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olkouj ou TTo^pfeY^^0 ^ 0 o X c y o L  (Thuc. IV. 94.1). Thucydides
informs us in this passage that the Athenians had far more'psiloi1in their
force than the Boeotians (i.e. the Athenians had well over 10,000‘psiloi1).
More importantly for our understanding of Athenian light-armed troops, he
also tells us that the psiloi* at the time of the Delium campaign were not
uniformly armed and equipped, nor did Athens possess any native psiloi*who
were. We also learn that the majority of the'psiloi*, who did not remain
•>/ \
with the main army but started on their march home, were c x o t t a o c ;
Gomme takes «oTrXo«. to mean 'unarmed' rather than 'light-armed' but, 
although it is difficult to separate o l o n X o x  from i l m X «. <t/m. L v o l  ,
I think we should-not exclude the possibility that at least a proportion of 
the psi loi* carried crude weapons..105 Even if the Athenian Vps i loi 'were used 
mainly for the building operation, they were all marching in enemy territory 
and were sent back to Athens without the protection of hoplites and cavalry 
and, in view of these facts, it seems probable that many of them were armed
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with weapons for their own defence; doubtless some of the Athenian'psiloi' 
could simply have picked up rocks and stones and thrown them at the enemy. 
Indeed, some Theban and Tanagraian black stone stelai with pictures of 
warriors incised on them, which A. Keramopoullos. believes should be associ­
ated with the battle of Delium, show rocks which have been thrown by an enemy 
On the funerary stele of Sauganes from Tanagra, which dates approximately to 
the period of the battle but may be slightly later, a warrior is depicted 
carrying a short sword in his right hand and with his broken thrusting-spear 
lying at his feet; we also see the head of an opponent's spear directed 
against him and a stone flying near his face and other stones lying by his 
feet - were the stones thrown by Athenian'psiloi?1^  The stele of Rynchon from 
Thebes, which also dates approximately to the period of the battle, shows a
1DQ
charging warrior and two rocks which may have been thrown at him at his feet.
In the battle itself, both armies charged at one another but Thucydides 
informs us that the extreme right and left wings of both forces, where the 
Boeotian 1ight-infantry were placed and probably also the*psiloi*of the 
Athenians who had been kept behind, were prevented form engaging by water­
courses ( f>o<x\<*ey) He makes no mention at all about the part played
by light-armed troops of both sides in the battle. Gomme, however, asserts
1 ( ithat "The light-armed would not have been hindered by s put
110should have taken advantage of them against hoplites". If Gomme's assertion,
as seems probable, is true, why does Thucydides make no mention of them in
his narrative of the battle?^^ The Boeotians, as we-know, had a very large
force of light-armed troops present on the wings of their phalanx and the
Athenians had at least some'psiloi'left with their main force: it seems
inconceivable that Thucydides does not even~give them a passing reference in
112his account of the actual fighting.
After the Athenians were defeated in the hoplite battle, the Boeotian 
cavalry pursued them from the field. In the battle the Athenians lost a
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little under 1,000 men, presumably hoplites,although they may have lost
t i i 1113
some cavalry, and a great number of psiloi and skeuophoroi. It is possible 
that the Boeotian cavalry caught up with the great mass of Athenian'psiloi* 
who were marching back to Athens, but I think that those referred to in 
this casualty list are those who stayed on the battlefield with the hoplites 
and that Thucydides probably means that a proportionately high number of the
l l  11ZL l lpsiloi present on the field were killed. The presence of skeuophoroi on 
the field can be explained by the fact that Hippocrates did not expect an 
attack and would not have had time to send them away; once they realized 
that a battle was about to take place, they almost certainly would have pre­
ferred to stay where they were under the protection of the hoplites rather 
than to make a run for it and risk the possibility of being cut down by the 
Boeotian cavalry.
The Boeotians then concentrated for an attack on the Athenian fortific­
ations around the temple of Apollo at Delium. We are informed by Thucydides
\  V  V  I
that they immediately sent for forces of akontistai and sphendonetai from
the region of the Malian Gulf, presumably for the attack on the fortifications.
Gomme understandably comments: "It is remarkable that the Boeotians, who had
over 10,000 light-armed at Delion, should have needed these reinforcements".11
The only possible answer is that the Boeotians felt that they needed more
specialist missile-troops in addition to their force of peltasts. Egyptian,
Assyrian and Roman slingers are depicted attacking fortified positions and
1
Philip of Macedon used them to attack-the city of Olynthus in 348 B.C. Clay
siing-shots could be heated to start a fire in an enemy camp, but this practice
is not mentioned here!17 The Athenian fortification was taken but again we are
not-told-what part, if any, the Boeotian light-armed troops played in its.
11Rcapture. °
m
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Campaigns in Chalcidice (424 - 423 B.C.):
In 424 B.C. the Spartan Brasidas advanced into Thrace and took the city
decided to make an expedition against the city of Torone which was held by 
the Athenians. In his attack on Torone, which bears a striking resemblance 
to that of Demosthenes on the Long Walls of Megara, Brasidas used light-armed
Brasidas arrived at Torone with his army during the night and took up 
position at the temple of the Dioscuri which was about three stades from the 
city. The Pro-Spartan faction in Torone admitted into their city a storming
of the city and began to break down the postern-gate which faced the promontory
Brasidas advanced nearer to the city with the rest of his army and sent 
forward one hundred peltasts to wait for any of the gates to be opened and 
the pre-arranged fire signal. Firstly, some peltasts were admitted through 
the postern-gate, in order to heighten the panic inside the city by means of 
a sudden attack in the rear. The Pro-Spartan faction then raised the fire 
signal and received the storming party of peltasts through the gates by the
119of Amphipolis; several cities in Chalcidice joined his side. Brasidas then
troops (psiloi) equipped with daggers and also peltasts in his storming party.120
i i
party of psiloi armed with daggers who killed the guards posted on the summit
(Thuc.IV.110.2).
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122market-place. On seeing the signal Brasidas rushed forward with his entire
army; some soldiers ran inside straight away, others occupied the walls.
Brasidas ascended towards the highest part of Torone with his main force,
while his remaining troops spread out over the rest of the city. While the
majority of the citizens were panic-stricken, the Pro-Spartan faction joined
the invading army. On the second day of fighting Brasidas captured the
fort of Lecythus, which was held by an Athenian garrison, and thus gained
123total control of the city.
Thus, we find Brasidas, a Spartan general, using light-armed troops to 
attack by surprise a fortified position at night - the very tactic which the 
Athenian Demosthenes had utilized earlier in the same year.
In 423 B.C.,when Mende and Scione revolted from Athens and the arrival 
of an Athenian force was imminent,we learn that "Brasidas, expecting a sea­
borne attack from the Athenians, had the women and children of the Scionaeans 
and Mendaeans conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice and also sent over 
for them 500 Peloponnesian hoplites and 300 Chalcidian peltasts, all of whom 
were under the command of Polydamidas" (Thuc.IV.123.4). In this passage 
we find Brasidas making use of peltasts whcmwe know for certain were native
12ZLChalcidians.
In 423 B.C. we gain some insight into the manner in which Brasidas and 
his force combated an attack by light-armed troops. Brasidas, deserted by 
his Macedonian and barbarian troops, faced the army of Arrhabaeus, king of 
the Lyncestians of Upper Macedonia, and his allied Illyrian troops. He 
decided to retreat and formed his hoplites into, a compact square with the 
crowd of 1 ight-armed troops ( cy-uXo\/ ); in the centre.^ The
'psiloi'were obviously unable to defend themselves and needed a formation in 
which they were protected by the hoplites. Brasidas ordered the youngest 
hoplites to sally out of their formation when the Lyncestians and Illyrians,
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many of whom must have been lightly-armed, attacked, whilst he himself with
300 picked troops formed the rearguard to beat off the foremost of their 
126attackers. Brasidas, according to Thucydides, addressed his troops in a 
speech which is tinted with the typical Spartan view that the skirmishing 
tactics used by the Illyrian troops were cowardly.
When Brasidas began the retreat, the barbarians attacked his force but 
were driven off by successive charges by his young hoplites: 
ot cc)OVTe^ T T o \ \  BopofinjJ
TTj>o£eke.iVTo1 (fcyvTec, cj? toyecv
l<o i T c * \ o < J L a v T c|)©ey> &c\/. KoA o(otoi^ o<i T e
 ^ k \ t/ _ / i i v  ^ \
€ K oj>c>j^ o(l try} © <$■ t t  c-rr t o l € . v  o C t t ^ v t u o v  lc<xi ctoT o j
S X U#V "rou^ e m  KeLyM^vou^ o <Jk  d"To{To j t e
/  C r\  \  /  • > /  ^  \  ,
t t t o t j^ o y > ^ v ^  ttc^ oc Y’ V t jy ^ ^ \ /  c ^ v T f c ^ T ^ i j ^ v  K o a  »o \ o t r r o v
^■rrc c|> e^><Y^e\/ou^ M.ev' evoL ^ u v o v t o  j
^  v > \  c /  /  ^  v ~  v ^
oC o i u T o t  uTT 6.y^toj>oo\/^ T o T £  X « o V  j^ a.£To(. T o o  o u
vu>v 4 v  T  3. t o (  O t  TTo W o t  T w v  £  otp | ) o ( | ) u iV
oCTTfcd' o v t o  1 (Thuc. Iv. 12/. 1 -2)". Brasidas1 tactics were very
X
effective and in open countryside, which was suitable for the hoplite square 
and did not test its cohesion, the enemy could not attack the Spartan block 
with any success. Demosthenes could have adopted these tactics in his
i i
retreat from the Aetolian akontistai in 426 B.C., but the terrain was probably
not suitable for the defensive square formation and his men were already worn 
127out. We cannot tell if the barbarians'tactics would have been successful
if they had persevered in their attacks; if the Lacedaemonians had become
exhausted by continued sallies against the enemy, they could have suffered
1 1 10Othe same fate as the Spartan mora-did near Corinth in 390 B.C.
It is remarkable to note that Brasidas did"not. employ his own light­
armed troops in the engagement; they were safely surrounded by hoplites in 
the centre of the square formation. They were clearly regarded as not being 
capable of standing up to the barbarians: was this because they were poorly
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equipped or more simply because they were heavily outnumbered by the barbar­
ians? As we shall see with the army of the Ten Thousand, light-armed troops 
were used to constitute separate van- and rear-guards; since Brasidas had 
not learned to equip or train his light-armed infantry to fulfil these roles, 
he formed his rearguard out of hoplites.
In 423 B.C., the Athenians sailed out against the cities of Mende and
Scione which had revolted. The Athenian generals Nicias and Nicostratus had
under their command 1,000 citizen hoplites, 600'toxotai', 1,000 Thracian
129mercenaries and some peltasts from their allies in Chalcidice. We are not 
told if the 600'toxotai*were Athenian citizens, allies or mercenaries. The
1,000 Thracian mercenaries are most likely to have been peltasts. Nicias 
tried unsuccessfully to attack a Peloponnesian force, which was encamped on 
a hill outside Mende, with his light-armed troops and 60 hoplites: k.o<\
they were used by Nicias as shock troops in his attempt to carry the Pelop­
onnesians' high position. The main Athenian force followed at the rear of
because of confusion caused byjthe wounding of Nicias or perhaps because the
Book Five of Thucydides: The Battle of Amphipol~is_ (422 B._C.) t
In 422 B.C., the Athenian general Cleon recaptured Torone and then sailed 
to Eion and from there he launched an attack on Stageirus and Galepsus. The 
capture of these two cities would have ensured the safety of Eion as a base of
o(u~T oi
c<TToi VT U
U TT 0(6 Tu>V
I
Psiloi and archers were well suited to fighting on uneven and steep ground and
these advanced'psiloi1, hoplites and archers but the attack failed, possibly
-ion
Peloponnesian force had numerical superiority.
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operations against Amphipolis; Cleon, however, succeeded only in capturing
Galepsus and decided to wait in Eion for reinforcements and requested
Perdiccas to send him an auxiliary force; he also asked the king ofA0domantoi
Polles, to collect for him as large a force of Thracian mercenaries as possibl
When Brasidas learnt that Cleon was in Eion, he took up a counter position
on a hill called Cerdylium, near Amphipolis, from which he could observe 
132Cleon's movements. Thucydides informs us that Brasidas had in his army 
1,500 Thracian mercenaries, the majority of whom were most likely peltasts, 
the entire force of the Edonians, which consisted of peltasts and cavalry,
1,000 Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts in addition to his own force of hop­
lites (which was smaller than that of the Athenians) and his 300 Greek cavalry 
Brasidas stationed 1,500 troops on Cerdylium, while the remainder of his army 
was drawn up in order of battle in Amphipolis.
Cleon, according to Thucydides to satisfy the impatience of his soldiers,
marched against Amphipolis and stationed his army on a steep hill above the
city from which he could survey the land. Thucydides repeatedly asserts
that he did not intend to fight an engagement and that he thought that he
could leave his position whenever he liked!^- When Brasidas saw the Athenians
advancing, he led his force down from Cerdylium into Amphipolis. He did not
want to fight a pitched battle with the Athenians because he regarded his own
troops as being inferior in quality to the Athenian hoplites and the forces
of their allies. To counteract the superior quality of the Athenian troops,
Brasidas wanted to launch a surprise attack-on Cleon's force before it retired
135and to fight a battle before the Athenians' reinforcements arrived.
Brasidas picked a force of 150 hoplites and put the rest of his:force 
under the command of Clearidas; with these troops Brasidas .wished to charge 
at the main body of Athenians and while they were in panic Clearidas' troops 
would attack them from another gate. The plan was not without risk: if the
Athenians held firm after the appearance of Clearidas' troops, Brasidas' own 
position, with the best Athenian hoplites arrayed against him,would have been
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perilous, The plan also meant that his large forces of peltasts, who could 
not have been fully utilized in a pitched hoplite battle, could take part in 
a swift surprise attack for which they were well suited. Thus Brasidas, 
like Demosthenes at the battle of Olpae in 426 B.C., resorted to a surprise 
attack on two fronts which enabled him to avoid a pitched battle with the 
whole force of the elite Athenian hoplites.1^
Cleon was warned that Brasidas was in the city with his whole army and 
that they might attack at any moment; he gave a general signal for retreat 
and at the same time ordered his forces on his left wing to retire towards 
Eion. The left retired so slowly that Cleon ordered his right wing, which 
should have acted as a rearguard, to wheel round and begin to retreat, even 
though this meant that their unshielded side was exposed to the enemy.
Brasidas saw his opportunity and charged with his force of hoplites into the 
middle of the Athenian army and put them to flight. Clearidas then sallied 
from Amphipolis and charged at the Athenians; the two-pronged attack threw 
the Athenian left wing into complete confusion and it was set in full flight. 
Brasidas then initiated an attack on the Athenian right wing but was fatally 
wounded. The right wing of the Athenians stood its ground on the top of the 
hill and repulsed the troops of Clearidas two or three times. It was in this 
fighting, according to Thucydides, that Cleon fled and was killed by a 
Myrcinian peltast.13^  The Athenian right wing did not yield until they were 
attacked on all sides by a combined force of Chalcidian and Myrcinian peltasts
and cavalry and put to flight under a shower of javelins: Oi S e  t x u - r o o
on-Xt-foa e.TTi. t o v  \ o < £ ) o v  T o v  T t  k ^ .X e .& c ^ c & x v ' y-^javvo\/to 
|< o u  Sc<^ ^  TTyao ^ y ^ c x \ o V T c <  ^ k c r f i  o u  TTpoT^o^  l . v 'e .S o ^ o iv '  T T y A v
^ T£ /Aujpkuvu* ^ oi
/ / v - * \ V  </ C\ _\
T T e y n  <s’ T o c v ' T e <7  K cXv. €. 6 <x k o  v  T  c S  o  v /T C ^  o ^ u T o u ^  e. T y >  e. ^  c< v \  o u T u  T o
( S T ^ t x T e o y a o *  r r S v /  T i I w  ^ 9  ( j > u y o V  ^ o < \ f c T f C o ^  K < *c  T T a \ \ X ^
c C \  / \ ■) / c/ \ ^ I /S. /
o o o u ^  T y x x T T o y M e .v /O L  k c < T 0 < O^  , o d ' o c  y a  d  (.t-C p Q o y o  <SoCV ^  c x u T ( k < *
G -V  ^  U TTO  " T ^  C, X  ^ T T T T O U  K c^ L T w v  T T 6 \ t c x - ^ t C j v /
o l  \ o t r r o \  c k n e k o y u c  £<y \~\ (.a  v e x . (Thuc.V. 10.9-10).
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The plan of Brasidas had been successful: the whole Athenian force 
had been routed with the loss of 600 men, while the Lacedaemonians lost only
part in Clearidas1 attack on the Athenian right wing in its high position. 
Like the Spartans in their last stand on Sphacteria, the Athenian troops of 
the right wing were surrounded by the peltasts who, in conjunction with a 
force of cavalry, rained javelins upon them and compelled them to flee.
The swift peltasts also took part in the pursuit of the routed Athenian army.
In 420 B.C., the Athenians made an alliance with the Argive Confederacy.
The terms of the alliance between Athens and Argos, Mantinea and Elis are
recorded in Thucydides V.47. A fragment of the official Athenian copy of
the terms of this alliance has been found, preserved on a slab of Pentelic
139marble, on the south slope of the Acropolis, near the Theatre of Dionysus.
In this treaty is set out the rate of pay for provisions for the soldiers
V  ^ r ,\ r t
L
Note that in this treaty the hoplite, light-armed so_ldier (psilos) and
In 419 B.C., Alcibiades led into the Peloponnese a small Athenian force
13ftseven. ''"In the battle itself the peltasts on the Peloponnesian side took
I  ( \  _  /} \
TTo<^>e^€.TUJ JXZV KoVTCX (TLTOV j
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archer all got the same allowance - we have evidence here that the psilos
and'toxotes1were treated on an equal basis with the hoplite with respect to
140payment for supp-lies. - - ■
i i
which consisted of Athenian hoplites and toxotai; this is one of the few
141occasions on which Athenian archers are specifically mentioned by Thucydides.
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Also in 419 B.C., the Argives on a flimsy pretext made war against the 
Epidaurians (Thuc.V.53); in the middle of the summer of 418 B.C. the Spartans, 
seeing that their Epidaurian allies were in great danger, marched against the 
Argives with their whole army. We are informed by Thucydides that the
Boeotian contingent which marched with the Spartans consisted of 5,000 hop-
i i 142lites, 5,000lpsiloi‘, 500 cavalry and 500 'hamippoi'. It is probable that
the 'hamippoi', like the 'hippodromoi psiloi1 in the force of Gelon, were
highly mobile light-armed troops who were trained to operate interspersed
148among their own cavalry.
In 418 B.C., the Spartans included large numbers of helots in their 
force which went to the aid of Tegea against the Argives: £ v t c <u &<*
Oeto< Tcov f\ u v  c^utiov/ Tfc \coic
sA \ u>Tiov KoO. oce< ootti-o TTyi(iTtpoV (ThUC. V . 64. 2) .
The helots in the force were almost certainly used as'psiloi1 and camp-followers, 
not hoplites. The Spartans managed to equip the 700 helots under Brasidas1
* i
command with hopla, but I am very doubtful whether they could have provided
' T w v  s i \ ixjtvov with panoplies: it would have incurred enormous
expense and the training of the whole helot force in the use of heavy arms
would have created a great danger to Spartan internal security. The
Spartans, along with the Arcadian allies, invaded the territory of their
enemy Mantinea and proceeded to lay waste the land, presumably with their
'psiloi'who were ideally suited for such a task.144 In the ensuing battle of
Mantinea between the Spartans and their Arcadian allies and the Mantineans,
Argives and Athenians, no mention is made by Thucydides of any light-armed
troops. Note that Agis was particularly afraid that the Spartan left wing
would be surrounded by-the Mantineans and took measures to prevent what could
145have been a dangerous outflanking movement, Agis1 fear would suggest that 
the Spartan left wing had no light-armed troops protecting its flank. 
Furthermore, after the Spartans defeated the enemy force, we are informed by
149
146Thucydides that they did not pursue their foes far or for a long time - 
this was normal practice for victorious hoplites who usually contented them­
selves with gaining possession of the battlefield and stripping the enemy 
corpses; pursuit was dangerous for the relatively slow hoplites and invited
have been ideal to use to press home a pursuit but they are not mentioned in 
this role by Thucydides. The historian's total silence about the presence 
of helots in the battle of Mantinea would suggest that they were taken along 
on the expedition merely for the purpose of attending their hoplite masters 
and laying waste to enemy territory and not for the purpose of battle at all, 
but we should bear in mind that elsewhere Thucydides' silence about the
148presence and part played by light-armed troops is apparently not reliable.
In 416 B.C., the Athenians made an expedition against the island of 
Melos and Thucydides informs us that their force consisted of "One thousand
i j » i
two hundred hoplites and three hundred toxotoi besides twenty hippotoxotai 
of their own, and about one thousand five hundred hoplites provided by their 
allies in the island" (Thuc.V.84.1). Part of a decree which may relate to 
the Melian expedition has been discovered on two fragments of a stele of 
Pentelic marble from the Acropolis; the restored text runs as follows: 149
147counter-attack. One would have thought that the light-armed helots would
l l i W u , v  <l v  £ K o < [] v re v T c .  ^ X ^
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We know from Thucydides that the Athenians had thirty ships on the 
expedition and we can therefore obtain from the inscription the following 
results:
Although the first two totals agree with those given by Thucydides,
it comes as a great surprise to learn that peltasts (of uncertain number)
are recorded by the inscription as being present on the expedition, yet are
not mentioned by the historian in his narrative. Mer’^ h a s ,  however,
suggested that the inscription does not relate to the force sent against
Melos but to a fleet sent to collect tribute at the beginning of the Arch- 
150idamian War. The inscription is badly damaged and the section which may
i i
have referred to the twenty Athenian hippotoxotai (if it is an inscription 
relating to the expedition of 416 B.C.) has not survived.1^  Note that the 
1 t o ^ o -t c o .^  T j 1 and the 1 i n n o T o ^ o T « t ^  1
of Thucydides V.84.1 are to be taken with 6o^oT w v  j i.e. they were true 
Athenian 'toxotai1 and'hippotoxotai1
BoofeSix and Seven of Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition (415 - 413 B.C.)
In 416 B.C., most Athenians favoured supporting the causes of Egesta 
against Selinus and of Leontini against Syracuse; they were ignorant of the 
size of Sicily and the great number of its inhabitants. Alcibiades spoke 
in favour of sending an expedition to Sicily and in Thuc.-VI. 17.3, on 
apparently no good grounds, Alcibiades is made to claim that the individual 
Sicilian had no heavy arms and armour -(hopla); as we shall see, the 
Syracusans had large forces of light-armed troops, but they also had hoplites. 
Nicias opposed sending troops to Sicily and Thucydides informs us that he 
tried to change the people's mind by making an exaggerated estimate of the
(Athenian) hoplites: 40 x 30 ships
archers : 10 (probably) x 30 ships
peltasts: 15 (uncertain) x 30 ships
1,200
450 (?)
300
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forces required. In Thuc.VI.20.4, Nicias is made to comment that the
Sicilians, especially the people of Selinus and Syracuse,"have great numbers
of hoplites and'toxotai* and akontistai" and also a large number of hoplites
and a big fleet. In 481 B.C. also, Syracuse had been strong in specialized
light-armed troops: Gelon had large forces o f ‘toxotai',‘sphendonetai1 and
152‘hippodromoi psiloi1. Nicias is further made to inform the Athenians that
large forces of archers and slingers were imperative to counter the large
158number of enemy cavalry.
In Thuc.VI.25.2 we learn that Nicias required over 5,000 hoplites and
that archers were to be raised from Athens and Crete and slingers. Cretan
154mercenary archers were renowned, especially in the later Classical Period. 
Thucydides records that the actual Athenian force sent to Sicily in 415 B.C. 
contained 480 archers, 700 Rhodian slingers and 120 Megarians who served as
t • i •/psiloi:
••• T o ^ o  T o i^  TTo<6'tv koX T £ T ^ k o -
(  \c©0. T o u t w v  Ot  0 | l o ^ k o \ / T ( X  Koii & Q  OV*^
T * t c  PoStuov , koci V C ^ OL<i 43‘JTc<^cV
€t\c.o6i k«a k\cot-ioV (Thuc.VI .43). The Rhodians were expert slingers
and were utilized in the retreat of the Ten Thousand.1^ 5 We also possess a 
fragment from a marble stele preserving part of a decree relating to the 
Sicilian expedition of 415 B.C. which gives some information about the light­
armed troops who took part in it:
v o ( y
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Note that specific mention is made in the inscription of peltasts 
(if tx €'\] Tc<£-roa^ is the correct restoration) and archers. Thucydides 
in his account of the expeditionary force omits any mention of peltasts; 
he also does not tell us if there were any peltasts in the Athenian auxiliary 
forces of 413 B.C. (Thuc.VII.33-35; VII.42.1), although it is possible that
1R7the Lemnians and Imbrians were armed as peltasts. The decree records special 
categories of light-armed infantry and seamen and appears to have contained 
precise numbers and would seem to be authentic - why then does Thucydides omit 
to mention the presence of peltasts in the Sicilian expeditionary forces when 
we have inscriptional evidence which would suggest that they did in fact 
take part? 158
After the Athenians arrived in Sicily in 415 B.C., they frittered away
the rest of the year in a number of small enterprises which led to nothing.
The Athenians were determined to draw the whole Syracusan army as far as
possible out of the city, and then in their absence to sail to Syracuse by
night and take up a good position without the risk of being attacked. They
knew that in the present situation an open landing would be almost impossible
since they had no cavalry of their own, whilst the Syracusans had a large
force which could be used to do great harm to the Athenian light-armed troops
159(psiloi) and camp-followers (ochlos). Thucydides in his account of the 
Peloponnesian War makes it plain that 1ight-infantry and also camp-followers 
were extremely vulnerable to cavalry attack, especially on level ground; ^  
hoplites, provided they maintained their formation, were usually able to repel 
cavalry attacks.
By a trick, Nicias lured the Syracusan-army to Catana for the purpose jaf 
"making an attack on the Athenian camp, which they were led to believe that - 
they would take unawares, while in the meantime the Athenians had gone on 
board the fleet and sailed off to the Great Harbour of Syracuse. Nicias 
landed and fortified his camp on the south-west side of the harbour, just
south of the temple of Olympian Zeus (VI.65).
When the Syracusans returned from Catana, both sides prepared for battle.
In VI.67.1 Thucydides gives the Athenian order of battle: half of the
Athenian army, drawn up eight deep, formed the van, while the other half
was drawn up, likewise eight deep, close to their sleeping places in 'plaision
formation. In this defensive formation were placed the'skeuophoroi‘, who
were presumably very badly armed, or perhaps more likely carried no arms at
all. The 'plaision' formation was used primarily to protect vulnerable
camp-followers who might be attacked by cavalry or missile-troops and was
normally used on the march; in Thucydides VII.78.2 we are informed that the
forces of Nicias and Demosthenes marched in 'plaision' formation with the
‘skeuophoroi*and the bulk of troops who were not hoplites (i.e. psiloi)
162inside. In his account of the Syracusan army, Thucydides mentions that 
there were fifty'toxotai'from Camarina. The Syracusan cavalry and‘akont-
istai'were placed upon their right wing. It was most likely normal practice
in Greek warfare to place light-armed troops and cavalry on both wings of a 
hoplite phalanx to guard against an outflanking movement by an enemy; in
i \
this case the cavalry and akontistai appear to have actually formed a large
1fV3section, if not all, of the right wing.
Before the phalanx blocks of both sides engaged, the Athenian and 
Syracusan light-armed infantry rushed in front of them and skirmished with 
each other: ^  ko<\ -ny>C.-rov cxutlov <£i<c*"r^ ou>\/ t q \i>6oj$o\o(
 ^ j ^ ' ^ VC / / v \ cyK&C 6~<p 6v/oO v ‘"j To^c Icaft T o ^ o T c (( TTp ouyu.<v^oVT<5 \coC I  T p o i
eclc oCp c k \ \ ^ \ u o v  c t t c k o u V  (Thuc.VI .69.2).
i; \
It is evident from this passage that Thucydides regards the lithoboloi, 
toxotai' and 'sphendonetai' as '-psiloi*. The historian has not previously
i i  i i
mentioned the presence of sphendonetai on the Syracusan side or lithoboloi
i i
on either side; it is probable that the lithoboloi were camp-followers who 
were utilized as crude 'psi loi'. In this type of skirmishing engagement, one
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would have thought that the archers and slingers, whose missiles had a much 
greater range than the stones and rocks thrown by the 'l ithoboloi*, would 
have had a great advantage over the crude s t o ne-t h rowe rsAll  light-armed 
troops, since they lacked proper body armour, were vulnerable to missiles
i i
and one would have thought that the position of the lithoboloi would have 
been perilous if opposed by trained archers and slingers who could snipe at
< i
them from a distance. If the lithoboloi of one side were to attack the 
archers and slingers of the other, they would have to approach them within 
a stone's-cast and thus leave themselves open to arrows and sling-bullets 
shot at close range; it seems likely to me that the'lithoboloi*on both sides 
would have been best suited to harassing their opposing phalanx blocks, 
rather than to skirmishing with specialized missile-troops whose range they 
could not match.188 The Syracusan‘akontistai1 took no part in this skirmishing 
battle as they were positioned on the right wing of their army. Note the 
condescending tone of 1 k o A  0
Gt t o l o u v '; Thucydides here, I think, betrays his prejudice 
against missile-troops whose effect on a normal battle he would often seem 
to regard as negligible. In the following clash of the Athenian and 
Syracusan phalanxes no mention is made of the light-armed infantry of both 
sides - did they form themselves upon the wings of their respective phalanxes 
or withdraw from the battle area?
In the spring of 414 B.C., after operations in the eastern region of
Sicily, the Athenians received a force of 250 cavalry and thirty'hippo-
toxotai1 from Athens. The Athenians then concentrated their activities on
16?
the heights of Epipolae to the north of the city of Syracuse; they defeated 
the 600 Syracusans who were guarding the heights and succeeded in fortifying 
a place called Labdalon (Thuc.VI.97).168 The Athenians intended to put 
Syracuse under siege by running a wall across Epipolae towards the Great 
Harbour.
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The Syracusans, having made a vain attempt to stop the building of the 
wall, started to build a counter-wall, beginning at the Temenites and
running westward, to intercept the southern wall of the Athenians and prevent
its reaching the harbour!69 The Athenians decided to make an attack on the 
Syracusan counter-wall and for this task "Three hundred picked Athenian hop­
lites and some specially selected'psiloi! who were given heavy arms, were 
instructed to run out against the counter-wall" (Thuc.VI.100.1). Speed 
was vital in an attack of this kind; if forewarned, the defenders could have 
congregated to repel the assault. Light-armed infantry were chosen and 
equipped for the attack on the stockade because faster runners were to be 
found among them than among the hoplites. The attack was a success.176
The Athenians proceeded to continue their wall southwards towards the 
Great Harbour.1^ * The Syracusans started to build a second counter-wall but
17?this was destroyed by the Athenians. The Syracusans then attacked the 
Athenian wall on Epipolae but this attack failed as Nicias commanded the 
'hyperetai1 to set fire to the timber in front of the wall; the fire drove 
the Syracusans back.176 The situation of the Syracusans looked bleak.
In 414 B.C. the Spartan Gylippus arrived at Himera with a relief force
for the Syracusans. He managed to raise troops from Himera, Selinus, Gela
and from among the Sicels and these included an undefined number of light­
armed troops (psiloi).1^ 4 Gylippus marched towards Syracuse, gained control 
of the heights of Epipolae, and entered into the city and took command of 
the Syracusan army. The Syracusans then built a third counter-wall to 
prevent the Athenians from hemming in the city by completing the northern 
section_ef their wall.175Meanwhile,-the Syracusan cavalry managed to harass 
Uie Athenian sailors who acted as foragers; these foragers were light-ly-armed 
or else carried no arms at all and thus were vulnerable to cavalry attack.176
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The two armies were drawn up in front of their fortifications and in 
the engagement which followed the Syracusans were defeated in the confined
space; Thucydides says that the reason for their defeat was that the
i 177Syracusan cavalry and akontistai' could not operate in the confined space.
Cavalry and javelin-throwers evidently formed an integral part of the
Syracusan army.
When the Syracusan counter-wall had almost passed the end of the
Athenian wall, the Athenians were forced to fight the Syracusan army to
capture their fortification on more open ground where they could use their
cavalry and'akontistai1. Gylippus placed his cavalry and‘akontistai* in
the open space between the points at which their respective lines of wall
178stopped and in the ensuing conflict the Athenians were defeated. The 
Syracusans carried their counter-wall past the works of the Athenians, thus 
depriving them of all hope of surrounding the city. With reinforcements 
arriving for the Syracusans, the chances of the Athenians taking the city 
became small. Nicias sent a letter, relating their dangerous position, to 
be read to the Athenian people. He stated that in the second recent battle 
with the Syracusans, the Athenian troops were overpowered by the large 
number of Syracusan cavalry and'akontistaiV^once again we find that their 
cavalry and javelin-throwers were a very important part of the Syracusans' 
army.
The Syracusans completed their wall, while Nicias occupied Plemmyrium, 
the southern headland of the Great Harbour. Winter had now come and 
Gylippus spent it in raising fresh forces in Sicily: Corinth and Sparta
sent more reinforcements. In the spring of 413-B.C., Gylippus returned to 
Syracuse with his aTlies and organized a Syracusan fleet. He then attacked 
and captured the Athenian fortifications at Plemmyrium, although his fleet 
was defeated by the Athenians in the Great Harbour.
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In the early summer of 413 B.C., the Athenians prepared to send out 
an auxiliary force to Syracuse under the command of Eurymedon and Demosthenes 
One thousand three hundred Thracian peltasts arrived at Athens for the
expedition but they had come too late and were sent back home: 'A l K o v t o  
k r t i  (b )p o (l< tov  | A o( ^ o c ip o  cj> o p t o v  t © 0  ^  ccxkou y
Tc*<^ -rr e \  T  c< oCk. e v  t i 3  o i i j t w  G e p t l .  t o v j  i w
~Xf>LX\<,o/^ o L K u \ } o u \  e S e c  T  <5 e<j T^v /
^  eTV. oc 6 o V T t p o i
S c & V o O u Vt o  O d J - T O ^  TTo< \ lV o f i t v  5 j \ 6 o \ /  4 ^  ® p o M < ^ v
o( TTOTT ep^Trecv  . T o  yc<p  €.^ecv TTp ® <^ S k .  _rT <j ^
1 T o \G p A .O V  O ^ U T o t ) ^  TroXuTfe\Ve<j £<J) C^lv/CtT o ’ 5 p < * ^ y U ^ \ /  y o ( p  
euj<.o<^Td^ e \oCfxfc oiV&V (Thuc. VI1.27.1-2).
Thucydides informs us that the peltasts were of the Dian race: in II.96.2
he gives the name Dioi to the 'mountain Thracians' who inhabited the
Rhodope range and who were 'machairophoroi'. The ceramic evidence would
suggest that the'machaira'was a peltast's secondary weapon; his primary
180offensive weapon was either the javelin or the thrusting-spear. The 
Thracian mercenary peltasts, being well equipped and fully trained in the 
use of their weapons, would have been useful to counter the large number of 
Syracusan cavalry and 'akontistai1, but when they arrived in Athens Demosthenes 
had already set sail (Thuc.VII.27.2; .29.1). Demosthenes tried to make up
for his loss of javelin-throwers by recruiting contingents of akontistai4on
his way to Sicily!81 Best rightly comments that the'akontistai'whom Demosth­
enes picked up on his journey to Sicily must have compensated for the lack 
of the 1,300 Thracian peltasts as far as quantity was concerned, but as for 
quality, a strong detachment of peltasts would naturally have been prefer­
able to units of'akontistai1 which had been liasti Ly assembled from various 
places. 182
Financial considerations made it impossible to use the Thracian 
mercenaries to combat ravaging attacks from Decelea and therefore they were
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sent home under Dieitrephes, who was instructed to use them against the 
188Euripus. The Thracian peltasts showed their barbarity by butchering the 
population of Mycalessus, the modern Ritsona, and this bloodthirsty action 
shocked even Thucydides.1^ 4 When news reached the Thebans of this disaster, 
they hurried to the aid of the people of Mycalessus and they pursued the 
Thracians, who were la den with spoil, towards the Athenian ships which were 
moored on the Euripus. The peltasts used their accustomed skirmishing 
tactics against the Theban cavalry but those who stayed in the city for
plunder were cut down: e.rreX cv yfe -r£j c< \ \ ^
o c t c / o t  Trj>K° i) T w v  ©^^>oCLt>j\/ cTrrrckoVj
oVfep TTpujTOV TT^ 5 j TTp O £ k 0 ^ O  V T £  ^  T &  l<COCl <T*Tpe
6TTt.^u>pcu) o\ c* v £TTOtOuVTO ) KOCC. o\tyot
oc«Jtu>v iv Tod-vu ^  ti K ocl iv rro\ec
St 0<pTVo<y^v e y\<C<TO< \  ^  (|>$£\/ o<f Tt u>\G-T O , Ot Se ^  fA>TT OW T ej
Tiov/ ® p o ( .  kco\/ TT e V T  Si  kov'Toi \< .o c \ S Le(Ko^LOL cirTo T p t ^ K o ^ t u j V  
t V /** J / ’l<oa xcXttov o<TreSo(vo\/.
(Thuc.VII.30.2).
It is interesting to note that when the Thracians fled back to the
Euripus, the Athenian ships abandoned them and anchored out of bowshot
( To^cup<((To<j , Thuc.VI1.30.2). This must have been because
185some of the Theban troops were armed with bows.
On his way over to Sicily, Demosthenes raised light-armed infantry to 
make up for his lack of trained javelin-throwers. He raised'sphendonetai1
l >  | .
and akontistai from the Acarnanian area (VII.31.5), 150 Iapygian akontistai 
of the Messapian tribe from the Choirad islands (VII.33.4), 300'akontistai' 
from Metapontum (VII.33.5) and 300'-akontistai'from Thurii (VII.35.t).
Meanwhile, reinforcements of light-armed troops came io aid the~Syracusans;- 
the Camarinaeans sent 3 0 0 'akontistai'and 300'toxotai1, while the Geloans sent 
400'akontistai1(VII.33.1). The large numbers of'akontistai1 on both sides 
make it evident that these troops were highly valued.
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Gylippus began the main fighting of 413 B.C. by attacking the 
Athenian station at Plemmyrium both by land and sea. The assault on the 
Athenian positions by land was two-pronged: Gylippus attacked from the city
of Syracuse with his forces whilst the troops who were stationed at the 
temple of Olympian Zeus, and included hoplites, cavalry and‘gymneteial
1pc
attacked from the opposite direction. Thucydides in the same chapter 
mentions the large number of cavalry and akontistai*who rushed from the 
temple,1^  Thucydides apparently uses the term only to des­
cribe light-armed troops from a Dorian community (Syracuse was a Dorian
1 OQ
community founded by Corinth). The fighting was indecisive and the Syracus­
ans attacked the Athenians again on the next day by land and sea; in the 
sea-battle the Syracusan akontistai1, who were posted on the decks of the
warships and in little boats, did the Athenians great harm and were respons-
189ible to a large degree for their defeat in the engagement.
At this point, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian 
reinforcements which consisted of 5,000 hoplites and ckKcwT<.<5T^ Te
E . W r | V t X ^  o u k .  o \ t y o u c ,  ; KoiL ( j ) £ v S o V  k o O .
T o ^ O T o ^  icoa T^v ckW ^ v  TTc*y5o<<s'ke.^v' Lk°<\/^v (Thuc.VI1.42.1).
Demosthenes decided on his arrival that he must take the Syracusan positions 
on Epipolae. The Athenians began to ravage the fields of the Syracusans 
about the river Anapus, probably with their light-armed troops; the Syrac­
usans now feared to go out with their army to face the reinforced Athenian
> i
army and only sent out parties of cavalry and akontistai from the temple of 
Olympian Zeus, presumably to combat the Athenian troops who were ravaging 
their land.190
Demosthenes was 'determined to attack Epipolae and Thucydides informs us 
that he took with him all the masons and carpenters in the army and also a 
' TTtxyocxtf-Ktu^v' To^toj^oiTwv 1 •1^ 1 In the commentary of Gomme, Andrewes 
and Dover this phrase is interpreted as "corps of archers", but I feel that
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it is better to simply translate it, as Jowett does, as "a supply of arrows" 
for the archers who were to be used to protect the masons, carpenters and 
troops building a fortification wall once Epipolae had been taken and to 
guard the wall once built.19^  In Thucydides' narrative of the ensuing night 
attack in which the Athenians were repelled, there is no specific mention of 
light-armed infantry on either side; in VII.43.2, he says that Demosthenes 
led out his whole force ( -rr&^v' f'rpem. ), but nothing in his
account suggests that any troops other than the hoplites took part in the 
fighting. However, Diodorus, in his account of the attack, says that 
Demosthenes took with him 10,000 hoplites and 10,000 psiloi. It is diff­
icult to see how such a large force of missile-troops could have been used 
along with an army of hoplites in the dark, as there was a real danger that 
they might misjudge distances in the darkness and hit their own troops or 
mistake their own men for the enemy. Perhaps Demosthenes thought that 
missile-troops might have been more trouble than they were worth and so left 
them behind. In the commentary on Thucydides by Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 
there is a comment that "presumably the light-armed troops were held back 
at the foot of the ascent to Euryelus, ready to be brought forward in day­
light as a protection against cavalry attacks when the hoplites had mastered
104the counter-wall and the forts". It is possible that missile-troops, when
used in conjunction with hoplites, could have been used to break up a cavalry
charge, although when used on their own, light-armed troops were particularly
vulnerable to cavalry. Archers, slingers and javelin-throwers certainly had
the potential to kill horses and riders, but it is perhaps to be doubted
whether they could, without the aid of hop-1 ites, kill enough cavalry to break
1Q6 : -up a charge before they reached them. If, as Diodorus asserts, Demosthenes 
took a large force of'psiloi'with him on his attack on Epipolae, we have no 
information as to how they were used.
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After the failure to retake Epipolae, Demosthenes saw that Syracuse 
could not be captured and that there could be no profit in remaining any 
longer where they were; Nicias refused to leave his post and considered 
that the Syracusans were heavily in debt because they kept many mercenary 
troops on whom they were dependent - many, perhaps, of the Syracusan light­
armed troops were m e r c e n a r i e s . ^  When Gylippus returned to Syracuse with 
reinforcements, Nicias realized that their situation was hopeless and agreed 
to their withdrawal; in VI1.57, Thucydides digresses and enumerates the 
allies of Athens and Syracuse.19^
After some undecided fighting, both sides prepared to fight a major
1 i i inaval engagement; in the naval battle toxotai and akontistai and even stone-
108throwers were utilized by both sides. The Athenians were heavily defeated
and realized that they had to retreat from their position; if they had
started at once they probably would have succeeded in reaching shelter at
Catana or inland among the friendly Sicels, but the Syracusans tricked them
into staying where they were by sending horsemen towards the Athenian lines
who shouted that they were friends and that it would be best to wait and set
109out when better prepared. The Syracusans meanwhile blocked the roads.
The Athenians finally set out on the retreat, leaving behind their
wounded and their dead unburied, and marched along the western road which
200crosses the Anapus and passes the modern village of Floridia. The aim was 
to reach friendly Sicel territory first and then to make for Catana because 
it would have been extremely dangerous to take the straight road to Catana, 
round _the west of Epipolae under the Syracusan forts. The army was divided 
into two forces with Nicias leading the van,-and Demosthenes the rear. The 
Athenians marched in 'plaision' formation with the baggage-bearers and 'ochl-os'
i t
enclosed by the hoplites - no mention is made of how the psiloi marched but
201possibly they are to be included in the term 'ochlos1.
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On the first day of the retreat, the Syracusan light-armed troops 
(psiloi) and cavalry attacked the Athenian force so incessantly with javelins 
that it only managed to advance four and a half miles.202 On the second day 
of the retreat, the Athenians tried to obtain supplies of food and water, 
while the Syracusans blockaded a rugged pass, which formed the approach to 
a high point called the Acraean Cliff over which the road passed. On the 
following day, the advance of the Athenians was again severely impeded by the
1 l | C ) £ I *■attacks of the Syracusan cavalry and akontistai: a u<STepcn.ci «c
T iy > 0  t koCL oi Tuiv '^_o^cAKO<S’LuiV k,oCL ^  V
C -C U T O U ^  LTrTTC j^  |< c ) t  k o V T ( .  d 'ToO . O V T 6  <j T T < i A . \ o i  €  k ,C <T  G p  u* 0  € V
* / \ v > / y / \  ^ /
€ k . u j A u o v  Kocc e i ' ^ k . o v T t ^ o v  “re . k.ac T f o < p c t t t v e o o v .  k c «
JA.&V T T o \ \ w  e y U c i^ o V T O  oc  ' A  € T T e iT C <  c £ \ /e ^  c j p  ^  T T c £ \(V
T o  e ( u T o  5 T | i o ( T o T r £ ^ o V  . ke£<. “Tctf € T T ( ." V ^ € . io  ^ O u  k / t l .  OyAQLui^
feL yO V * O O  yodp 4!t l  i l T O v w p e ? /  O l \4 v  T * UTTO t £ v /  c T T ir fe to V /.
A  i A r I (Thuc.VI1.78.6).
On the fourth day the Athenians found the Syracusans drawn up in the
pass before their wall and unsuccessfully attacked them; the Syracusan
'akontistai' could hurl their javelins down at the Athenians withreat velocity
from their high position: ko<\ frpaf jLc*\6\jT6<j oc ’Ag^v/o/loi eTe.c^o^ci^oo\/)
l< o c l ^ \ \ o | l £ V < 5 l .  OTTo T T o W  CSv oCTTo T o o  \ o ( j ) O U  C T T O iV T O U ^  O v /T O ^
CV-l^v/oO VTO  V ^ P  p  0^ 0^  o t  O ^ \/C J 0 € V  )  ko^c o u  ^oV c<pA & V O (» LoC€c4.6& oU
cive^u»pouv TTciXtv Koa o c v& tto u^ o V t o  (Thuc. V11.79.2).
This is the first occasion we hear of a high position being actively defended 
by light-armed troops.
On the fifth day of their retreat, the Athenians advanced again but the, 
Syracusans tried to surround tfiem using light-armed skirmishing1tactics:
T 3 V
T'e TTcyv'Tcx'^  w u T O l ^  ku)<\u) k^l T T o W o U ^  k«’r€.T^>0^ upA.C<T U^OV/1 }
, v > \  ? /  c > A  / S ' '  c / * ^ ^
k c tf l  G t  p A G V  G r r c o ^ G V  O l  / “ \  cr w ^ v o ^ O L  ? UTT j> 0 O V } £<- d o^ Vci
€ .T T g |<;g L \/T O  > k c iC  y u .o < :\c  k T 0 <  T o c ^  i x J T o l l T O ^  TTperf' TT cTT T O V T f c ^  j £<.
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Since their way was barred by the Syracusans in the pass, the Athenians now 
moved southwards, and, abandoning the idea of reaching the Sicel hil1-land from 
this point, marched to the Helorine road, which would take them in the direction 
of Camarina and Gela. They started fires and set off on a night march but 
fell into confusion; the force of Nicias, which led the way, kept together 
and marched on ahead, but that of Demosthenes, which was the larger half, got 
cut off from the other division and marched in a less orderly fashion.
When day broke, the Syracusans set off in hot pursuit of the Athenian army; 
they firstly caught up with the force of Demosthenes, which was about six miles 
behind that of Nicias, and drove it into a narrow space where it was surrounded
u . .  J .U -  r - ________________  J ._______  ). V / W   V  V _ .
situation of the Athenians is like that of the Corinthians in 460 or 459 B.C.,
Athenians could not fight back and their casualties began to mount due to the 
missile weapons showered upon them from all sides by the Syracusans. The 
Athenian troops were finally worn down by the sustained attack of the Syracusan
succumbed to the very tactics which he had utilized on Sphacteria in 425 B.C.
On the following day, Nicias was overtaken by the Syracusans, who told
-h-im that Demosthenes' force had surrendered and that his should do the same.
Nicias, when he found out the truth, tried to negotiate a settlement but the 
Syracusans refused and "attacked and surrounded this army, as they had 
Demosthenes', raining missiles on them from all sides until the evening".
(Thuc.VI1.83.3). At dawn on the next day, his army moved forward and the
O V T O  TT l ^ T W o o V  , T < M  CtfO
M c£ y <Xi C OL ^  upoC K o V t o c
u V T O
203when they were caught in an enclosure, surrounded, and stoned to death. The
missile-troops and surrendered?^ It is ironic that Demosthenes should have
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Syracusan light-armed troops immediately attacked them, hurling javelins 
and other missiles at them from all sides.^ The Athenians hurried towards 
the River Assinarus, the modern Tellaro, and hoped to gain a little relief 
from the attacking forces once they had forded it; they, however, lost all 
order in crossing the river and the Syracusans stood upon the further bank,
onc
which was very steep, and hurled missiles down on them. The Athenian force 
finally lost all formation under the hail of missiles and Nicias was compelled 
to surrender. Thucydides comments that a great many Athenians fell in the 
fighting around the River Assinarus and that many also had fallen in the 
frequent attacks of the Syracusan light-armed troops on the m a r c h . ^
The Syracusan light-armed troops, especially their'akontistai', had 
played a vital role in impeding and attacking the forces of Demosthenes and 
Nicias in their retreat; they were also particularly effective when used in 
conjunction with cavalry. The way in which they used their skirmishing 
tactics to slow down the Athenian advance and overwhelm them in the final 
conflict, suggests that they were highly trained and well organized troops.
Surprisingly, the Athenian archers, slingers and javelin-throwers are 
nowhere mentioned in Thucydides' account of the final retreat. This is
extremely baffling when one considers the Athenians' position; they, as 
Greeks in the army of the Ten Thousand after the battle of Cunaxa, were in
i . i
great need of missile-troops to protect them from the Syracusan akontistai 
and cavalry (Nicias had specifically told the Athenians that large numbers of 
archers and slingers were imperative to counter the Syracusan cavalry!) and 
did in fact have in their army large forces of specialist light-armed missile- 
troops: why:, .then, if we are to trust the silence of Thucydides, did_they v
-not-use them? Are we to suppose that they were so outnumbered by the- 
Syracusan cavalry and'akontistai that they were kept continually in the centre 
of the'p1 aision' formation for their own protection? Yet, it seems to me that 
the need of the Athenians was so great that even if their light-armed troops
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were outnumbered they would still have tried to utilize them. To my mind, 
there is no adequate explanation as to why the Athenians failed to use the 
large forces of specialist missile-troops in their army for their own 
defence and thus it seems more probable that Thucydides failed to mention 
their use.
Book Eight of Thucydides (413 - 411 B.C.)
In 412 B.C. the Athenians sent a force against Miletus, which had 
revolted, which consisted of 1,000 Athenian hoplites, 1,500 Argives, of 
whom five hundred were originally light-armed (psiloi), but the Athenians 
gave them heavy arms, and 1,000 troops of the allies?^ The Argives had 
originally provided a force for the Athenians in which light-armed troops 
formed 33% of the total.
After the Oligarchic Coup of 411 B.C., the Spartan Agis thought that 
he would take advantage of the confusion in Athens and advanced against the 
Long Wallsfrom Decelea; the attack, however, was repulsed by a combined force 
of Athenian cavalry, hoplites,'psiloi', and 'toxotai1: Vc.
t g .  € . y y o ^  kol\. o l  P\Qy/oiloi  to <  e v ^ o & e v  o t tu j^ t« .o G v
\/? Tou^ lrrnto<^ <= c»c\/Te<^  kodv.
, T w v  o r r V tT to v  kc<c k©A t o ^ o t Co v  < icvS ^c^ Tfc
) < o T o  G-Yyu^ TT o 6 & V  G l. V K<X(. Otr\u>v' TcVlo^  
|<ot(. s/6kpu»v 6 cist) o u f w  yv'o 'u^ ©<TY>^yo*y£ T T o tV iV  T ^ v  6’T^c(TcoCv/
(Thuc.VIII.71.2). In the engagement it was the Athenian1psiloi‘ and'toxotai'
209who shot down the Spartan.hoplites with their missile weapons. The Athenian 
archers and light-armed troops must have advanced in front of their hoplites, 
who are not mentioned in the action; the Athenian cavalry could have been 
used in close conjunction with these swift 1ight-infantrymen. Were the 
cavalry, hoplites,'psiloi'and'toxotai'all from the Athenian forces of 
'peripoloi? 'Psiloi' and'toxotai', with their long-range weapons, would have
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been ideally suited to patrolling and guarding the Long Walls. ^
In Thucydides VIII.98.1, we learn that Aristarchus, one of the leading
oligarchs in Athens in 411 B.C., had a force of archers of the most barbarous
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sort: £Toy>^o<^ Ag. cv6tO\/ Y01^
\<*fiu>\/ T c ^ / S° ^  T c ^ O T o C ^  T lvo C C ^  T O ^  ^C <J>jS c<^u3"V  p c t o u ^
Tr/i0<) Tlqv b Thucydides does
not mention whether the barbarous archers were Scythians or Northern Greeks - 
they were almost certainly mercenaries. Several stelai, dating to the 
period of the Peloponnesian War, have been found which record 'barbaroi 
tochsotai1 who had fallen on Athenian service. ^
We also possess an inscription dating to 412/411 B.C. from Thasos which
0-10
records archers who took part in a Corinthian expedition.
The Period 410 - 404 B.C.
In 410 B.C. Dorieus, the Rhodian who commanded the triremes from Italy,
after he had quelled the tumult in Rhodes, set sail to join Mindarus on the
214Hellespont at Abydus. When he was in the neighbourhood of Sigeium,the large
Athenian force of 70 ships sailed out against him from Sestus; Dorieus,
when he saw the size of the Athenian fleet, was alarmed and, in order to
save his force, he put in at Dardanus. He then disembarked his soldiers and,
according to Diodorus, speedily collected together a vast supply of missiles
and posted his men on the prows of the ships and in advantageous positions on
the shore (D.XIII.45.10) - evidently the troops of Dorieus were ready to meet
215any Athenian attack-from the sea with a barrage of missiles. We furthermore 
le_arn that archers and javelin-throwers took part in the sea battle which 
followed (D.X111.46.1). ~ -
21 c
We find archers also being used in the battle of Cyzicus in 410 B.C.
A sea battle took place off Cyzicus by the sea of Marmara in which Mindarus
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and the Peloponnesian fleet were hard pressed and forced to seek safety on 
land near a place called Cleri, where Pharnabazus had his army. The 
Athenians tried to drag the Peloponnesian ships from the land, while the 
troops of Mindarus and Pharnabazus tried to stop. them. The Athenians landed 
their marines to engage the enemy and in Diodorus we hear about Thrasybulus, 
one of the Athenian commanders, waging a fierce battle against the troops of 
Mindarus and Pharnabazus with his ownlepibatail and toxotai': °
©y&oC £Tek. T<Z^/ e.TK£®*Tuov' 'T^w  "Vo'^OTuW
To tt^Co to v  euyiuo <rTLO^ o r r e ^ T ^  Tou^ T T o \t ,^ L d u ^  Icoa
TtAVouj y^ ev ocveZ\tv t ouk o\t- Sfc. KoiL Tuv
i t^ t t t o n /T c^ ^  (D.XIII.51.2). More Athenian troops rushed
to the aid of the epibatai'and'toxotai1 of Thrasybulus in the nick of time and 
enabled them to fight back and defeat the Peloponnesians and the troops of 
Pharnabazus. When Mindarus was struck down, the Peloponnesian troops gave 
way and the Athenians pursued them for a great distance and only stopped 
their pursuit when they realized that Pharnabazus was about to launch a cavalry 
attack against them.
As we noted in the narrative of Thucydides, Athenian archers were quite
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commonly included in sea-borne expeditions. They must have fought well in 
conjunction with the marines to withstand the superior numbers of their 
enemies; being lightly-armed and swift, they may have taken part in the 
pursuit of the Peloponnesian troops. Xenophon in his account of the land 
battle does not specifically mention the Athenian 'toxotai1. 218
In 410 B.C._ the Spartan king Agis made an attack on the. Long Walls of 
Athens from Decelea which is recorded by Xenophon.219 Thrasyllus led forth thep- 
Athenian forces-from the Lyceum but Agis was not willing to meat their challenge 
and withdrew hastily; the Athenian psiloi' harassed Agis' rear-guard troops 
and killed a few of them: lSujv St -tocotc*. T V }  cctt^ y of ye
T c < ^  KoCi o\^yoL <=tt\
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ttS^ cv utto t w v  *Trc0<xvflv(Hel 1.1.1.34). The Athenian'psiloi'obviously
operated in front of their own hoplites, who did not have the speed of foot 
to overtake the retreating Spartans. Were these'psiloi' part of the 
Athenian 'peripoloi forces as suggested in p. 165? 220
Thrasyllus was present in Athens in 410 B.C. for a specific reason:
after the sea battle at Abydus (411 B.C.) in which Alcibiades defeated a
Spartan force, Thrasyllus had sailed to Athens to report the victory and to
221ask for an army and a fleet. The Athenians, according to Xenophon, voted
222Thrasyllus one thousand hoplites, one hundred cavalry and fifty triremes.
In 409 B.C., after having equipped five thousand sailors asvpeltastai‘, he 
set sail to Samos to take the reinforcements to Alcibiades^It is clear from 
passages in Thucydides and other pieces of Xenophon that the crew of a ship 
could be armed to fight on a land raid.224Demosthenes had equipped the oarsmen 
of his ships with light shields made out of woven twigs in his defence of 
Pylos and in the landing on the island of Sphacteria all his oarsmen, with 
the exception of those of the lower benches, took part ' ^  ^ko^-ro^
& K G.U ©< £ <c.V 0 C ' •
After remaining at Samos for several days, Thrasyllus sailed to Pygela 
in Ionia and there laid waste the country and attacked the fortification wall 
of the tow n . ^  In this raid Thrasyllus utilized his light-armed troops, who
were later attacked by a force of infantry from Miletus who came to the aid
\ \  ^ \ of the Pygelans; thereupon the peltastai and two lochoi of hoplites came to
the aid of the Athenian'psiloi' and succeeded in wiping out almost the whole
force from Miletus. The Athenians captured about 200 shields and set up a
-trophy.^ The light-armed troops-of Thrasyl lus were well suited to ravaging-
i »
attacks and attacking the walls of Pygela. The Athenian psiloi were part­
icularly vulnerable to attack when scattered for plunder - when the Milesians 
in a body attacked them in the act of plunder, they put up no resistance and
fled (Hel1.I.2.2). Best is puzzled by Xenophon's narrative in Hellenica
1.2.3 - we are told that the'peltastai' (who were 5,000 strong) and two
' i i ilochoi of hoplites came to the aid of psiloi, who have not previously been 
mentioned, against a force of Milesians which cannot have been much more
poo
than 200 men strong. ° The number of Athenian hoplites in the auxiliary force 
presents no problems, but it does seem unlikely that Thrasyllus would have 
put ashore all five thousand'peltastai'to combat such a small enemy force - 
presumably only part of the peltast force was engaged in the fighting. It 
also seems as if Xenophon, unlike Thucydides, uses the terms'psiloi'and
i i  i t  ppq
peltastai indiscriminately here for the sailors equipped with peltai.
Xenophon does not previously mention a distinct body of'psiloi', but only the 
5,000 sailors-cum-peltasts: the Athenian 'psiloi' who were engaged in the
plundering and attack on the walls of Pygela were almost certainly part of the 
peltast force; it follows from this that Xenophon here uses the terms'psiloi'
» i
and peltastai as interchangeable.
Thrasyllus then sailed from Pygela to Notium and marched to Colophon; 
the Colophonians gave them their allegiance. The Athenian force next made 
a night raid into Lydia, burning many villages and seizing a great amount of 
plunder - light-armed troops, being swift and silent, would have been ideal 
to use on a surprise night attack.^ The Persian Stages attacked the Athenian 
ravagers when they were scattered, killing seven and capturing one; the 
Athenian troops were saved by the swift supporting action of their cavalry. 
Thrasyllus led his men back to their ships and sailed to Ephesus. He then 
disembarked his hoplites at the foot of Mount Coressus, and his cavalry, 
'peltastai', 'epibatai1 and all the rest near the marsh on the opposite side of 
the city.2^ In the fighting which followed, the Ephesians and their allies- 
firstly attacked and routed the Athenian hoplites at Mount Coressus, killing
about 100 of them, and then engaged the rest of the Athenian force, which
* * 1 .1 consisted mainly of peltastai and epibatai, by the marsh,killing about 300
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men.^  A greater percentage of hoplites were killed (10% of hoplite force ) 
than of the other troops (approx. 4.5 - 5%). This was probably due to the
i i
greater mobility of the cavalry and peltastai. After this failure, Thrasyllus 
carried out no further operations on the mainland of Ionia, but set sail to 
Sestus, which was the main Athenian base in the Hellespont.
In 408 B.C., we learn that a small force of peltasts was included in a 
storming party by Alcibiades in his surprise attack against the city of 
Selymbria.233 Plutarch's narrative of the capture of this city is very like
OOA
Thucydides' description of Brasidas' occupation of Torone. A Pro-Athenian 
group in the city agreed to Alcibiades that they would display a lighted 
torch and open one of the gates at night. However, one of the conspirators 
lost heart and the others were forced to give the signal before the Athenian 
force was ready. Alcibiades chose a shock force of 30 soldiers, reinforced 
by.20 peltasts, and rushed towards the gate, bidding the rest of his force 
to follow him. This force managed to get through the gate but the Selym- 
brians advanced against them with their full force: Se
c ^ y T u )  k c a  TT ^>o ^ y  f c V O | A e v t o \ /  T o l ^  Ko VTcK
TT£.\-To{6TO>V TTc*^€ .< .d"TT6 T O U C ,
4^ c v ^ V T ^  T w v  o/T r ' W
( Plut.Alc.30.3). Alcibiades realized that his position was hopeless since 
the main Athenian army had not yet come to his support and he made a pro­
clamation that the Selymbrians should not bear arms against Athens. The 
Selymbrians, since they thought that a sizeable part of the Athenian force 
was already in their city, negotiated for a peaceful settlement. Note that 
after-the Selymbrians made it clear that they wanted peace, Alcibiades was 
afraid tfrat his large force~of Thracian troops might try to sack the city 
and consequently ordered it to withdraw (Plut.Alc.30.4-5) - were these 
Thracian troops peltasts? For operations in the Hellespont area it would 
have been better to recruit fully trained native peltasts than to convey
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Athenian 'psiloi' from Athens or to make use of sailors who acted as poorly 
trained and badly organized peltasts. Peltasts and javelin-throwers were 
common in the area of the Hellespont and on the coast of Asia Minor and both 
Xenophon and Plutarch record the fact that Alcibiades recruited a large 
number of native troops of both Thracian and Greek origin in this area, 
although it is not specifically stated that these included peltasts or 
j aveli n-throwers.235
Also in 408 B.C., Agis, according to Diodorus, led his troops from 
Decelea on a night march against Athens. Diodorus informs us about his 
force: ^  I >
^ oi o T T V c T o a  K oc t 5 ek.Vo^v',
c £ > c / \ 7 •oc 6 AjAXoi. (XIII.72.4). So Diodorus asserts that Agis
took with him a force of 14,000’psiloi' from Decelea in his attack on Athens. 
Commentators have doubted that Agis had such a large force of light-armed 
troops. Obviously they were not part of the permanent garrison but a 
special force which was most likely included in this attack, as Hanson 
suggests, for the purpose of ravaging the rich land near the walls of Athens?-50 
We are not told if the'psiloi'were helots, but it is probable that a prop­
ortion of them were; however, some may have been light-armed troops from 
the Boeotians (Diodorus XIII.72.4). The Spartans succeeded in taking some
of the Athenian outposts which were situated near the city; the Spartan 
light-infantry may have rushed ahead of their hoplites and secured these 
postions. After one day spent in cavalry fighting, the Spartans advanced 
against the walls of Athens; they failed, however, to approach near them due 
to the hail of missile weapons thrown at them by the Athenian defenders?'7 
-Were missile-troops from among the'peripoloi' used mainly in this-defence 
rather than conventionally equipped hoplites, who may have lacked the mobility 
necessary to use missiles due to their heavy arms and armour? The Spartan 
troops then fell to ravaging the land of Attica and, when they had completed
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this task, departed to the Peloponnese; as we have noted on numerous 
occasions, light-infantry were ideally suited to act as ravagers.
Xenophon informs us that the Athenians in 408 B.C. attacked the city 
of Byzantium both with missiles from a distance and by close assault (Hell.
1.3.14). We hear no more about the actions of light-armed troops in the 
closing years of the Peloponnesian War (407 - 404 B.C.).
Conclusions to the Peloponnesian War (431 - 404 B.C.)
Archers:
We know from I.G.12.929 that already by 460 or 459 B.C. the Athenians 
had a force of citizen archers. In 431 B.C. we learn that Athens had a 
force of 1,600 archers; according to the figures given by Thucydides, the 
archers formed 5% of all the Athenian troops in 431 B.C. - in the figures in 
the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, which probably reflect the period before 
mobilization, archers represent 30% of all Athenian troops (Thuc.II.13.8; 
Ath.Pol.XXIV.3). From the fact that the'toxotai' are mentioned as a distinct 
group in funerary stelai and in the lists given in' Thucydides and the Ath.Pol., 
it would appear that they were regarded as a recognized corps in the army like 
the hoplites. The fact that they had archer commanders (toxarchoi) indicates 
that they were a well organized force (Thuc. III.98.1). Ordinary'psiloi' are
not mentioned as a group in any funerary stelai of the Peloponnesian War 
period and are not given in the lists of the armed force in 431 B.C. by 
Thucydides and the Ath.Pol.; we also have no references to commanders of
i i
psiloi. It would seem probable that the archers were regarded by the Athen­
ians as both militarily and socially superior to the crude 'psiloi*. In the 
-period 43t_- 410 B.C. archers in Athenian forces are mentioned on 24-occasions:, 
on two occasions they are specified as being Athenians (Thuc.111.107.1;
V.52.2); on three occasions they are specified as being non-Athenian (Thuc.
IV.28.4 [ (x\\o0cv ]; VI.25.2 = VI.43 [Cretan]; VIII.98.1 [barbarian]).
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On 19 occasions their origin is undefined. We have further inscriptional 
evidence which would suggest that the Athenians recruited barbarian mercenary 
archers to supplement their own native forces of this arm (see pp.4 - 5 ).
We learn that archers were often included in Athenian expeditionary 
forces:
Thuc.II.23.2 (431 B.C.) Expedition round Peloponnese; 400 archers.
111.98.1 (426 B.C.) Athenian force against Aetolia.
111.107.1 (426 B.C.) 60 Athenian archers in force sent to Amphilochian Argos. 
IV.9.2 (425 B.C.) Archers in original expeditionary force at Pylos.
IV.28.4 and.32.2 (425 B.C.) Archers in force sent to Pylos.
IV.129.2 (423 B.C.) Force sent against Mende and Scione included 600
archers.
V.52.2 (419 B.C.) Athenian expedition round Peloponnese.
V.84.1 (416 B.C.) 300 archers in force sent to Melos.
VI.25.2 and .43 (415 B.C.) 480 archers in original force sent to Sicily.
VII.42.1 (413 B.C.) Archers sent in auxiliary force to Sicily.
Diodorus XIII.51.2 (410 B.C.) Archers were present in the force of Thrasybulus.
The percentage of archers in these expeditionary forces varied greatly:
11.23 = 29%; III.107.1 = 23%; IV.32.2 = 8%; IV.129.2 = less than 23%;
IV.129.4 = 77%; V.84.1 = 10%; VI.43 = 7.5%. The only trend one can detect
is that on expeditions the percentage of archers to Athenian hoplites (and 
where these were not present, to allied hoplites) does not vary greatly (with 
the exception of the force at Sphacteria, which is a special case): 11.23 =
28.5%; III.107.1 = 23%; IV.129.2 = 37.5%; V.84.1 = 20%; VI.43 = 24%.
We also have descriptions of archers in Athenian forces fulfilling active 
combat roles:
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IV.32.2 and IV.36.1 (425 B.C.) 800 archers in attack force on
Sphacteria.
IV.129.4 (423 B.C.) Archers in strike force sent against a Peloponn­
esian army in a high position.
VI.69.2. (415 B.C.) Archers involved in skirmishing on Sicily.
VIII.71.2 (411 B.C.) Archers used in a force to beat off the Spartans
from the long walls.
Diodorus XIII.51.2 (410 B.C.) Archers fought at battle of Cyzicus.
Archers on the Athenian side were probably used to guard fortified 
positions and may have been part of the'peripoloi* force:
VII.43.2 (413 B.C.) Supply of arrows taken along on attack on Epipolae - 
these were to be used by archers to protect their comrades building a wall 
if the position was captured.
VIII.71.2 (411 B.C.) Archers were used near the Long Walls to fend off
a Spartan attack.
Although archers were used to good effect against Spartan hoplites on 
Sphacteria (IV.34 and .36) and near the Long Walls (VIII.71.2) and appear to 
have been able to fend off attacks made on Athenian hoplites by Aetolian 
javelin-throwers for a time, they also had their failures: in IV.129.4 we
learn that the Athenian archers and'psiloi' sent to attack a Peloponnesian 
force outside the city of Mende were repulsed. The Athenian archers on the 
Sicilian expedition hardly feature in Thucydides' narrative of the fighting 
at all. Like all types of troops, the archers performed well in some 
engagements, and less well in others.
Thucydides says little about how the archers were employed in relation 
to the hoplites. In fighting near Syracuse we are informed that the archers, 
along with the'l ithoboloi' and'sphendonetai', in the Athenian force fought with 
the Syracusan light-armed troops in front of the two phalanx blocks (VI.69.2).
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After the Athenian and Syracusan phalanxes engaged, we hear no more about 
the light-armed troops; they must have withdrawn from their position in front 
of the phalanxes and either taken up position on the wings or at the rear of 
their own hoplites. In the attacks on the Poloponnesian forces on Sphacteria
t \
and near Mende the Athenian archers operated in front of their own hoplites.
We are given no further clues by Thucydides as to how archers operated in 
relation to hoplites.
Although references to archers in Athenian forces are predominant in the 
narrative of Thucydides, we do learn that other Greek states utilized archers 
on certain occasions: in 432 B.C. in a naval engagement off Cheimerion the
ships of the Corinthians, Megarians and Ambraciots on one side and Corcyraeans
and Athenians on the other, had many archers on board, although we cannot 
tell if all the states mentioned contributed these troops or whether it was 
only one state on each side which did (I.49.1);in 429 B.C. archers from the 
allies of Sparta were present in the siege of Plataea (II.75.5); in 428 B.C. 
Lesbos was awaiting a force of Scythian archers (III.2.2); in 425 B.C. the 
Spartans, after their defeat on Sphacteria, raised their own force of native 
archers (IV.55.2); in 420 B.C. we can be fairly sure that the forces of the 
Argive Confederacy contained some archers (V.47.6). Cretan archers, almost 
certainly mercenaries, were included in the Athenian army sent to Sicily 
(VI.25.2; VI.43); the Syracusans (VI.20.4) and the Camarinaeans (VI.67.2;
VII-33.1) among the Sicilian Greeks also had forces of archers; in 413 B.C. 
there were archers in the Theban relief force which went to the aid of
Mycalessus (VII.30.2) and in 412 - 411 B.C. archers +ook part in a Corinthian
expedition (IG 12.8,no.402).
Other Light-armed Troops:
Other types of 1 ight-infantry - peltastai','akontistai','sphendonetai',
'lithoboloi', 'psiloi' (which could be used to describe a wide range of light-
176
armed troops, including archers) and 'gymnetes' (this term was apparently 
only used by Thucydides to describe light-armed troops on the Dorian side) - 
are frequently mentioned in the forces of both Athens and Sparta. The 
‘akontistai', ’sphendonetai' and 'true' peltasts were never, so far as we know, 
Athenian or Spartan citizens but allies or mercenaries. The crude light­
armed troops of the Athenians (termed 'psiloi' by Thucydides in the battles 
of Megarid [460 or 459 B.C.], Sphacteria [425 B.C.] and Delium [424 B.C.]) 
were composed of the poorer citizens and also probably the metics and foreig­
ners who were resident in Attica but could not afford a panoply. The light­
armed troops of the Spartans were either provided by their allies or raised 
from the subject groups of Laconia and Messenia.
Light-armed troops were used in several types of operations:
1 In simple attacks:
Thuc.I.106.1-2 (460 or 459 B.C.) Athenian*psiloi' attacked Corinthian 
hoplites.
II.79 (429 B.C.) Chalcidian peltasts, 'psiloi1 and cavalry acted
in conjunction against Athenian hoplites near Spartolus.
III.97f (426 B.C.) Aetolian'akontistai1 attacked Athenian force on
rough terrain.
IV.32f (425 B.C.) Archers, slingers, peltasts and crudelpsiloi1
of an Athenian force attacked Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria 
[IV.93 (424 B.C.) Light-armed troops probably fought at the
battle of Delium].
IV.125; 127-128 (423 B.C.) Lyncestians and Illyrians attacked a
Peloponnesian army using tactics of light-armed troops.
IV.129.4 (423 B.C.) 'psiloi' in an Athenian force took part in an
attack on a Peloponnesian army near Mende.
1 it .>VI.62.2 (415 B.C.) Athenian and Syracusan lithoboloi, sphendonetai
i i
and toxotai skirmished with each other.
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VII.5.3; 6.2; 37.2-3; 42; 78f; 81.4-5; 83.3; 84.4 (414-413 B.C.)
I i
Syracusan akontistai, usually acting in conjunction 
with cavalry, attacked Athenians.
VIII.71.2 (411 B.C.) Athenian‘psiloi' attacked advancing Spartans.
X.H. 1.1.34 (410 B.C.) Athenian psiloi1 fended off an attack by Agis.
X.H. 1.2.3 (409 B.C.) 'Peltastai'from Thrasyllus1 army attacked
Milesian force
X.H. 1.2.7 (409 B.C.)'Peltastai of Thrasybulus took part in an
attack against the Ephesians.
2 In ravaging attacks:
11.31.2 (431 B.C.) Athenian'psiloi' used in ravaging expedition.
111.1.2 (428 B.C.) Spartan'psiloi'took part in a ravaging
attack on Attica.
IV.56.1 (425 B.C.) Athenian‘psiloi1 were used to ravage Spartan
territory.
X.H. 1.2.2 (409 B.C.)'Psiloi' of Thrasyllus1 force laid waste to
the land around Pygela.
3 In attacks on fortified positions:
III.23 (428 B.C.) Plataeans equipped as'psiloi1attacked part of 
the Peloponnesian circumvallation during their escape.
IV.67.2 (424 B.C.) Psiloi' in Athenian force captured a gate in
the Long Walls of Nisaea.
IV. 100.1 (424 B.C.) Boeotians sent for'akontistai' and‘sphendonetai'
from the Malian Gulf to help in their attack on the 
Athenian fortification at Delium.
IV.III.1 (424 B.C.) Brasidas used'psiloi1 armed with daggers and
a force of peltasts to spearhead his attack on the city
of Torone.
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VII.29 (413 B.C.) Thracian peltasts plundered the city of
Mycaiessus.
Plutarch, Alcibiades, 30.3 (408 B.C.) Peltasts from Athenian force 
spearheaded an attack on the city of Selymbria.
Xen.Hell. 1.3.14 (408 B.C.) Athenian missile-troops took part in attack 
on Byzantium
4 In ambushes:
II.81.5 (429 B.C.) Acarnanians ambushed the Chaonians and barb­
arians of a Peloponnesian force (Acarnanians proficient 
slingers II.81.8).
III.100 and 112 (426 B.C.) Demosthenes placed a force of‘psiloi1
and hoplites in ambush at the battle of Olpae and used 
his Amphilochian ‘akontistai' to carry out a surprise 
night attack on Ambraciot hoplites.
V.10 (422 B.C.): At the battle of Amphipolis peltasts
(V.6.4) and hoplites from the Peloponnesian force were
used in a surprise attack to counter the superiority of
the Athenian hoplites.
5 In the pursuit of enemy soldiers: III.98; III.110; IV.35; V.10;
VII.78f.
We find that in the majority of cases, light-armed troops were success­
ful against hoplites (see 1.106.1-2; 11.79; 11.81; III.23; III.97f;
III.110; III.112; IV.32f; V.10; VII.78f; VII.79.2; VII.81.4-5; VII.
84.4; VIII.71.2; X.H.1.1.34; X.H.1.2.3); their strength lay in the fact 
that they could fight at a distance with missile weapons and thus did not 
come into combat with the heavily-armed infantry troops who had great super­
iority in close hand-to-hand fighting. Since they were lightly armed they 
had considerable speed of foot and could easily flee from the cumbersome and 
slower hoplites, who obviously could not run very fast owing to their heavy
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arms and armour which restricted their movements. By continually attacking 
and retreating from a hoplite phalanx, the light-armed troops could slowly 
exhaust and fragment the tightly-packed body of heavily-armed troops. Such 
tactics were especially effective against hoplites when the light-armed 
troops were used in conjunction with cavalry and on rough terrain which was 
not suitable for the phalanx formation. The ultimate aim of the light­
armed troops was to surround the body of hoplites completely so as either to 
annihilate them with their missile fire or to force them to surrender. If 
the light-armed troops did not completely surround the opposing hoplites but 
still managed to rout them, they were well suited to pursue their more 
heavily equipped foes.
Thucydides, Xenophon and Diodorus give us very little information about 
how light-armed troops would have been used in an engagement in the period 
of the Peloponnesian War in which the clash of two phalanx blocks formed the 
main part. They may have been posted on the extremities of the wings of 
a phalanx, as the Boeotian‘psiloi1 and peltasts were at the battle of Delium 
in 424 B.C., to protect it against an attack by an enemy on one or both
i i
flanks; in Thuc.VII.6.2 we find Syracusan cavalry and akontistai being posted 
opposite the wings of the Athenian phalanx so that they could attack its 
flanks. In several instances light-armed troops would appear to have 
actually formed a wing (e.g. Amphilochian'akontistai* formed part of the 
right wing at the battle of Olpae; in Thuc.VI.67.2 Syracusan 'akontistai1, 
along with their cavalry, formed a wing) rather than having been positioned 
at the end of one, although it should be noted that Thucydides does not draw 
a clear distinction between these two postings. It is also clear from 
Thuc.VI.69.2 that light-armed missile-troops could be used to skirmish with 
each other in front of two phalanx blocks before they engaged. We also 
find 1ight-infantry being used in front of their hoplites in Thuc.IV.32f,
VIII.71.2 and Xen.Hel1.I.1.34.
How were light-armed troops armed in the Peloponnesian War? The 
specialist sphendonetai1 were armed with slings and the'peltastai1 and‘akontista 
with javelins. It is not clear whether they were equipped with a secondary 
weapon such as a dagger, sword or hatchet for hand-to-hand fighting; depict­
ions of peltasts and akontistai'on Classical Greek vases only rarely show 
troops of these two types armed with a secondary weapon. The peltasts at 
least were equipped with a wicker shield. It is more difficult for us to 
tell how the non-specialist light-infantry were armed. Some light-armed 
troops in this period acted simply as stone-throwers (Thuc.I.106.1-2;
IV.32.4; VI.69.2). It is apparent that there was little uniformity in the 
arms carried by non-specialist light troops (c.f. Thuc.IV.94.1): in Thuc.
III.22.3 we learn that some of the Plataean‘psiloi' were armed with only 
breastplates and daggers, whilst others carried a normal spear or javelins.
y ,  /
In the fighting on Sphacteria, apart from the 1 1 and
1 used by the archers and slingers, the other‘psiloi1 threw 
stones and javelins (^ kovti'ch^ and , Thuc.IV.32.4) and at least
some of them were equipped with small wicker shields (Thuc.IV.9.1). Brasidas 
used'psiloi' armed only with, daggers to take one of the gates of Torone 
(Thuc.IV.110.2).
In the Peloponnesian War, Athens and Sparta had no regularly equipped 
or organized forces of native light-armed troops other than bodies of archers 
but preferred to employ specialist allied and mercenary peltasts and 
'akontistai' from the more backward parts of northern Greece and also from Asia 
Minor (Athens also obtained slinjers from Rhodes). Why, then, did Athens, 
Sparta,and many other mainland city states fail to develop large, properly 
organized and equipped units of light-armed troops from among their own 
citizens?
Let us first consider a geographical paradox: Greece is an extremely 
mountainous land and in certain areas there is very little level ground at
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all - an ideal terrain, one would have thought for the lightly-armed mountain 
guerilla. Mardonius, according to Herodotus, realized the paradox, and is 
made to say that instead of finding the terrain where they might have the best 
chance of victory, "they declare war against one another, then find the fair­
est and most level land and go down to it and fight" (Herod.VI1.9.p.1). Certain 
backward upland peoples such as the Acarnanians, Amphilochians, Aetolians, 
Ozolian Locrians, Thracians and many of the Thessalian tribes had developed 
highly trained light-armed troops who could dominate high and rugged terrain - 
they lived in scattered highland villages rather than in cities and learnt to 
use missile weapons to hunt and to protect their flocks from predators. In 
contrast, most Greek city states relied almost totally on heavily-armed infant­
rymen who fought in close-packed phalanx formation on the economically important 
plains, on which grew the crops vital for the cities' survival. It is certain­
ly acceptable to state that the Greek states used hoplite tactics because they 
were well suited for the defence of these plains, but this certainly does not 
explain why no city state with a plain to defend developed a native light-armed 
corps to combat enemy hoplites in the hills before they reached the plain or 
on a rough and broken part of the plain. Most Greek city states had mountain 
barriers which must have been easily defensible against heavily-armed infantry
who found it difficult to advance up slopes and to keep their phalanx block in
239order on rough, uneven terrain. Admittedly, as Holladay points out, some
cities of the Arcadian plateau, the coastal strip of the northern Peloponnese,
and of Boeotia and Thessaly, had only fairly low hills between them and there
are almost always several passes through the main mountain barriers, which
240meant that there were several routes which an invading force could take.
It may, however, be doubted whether the hoplite phalanx could retain its 
cohesion on the stony undulating ground, often interspersed with streams, of 
low hills under attack from an efficient body of light-armed missile-troops; 
a light-armed force could also be divided into mobile sector units, like the
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'comitatus'of the Later Roman Empire, to defend several passes at strategic 
positions - being swift of foot, the light-armed troops at other points 
could move quickly to reinforce another of their units which was attempting 
to fend off an attack.
Holladay further argues that there was no point in having a force of
light-armed troops guarding mountain passes, even if they were effective in
repelling hoplites, since almost all Greek states were open to invasion by
forces, which included hoplites, from the sea,so that the invading hoplites
would have to be fought on flat ground anyway.^ Admittedly, sea-borne raids
were often carried out in the Classical Period, especially by Athens, but
land-borne attacks were far more common (particularly by Sparta) and, with
the exception of Athens' expedition against Syracuse, we never hear of any
Greek state carrying out a mass invasion against an enemy by sea - before
480 B.C. and for some time after, few states would have had enough ships to
carry out a large attack by sea and, as the unfortunate Anchimolius found
out, an army during disembarkation and shortly afterwards could be in a peril-
242ous position if caught off guard; the danger of storms at the beginning and
end of the sailing season must have made sea-borne expeditions of any sort
248risky at these times. Some cities such as those of Arcadia were immune from 
attack by sea.
In view of the fact that light-armed missile-troops had proved themselves 
effective in mountainous Aetolia and on the difficult ground on the island of 
Sphacteria, it is strange that we never hear of any mainland Greek state using 
1ight-infantry to defend high ground in the narrative of Herodotus of the 
Persian Wars or of Thucydides, Xenophon and Diodorus of the Peloponnesian War. 
During Xerxes' invasion the Greeks, if we can trust the silence of Herodotus, 
failed to use light-armed troops at all to guard high rugged positions: a
force of 10,000 hoplites was sent to Tempe to guard the Tempe Gorge and
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possibly the steep pass to Gonnos, but as far as we know there were no light­
armed infantry. At Thermopylae a force of 1,000 Phocian hoplites was 
alloted the task of guarding the difficult Anopaea Path which ran across 
Mount Callidromus to the rear of the Greek position but Herodotus again does 
not mention the presence of any Greek light-armed infantry. Light-armed 
missile-troops would have been ideally suited for preventing Xerxes' troops 
from attempting to advance along the pass which led under the Trachinian 
Cliffs towards Phocis, but again Herodotus is silent about their existence.
No attempt was made to defend the passes on the Cithaeron - Parnes line by 
light-armed guerillas, who could have tried to set up ambushes at strategic 
positions in the passes, inflict casualties, then retreat behind their own 
lines.
In Thucydides' narrative, the only city state to organize an effective
defence of a hilly pass with light-armed troops was Syracuse (VI1.79.2).
Thucydides only rarely hints that Greek mainland city states attempted to
defend mountain barriers and even when he does so, we are not told whether
there were any 1ight-infantry in the defending forces: in 457 B.C. we learn
that the Spartan army in Boeotia could not get home because an Athenian naval
force patrolled the gulf of Corinth and Athenian troops held Megara and
Pagai and guarded Mount Geroneia?^ This mountainous line of defence was lost
with the loss of Megara, but the Athenians do not appear to have tried to hold
the hills between Megara and Eleusis. It is also apparent that Athens'
frontier forts were not intended to stop a large invader but were intended as
an early warning system against attack and as a mode of combating smaller 
245incursions. As Gomme points out, Argos had an excellent mountain barrier
against Sparta both on the south-west and on the west, if Spartan troops
attempted an invasion through Arcadia, but the Argives in their wars with the
Spartans never, so far as we know, attempted to defend this mountain barrier
246and the battles between these two states were always fought in the plains.
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It we accept that light-armed troops were well suited for counterina 
hoplites on both rugged and hilly terrain, we must ask ourselves why, then, 
did the Greek city states not develop their own bodies of well-trained and 
properly armed 1ight-infantry? It was certainly not due in most cases to a 
lack of manpower and probably not of financial resources either. Holladay's 
conclusion that "the truth seems to be that none of the Greek cities came to 
believe that the light-armed soldier was the all-purpose weapon of the future" 
seems correct, with certain exceptions, for the period before 426 B.C. but 
certainly not for the period after 426 B.C. when the Aetolians, Demosthenes
and Brasidas had shown the frightening potential of specialist light-armed
i 247
troops (indicated by Spartas institution of a force of archers in 425 B.C.).
Despite their proven efficiency there seems to have been a deeply ingrained
feeling, which was especially strong at Sparta and evidently felt at Athens
also, that archers and other light-armed troops were cowardly and had no
part in hoplite battles, which in certain aspects were almost ritual; this
conception that light-armed modes of combat were cowardly must have been at
248least a factor in the failure to develop large units of light-armed troops.
Economic, social and political factors also contributed to this failure: 
there was no mechanism for the polis' to train and equip large bands of light­
armed troops and the majority of the men who would have been needed to form 
such units would have been employed in -cultivating crops or watching herds 
and it is doubtful whether they would have had the time to spare for training, 
campaigns and guard duty. In almost all city states only fairly wealthy 
farmers, manufacturers, and traders could have afforded to buy a full panoply, 
while the poorer men, if called upon to fight, armed themselves as best they 
could and probably carried only simple arms such as a spear or knife, with 
no body-shield and certainly no expensive body-armour. In warfare, the 
hoplite classes were predominant and could retain their social and political 
superiority over the poorly equipped and untrained 1ight-infantrymen, who
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could not increase their social standing or political rights due to good 
service on the battlefield; this is reflected in the fact that in the sixth 
century B.C. the top three classes in Athens held political predominance, 
whilst the thetes had comparatively little pow er.^
Let us consider the cases of Athens and Sparta:
1 Athens: Before the rich silver-strike at Laurium in 483-2 B.C. and the
subsequent building of the large Athenian fleet, our sources, by their 
silence, would lead us to believe that the1thetes' took no part in the military 
affairs of the state, which were dominated by hoplites. In the large new 
fleet which numbered about 200 ships in 480 B.C., the poorer sections of the 
community filled the vital role of oarsmen (approximately 40,000 were needed) 
and thus contributed to Athens' military affairs; there must indeed be some 
truth in Gomme's assertion that before the new naval tactics were developed,
rowing was despised and hence hoplites would have been disinclined to serve
250 i ias oarsmen. With the growth of the military importance of the thetes went
increased political power. It has been argued that after the Persian Wars,
such a high percentage of the poorer Athenians must have served as oarsmen
in the fleet that Athens could not possibly have had the manpower both to
fill all her ships with rowers and to form a large organized force of native 
2511ight-infantry. I would certainly agree that many poorer Athenians who 
could have been formed into 1ight-infantry units were vitally needed in the 
fleet, but it seems probable that Athens did in fact have the potential man­
power and resources to equip her triremes with rowers and to institute a 
force of native light-armed infantr/r^ in 460 or 459 B.C., when Athens was 
heavily involved in the Egyptian campaign, she still managed to form a force 
of‘psiloi1 which was large enough to surround a large section of the Corinth­
ian army which had invaded the Megarid (Thuc.I.106.1-2); during the 
campaign of Delium in 424 B.C., the Athenian'psiloi1, who accompanied the
7,000 Athenian hoplites and cavalry, far outnumbered the 10,000 Boeotian 
1ight-infantry (Thuc.IV.94.1).
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The failure to develop a regularly equipped and organized native light- 
infantry force at Athens must have been to a large extent due to the conserv­
ative influence of the hoplite classes, which dominated land warfare and 
regarded light-armed troops with part of the contempt felt towards them in 
Sparta. This obviously is only partly the truth as Athens had a force of 
archers at the battle of Plataea and had a large force of these troops by 
431 B.C. and the general Demosthenes frequently used specialist light-armed 
infantry from other areas of Greece and from the islands of Crete and Rhodes. 
Conservatism also prevented the institution of a mechanism for the state to 
provide training, officers and arms for native Athenian light-infantry; even 
after the crushing hoplite defeats at the hands of light-armed troops in 
Aetolia and on Sicily and the success of their own light-armed on Sphacteria, 
the Athenian hoplites continued to regard their own military position within 
their state as supreme and made up for their own lack of trained native'psiloi' 
by employing allied and mercenary archers, slingers,1akontistai'and peltasts 
from the more backward parts of Greece, certain Aegean islands such as Rhodes 
and Crete, Asia Minor and from- among non-Greek barbarians.
2 Sparta: Sparta had a large subject population from which she could have
formed a sizeable force of organized light-infantry if she had wanted - but
the Spartiates realized that if they did form such a force it would represent
a considerable threat to their internal security and might lead to the destruct- 
2S3ion of their state. Messenian helots armed as light-infantry might have 
revolted or deserted to the Athenians as they did when the Athenians held 
Pylos. Forces of helots armed as light-infantry accompanied and fought with 
the Spartan armies at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. and Plataea in 479 B.C. - they 
must have been fairly inefficient as Pausanias was in desperate need of the 
Athenian corps of archers at Plataea.
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Throughout the Peloponnesian War, Spartan and allied light-armed troops 
accompanied Peloponnesian armies and were frequently used to devastate the 
land of an enemy. Brasidas was the first Spartan general to recognize the 
potential of specialized peltasts from northern Greece: he used a large
force of Chalcidian and probably also Thracian peltasts in his defence of 
Amphipolis in 422 B.C. and a force of peltasts in the storming of Torone. 
Brasidas was an exception to the rule - Spartan generals did not normally 
make good use of light-armed troops in combat roles. The Spartans appear 
to have held all light-armed missile-troops in deep contempt and this must 
have been a main reason for Sparta's failure to develop a force of organized 
light-infantry and their late institution of a body of archers. So long 
as Sparta's enemies retained their large forces of hoplites and failed to 
make effective use of light-infantry, she had little need of light-armed 
troops.
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Appendix to Thucydides
A. Percentages of Light-armed Troops and Archers Present in the Various
Forces of the Peloponnesian War for which Thucydides Gives Figures
1 432 B.C. Corinthian force sent to Potidaea (1.60.1)
Force of 400 ‘psiloi' and 1,600 hoplites
The psiloi* constituted 20% of the whole force.
2 431 B.C. The Athenian Army
cavalry and hippotoxotai
I V
toxotai 
combat hoplites 
hoplites on garrison duty
Thuc.II.13.8 
1,200 
1,600
13.000
16.000
Ath.Pol.XXIV 
1,200 
1,600
hoplites: 2,500 (Peacetime 
quota for 
garrison duty: 
Rhodes on 
Ath.Pol.)
Ath.Pol.
> i
Toxotai as pc of whole force 
= 30.2%
i «
Toxotai as pc of all hoplites and 
‘toxotai’
= 39%
Thuc.
Toxotai as pc of whole force 
= 5%
'Toxotai' as pc of all hoplites and 
'toxotai1
= 5.2%
> i
Toxotai as pc of mobile hoplites 
and 'toxotai'
= 1 1 %
3 431 B.C. Athenian force sent round Peloponnese (II.23.2)
Force of 400*toxotai' and 1,000 hoplites 
The'toxotai'constituted 28.6% of this force.
4 426 B.C. Athenian force sent against Ambraciots (III.107.1)
Force of 60 Athenian toxotai' and 200 Messenian hoplites
i i
The toxotai constituted 23% of this force.
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5 425 B.C. Athenian assault force on Sphacteria
Force of 800 archers and 800 peltasts (IV.32.1-2) and the majority 
of oarsmen from more than 70 ships, including all but the lowest rank,
armed as psiloi' (c.7,700 men+), and a force of about 800 hoplites
(see Wilson, Pylos 425 B.C., pp.104-5).
The 800 archers, 800 peltasts and c.7,700 oarsmen/psiloi' constituted 
over 92% of the whole force.
6 424 B.C. The Battle of Delium
a. Boeotian force at the Battle of Delium (IV.93.3)
7.000 hoplites
1.000 cavalry 
500 peltasts
10,000 'psiloi'
Light-armed troops (psiloi* and peltasts) as a pc of whole force = 57%
Light-armed troops (psiloi1 and peltasts) as a pc of hoplites and
light-armed = 60%
b. Athenian army:
7.000 hoplites
300+ cavalry (at temple; how many on wings?)
10,000+ psiloi*
The Athenian'psiloi' almost certainly constituted over 50% of the whole 
force.
7 423 B.C. A Peloponnesian force sent to aid Mende and Scione (IV.123.4)
Force of 500 Peloponnesian hoplites and 300 Chalcidian peltasts.
The Chalcidian peltasts constituted 38% of the whole force.
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8 423 B.C. An Athenian force sent against Mende and Scione (IV.129.2)
1.000 citizen hoplites 
600 'toxotai'
1.000 Thracian mercenaries (peltasts?)
? Allied peltasts (number undefined)
'Toxotai' as a pc of citizen hoplites and archers = 38%
‘Toxotai1 as a pc of hoplites, Thracian mercenaries and archers = 23%
'Toxotai' and Thracian mercenaries as a pc of hoplites, Thracians
and archers = 62%
Light-armed troops, including an undefined number of allied peltasts, 
must have constituted well over 62% of the total force.
9 423 B.C. Athenian strike force sent against a Peloponnesian Army
(IV.129.4).
120‘psiloi1 from Mende 
60 Athenian hoplites 
600 archers
\ i
Toxotai as a pc of the whole force = 77%
i i
Toxotai as a pc of the archers and hoplites = 91%
Light-armed troops as a pc of the whole force = 92%
10 422 B.C. The Battle of Amphipolis (V.6.4)
Brasidas1 force:
1,500 Thracian mercenaries (probably peltasts)
? Edonian cavalry and peltasts
1.000 Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts
? other Chalcidian troops in Amphipolis
2.000 hoplites
300 cavalry
The peltasts probably constituted more than 50% of the whole force (this 
assumes that the 1,500 Thracian mercenaries were peltasts).
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11 419 B.C. Boeotian contingent of a Spartan force (V.57.2)
5.000 hoplites 
500 cavalry
5.000 'psi loi'
500 hamippoi'(I understand these to be light-armed)
The light-armed troops (psiloi and hamippoi) constituted 50% of the 
whole force.
12 416 B.C. Athenian expedition against Melos (V.84.1)
1,200 Athenian hoplites 
300 archers
i i
20 hippotoxotai
1,500 Melian hoplites 
Infantry archers and'hippotoxotai'as a pc of the whole force = 11% 
Infantry archers as a pc of Athenian hoplites and archers = 20%
13 415 B.C. Sicilian Expedition (VI.43)
Original Athenian force:
480 archers (80 of whom were Cretans)
700 slingers
120 Megarian 'psiloi'
5,100 hoplites 
30 cavalry
Light-armed troops (archers, slingers and psiloi) as a pc of the
whole force = 20%
Archers as a pc of the whole force = 7.5%
Archers as a pc of archers and 1,500 Athenian hoplites = 24%
Slingers as a pc of the whole force = 11%
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14 413 B.C. Athenian auxiliary force sent to Sicily
(See VII.31.5; VII.33.4; VII.33.5; VII.35.1; VII.42.1)
5,000 hoplites 
1 ,000+ 'akontistai'
VII.31.5 Acarnanian akontistai'(number unknown)
VII.33.4 150 Iapygian'akontistai1
t i
VII.33.5 300 akontistai from Metapontum 
VI1.35.1 300 akontistai' from Thurii
i i
? other akontistai
? 'sphendonetai' (Acarnanians)
‘ «
? toxotai
I  ( I I
Akontistai as a pc of akontistai and hoplites = 20%+
Light-armed troops (including‘sphendonetai1 and‘toxotai') must have been 
substantially more than 20% of the whole force.
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B Archers in Athenian Expeditionary Forces
(numbers refer to examples given in section A)
3 28.5%
4 23%
8 38%
12 20%
13 24%
On Athenian expeditions the pc of archers to Athenian hoplites (and 
where these were not present, to allied hoplites) does not vary greatly 
(with the exception of the force on Sphacteria, which was a special case).
In Athenian and Peloponnesian forces the percentage of all light-armed 
troops ranged widely:
5 92%+ (Athenian)
6b 50%+ (Athenian)
8 62% (Athenian)
9 92% (Athenian)
13 20% (Athenian) ■
14 20% (Athenian)
1 20% (Corinthian)
7 38% (Peloponnesian)
10 50%+ (Peloponnesian)
At the battle of Delium in 424 B.C. (6a) and on campaign with a Spartan 
force in 419 B.C. (4), the Boeotian light-armed troops as a percentage of 
their whole force remains not much different - 57% at Delium and 50% in 419 
B.C.; since we have only these two sets of figures it is dangerous to draw 
any inferences from them.
C H A P T E R  S I X
LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE FORCES OF OPPOSITION TO 
THE THIRTY TYRANTS AT ATHENS (404 - 403 B.C.)
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Light-armed infantry took part in the events of 404 - 403 B.C. which 
resulted in the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens.1 The Thirty 
became hated because of their indiscriminate murder of innocent men and 
their confiscation of land. In Xenophon's Hellenica we learn that the 
tyrants began to confiscate the properties of smallholders (11.4.1); they 
first banned from Athens itself all who were not on the roll of the Three 
Thousand, then drove them from their villages so that they could seize 
their farms for themselves and their friends. The dispossessed smallholders 
fled to the Piraeus but were driven away and sought refuge in Megara, Corinth
p
and Thebes. Thrasybulus, the leader of the exiles, marched from Thebes with 
seventy Athenian supporters and succeeded in occupying the small fort of 
Phyle, under Mount Parnes.'3 The Thirty marched out of Athens with the Three 
Thousand and some of their troops began to attack the high enemy position at 
Phyle, but could not take it and suffered some losses;4 as we shall see in 
Xenophon's description of the battles on the hill of Munychia, Thrasybulus 
made good use of his light-infantry to defend his elevated position and it 
is probable that he used them also in his defence of Phyle. When their 
attack failed and bad weather prevented them from erecting a wall round the 
fortress, the troops of the Thirty returned to Athens.
The Thirty, through fear of plundering raids by the soldiers of Thrasy­
bulus, sent almost all the Laconian guard and two units of Athenian cavalry 
to protect the outlying districts.5 These troops encamped in a bushy, wooded 
spot in the deme of Acharnae, not far from Phyle. Thrasybulus marched at 
night with his forces, which had now grown to 700 in number, against these 
troops and just before dawn charged at them, killing more than 120 hoplites 
and 3 cavalrymen. It seems likely that some at least of Thrasybulus' troops 
were light-armed skirmishers since the pursuit of the fleeing Laconian and 
Athenian troops was pressed for about a mile;6 also note that Thrasybulus' 
soldiers were careful to gather all the 'hopla' of the routed troops - this
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was because the Thirty had confiscated all the heavy arms and armour except 
those of the Three Thousand.^ Light-armed infantry were ideally suited for 
swift night attacks and ambushes - in the bushy and wooded ground the hoplites 
of the Laconian garrison and Athenian cavalry must have been at a disadvantage 
to any 1ight-infantrymen who were in Thrasybulus' force. Perhaps signific­
antly the Tyrants sent a force of cavalry, who would not have been able to 
operate effectively against hoplites arrayed in a tight-packed phalanx form­
ation, to combat the exiles: as we have seen on many occasions in Thucydides'
account of the Peloponnesian War, light-armed infantry were very vulnerable 
to cavalry attack.®
Soon afterwards, Thrasybulus with an army now of one thousand men, 
carried out a night march from Phyle to the harbour town of Piraeus and 
stationed his army on the hill of Munychia, a strong defensive position.^ The 
Thirty, with their hoplites and cavalry and also the Laconian guard, advanced 
against the troops of Thrasybulus who had gathered in a compact body on the 
hill where they could only be attacked on a narrow front. The troops of 
the Thirty drew up for battle in a mighty phalanx block approximately fifty 
men deep and then began to ascend the hill. Thrasybulus in turn drew up his 
troops on top of the hill with care: he positioned his hoplites, ten men deep,
in front and behind these his large forces of 'peltophoroi' and 'psiloi 
akontistai' and behind them his 'petroboloi' (Xen.Hell.II.4.12). The speech 
of Thrasybulus before the battle, which Xenophon probably heard (from the 
wrong side) and probably reflects reasonably accurately what he said, indicates 
that he knew well the potential of light-armed missile-troops in an elevated 
position:"And now the gods have brought us to a position where our enemies, 
because they are advancing up hill, cannot hurl either spears or javelins 
over the heads of those drawn up in front of them, while we, throwing spears, 
javelins and stones downhill, shall reach them and fell many of their number. 
And although one might have thought that we should be compelled to fight with
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the soldiers of their front ranks on even terms, yet if you let fly your 
missiles energetically, as you should, no man will miss his mark since the 
road is packed with them and they, in their attempts to put up a guard 
against these missiles, will be continually cowering under their shields. 
You will therefore be able, just as if they were blind men, to strike out 
at them wherever you wish and then to leap upon them and lay them low".
(Xen.Hell.II.4.15-16).
This long exhortation to his missile-troops is perhaps indicative of 
the fact that Thrasybulus regarded these troops as vital in compensating 
for his 5 - to - 1 disadvantage in hoplites.^ Xenophon informs us that 
there were many light-armed troops in the force of the exiles and that many 
of these came from the area around the Piraeus: these men were probably
mainly disaffected smallholders and metics. Let us now look at the various 
types of light-armed infantry in Thrasybulus' force and their mode of oper­
ation in relation to their own hoplites. We are informed that there were 
'peltophoroi1, 'psiloi akontistai' and 'petroboloi' (Xen.Hell.II.4.12) but 
there is no mention of the archers and slingers who were to take part in 
the battle with Pausanias' troops in the following year (Xen.Hell.II.4.33); 
perhaps the men equipped with slings mentioned in the latter passage could 
be included under the term 'petroboloi' or perhaps even 'peltophoroi'. 
Archers could not have been included under any of the terms which Xenophon 
gives in Hell.II.4.12 - were there really none of these troops present in 
this battle with the Thirty or does Xenophon simply omit to mention them?
Now let us consider the mode of operation of these light troops: they
were positioned behind their own hoplites (Xen.Hel1.11.4.12) and shot their 
missile weapons over their heads (Xen.Hell.II.4.15). We have only one 
earlier reference in Greek literature to light-armed infantry operating from 
behind more heavily-armed soldiers: this comes in Iliad N712 - 722, where
Locrian archers and slingers are described as operating from behind the 
conventionally armed Achaean infantry. Onasander specifically notes
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that'psiloi positioned behind their own troops were ineffectual and also 
could "do more damage to their own soldiers than to those of the enemy"
(The General,XVII). We are so rarely informed by our sources of the 
position of Greek light-armed troops in battle that we cannot say if it 
was, or was not, regular practice for them to operate from behind their 
infantry. On a flat plain and if their infantry was arranged in a deep 
formation, there must have been, as Onasander notes, a danger of light­
armed troops positioned behind their conventional infantry shooting short 
and hitting their own front ranks, but since Thrasybulus' missile-troops 
were positioned higher up the slope of Munychia and since they had a clear 
view of the enemy, the danger of hitting their own hoplites in the back must 
have been minimal.
In the battle which followedjthe troops of the Thirty were routed and 
pursued down the hill of Munychia to level ground - over seventy soldiers 
in the army of the Thirty were killed. Again Thrasybulus1 men took the much 
needed heavy arms and armour from the dead hoplites.^ Xenophon's description 
of the battle is very brief and does nothing to clarify the roles of 
Thrasybulus' hoplites and light-armed troops in the main fighting.
During 403 B.C.,many more men flocked to join the exiles and Thrasybulus 
tried to equip more of his men with hoplite arms and armour. Some of 
Thrasybulus' followers who lacked shields made make-shift shields of wood 
and woven willow twigs which they painted white. Were these shields light 
'peltai* and were they used by the troops which Xenophon terms 'peltophoroi'in 
Hell.II.4.12? 14
A large section of Thrasybulus' force went out from the Piraeus area and 
made foraging expeditions on the land around the city. We are informed that 
there were ' t t o X X oI  ottX ctocv . 1 and ' t t o \ X o <. i i n 0ne
foraging party; the men in the city sent out cavalry squadrons to try to
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18hamper these parties. With more citizens and metics and other foreigners
flocking to join Thrasybulus, the position of the exiles seemed strong and 
they even made attacks on the walls of Athens, but in August 403 B.C.
Spartan allies except the Boeotians and Corinthians sent contingents.1^
Meanwhile Libys, the admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, tried to stop
supplies reaching the Piraeus by sea. The Spartans encamped on the plain
of Halipedon near the Piraeus in order of battle, with Pausanias and his
Spartan hoplites on the right and Lysander and his mercenaries on the left.
When the exiles refused to disperse to their homes, Pausanias led an irres-
18olute attack against them which accomplished nothing.
Lysander had not attempted to wall off the Piraeus and the naval block­
ade had not been effective enough to force the capitulation of the exiles
in the Piraeus. Pausanias realized that a wall was necessary and set out
19with a large reconnaissance unit to see where it could best be built; he 
took along with him two'morai’of Spartan hoplites, apparently one third of 
all Spartan troops and possibly amounting to around 2,600 men, and three
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tribal units of Athenian cavalry. As Pausanias' troops were returning to 
camp, they were attacked and harassed by some of Thrasybulus' light-infantry. 
Pausanias sent the Athenian cavalry and young Spartan hoplites to chase after 
them at speed, while he and the other hoplites would follow along behind at 
a slower pace. Pausanias' van-guard managed to kill thirty of the light 
troops and pursued the rest to the theatre of Dionysus on the lower slopes 
of the Munychia hill. There the whole of Thrasybulus' light-armed troops 
and hoplites were waiting. It seems as if Pausanias fell into a trap: the 
light-armed troops of Thrasybulus rushed down en masse against them:
Pausanias set out with a Spartan army for Attica to crush them;1** all the
kofi oc y^cv 'Vtfo v t £ ^  4j§cxWov,
£ T o ^ £ O o v ^  e6'< j>€.v^ovu)V  ' <X Se A  ock£^c*Lyuov<.o i } CTree o ^ u tu jv  
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CTTi t t o^ oc (Xen.Hell.II.4.33). The Spartans suffered many
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casualties from the missile weapons and began to give ground. When the 
light-armed troops saw that the Spartans were giving ground, they attacked 
them all the harder with a hail of missile weapons. In this attack, the 
Spartans lost the polemarchs of both'morai', Chaeron and Thibrachus.
When Thrasybulus saw that his light-armed troops were forcing the
Spartans to retreat and were causing many casualties, he formed his hoplites
in a phalanx formation eight-deep and led them downhill in front of his
‘psiloi1. His light-armed infantry withdrew behind their hoplite ranks and
possibly continued to harass the Spartan troops with missile weapons shot
over the heads of their own heavily-armed soldiers. Pausanias was forced
to retreat four or five stades to a hill where he sent orders to all his
other troops to join him in full force. There he formed an extremely deep
phalanx and advanced against the shallower phalanx of the exiles, who now
felt confident enough to risk a close-fought phalanx engagement. The
Spartans succeeded in breaking Thrasybulus1 phalanx block, pushing a section
21of the enemy into the marsh of Halae, and killed about 150 of his troops. 
After this victory, which was probably dearly won, Pausanias quickly came 
to terms with the men in the Piraeus without further bloodshed and then 
marched with his troops out of Attica.
Thrasybulus' light-armed troops give the impression of being competent 
skirmishers: not only did they have the nerve to attack and drive back the
Spartan hoplites, inflicting casualties in the process, but they also acted 
in conjunction with their own hoplites by withdrawing to the rear of their 
own phalanx when the Spartans were retreating, and so allowed their own 
hoplites to get to grips with the Spartans when they were most vulnerable. 
Best thinks that this was the first occasion on which true Athenian light- 
infantry used skirmishing tactics, but some at least of the light-troops 
who used such tactics on Sphacteria in 425 B.C. were Athenians.22 A little 
must be said about Xenophon's terminology of the light-armed troops engaged
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in this battle: we find that Xenophon, before H e n . II.4.33 uses the terms
'gymnetes' and 'psiloi' to refer to Thrasybulus' light-infantry; in II.4.33, 
however, Xenophon divides the exiles not into 'hoplites and gymnetes' or 
'hoplites and psiloi', but into 'hoplites and peltastai', even though he 
has not previously informed us that there were any true peltasts in Thrasy­
bulus ' force. Immediately afterwards,Thrasybulus' light-infantry are again 
termed 'psiloi' even though they are obviously the same troops as those who 
were called 'peltastai' in the prece ding sentence. It follows,then,that 
Xenophon uses the term 'peltastai' loosely in this passage, not to refer to 
true peltasts but to describe all Thrasybulus' light-armed troops. Inter­
estingly, a fragmentary inscription referring to a ^ eltastes' has been found 
on part of a stele of Pentelic marble from a late context west of the northern 
part of the Odeion and it has been suggested by D.W. Bradeen that this was 
the monument of one of Thrasybulus' light-infantrymen who fell in the strife
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It may be in this inscription also that the word 'peltastes*does not indicate 
a true peltast but simply denotes a light-armed infantryman of any type.
Another archaeological discovery is of great interest to us: the
or
Peribolos tomb of the Lacedaemonians in the Kerameikos. Xenophon in 
Hellenica II.4.35 informs us that the Spartans suffered many casualties at 
the hands of Thrasybulus' missile-troops before the phalanx blocks came 
together and further informs us that both Spartan polemarchs, Chairon and 
Thibrachus, and Lacrates, a winner in the Olympic games, and the other 
Lacedaemonian dead, were buried in the Kerameikos, in front of the gates of
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Athens. In 1930^German archaeologists in their excavations in the outer 
Kerameikos found an impressive ashlar masonry structure which was crowned 
by a cornice block with the following inscription (IGI12 ,11678):
This inscription, written in the Lacedaemonian alphabet and retrograde, 
indicated for certain that this was the grave of the Spartans buried in the 
Kerameikos since it names the polemarchs Thibrachus and Chairon. The tomb 
is a peribolos in form and differed from those of private burials in its 
internal division into three chambers; the burials were carried out beneath 
its irregularly laid foundations. The spacing of the capital letters 
(which formed the inscription: A A [ K E  A  A T M O N I  O X ]  ) with one 
placed between each two names made the archaeologists think that at least 
thirteen or fourteen men were buried in the tomb - in fact during the 
excavation thirteen skeletons were found in the grave enclosure. Franz 
Willemsen was convinced that the Spartan dead numbered many more and suggested 
that a stretch of 50 metres in the Kerameikos was filled with Lacedaemonian 
dead.
The excavators found three skeletons in the centre chamber of the tomb 
who had been laid out with great care - these skeletons are most likely 
those of Chaeron, Thibrachus and Lacrates. An astonishing discovery was 
made when the other skeletons were excavated: two of the skeletons still
carried the heads of the weapons with which they had been wounded. One 
skeleton was found with an iron spearhead lodged in its left rib-cage, 
whilst another had two bronze arrowheads lodged deeply in its right leg.
The arrowheads were so deeply imbedded in the latter1s leg that it seems 
probable that he was shot at fairly close range by one of Thrasybulus1 
archers; the two wounds in the leg of the Spartan hoplite must have crippled 
him and left him open to a coup de grace.
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A The Hoplite in the Army of the Ten Thousand
The hoplite, as the name suggests, was an infantryman who was equipped 
with heavy arms and armour. 1 However, we know for certain from literary 
and archaeological evidence that hoplites in the age of Xenophon were 
becoming more mobile and less heavily armed - this was probably due, as 
Snodgrass suggests, to the increased prestige of the peltast and consequently 
the new more mobile role demanded of the hoplite: they were expected to
follow close behind the peltasts in running attacks on both flat and diffi­
cult terrain.
The use of metallic and metallic-plated body armour declined. We learn 
in Anabasis 1.2.16 that when Cyrus paraded his Greek hoplites for the benefit 
of the queen of Cilicia, they had bronze helmets, red tunics, greaves and 
shields. The generals had been ordered to draw up their soldiers in battle 
line, and presumably they were also armed for battle. Tunics were regularly 
worn under body-armour, but Xenophon only mentions the red tunics and no 
body-armour. Some at least of the hoplites wore the 'spolas1, a light cloth 
or leather jacket (Anab.III.3.20; IV.1.18) - a number of hoplites on the 
second frieze of the Nereid Monument of Xanthus (c.400B.C.) wear the spolas' 
and so do some of the archers, whilst other hoplites and archers are simply 
clad in tunics.^ When the small body of Greek cavalry was formed during 
the retreat after Cunaxa, Xenophon expressly notes that'spolades'and thor’akes 
were provided for the cavalrymen (Anab.III.3.20). Presumably, therefore, 
not all these soldiers had body-armour when they served in the infantry. At 
about the same period in Sicily, Dionysius I of Syracuse provided body-armour 
for his officers, cavalry and guards, but not for his normal infantry, when
o
equipping his forces to fight against the Carthaginians.
There is also evidence that at this period some hoplites were abandoning 
the heavy, uncomfortable and hot bronze helmet for a light pointed hat called
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the 'pilos' which became a common motif in works of painting and sculpture 
at the end of the fifth century B.C.4 The'pilos1seems to have been worn by 
light-armed troops and the servants of hoplites also. It was probably in 
most cases made of stiffened felt or leather, although metal'piloi'have 
been found at Dodona.0
Snodgrass notes that few examples of metal greaves have been found 
dating to this period and there are also few depictions of the metal greave7 
The dispensation of the use of greaves would have made hoplites far more 
mobile.
In conclusion,we may say that from literary and archaeological evidence 
it is evident that the panoply of the hoplites in the age of Xenophon was 
becoming lighter. This was due most probably to the increased importance 
of the peltast and the more mobile role which was expected of the hoplite 
if he was to act in close conjunction with the peltast. The lighter panoply 
must also have cost less to produce and increased the comfort of the hoplite.
1 Greek Archers in the Army of the Ten Thousand
Xenophon reports that at Celaenae Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian exile, 
arrived with a force which included 200 Cretan archers (Anab.I.2.9).
J. Roy supposes that Clearchus recruited this body of professional mercenary 
archers in the Chersonese? We may infer that the force of Cretan archers 
was well organized from the fact that they had a special commander, a Cretan 
named Stratocles? Cretan archery and archers, to judge from the frequency 
of the literary allusions, must have been famous in mainland Greece.10 The 
force of Cretan archers in the army of the Ten Thousand was small and it 
amounted to only 1.6% of all the troops at Celaenae (and as a percentage of 
the other light-armed troops, 8.6%). 11
We hear nothing about the actions of the Cretan archer force until
after the battle of Cunaxa. The Cretan archers probably were present at
the battle and are to be included in the term 'peltastikon' of Anabasis
1.8.5 - if so, they were positioned on the extreme right of the Greek force
with the other 1ight-troops, to prevent an outflanking movement by the troops
of Artaxerxes' left wing. It is clear from Xenophon's account of the battle
of Cunaxa that, as we should expect, archers were present in Artaxerxes'
force and also that they were used against the Greeks.1^  Although Xenophon
has the troops of Artaxerxes fleeing before they ever came to close grips
with the Greeks, Diodorus differs from him here in his account of the battle:^
"When the two armies were about half a mile apart, the Greeks raised the
paean and at first advanced slowly but as soon as they were within range of
the Persian missiles they began to run very quickly. Clearchus, the Spartan,
had ordered them to do this, thinking that, if they did not run from a great
distance, he would keep his warriors fresh for the battle and that, if they
advanced at a run from close quarters, the arrows and other missiles shot
by the Persians would fly over their heads. When the soldiers with Cyrus
approached the King's army a great many missiles were shot at them, as one
might expect from a force of 400,000. Nevertheless, they fought for a short
time with missiles and then for the remainder of battle joined in hand-to-
hand combat" (Diodorus XIV.23.1-2). It would appear, then, from the account
of Diodorus that the Greeks of the Ten Thousand adopted the tactics used by
the Athenians and Plataeans at the battle of Marathon in order to reduce
14their losses due to missile fire.
On their homeward march the Greeks were attacked by a force of 200
Persian archers and slingers, under the command of Mithridates, after they
had crossed the Zapatas River. Xenophon informs us that when the Persian 
archers and slingers were inflicting many wounds on the Greek rearguard, the 
force of Cretan archers was unable to ward them off effectively: ol Xe
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The Cretan archers on this occasion operated from inside the’plaision'form­
ation since they had no armour to protect them from the missiles fired by 
the Persians and also had a shorter range than the Persian archers. The 
most probable reason why the Cretans had a shorter range was because they 
used a large and heavy 'boss-and-barb' type of arrowhead, whilst Oriental 
arrowheads were comparatively small18 both the Cretans and Persians used the 
composite type of bow.18 The Cretan archers must either have operated over
i i
the heads of the hoplites or through gaps in the plaision formation.
In Anabasis 111.4.13f., Xenophon informs us that not far from the ruined 
city of Mespila, Tissaphernes attacked the Greeks with his large force of 
archers, slingers and cavalry - they did not approach near, but shot their 
missile weapons from a safe distance. We are informed that the Cretans 
picked up the Persian arrows which were fired at them and used them for high 
trajectory long-range shots (Xen.Anab.III.4.17). The Persian force, which 
was numerous and covered a wide area, presented an ideal target for such high 
trajectory shooting.17
The Greek archers and slingers, however, did not hold the upper hand 
when attacked by the Persian missile-troops from a high position while cross­
ing a mountain: "The Persians not only inflicted many wounds, but they got
the better of the Greek gymnetes and shut them up within the formation of 
their hoplites so that the Greek slingers and archers were mixed up with the 
mass of camp-followers and were rendered useless for the whole of that day" 
(Xen.Anab.III.4.26). The Persians inflicted so many casualties that the 
Greeks had to appoint eight doctors to attend those wounded by the missiles.18
oc v t e.TT OL ouv y oucev v IOi. f t Y  oec, K
On the march through the Carduchian mountains we are informed by 
Xenophon that all t h e ‘gymnetes were positioned in the van - this almost 
certainly included the Cretan archers; they would have been useful for 
countering any attack by enemy missile-troops on the ascending Greek army.19 
The Carduchians then attacked the Greeks by shooting huge armour-piercing 
arrows and large sling-shots at them. The penetrative power of the 
Carduchians1 arrows is astounding and Xenophon and Diodorus would have us 
believe that they could pass through both shields and cuirasses?8 The bows 
of the Carduchians may have been similar to the Medieval long-bow which was 
capable of firing arrows which could penetrate thick metallic armour.21 
Xenophon notes specifically that the Cretan archers were of great use in 
combating the Carduchians (Anab.IV.2.28). In crossing the River Centrites 
in their march out of the territory of the Carduchians into Armenia, the 
Greeks were harassed by archers from the forces of the Persians Orontas and 
Artuchas and also by the Carduchians22 The Greek archers, slingers and 
peltasts were used to frighten their opponents on the opposite bank.28
In Anabasis IV.8.15, Xenophon describes how the Greeks drew up for 
battle against the Colchians: "When the officers were at their own positions
and had formed their lochoi in column, there were about eighty companies of 
hoplites with each company numbering near one hundred men; they formed the 
peltastai and archers into three divisions, one on the extremity of the left 
wing of the hoplites, the second on the extremity of the right, and the third 
in the centre, each division numbering about 600 men." The Greek archers, 
along with the other 1ight-troops, were to protect the wings of the Greek 
phalanx, threaten the wings of the enemy and give added support to the centre
Xenophon informs us that the Greek archers took part in the attack on
o r
the mountain fortress of the Drilae. Greek archers, wearing Greek bronze
t I
helmets and the spolas or tunic, are depicted on the second frieze of the 
Nereid Monument from Xanthus (c.400 B.C.) giving covering fire to hoplites
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26climbing a ladder to attack a city. Compare to this representation the 
scene depicted on the British Museum's silver bowl from Amathus, a Phoenician 
work of the mid-seventh century B.C. - this shows long-robed Asiatic archers 
covering a column of hoplites which has placed its scaling ladder against 
the walls of a city.^ Both representations would suggest that archers could 
be used to protect hoplites in their attacks on city walls; the depiction 
on the Nereid Monument would suggest that by the fifth century B.C. both 
Greek mercenary hoplites and specialist missile-troops became sought-after 
by Asiatic potentiates, whereas the Amathus Bowl might perhaps suggest that 
at an earlier date it had only been the Greek hoplites in whom they had been 
interested.
In Anabasis V.2.28-32, Xenophon recounts a trick which the Greeks played
on the Drilae so that they could carry on their descent to Trapezus in safety.
A Mysian soldier took ten of the Cretans and laid a mock ambush in some
OQ l |
undergrowth - the Cretans were to flash their peltai (which were 'chalkai' - 
probably 'bronze-faced' rather than 'of bronze') out of the bushes, so that 
the Drilae would be terrified that the Greeks were setting up a large ambush
l  |  O Q
against them. Were these Cretans equipped with both peltai and bows? The 
Cretans who came to their rescue were certainly armed with bows (Xen.Anab. 
V.2.32). Cretan archers, being lightly-armed and mobile, would have been 
ideally suited to this type of mock ambush.
In their march against the hostile Mossynoecians, the lochoi'of hoplites 
were formed in parallel columns with the archers placed in the intervals 
between themp1 When the hostile group of Mossynoecians ran down a hill and 
pelted the Greeks with stones, they were held back and repulsed by the Greek
■ i
archers and peltastai. It is clear that the Greek archers played an 
important role in fending off enemy missile-troops from their own hoplites.
In Anabasis V.6.15, Xenophon comments on the numbers and efficiency of the 
archers and other light-troops and also of the cavalry.
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In conclusion,we may say that Cyrus employed a specialist corps of 200 
mercenary Cretan archers who were under a regular commander; this was a 
small force and only represented 1.6% of the Greek army at Celaenae. It 
cannot have been uncommon for Greek mercenary archers to be hired by Asiatic 
potent ates: Greek archers wearing spolades' and Greek metallic helmets are
depicted on the Nereid Monument from Xanthus. Although not specifically 
mentioned as having taken part in the battle of Cunaxa, the Cretan archers 
did perform a very useful role on the homeward march by countering enemy 
missile-troops, even though their arrows had a shorter range than those fired 
by the Persian archers due to the heavy type of arrowhead which they used.
The Greek archers operated well in rough terrain and Xenophon specifically 
states that the Cretan archers were of great use in combating the Carduchian 
troops in their mountainous homeland (Anab.IV.2.28) - only when they met stiff 
resistance from numerically superior missile-troops were they forced to take
t i
shelter in the defensive plaision formation. It is also evident from 
Xenophon's description of the attack on the mountain fortress of the Drilae 
and the scenes on the Nereid Monument that archers were well suited to taking 
part in attacks on fortified positions.
2 Greek Slingers in the Army of the Ten Thousand
The Greeks were attacked by Persian archers, slingers and cavalry on 
their homeward journey after they had crossed the Zapatas River. Xenophon 
comments that the Persians attacked with impunity because their archers had 
a greater range than their Greek counterparts and their slingers could shoot 
further than the Greek akontistai could throw their javelins (Anab.Ill.3.7). 
The Greek light-troops and hoplites could not catch up with the Persian 
archers and slingers, who were extremely nimble, and consequently they 
suffered so badly from the Persian harassing attacks that they only managed 
to march about two and a half miles in one day.32 Xenophon realized the urgent
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need of slingers (and cavalry) to combat the Persian missile-troops, and 
therefore wished to find out which soldiers already had slings in their 
possession, offering payment to these men to act as slingers, and to anyone 
else who was willing to manufacture slings. He addressed his men thus:
(Xen.Anab.III.3.16-18).
In Anabasis 111.3.20 we are informed that a force of 200 Rhodian 
slingers was formed. The Rhodians were famed slingers and were used by
range of not less than twice that of their Persian counterparts and could
in Greek literature to the use of the lead siing-bullet, which was termed
material from which to manufacture such objects, as it is easy to cast and 
provides the maximum weight in a small volume. Our archaeological evidence 
for the early use of the lead bullet is extremely limited and no Classical 
lead siing-bullet which can be dated with any certainty to before the end 
of the fifth century has been published. Lead bullets which may have dated 
to the Archaic Period were found at Olympia, but their context is not properly
33Athens in the Sicilian Expedition. Xenophon tells us that they had a
use both stones and lead-bullets as missiles.^ This is our first reference
in Greek Lead is a very suitable
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known, whilst the lead sling-shots which are said to have been found on
oc
the battlefield of Marathon are of extremely doubtful authenticity. The 
Persian slingers, like the Assyrian, Balearic and Roman slingers, used large 
stones as projectiles which had a much shorter range than the small lead 
sling-bullets. The Persian sling-stones which were "the size of a fist" 
must have had the potential to crush a man's skull even when protected by a 
metallic helmet or to cripple unprotected limbs - Peruvian slingers used
07
large stone sling-shots to good effect against Spanish Conquistadors.
The Rhodians formed a corps of 200 slingers; the Cretan archer force 
also numbered 200 men - was this the regular size of a unit of archers or
00
slingers in Xenophon's time? When Xenophon appealed for slingers he 
specifically mentioned the Rhodians - were there any other forces in the 
army of the Ten Thousand who could have supplied these troops? A small 
collection of lead bullets found in Crete and dating approximately to this 
period, might suggest that the Cretans could have supplied slingers - but 
they must primarily have been needed for their ski 11 at a r c h e r y . O n e  of the
1 1
taxiarchs was an Acarnanian and there may well have been more Acarnanian 
troops, whom Thucydides notes were skilled slingers, in the army of the Ten 
Thousand; if some Acarnanians did act as slingers, Xenophon is silent about 
this point.40
Near the city of Mespila, the Greeks were attacked by the troops of 
Tissaphernes and Orontas, who did not approach near them, but shot at them 
with their slings and bows. The Persian missile-troops were driven off by 
the Rhodian slingers and Cretan archers who fired withering volleys into 
their ranks. The Persian troops speedily withdrew out of range. Xenophon 
realized that the Rhodian slingers played a major role in preventing the 
Persian missile-troops from harming the Greeks on the march and comments 
that this was because they had a longer range than both the Persian slingers 
and archers (Anab.III.4.16). The fact that on several Assyrian reliefs
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slingers are positioned behind archers would suggest that they out-ranged 
them.
In the villages near Mespila the Greeks found sinews and lead in abund­
ance, which were used by their slingers to make slings and bullets?^ Xenophon 
again states in Anabasis II1.4.18 that the troops under Tissaphernes had the 
worst of missile fighting and were more wary about attacking the Greeks. 
However, when attacked by the Persian slingers and archers from high positions 
on a mountain, the Greek siingers,along with their forces of archers and
t •
other gymnetes, were shut up inside the defensive plaision formation and 
rendered useless.^ The Greek light-troops offered no resistance to their 
Persian counterparts and as a result the Greeks suffered many casualties.
The Persians realized a fact which the mainland Greeks throughout the fifth 
century failed to comprehend - light-armed missile-troops were ideally suited 
to defending mountain barriers against hoplites.4^
On their march through the mountains of Mesopotamia the Greeks were
45attacked by the native Carduchians, who shot large rocks at them from slings; 
only 'staff-slings' could be used to project heavy rocks and it seems 
probable that the Carduchians used this type of sling rather than the con­
ventional sling - there is some evidence that the Ancient Greeks, as well as 
the Romans, had knowledge of the staff-sling, although there is no evidence, 
as far as I know, that it was used by barbarian peoples.^ We are informed 
by Xenophon that the Greek slingers, acting in conjunction with their archers 
and peltasts, were used to frighten their opponents who were positioned on 
the opposite banks of the River Centrites. Xenophon ordered his troops to 
charge when their shields rang with the noise of sling-shots fired by the 
enemy - it must have been a frightening experience for the Greek hoplites to 
be attacked by slingers using stone-bullets which may have been about the 
size of tennis balls.
Greek slingers also took part in an attack on the highland fortress
of the Drilae. Xenophon ordered t h e ‘peltastai1 to advance with their
fingers in the thongs of their javelins,the'toxotoi' to have their arrows
on their bow-strings and the'gymnetes1 to have their bags full of stones
(Anab.V.2.12), We are informed that when the light-armed troops charged,
they let fly their spears or javelins and their arrows and sling-shots
( &(^e>/\o\/o£L ) and ordinary stones which they had collected (Anab.
V.2.14). In Anabasis V.2.12 we are informed that there were Greek'peltastai1
\ \
armed with javelins, archers with arrows and gymnetes with bags full of 
stones; there is no reference to slingers standing ready with their slings, 
yet we must infer their presence from the of Anabasis V.2.14 -
i iwere the gymnetes really slingers equipped with bags which they filled with 
small stones and,if so,why does Xenophon term them gymnetes1 rather than 
sphendonetai1? ^  Xenophon may have regarded the slingers and ordinary stone- 
throwers as crude light-armed troops which he termed 'gymnetes1, whereas he 
may have thought of the 'toxotai' and true'peltastai' as specialist forces 
which were separate entities. We last hear of the Greek‘sphendonetai*in 
Anabasis V.6.15,where Xenophon views the Greek light-armed troops and comments 
that they had become very efficient.
As an appendix to this section on Greek slingers in the army of the Ten
Thousand we may consider the question of whether the satrap Tissaphernes
learnt ffoTTi his exposure to the Greek lead siing-bullets and employed these
efficient projectiles and perhaps even a force of Greek mercenary slingers.
A small lead siing-bullet, of roughly the same weight and dimensions as many
later Greek bullets, bearing the inscription T  I C  C A  IE E  P [' J
(written crudely: cjj7 ^  [1j (P ). has been found reportedly
48at the modern Gordes in the territory of Ancient Lydia. The last letters 
of the inscription are totally illegible, but would probably have contained 
the genitive ending of the name Tissaphernes. It is virtually certain that
this bullet is genuine and not a counterfeit, and must have been issued by 
Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia^from 413 to 395 B.C., or by some other 
Persian of the same name. We know of two other men named Tissaphernes but 
these seem unlikely candidates since they inhabited the central provinces 
of the Persian empire in an earlier age and, as far as we know, had no 
dealings with the Greeks.49 It seems most likely, then, that the inscription 
refers to the Lydian satrap Tissaphernes who in his fighting with the army 
of the Ten Thousand after Cunaxa gained first hand experience of the Greek 
lead sling-bullet. He must have realized that the large stones which the 
Persian slingers used had a far shorter range than the lead projectiles of 
the Rhodian slingers. When Tissaphernes returned to Asia Minor after the 
withdrawal of the Ten Thousand from Persian territory, he may well have 
wanted his own slingers in his army to employ these new efficient sling- 
bullets which had been used against him. These lead bullets may even have 
been issued for the use of Greek mercenary slingers in the employment of 
Tissaphernes®- Greek archers, wearing Greek helmets and 'spolades', are 
depicted on the second frieze of the Nereid Monument from Xanthus in Lycia 
fighting alongside Greek hoplites in an attempt to capture a walled city; 
these are obviously Greek mercenaries in the service of an Asiatic ruler - 
if Asiatic potent ates employed Greek mercenary archers in addition to 
hoplites, they may well have employed Greek slingers too. According to 
Xenophon a Rhodian named Timocrates rose to a high position under Tithraustes, 
the successor of Tissaphernes to the satrapy of Lydia, but it is not known 
if he was a commander (and if he was, could he have been in command of a 
contingent of Rhodian light-troops - slingers?).^ The composition of the 
Ten Thousand itself shows that Cyrus was willing to employ not only Greek 
hoplites but a full range of Greek light-armed infantry.
Another hypothesis is that this type of lead sling-bullet was issued 
by Tissaphernes between 401 and 395 B.C. for the use of slingers from the
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city of Aspendus in Pamphylia, which was situated in his own satrapy.
It is perhaps significant that silver staters portraying on the reverse a 
slinger, clad only in a tunic, with his sling poised above his head in the 
starting position for casting, were first struck by the city of Aspendus 
in around the year 400 B.C. and not before. Aspendus was a large Persian 
naval base and it is highly probably that the city supplied soldiers to the 
satraps. To judge by their silver staters, the people of Aspendus prided 
themselves on their slingers - since the people of Aspendus wrote in the 
Greek alphabet, it may be that Tissaphernes issued lead siing-bullets to 
them with his name inscribed in Greek. In 375 - 370 B.C.,Selge, another 
Pamphylian city situated about 20 miles up the River Eurymedon from Aspendus, 
began to strike a virtually identical coinage to the Aspendian and the
CO
slinger appeared on their silver staters also. It seems possible, then, 
that slingers from Aspendus or Selge used lead bullets of the same type as 
the sling-shot with the inscription to Tissaphernes.
In conclusion,we may state that in order to counter attacks by Persian 
missile-troops, the Greeks in the army of the Ten Thousand formed a force 
of 200 Rhodian slingers who knew how to sling both stones and lead bullets; 
this is the first reference in Greek literature to lead siing-bullets (Anab.
III.3.17). These lead bullets carried twice as far as the larger stones 
used by the Persian troops as sling-shots and probably had a range cF some­
what less than 400m. In the engagement described in Anabasis 111.4.2f 
the Greek light troops, with their archers and newly-formed body of slingers, 
acted in conjunction with their cavalry and hoplites to rout the Persian 
cavalry, archers and slingers. Tissaphernes and Orontas feared to approach 
near the Greek force after this defeat and Xenophon specifically mentions 
the usefulness of the Rhodian slingers in Anabasis III.4.16. The slingers 
could operate well on rough terrain and even against mountain fortresses - 
only when they met with stiff resistance from numerically superior missile-
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troops firing from nigh positions were they forced to take refuge in the 
defensive‘plaision'formation (Anab.Ill.4.26).
We may infer from a lead bullet found at Gordes with an inscription 
T  I C C E t h a t  Tissaphernes learnt from his exposure to the 
efficient lead sling-bullets and that between 401 and 395 B.C. he issued 
similar lead bullets with his name inscribed on them for the use of mercenary 
slingers from mainland Greece, or possibly of slingers from Aspendus or 
Selge.
3 Other Types of Light-armed Infantry in the Army of the Ten Thousand
» » i *
As well as using the terms toxotai and sphendonetai to describe specific 
types of specialist light-armed troops, Xenophon also uses the terms
• ‘ \ t 1  I , |CA  i  I
akontistai, peltastai, psiloi and gymnetes, the term akontistai denotes 
javelin-throwers who may,or may not,have been equipped with shields (it is 
very probable that Xenophon regarded this term as mutually interchangeable
i t  \ * * iwith peltastai), whilst Xenophon generally uses the terms peltastai, psiloi 
* 1and gymnetes as collective nouns to refer to all types of light-infantry.33 
On several occasions Xenophon does in fact make a distinction between
* i
the peltastai and other light-armed troops:
Anabasis 1.2.3 ‘peltastai'/gymnetes*
V.2.12 1 peltastai1 distinguished from'gymnetes'and'toxotai'
V.2.16 ' pel tastail/ps i loi1
Xenophon apparently only once in the Anabasis counts peltastai'among 
t h e ‘gymnetes1(IV.1.16), but in the Oeconomicus (VIII.4 and VIII.6) we find 
Xenophon including 'peltastai', 'toxotai* and 'sphendonetai* under the term'psiloi!
However, in the majority of cases where Xenophon makes a distinction 
between hoplites and light-armed units, all the light-armed troops are
i i
considered to be peltastai:
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Anabasis 1.2.9"') In enumerating totals Xenophon divided the army
i i i1.7.10/ into hoplites and peltastai, despite the fact that
i i i i
the gymnetes and toxotai would have been included in 
the totals.
1.8.5
1.10.7
VI.2.16
It would seem that Xenophon in the Anabasis prefers in general the 
collective noun'peltastai1 to'psiloi'or'gymnetes! Contrast Xenophon's usage 
of the term'peltastai'to that of Thucydides, who maintains a clear distinction 
between true peltasts and other types of light-armed infantry throughout his 
narrative.
The hoplites,we learn,were commanded by'lochagoi'^and for the first time
in Greek history we hear of light-armed troops, as opposed to a force of
i 157archers with their toxarchos, under the command of regular officers; we 
hear of four of these: Aeschines, the Acarnanian (IV.8.18; termed
'commander of the peltastai'), Aristeas, the Chian (IV.1.28 and IV.6.20; 
'taxiarch' and 'commander of gymnetes1), Episthenes, the Amphipolitan 
(1.10.7; 'commander of the peltastai') and Nicomachus, the Oetaean (IV.6.20; 
'commander of gymnetes1). The light-armed troops in the army of the Ten 
Thousand had their own regular commanders and we may infer from this that 
they were well organized. The known commanders of the light-armed, with 
the exception of Aristeas, the Chian, all came from mountainous areas where
CQ
light-armed troops were plentiful.
The 1ight-infantry constituted by no means a negligible part of the
army of the Ten Thousand. In Anabasis I.2.3f, Xenophon enumerates the
Greek contingents which joined Cyrus; some of the contingents consisted in
* \
part of light-armed troops - in 1.2.3 we learn that Proxenus had 500 gymnetes 
in his force, whilst Paison, the Megarian, had 300'peltastai'. At Colossae,
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Menon, the Thessalian, arrived with 500 peltastai', consisting of Dolopians,
59Aenianians and Olynthians. At Celaenae the Spartan Clearchus arrived with 
800 Thracian peltasts and Cyrus held a review and made an enumeration of 
the Greek mercenaries who amounted to 11,000 hoplites and about 2,000 
'peltastai1(Anab.I.2.9) - according to the figures which have been previously 
given, the exact totals are 10,600 hoplites and 2,300 1ight-infantrymen.^
The 1ight-infantry formed 19.3% of the Greek force at Celaenae. Thracian 
and Olynthian peltasts are mentioned in Thucydides, but this is the first 
reference to peltastai from Dolopia and Aenis - these two areas, which were 
bordered by Amphilochia on the west and Aetolia on the south, were among 
those areas whose development had lagged behind the rest of Greece and which 
might be expected to have used light-armed troops rather than the convent­
ional hoplites. The light-armed troops were clearly recruited locally by 
each commander who had them in his force - Menon in Thessaly raised bodies
i i
of Dolopian, Aenian and Olynthian peltastai, while Clearchus in the 
Chersonese recruited Thracian'peltastai1.^ 2
We have very little information as to whether the forces of light­
armed troops were broken down into smaller more manageable units like the 
hoplites, who in Anabasis IV.8.15 are said to have formed 80 lochoi1 with 100 
men in each 'lochos! The Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers were both 
manageable units of 200 men - is it mere coincidence that there was the same 
number of men in both units? Again in Anabasis IV.8.15 we learn that the 
Greek'peltastai'(here simply equal to 'light-armed' in the broader sense, 
not the specific sense of true peltasts) and'toxotai1 were formed into three 
divisions, "with about six hundred men in each division" - the number in 
each division must be a vague approximation as it gives a total of one 
thousand eight hundred, as compared with an original two thousand three 
hundred (the'peltastai1 must have suffered losses, but I doubt whether Xenophon 
means us to suppose that they had lost 500 men). Were these larger units 
of 600 men further subdivided into units of 200 men such as the Cretan
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archers and Rhodian slingers? Such subdivision would have made the light­
armed force more manageable and efficient. Modern commentators such as 
Anderson, Best, Parke and Roy do not deal with the question of the organiz­
ation of the light-armed units.
Let us now consider the military role of the light-armed infantry in
63the army of the Ten Thousand. We frequently hear of Greek light-infantry 
(termed'peltastai1, ‘gymnetes1, ‘psiloi1 or akontistai1) being used in active roles 
1 In simple attacks:
Anabasis 1.8.5; 1.10.7 Greek‘peltastai1 at the battle of Cunaxa.
111.3.7 Greek‘akontistai* attempt to counter an attack by 
enemy archers and slingers.
111.3.8 Greek1 peltastai1, in conjunction with hoplites, 
attack Persians.
IV.3.28 Greek akontistai', acting in conjunction with
'toxotai1, make an attack on Carduchians from a river 
bank.
IV.4.20 Greek'peltastai*attack Tiribazus' camp.
IV.8.16-18 Greek'peltastai*take part in an attack on the 
Colchians.
V.4.22-24 Greek'peltastai'and archers fend off hostile 
Mossynoecians.
VI.3.4 Native Thracian'peltastai1 wipe out two companies 
of Greeks.
VI.3.6f Native Thracian'peltastai'and cavalry try to
surround a force of Greeks.
VI.5.26 Greek'peltastai1 charge against Bithynians.
VII.3.44 Seuthes uses his'peltastai* in an attack.
In attacks on high positions (and for dominating high ground):
i i
III.4.38f Greek peltastai, with the backing of cavalry,
dislodge enemy from a high position.
IV.6.20 and .6.25 Greek gymnetesVpeltastai* take part in an attack
on a high position along with hoplites,
IV.8.18 Greek‘peltastai1 take the summit of a hill from
Colchian troops.
V.2.4f Greek'peltastaiVgymnetes' take part in an attack
on a mountain fortress of the Drilae.
VI.3.15 Greek‘gymnetes* are used to dominate high ground.
VI.5.29-31 Greek'peltastai1 take part in the pursuit of
Persian and Bithynian cavalry up a hill.
In attacks on fortified positions:
1.2.3 A force of 300'peltastai' are usedin an attack
on the city of Miletus.
V.2.4f Greek*peltastaiVgymnetes take part in an attack
on a fortress of the Drilae.
In pursuits:
111.3.7-8 Greek akontistai', acting in conjunction with
archers and hoplites, pursue Persian troops - 
Xenophon uses the terms'psiloi'and'peltastai' 
here as collective nouns to refer to light- 
infantry.
III.4.3f Greek hoplites and'peltastai1, reinforced by
their new cavalry force, successfully pursue 
the Persians.
IV.3.22 Greek cavalry and'peltastai1 pursue the Persians.
V.4.24 Greek'peltastai*pursue the hostile Mossynoecians,
5 In ambushes:
IV.6.17 Greek'gymnetes'successfully set an ambush.
V.2.28f Cretans, equipped with'peltai* plated with bronze,
set up a mock ambush - these may have been archers.
VII.4.14f The Thynians, armed with javelins and clubs,
carry out a night attack, 
fid6 For ravaging enemy land:
VI.3.15 Greek'gymnetes* were ordered to burn everything
which they found that could be burned.
VII.4.1 Seuthes1 troops -'peltastai*and cavalry - burn up
villages.
In carrying out these active roles many of the light-armed troops were 
killed. Whereas 10,400 hoplites and 2,500*peltastai' were present at the 
last rollcall which Cyrus held before Cunaxa (Anab.I.7.10), at Heracleia the 
Greek force only amounted to 7,600 hoplites and 1,000'peltastai* (VI.2.16).
If these two groups of figures are accurate we must conclude that 27% of the 
hoplites had been killed, compared to 60% of the peltastai.
An important question which is not treated in any detail by Best is the 
position of the Greek light-armed troops in the battle formation and on the 
march. Let us firstly examine the question of their position in military 
operations - in the battle of Cunaxa the Greek peltastai along with 1,000 
Paphlagonian cavalry were drawn up on the outside of the right wing formed 
by the Greek hoplites.^5 Their role in the fighting was obviously to counter 
any outflanking movement which Artaxerxes1 left wing, under the command of 
Tissaphernes, might make.^ In the battle the Greek hoplites routed the 
forces under Artaxerxes. Tissaphernes had not fled with the rest of the 
Persian left wing, which he had flanked with his cavalry, but charged along 
the River Euphrates through the Greek'peltastai*, who were protecting their
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own wing. The Greek light-armed did much harm to the Persian cavalry by 
striking them with their weapons and showering javelins on them.^ Tissaphernes 
thought it safer to ride on to the rear of Cyrus' troops then to return by 
running the gauntlet of missiles which the Greek‘peltastai* threw.
In Anabasis IV.8.15, we learn that the light-armed troops and archers 
were formed into 3 contingents of about 600 men in each. We are further 
informed that two of these contingents flanked the left and right wings of 
the hoplites, whilst the third contingent was positioned in front of the 
centre of the hoplites. In the battle against the Colchians which followed, 
the Greek peltasts played a large part: when the Greeks attacked, the'pelt-
i
astai on the Greek wings made an encircling movement, thus threatening the 
Colchians' flanks. The Colchians in the centre came to the aid of their 
men on the wings, leaving a large gap in the middle of their line. The 
Greek'peltastai', who were drawn up in front of their own centre,advanced at 
the double to the top of the mountain, thinking that the enemy were running 
away. When the enemy saw that these troops were backed up by Arcadian 
hoplites, they fled. This is the first occasion on which we hear of light­
armed troops being used to outflank the wings of an enemy, who were forced 
to give aid to their own troops on the wings, so leaving a gap or weakened 
front for the Greek'peltastai*positioned in front of their own centre to rush 
through - these tactics indicate the high degree of organization of the light­
armed troops in the army of the Ten Thousand. In Anabasis VI.5.25 we again 
learn that the Greek peltastai'were positioned on either flank of their army.
In Anabasis VII.1.23 the Greek'peltastai1 are yet again described as being 
positioned on either wing of their hoplite force. Thus on four occasions 
in the Anabasis we hear of Greek light-armed troops positioned on the wings 
of Greek hoplites - these troops were used to counter or take part in a 
flank attack.
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We also hear on several occasions of Greek light-armed troops operating 
in front of their own hoplites rather than on their wings, although of course 
these troops may have fanned out from the wings. In Anabasis IV.6.25 we hear 
of Greek‘peltastail charging at a run in front of their own hoplites; in
IV.8.18-19 the‘peltastai1 of the Arcadian division charged in front of their 
hoplites; in V.2.4 we hear o f ‘peltastai1 running five or six stades in front 
of their hoplites and in VI.5.26 Greek'peltastai1 charged in front of their 
own hoplites in no order against Bithynian forces.
Thus it appears that the Greek light-armed troops had two main roles 
when operating in conjunction with hoplites:
1 When positioned on the wings, they were used to counter or take part
in a flank attack.
2 When positioned in front of the phalanx block, they were used to
soften up the front ranks of the enemy by their skirmishing attacks 
with missile weapons.
Only in Anabasis IV.8.15 do these two roles appear to have been combined 
at one time.
Let us now consider the position of light-armed troops on the march.
On relatively flat ground the Greek*peltastai1 were used mostly in the rear­
guard to combat enemy attacks (Anab.III.3.8; 111.4.40). In hilly country
the light-troops were positioned mainly in the van, to counter enemy attacks 
from high positions (e.g. Anab.IV.1.6 [gymnetes]; IV.4.20 [peltastai]).
In Anabasis VII.3.37 we learn that the nature of the terrain dictated whether 
hoplites o r ‘peltastai*or cavalry were to lead the army - at night it was 
Greek practice for the slowest troops to lead. When under attack from 
missile-troops we learn that the Greek light-armed were shut up in a defensive 
1 plaision1formation of hoplites along with the'ochlos*of camp-followersi^we
i i
frequently hear in the Anabasis of the Greeks in plaision formation during
the march.69
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We learn that the crowd of camp-servants sought refuge in the*plaision1 
formation - were these camp-servants armed as make-shift 1ight-infantry? 
Greek attendants, some of whom Roy suggests were slaves (based on Anab.II.5. 
32), attempted to protect the camp of Cyrus and the Greeks during the battle
of Cunaxa against plunderers from the army of Artaxerxes "P A Milesian
concubine of Cyrus fled frpo^ -r£>v E W ^ v u j v  ol i!t o ^ o v  tv 
6Xtuoc|><4p>OL<j cm\o< t^ovTe^ Kocl c2:v'T'»T<x^0evT€,<s> t t o W o o ^
TujV OCpTTot^OVtuoV ©<TTeXT tLVctf V , Ol Koa O* UTCov CX'TTe 0 otvov*
' v »/ i / > \ \ v v / V ,O u  J^^V tq>uyOV Y £ > oc a \ o<: Koa  Tc*uTwy\/ e<5'uJ<foCv’ K<*c
t S V x  <X , OTTO <foC e V T o C  c< 0 t £jV K.OO. YDv^pAOtTCV K cV l
W /s > / ' ,0(v y  ptoTTOC G v e v o v t o  . T?oCV-To( t <f to O'\/.
(Anab.f.10.3). 1
Although Xenophon says that these men who fought around the baggage
i i
train were armed with hopla, I think that this term almost certainly does
not specifically denote heavy arms but simply any arms which they managed 
71to pick up. Light-armed attendants, usually armed with one or two spears
(javelins?) are frequently shown on Attic fifth century vases fighting beside
72their hoplite masters.
We have little information about the status of the Greek light-armed 
troops. There is no evidence that the Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers 
(who had previously been hoplites) bore any social stigma. The peltastai1 
under Menon and Clearchus were the normal type of infantry from Thessaly and 
Thrace. However, in Anabasis IV.8.4 we learn that one of the 'peltastai1 had 
been a slave at Athens - we must infer from this that at least some of the 
peltastai1were of servile or lowly background.
In conclusion, I would state that I have concentrated on certain aspects 
of the Greek light-armed infantry which Best does not cover fully in his book 
on Thracian peltasts. Xenophon's terminology for the various types of 
light-armed troops, apart from archers and slingers, is not as accurate as 
that of Thucydides. Although in some places Xenophon distinguishes between
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true peltasts and other light-armed troops, he most often considers all light- 
troops to b e ‘peltastai1. Perhaps at this period the prestige of the true 
peltasts was growing so greatly that all light-armed troops became associated 
with their famous counterparts. A fairly large force of light-infantry were 
present in the army of the Ten Thousand - they numbered 2,300 at Celaenae 
(19.3% of the whole force). The‘peltastai1 of Menon were Thessalians, those 
of Clearchus Thracians. The light-armed troops in the Greek force appear to 
have been well organized - they were set under the command of regular officers 
and were most probably broken down into manageable units. It is probable 
that some of the camp-followers were used as crude 1ight-troops.
Best gives a case by case study of the peltasts by following in detail 
the narrative of the Anabasis, whilst I have attempted to study thematically 
certain roles of the Greek'peltastai1 so as to try to clarify some of their 
military uses. Just as we find in Thucydides,, light-armed troops in the 
Anabasis were used for simple attacks, operations on high ground, attacks on
fortified positions, pursuits, ambushes and ravaging expeditions. They were 
actively engaged in many operations and suffered high casualties - if the 
figures which Xenophon gives are accurate, we may assume that approximately 
60% of thelpeltastai‘ were killed.
Two points of interest which I have tried to elucidate are the position
of light-armed troops on the battlefield and on the march. On the battlefield i
the light-infantry appear to have had two main roles in the Anabasis (only
I
in IV.8.15 do we find these two roles combined): j
s
1 When positioned on the wings,they were used to counter or take part |
i
in flank attacks. j
2 When positioned in front of the phalanx block,they were used to soften .]
up the front ranks of the enemy by their skirmishing tactics with
missile weapons.
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On the march the light-armed troops generally formed part of the rear­
guard on relatively flat ground, and the van on hilly terrain. During a 
night march they must have been positioned between the hoplites and cavalry. 
When under attack from resolute enemy missile-troops firing from commanding 
positions, the Greek light-armed infantry, who were not equipped with effect­
ive defensive armour, sought protection with the camp-followers in the
i i
defensive plaision formation of hoplites.
I would like to end this section with a comment about the Persians and 
other native peoples who stood opposed to the Greeks in their retreat after 
Cunaxa: they realized a fact which, if we are to trust the silence of our 
sources, the mainland Greeks in the Classical era before the 370s failed to 
comprehend - lightly-armed missile-troops were ideally suited for defending 
mountain barriers against hoplites. When the Greeks of the Ten Thousand 
tried to force their way through mountain passes, they always suffered heavy 
losses and only the specialist Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers prevented 
their force from being decimated like Demosthenes' in Aetolia; the adver­
saries of the Greeks in their high positions must have suffered relatively 
light casualties.
C H A P  T  E R  E  I G H~ T
LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE PERIOD 400 - 362 B.C.
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1 Archers in the Period 400 - 362 B.C.
Literary references to archers in the years 400 - 362 B.C. are dis­
appointingly very few. We have, however, pictorial evidence for the use 
of Greek archers in Asia Minor by Oriental potent ates at the very beginning 
of this period: Greek archers are depicted on the second frieze of the
Nereid Monument from Xanthus in Lycia which dates to about 400 B.C.1 On 
slab number 869 two archers (badly damaged) are depicted covering two advanc- 
ing hoplites who hurl rocks; on slab number 859 a single archer, wearing a 
tunic and Greek plumed bronze helmet, covers the advance of a hoplite; on 
slab number 855 an archer, wearing a Greek plumed bronze helmet and apparently
• i
carrying a hoplon on his left arm, aims a high shot; on slab number 881 an 
archer, wearing a Greek helmet and a tunic, advances with a hoplite against 
some enemy hoplites. On slab number 866 two crouching archers give cover­
ing fire to a column of hoplites who are climbing a ladder to attack a city; 
both archers wear Greek bronze helmets and have what appear to be quivers on 
their backs (in the majority of cases in vase paintings Greeks are shown 
carrying their quivers over their backs) and one of them wears a 'spolas1, 
the other a tunic. The archers shoot high at the defenders on the city walls:* 
The depictions of archers on the second frieze of the Nereid Monument would 
suggest that they were well suited to giving covering fire to advancing 
hoplites and to operating against defenders positioned orr the fortification 
walls of cities.
Our first literary reference to archers in a Greek force in the years 
after 400 B.C. comes in 395 B.C. when Agesilaus collected together his army 
at Ephesus and there, "wishing to train it, he offered prizes to the hoplite 
units for the unit which should have the fittest men and to the cavalry 
brigades for the brigade which should show the best skill at riding; and 
he also offered prizes to the peltastai and the toxotai, for those of their 
number who should show themselves most skilled in their respective duties.
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Thereupon one might have seen all the gymnasia packed full of men exercising, 
the hippodrome full of men riding, and the peltastai and archers practising 
their shots." (Hel1.111.4.16)5 Best suggests that the archers in the 
force of Agesilaus came from Asia Minor, but there is no evidence for the 
nationality of these archers. We hear no more about the operations of the 
archers of Agesilaus in the warfare against the Persians.
In Hellenica IV.2.1-5 we learn that when Agesilaus was called back to 
Greece in 394 B.C. because Sparta was being threatened by a coalition of 
the hostile cities of Corinth, Athens and Thebes, he took back his force of 
'toxotai1 with him. In 394 B.C. when the Spartans advanced into Corinthian 
territory, the gymnetes1 of the Corinthians and their allies, including a 
force of archers, did the Spartans much harm by attacking them on their 
unshielded side from high positions: c ^ e i \ e v T w v  olutC,v
N -r'V ’ r  l ,
K.C*TCX T ^ v  t - T r c  tLfc.e.COCV/ t T 6  T T ^ u j T O V  T u j V
V T 6 ^  o i U T O U j  kc x l  T O ^ t J o v T e ^  jX o(\o( 
GTTOLOUV' oc yuyuLV^T^ tG>/ <Jvtcttc<\<->V (Hell .IV.2.14). In this 
passage we find Corinthian archers making use of hilly terrain to attack 
Lacedaemonian troops - if Greek city states realized that missile-troops 
positioned on high ground could attack with impunity hoplites on more level 
ground, why do we never hear of them using these troops to guard high mount­
ain passes against invading hoplites?^ in Hellenica IV.2.16 Xenophon 
enumerates the contingents in the large Lacedaemonian force and informs us 
that the army included a corps of about 300 Cretan archers. These were 
undoubtedly mercenaries like the 200 Cretan archers who joined the army of 
the Ten Thousand. Pausanias claimed that the Spartans made useof Cretan 
archers as early as the First and Second Messenian Wars, but his account of 
their use at this date is not reliable: possibly he did preserve a genuine
later tradition that the Spartans had used Cretan mercenary archers at some 
undefined period in earlier ages.7 In this Lacedaemonian force of 394 B.C. 
the Cretan archers formed an insignificant percentage of all the troops -
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only 2%. In the battle of Corinth which followed, Xenophon makes no 
specific mention of the archers on the Corinthian or Lacedaemonian sides.
Xenophon also informs us that when the Spartan Agesipolis made an 
expedition against the Argives in 388 B.C., he had a force of Cretan archers 
under his command. Agesipolis1 troops chased a body of Boeotian cavalry 
right under the walls of Argos and Xenophon comments that "if it had not 
happened that the Cretans were away at the time on a plundering raid on 
Nauplia, many cavalrymen and their horses would have been shot down by their 
arrows" (Hel1.IV.7.6). The Cretan archers, since they used a large type 
of arrowhead, had the capability of shooting down both men and horses and 
must have been able to break up a charge by cavalry. They were used in a 
plundering expedition against Nauplia: in the narrative of Thucydides we
o
frequently hear about archers used in ravaging expeditions.
In Hellenica VII.5.10, we learn that a Cretan scout warned Agesilaus 
that Epaminondas and his Theban force were marching on Sparta (362 B.C.). 
Unfortunately, we are not told whether this Cretan scout was an archer.^
The typical Spartan contempt for archers, which we found in both 
Herodotus and Thucydides, is reflected in a saying which Plutarch asserts 
that Agesilaus made when forced to give up his expedition against the Persian 
king because of the anti-Spartan coalition of Thebes, Corinth and Argos, which 
was funded by Persian money. Persian coins were stamped with the figure of
• i
an archer and Agesilaus, making a pun on the noun toxotes, claimed that the 
king of Persia was driving him out of Asia with a myriad of mere'toxotai'-
a bitter pun on the cowardly archers and the coin bearing the stamp of the
1 1 10 toxotes.
In conclusion,we may say that Xenophon surprisingly mentions archers 
very rarely in his narrative of the years 400 - 362 B.C. It is possible 
that archers were included on some occasions by Xenophon in the term
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'peltastai1, which he often uses to denote all types of light-armed troops 
rather than true peltasts. It is quite striking that no Athenian archers 
are mentioned, but only Corinthian archers and Cretan mercenary archers in 
the employment of Sparta. We must bear in mind the strong possibility that 
Xenophon's silence about the presence of archers may not reflect reality but 
rather his pro-Spartan sentiments; although the Spartans did utilize a corps 
of Cretan archers, it is still probable that they retained their long-held 
belief that archers were cowardly and did little to influence the outcome 
of a battle.
2 Greek Slingers in the Period 400 - 362 B.C.
As with archers, literary references to slingers in the years 400 - 
362 B.C. are extremely few. We have virtually no archaeological evidence 
to supplement the information given by our literary sources: there are, 
as far as I know, no Greek portrayals of slingers engaged in combat dating 
to this period. Sling-bullets are notoriously hard to date with any certainty 
but we know for certain that the Rhodians, and possibly also the Cretans, 
used lead bullets by the end of the fifth century B.C. 11
In 394 B.C. when the Spartans advanced into Corinthian territory, the 
large Lacedaemonian force included a body of not less than 400 slingers:
)Co(i yu^v <=y  ^oV ^  T t .  cx^yocv^ujv k o a  / K e j p i V ' - J V
koti 0 \ u i V  O V k  e \ o S - T T o u ^  (Hell.IV.2 . 16).
The mountain villages of Margania, Letrinia and Amphidolia had revolted from 
Elis at the time of Agis' invasion six years earlier. The exact position 
of the villages is not known but they appear to have been situated in the 
Pisatis, in the hills around Pyrgos. Letrinia has been associated with a 
site near Hagios Ioannis, west of Pyrgos, where ancient objects have been 
found, but the identification is far from certain.12 We would expect that 
the inhabitants of such mountain villages, through their links with pastoral
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farming and hunting, to have had knowledge of the sling.15 The slingers
formed an insignificant percentage of all the troops of this large 
Lacedaemonian army - only 2.7%.
In 389 B.C. the Acarnanians, who were allies of the Athenians, along 
with some Boeotian and Athenian soldiers, made an expedition against the
and Agesilaus, with a Lacedaemonian force, joined the Achaeans in an attack 
against the Acarnanians. Agesilaus made a successful lightning attack 
against the place where the Acarnanians kept their herds but was forced by 
Acarnanian slingers and other missile-troops to withdraw from his camp on a 
mountain-side to the plain, where his hoplites were capable of forming their 
phalanx formation on the level ground: Tdov yucvroi AK°cpve£vu>v
TTO ol  T T e \ " T o c o<l ^ X O o V ,  k o a  T £  cy>tc tf’k.rjV’o u ' /T o ^
Note that Xenophon calls the Acarnanian missile-troops and slingers 'peltastai', 
even though they probably did not carry 'peltai' - a shield would inhibit the 
movement of a slinger. It is obvious that he uses the term to mean light-
attacking Peloponnesian hoplites and forcing them to retreat - they certainly
Amphidolians, the Acarnanians were mountain-dwellers who lived, in part at
were extremely nimble and swift on high ground and harassed the Lacedaemonian 
troops under Agesilaus as they retreated through the mountain passes from 
their country. It was difficult for the Lacedaemonian hoplites to catch up 
with them. jhe Acarnanians' strength lay in their slingers and missile-
14Achaeans who dwelt in Calydon. The Achaeans appealed for aid to Sparta
armed troops in general.15 In Thucydides we hear of Acarnanian slingers
were most effective slingers.15 Just like the Marganians, Letrinians and
least, by pastoral farming.1^  The Acarnanian slingers and other missile-troops
10
troops, as their hoplites performed less well in battle. u
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Diodorus in his account of the preliminary cavalry action at the battle 
of Mantinea in 362 B.C. informs us that the Thebans had a force of sphend­
onetai1 from the regions around Thessaly in their army and that the Theban 
cavalry were victorious over those of the Athenians because they were 
supported by light-armed troops (psiloi1) who outnumbered those of the 
Athenians three-to-one: ^  yxj* T u W  Itttt Tck^
t £w  ® ^ c < i e o v  e/rfeXc^odvTe,^ ^\o<'r-ToC)v"ro 
cT T T r^V  0<J>£*Tc*l^ 0 0 ^  "ToO.
X  s  «. i  ^  1  \  /  CX 3
k e i T o (  T v  t t t t l K * ^ v  t» o C c ^  e ,V  t o u T O L ^  c^TToC<5Tv^ O y K .
VCoC"Tc< S *e fetf"*T€ .^>O V  T O  T U ) V  «. T7 T t  <. V< d \ / * T  O  £
Kou TT<*j>oc<rKeu^ t £»v  koi\
O’UV"T0<^€.C T T o \u  T t O V '  e V o /V T tU jV  G ^^LTTO V TO  - ctfoTOL yu,ev O uv 
o V c y o u ^  € ? ^ o v  t k k o v T ^ T c i ^ , OUOC ■ ?
tf‘ C^>e.vSoV^'T£5<^ k « l  © C kO V Tl 6"T©t<j Tou<^ £ k  T & V  TT6.JH - r \ y  © d T T tfX u S V  
T o m o v  oCTT6 £Te/VyJte.>/0 0 ^ . O O T O C  TT€.j>L"TToT€^>GV € K  
^ V o G v r e ^  t ^ v  ev t o u t o c ^  j>ott^v/ Tfoce.cv
€ .L L ^ ©  € .1  tf’c k V  € V  y u i ^ o c c ^  € V  T O o T O C ^  Lj^'TCei.p {.&CV.
%{.o t t £.j> o l  A O ’y o a . O L  kodToc t n k ^ y u . e v o c  ^M.ev t C»v
'Vj/s,c \ \ k t o v  v K o C -r o tT T o v c o ju e v c L  ^ u t t o  t C>v  c? t u >v >
o C T i< r t \ /^ e ^  e T ^ o C r r ^ i  <5’ o^v'.
(Diodorus XV.85.4-5). Diodorus, following the account of Ephorus, gives 
us the impression that the Theban*psiloi1 played a vital role in the battle,
pi
but Xenophon tends to minimize their importance.
We learn that the Thessalians and other Theban allies were positioned 
in the centre of the Theban line (Diodorus XV.85.2); some of the other 
allies such as the Messenians (cf. Pausanias IV.26.1) and Malians (cf. Thuc.IV. 
100.1) and less likely the Euboeans (cf. West, Archilochus, frag.3) may have 
had some slingers in their light-armed forces. Diodorus informs us that 
the peoples around Thessaly were highly skilled in the use of their missile 
weapons and consequently were accustomed to exercise great weight in warfare. 
The Thessalian slingers and other light-armed troops of the Theban centre
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harried to exhaustion the Athenian cavalry, who turned and rode off.
Slingers could be particularly effective when used against cavalry - in 
Thucydides VI.22, we learn that Nicias before the Sicilian expedition had 
told the Athenians that large forces of slingers, as well as of archers, 
were imperative to counter the large number of enemy cavalry, and Korfmann 
notes that Peruvian slingers could fire sling-shots with such force that 
they could kill horses?^ We are not told by Xenophon or Diodorus if any of 
the light-armed troops on the side of Sparta, Arcadia and Athens in the 
battle of Mantinea were armed with the sling. 23
In conclusion, we may say that there are very few references to Greek 
slingers in our sources for the period 400 - 362 B.C. In the Hellenica of 
Xenophon we have references to Marganian, Letrinian and Amphidolian slingers 
in a Peloponnesian army of 394 B.C., and to Acarnanian slingers in 389 B.C.
These slingers all came from hilly areas where they most probably used the 
sling to protect their flocks from predators or for the purpose of hunting.
We also learn from Diodorus that there were slingers from the regions around 
Thessaly present in the Theban force at the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. 
Xenophon does not mention their presence and it is likely that they are to 
be included in his terms 'hamippoi pezoi1 and 'peltastai' (Xen.Hel 1 .VII..5.23-25 \ 
In Hellenica IV.6.7 Xenophon also terms Acarnanian slingers 'peltastai'.
It consequently seems very likely that we are missing references to slingers
i i
in the works of Xenophon, whom he simply includes in the terms peltastai,
* i ipsiloi or gymnetes.
3 Other Light-armed Infantry in the Period 400 - 362 B.C.
The skirmishing tactics of peltasts reached a peak of efficiency when 
in 390 B.C. Iphicrates' peltasts inflicted extremely heavy casualties on a 
Spartan'mora'near Corinth. We must consider the method of combat of the 
peltasts, which is recounted in this instance by Xenophon in greater detail
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than any other source which we have yet studied: an Athenian force,
consisting of both hoplites and peltasts, which was positioned in Corinth,
force was on its return journey from Sicyon to Lechaeum and it had been 
arranged that a force of cavalry, which had escorted the Amyclaeans for part 
of their journey home, would join them later. Callias, the commander of 
the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates, the leader of the peltasts, decided 
to attack the relatively small force of Spartan hoplites on their unprotected 
side with their highly mobile peltasts, who could operate with impunity since 
the Spartans at this stage had no support from either cavalry or light- 
infantry (Hell.IV.5.13). Callias drew up his hoplites not far from Corinth 
in case the peltasts got into trouble, while Iphicrates1 men attacked the 
Spartans, killing some immediately with their javelins. The Spartan pole- 
march ordered the hoplites who were in the age groups 20 to 30 to charge 
their attackers, but these failed to catch up with the swift peltasts. When 
these Spartans turned back towards their main body, Iphicrates1 men hurled 
javelins at them from the front and ran along their unshielded side, shooting 
them down with their javelins. Iphicrates' peltasts give the impression of 
being highly-trained light-armed troops: o
learnt of the approach of a mora of 600 Spartan hoplites. The Spartan
c UJ K o Vevou
(. OVTfe
T T £ p t  T O V
1 / 6vveo<
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When the Spartans continued to suffer heavy losses, the polemarch 
ordered the hoplites in the age groups 20 to 35 to charge,but in falling back 
from this pursuit even more men were struck down by the peltasts1 javelins 
than on the previous occasion. The Spartan cavalry then arrived but these 
failed to press home their pursuit of the peltasts and the Lacedaemonians 
continued to suffer losses and began to lose heart (Hel1.IV.5.16). The 
Spartans in their desperation withdrew to a hill near the sea about two miles 
from Lechaeum. When they were incessantly harassed by Iphicrates1 peltasts 
and saw the Athenian hoplites advancing against them, they broke all formation 
and some of them dashed to the sea and were probably taken on board their 
ships, whilst others attached themselves to the cavalry and escaped to 
Lechaeum. Two hundred and fifty Lacedaemonian hoplites were shot down by 
the peltasts - 42% of the Spartan force (Hel1.IV.5.17). The spectre of 
their defeat on Sphacteria had returned to haunt the Spartans. The peltasts 
of Iphicrates, who almost certainly outnumbered the Spartan force, used their 
skirmishing tactics on fairly level ground with such efficiency that they 
were able to wipe out almost half of a unit of the finest hoplites in Greece.
The stunning success of Iphicrates1 peltasts against the Spartan’rnora' 
near Corinth has fired the minds of many historians, and consequently many 
detailed analyses of the true peltasts of this period have been produced. ^  
Rather than summarizing their detailed expositions, I should prefer to give 
a brief thematic study of the role of the light-infantry in the period 400 - 
362 B.C. in general:
1 Light-armed troops were used in various types of attacks:
Hellenica: III.2.3 (399 B.C.) Bithynian'peltastai'and cavalry made an 
attack on Dercylidas' camp and slaughtered a great number of his troops.
III.4.23 (395 B.C.) Agesilaus' 'peltastai* led an attack at 
a run against Persian cavalry.
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IV.1.21f (395 B.C.) Paphlagonians, who were peltasts, were 
used in a dawn attack on Pharnabazus1 camp.
IV.2.14 (394 B.C.) Corinthian'gymnetes' attacked a Lacedae­
monian force from high ground.
IV.3.22-23 (394 B.C.) Locrian light-armed troops attacked 
the rear of a Lacedaemonian force from high ground with javelins and other 
missiles.
IV.5.11-17 (390 B.C.) Iphicrates1 peltasts heavily defeated 
a Spartan'mora* near Corinth.
IV.6.7-11 (389 B.C.) Acarnanian slingers, javelin-throwers 
and other missile-troops (all termed'peltastai*by Xenophon) attacked a 
Lacedaemonian and Achaean force from high ground. In Xenophon's Agesilaus 
(11.20) we are informed that the high position of the Acarnanians was taken 
by Agesilaus''psiloi', although we are informed in the Hellenica (IV.6.11) 
that it was taken by his hoplites. Light-armed troops were more suited than 
hoplites to carry high positions and it is probable that the words t o l ^ 
are a correction by Xenophon.
IV.8.37-38 (389 B.C.) Iphicrates'1peltastai (see IV.8.34) 
were used in an ambush on Anaxibius' Lacedaemonian force on a hillside.
V.1.11-12 (388 B.C.) Chabrias set an ambush with his light­
armed missile-troops against a Lacedaemonian force - some at least of these 
troops were armed with the javelin.
V.4.54 (377 B.C.) Mercenary'peltastai' in the employment 
of the Thebans attacked a force of Agesilaus.
VI.2.20 (373 B.C.) Corcyraeans threw javelins from tomb­
stones at a Lacedaemonian force.
VI.4.9 (371 B.C.) 'peltastai*of the Phocians took part in
an attack on the camp-servants of the Boeotians.
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VI.5.13 (370 B.C.) Orchomenian javelin-throwers attacked 
Mantinean troops.
VI.5.26 (370 B.C.) The troops of the Spartan commander
Ischolaus were wiped out by missile weapons and close combat with Arcadian
troops.
VII .1.19 (369 B.C.) Corinthian 'psiloi' throwing javelins 
and using other missiles routed a Theban force.
Diodorus XV.85.4-5 (362 B.C.) In the preliminary cavalry battle 
before the battle of Mantinea, the Athenian cavalry suffered badly due to 
the attacks of Theban 'psiloi' who were armed as javelin-throwers ('akontistai') 
and slingers ('sphendonetai') and apparently acted in close conjunction with 
the cavalry.
2 In the period 400 - 362 B.C. we find light-armed troops being used for
the first time in mainland Greece to guard passes and dominate high ground:
V.4.14 (379 B.C.) Athenian 'peltastai' guarded the pass of 
Eleutherae; note also that Cleombrotus used his peltasts to dominate high 
ground.
V.4.37 (378 B.C.) Mercenaries, who were most probably 
peltasts (see Best, Thracian Peltasts, pp.98-99), occupied Mount Cithaeron 
for Agesilaus.
V.4.59 (379 B.C.) Cleombrotus' 'peltastai' went ahead of 
his army in an unsuccessful attempt to occupy the heights above the road 
through Cithaeron.
3. Light-armed troops, as in Thucydides, were used for ravaging expeditions
oc
and plundering:
III.2.2 and 2.5 (399 B.C.) Odrysian 'peltastai', acting in 
conjunction with cavalry, raided the country of the Bithynian Thracians.
III.2.8 and 2.10 (398 B.C.) Thracians, probably mainly 
light-armed, continually pillaged the Chersonese.
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I socrates, Paneg., IV. 144 (398 B.C.) Three thousand'peltastai1 plundered 
the Mysian plain.
III.4.24 (395 B.C.) After a victory over the Persian cavalry, 
some Greek'peltastai'turned to plundering (cf. Xen.,Ages, 1.32)
IV.4.16 (391 B.C.) Iphicrates' peltasts plundered many 
districts of Arcadia.
Plutarch, Agesilaus.31.1-2 (370 B.C.) Many light-armed troops (psiloi1) 
were included in Epaminondas1 force which laid waste Laconian territory.
Light-armed troops and other soldiers were extremely vulnerable to 
cavalry attack when broken up into ravaging parties.^
4 It is in the period 400 - 362 B.C. that we are specifically informed 
for the first time that Greek light-armed troops were used to defend fort­
ified positions:
111.1.22 (399 B.C.) Missile-troops were positioned on the 
towers of the city of Gergis.
111.5.23 (395 B.C.) The Lacedaemonians could not recover 
the bodies of their men who had fallen near the walls of Haliartus because 
of the missile-troops positioned on the towers.
V.3.5 (381 B.C.) Lacedaemonian cavalry and'peltastai'were 
forced to retire from the walls of Olynthus owing to missile fire which was 
directed against them.
VII.2.7 (369 B.C.) Missile-troops were positioned on the 
walls and towers of the city of Phlius.
It is strange that no historical writer specifically mentions any Greek 
missile-troops defending a city's wall before Xenophon (their presence in 
the defence of Plataea in 429 - 427 B.C. may, however, be inferred from 
Thucydides' narrative of the escape of a body of Plataeans)28- archaeological
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information makes it certain that Greek archers were used in the defence 
of cities. Why then do our sources fail to mention their presence before 
399 B.C.? 29
We can glean more information in the period 400 - 362 B.C. about the 
position of light-armed troops in relation to hoplites and cavalry, although 
we hear little of'peltastai' in pitched battles. Only once do we hear of 
'peltastai* being arrayed on either wing of their hoplites - in HellCnica III. 
2.16 Dercylidas arranged his peltastai1 thus, along with his cavalry, for an 
engagement (which did not come about) with the troops of Pharnabazus in 
397 B.C. On several other occasions we hear o f ‘peltastai* advancing in front 
of their own hoplites:
Hellinica III.4.23 (395 B.C.) Agesilaus1‘peltastai* lead an attack at a 
run in front of their own hoplites against some Persian cavalry (cf.Xen.Ages. 
1.31).
V.4.43 (378 B.C.)'peltastai'of Phoebidas operated in front of his hop­
lites against the Thebans.
VII.4.22 (365 B.C.) Archidamus''peltastai1 ran in front of his hoplites.’
In the period 400 - 362 B.C. we again find 'hamippoi' being utilized. 
Xenophon informs us that 'pezoi hamippoi' were used by Epaminondas at the
(Hel1.VI1 .5.23-24). Diodorus in his account of the preliminary cavalry 
engagement before the main battle of Mantinea makes it plain that the Athenian 
cavalry suffered badly due to the attacks of the strong and skilful force of
battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C.: '\ _  v < , < vKeayu-jv Touj iTTTreo  ^ ot yuev
TToVfeMAOl 0CVTt.TT0<ft6T«&^ (XVTO ujtfTTfcD OTr\(.TC^«:\ctfyyc< & <* <9 «K
V  A  c/  . c V ’ c  i ^
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Theban ‘psiloi1. It is almost certain that these Theban 1 psi 1 oil are the 
‘pezoi hamippoi1in the Hellenica of Xenophon; note that they were armed as 
‘akontistai' and sphendonetai1and that they were extremely well trained.^
As in the Anabasis,Xenophon tends to regard all light troops, whether 
they were slingers, archers or ‘akontistai', as‘peltastai1. It is often 
impossible for us to tell if Xenophon means true peltasts equipped with 
lpeltai' and javelins, or not. In Hellenica IV.6.7 Xenophon terms the 
Acarnanians who fought with slings 'peltastai'. Xenophon also appears to 
regard the terms 'peltastai' and 'akontistai' as mutually interchangeable - 
we find this in Hellenica III.4.16, where the'peltastai1 are obviously the
I \ op
same men as the akontistai. In Hellenica VI.1.9 a messenger is made to 
say: "Indeed, Thessaly is a very flat land and the tribes round about are 
subject to her whenever a Tagus is established there; and almost all who 
live in these neighbouring places are akontistai, so that it is likely that 
our force would be superior in peltasts ( r r € > T « t f - r c )". Here 
again Xenophon regards 'akontistai' as'peltastai*.
As we have found before, the Greek specialist light-armed troops gener­
ally came from small villages and towns which were situated on high ground 
(e.g. Acarnanians, Thracians, Marganians, Letrinians, Amphidolians) in areas 
which lagged behind the rest of Greece both politically and socially. The 
small village units positioned on high and rough terrain had more need of 
light-armed missile-troops to defend them than hoplites. In these areas 
weapons such as the bow, sling and javelin were probably closely associated 
with pastoralism and hunting.33 Thessaly, like Thrace, was fragmented into 
tribal groups and had a vast number of native'peltastai1.'34 Thessaly was 
unusual in that it had a larger than usual area of plain and its'peltastai* 
must have been used more often on flat, rather than difficult, terrain.35 
Many of these'peltastai'must certainly have been 'penestai', of whom the 
Thessalians had a vast number. The'penestai'were Thessalian serfs, whose
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serfdom was much milder than that of the Laconian helots and they seem for
the most part to have been fairly stable, although we know of infrequent
revolts and trouble with them.^ the Spartans also in part must have depended
on their own subject groups to supplement the light-armed troops of their
allies and light-armed mercenaries in their employment (Cretans) - in Hellenica
III.3.7, we learn of the Spartans' fear of their own subject groups being
armed with swords, spits, axes, hatchets and sickles. In Hellenica VI.
5.29 we also hear about the fear of the Spartans at 6,000 newly enrolled
helots being in their ranks when the Thebans invaded their territory in
370 B.C. - but these remained true. Xenophon informs us that members of
37their subject groups acted as shield-bearers and camp-followers and it seems 
probable that these were armed in some crude fashion: the camp-followers,
attendants and slaves of the Spartan Mnasippus turned back the Corcyraeans
OQ
from attacking their camp in 373 B.C. It is probable that most hoplite
armies, not only Spartan, of this period were followed by camp-attendants
and squires whom we may expect to have been lightly-armed for emergencies;
these followers could not have stood up to a charge of hoplites, but could
have been used to protect any defences round a camp?^ Although the Spartans
used light-armed infantry widely,they obviously still felt, as we found in
passages of Herodotus and Thucydides, contempt for light-troops and more
40especially for troops of this type who gave way under attack.
The types of arms used by light-infantry in this period seem to have
been as varied as the types found in Thucydides: slings, bows, javelins
41and less frequently daggers, swords and crude make-shift weapons. However, 
now,with the rise of the specialist 'true' peltast, the javelin took on a 
very important role and tended to supersede all other missile weapons, even 
the bow.
I have not attempted to examine the dubious reforms of peltast equip­
ment by Iphicrates since much has already been written by modern historians
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42on this issue and little more can be said. I am uncertain as to what 
weight we should give to Diodorus' testimony:^ the lighter shield and 
cuirass may simply reflect the lightening of the hoplites' equipment due 
to the more mobile type of warfare but on the other hand Diodorus may 
genuinely be describing a new heavier type of peltast who represented a 
half-way house between the normal peltast and the hoplite?4 Without any new 
evidence Iphicrates' reforms will continue to baffle historians.
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Appendix
Missile-Troops in the Fictional Battle of Thymbrara
Before the fictional battle of Thymbrara in the Cyropaedia of Xenophon,
He reasons that his heavy infantry will act as a shield in front of the
In 404 B.C. Thrasybulus' tactic of drawing his light-armed missile-
troops up behind his hoplites on the hill of Munychia had been employed to 
46good effect, but it is to be doubted whether missile-troops drawn up behind
hoplites on level ground would have enjoyed the same successias Aeneas Tacticus
notes, the danger of hitting their own heavily-armed infantry in the back was 
47great. On level ground the missile-troops positioned behind other infantry 
could only shoot blindly up into the air and,unless they used heavy arrowheads 
or sling-shots,the force of their missiles was spent before they fell on the 
enemy and so they did little damage. Note also that in the first action 
against Mithridates during the retreat of the Ten Thousand, the Cretan archers
AQ
had proved ineffective when compelled to shoot from behind their hoplites.
Cyrus expresses his wish to position his‘akontistai1 behind his more heavily- 
armed infantrymen (1 thorakophoroi1) and his'toxotai1 behind his ‘akontistai'.^
evocvT^ouT o o
rtoivTc T o o t ^
(Xen. Cyropaedia, VI.3.24)
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In the fictional battle of Thymbrara it is clear that Xenophon 
imagined the light-armed troops as being organized in special units under 
their own officers. Xenophon also regards the 'akontistai1 of Cyrop.VI.3. 
26 as ' peltarstai': & \ \  1 ^  n x p x y y  l\\uj
T o f t r z d '& e  y ko t l  ot t w v  -nft\"\octf-Tu>v £ t t I
T o u t o i ^  wtf’ocu-rw^ t e V j  K u O i ^ - r o t ^ e  , Kc*\
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C H A P T E R N I N E
SICILIAN LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY FROM THE SEVENTH CENTURY 
B.C. TO CIRCA 367 B.C.
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We first hear of light-armed infantry in Sicily under the tyrants
of the Archaic Period. Our information about these troops however
derives from Polyaenus, a particularly untrustworthy source - Polyaenus
was a Macedonian rhetorician who lived in the second century A.D. and
who compiled a collection of stratagems in eight books which he
dedicated to the Emperors Marcus and Verus to aid them in Verus1 Parthian
War in 162 A.D. Most of the stories may possibly have a grain of truth
in them,but this,in most cases^has obviously been embroidered with 
2
fantasy. The first tyrant who, according to Polyaenus, used light­
armed troops was Panaetius, who set himself up as tyrant in Leontini 
in the last decade of the seventh century. Panaetius supported the 
unprivileged section of the Leontine population against the oligarchical 
factions who controlled the state. 4 Polyaenus in Book V chapter 47 
informs us that Panaetius was a military leader (polemarchos) and that 
he sowed dissension between the poor who constituted the'pezoi' and the 
rich who made up the hippeis1. In lines 9 to 18 Polyaenus tells how
i v
Panaetius seized power with the aid of 600 peltastai and the cavalry­
men's servants. The details of the coup are suspect, especially the
i i
trick by means of which Panaetius disarmed the hippeis and brought about 
their slaughter. It is highly unlikely that the troops used by 
Panaetius for his coup were true peltasts as the distinctive Thracian
* i i i i  i
peltast equipment of pelte, machaira and Zeira would have been unknown
1 * bat this date, but they may have been ordinary psiloi armed with javelins;
t i
akontia were the main weapon of the true peltasts and this fact may have
1 1 fiprompted Polyaenus to call Panaetius' light-armed infantry peltastai.
• i
As we shall see, Sicilian akontistai played a large part in the fighting
of 415 - 13 B.C.
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Polyaenus also informs us that Phalaris,the tyrant of Acragas,who 
probably ruled in the period c. 570 - 550 B.C.,was supported in his 
initial attempt at tyranny by foreign mercenaries and slaves/ The 
slaves acted as crude 1ight-infantry and fought with only stones and 
two different types of axes (V.1). The details of Phaiaris1 coup are 
very dubious ,but it just possible that Polyaenus was following a true 
tradition that Phaiaris was helped to power by foreign mercenaries and 
slaves who were equipped as crude*psiloi*with whatever weapons they
o
could lay their hands on.
Polyaenus also asserts that a certain Theron, a son of a man named
Miltiades, was supported in his attempt to become tyrant of Selinus by
9
slaves who acted as crude light-armed troops. Polyaenus in 1.28.2 
informs us that after the people of Selinus had been defeated by 
Carthaginian forces and their fallen had been left unburied on the battle­
field, Theron volunteered to cremate the bodies where they lay if given
10three hundred household slaves equipped for wood cutting. These slaves 
were equipped with scythes and different types of axes and Theron per­
suaded them to support him in a coup against his opponents in the city.
At evening they returned to Selinus and the guards posted on the walls 
let them in. Theron then ordered his slaves to kill the guards and 
slaughter a great many citizens in their sleep; by thus getting rid of 
his opponents Theron made himself tyrant of Selinus. Yet again this 
story could possibly have some grain of truth,but many of the details are 
dubious; note that according to Polyaenus both Phaiaris of Acragas and 
Theron of Selinus made use of slaves armed with very crude weapons in 
their attempts at tyranny.
We next hear of light-armed troops under the tyrant Gelon who instit­
uted his tyranny at Syracuse in about 485 B.C.^ In 481 B.C. when a 
Persian invasion of mainland Greece was imminent ,the Greeks sent an
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embassy to Gelon at Syracuse to ask for military aid. Herodotus 
records the military assistance which Gelon was willing to give the 
Greeks if he was given the supreme command of the Greek forces against 
the Persians: c.e of- K
c 7 _ c  ^ •> v \ / "' o r 1   /Cj|\A.Gu— CTC^ ACM. O^LiV. o AA £ |CL^C^ £l^U_ po.^tefe '-V  I cy
c > ^V / _  / \ / c V ' _   ^ \  /
ca^ k.0 6U<^ le lyXr i. Ot-6yAUpU>0^ CnA Llc^ K.&A ACf-|v’c/ v 0 \ ' — v-/ \ ' , i . C , t
ut u o v  k. oA CJ C(5^L A'-U 0^ 10^  0 l Ca ^ k.GA £ Cf6v'o C- v '^  ! <a<>
k.ol oc.6^c\Cou^ frrno6poytuA'^ \*f'Aovy< * (Herod. VII.158.4)
When the Greeks refused to give him command of either the navy or
the army Gelon withdrew his offer. Despite what Herodotus would lead
us to believe, it seems unlikely that Gelon would have sent any help to
Greece: Xerxes, a far off Persian King, posed no threat to him and he
had to fend off imminent Carthaginian military aggression. Gelon, we
learn, had large forces of specialist light-armed troops at his command
and according to Herodotus was willing to send to the Greeks, in
addition to hoplites and cavalry, 2,000 archers, 2,000 slingers and
122,000 light-armed troops who were trained to run with the cavalry.
* »
Note that there is no mention of akontistai - these troops, as we shall
see, played a large part in the fighting of 415 - 413 B.C. How and
Wells are sceptical about the numbers given for the light-armed infantry,
but, as we shall again see in the strife around Syracusein 415 - 413 B.C.,
the Sicilians were especially strong in troops of this arm,and so I think
13that we should accept as possible the numbers given by Herodotus. Many
historians regard the light-armed troops in Gelon‘s army as specialized 
14mercenaries. Macan further hypothesises that some may have been foreign 
mercenaries and in particular that the sphendonetai may have been Balearic 
mercenaries.15 It is uncertain how many of Gelon's troops were mercen­
aries but Diodorus informs us that he admitted about 10,000 of them to 
citizenship.16 Dunbabin also suggests that some of the psiloi of Gelon
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came from the Sicels whom Gelon had conquered; many of the Sicels, who
dwelt on high ground and practised pastoralism, would almost certainly
have used weapons such as the bow and sling to protect their flocks and
17for the purpose of hunting.
Let us examine in more detail the various types of 1ight-infantry 
in Gelon's force: Herodotus informs us that Gelon had a large force of
2,000 archers. In Polyaenus (1.27.2) we again hear of Gelon's toxotai* 
and learn that they had a commander named Pediarchus: if this inform­
ation is true it would suggest that the archers were a well organized 
unit. One piece of archaeological evidence proves that archers were in 
existence on Sicily at this period: a double-edged and barbed type of
arrowhead, which can be dated to the beginning of the 5th century B.C., 
has been found on the island.18 As we shall see, the Syracusan army of 
415 - 3 B.C. included a force of archers.
According to Herodotus Gelon had a force of 2,000 slingers. It is 
uncertain whether the slingers were Syracusan citizens, Balearic mercen­
aries or Sicels who dwelt in the hills and practised pastoralism. In 
the fighting of 415 -13 B.C. slingers formed part of the Syracusan force 
and later clay sling-shots have been found on Si ci ly. 1^
i »
Gelon also had 2,000 hippodromoi psiloi in his army. There is some
doubt as to what type of troops these exactly were. Some commentators
regard them as 1ight-cavalry but I prefer to follow How and Wells, Adcock,
Burn and Sekunda who interpret them as light-armed infantry who operated
1 1 ?ninterspersed among the cavalry like the Boeotian hamippoi. Adcock 
thinks that a formation consisting of cavalry interspersed with 1ight- 
infantry was more suited to skirmishing than a vigorous charge; Caesar 
used the tactic of intermingling infantry with cavalry at the battle of
pi
Pharsalia- he copied this formation from certain tribes in Gaul.
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Interestingly this tactic was also used by the Scots Greys and Highlanders
pp
at St. Quentin during the First World War.' In Thucydides' account of the
struggle of 415 - 413 B.C. near Syracuse, we find that akontistai, who
often acted in conjunction with cavalry, on the Syracusan side, were prom­
pt
inent - it seems strange then that Herodotus does not mention them in his
i ,
account of Gelon1s forces: were there really no akontistai in the
Syracusan army of 481 B.C. or are we to regard the hippodromoi psiloi as
* ft
akontistai who operated in close conjunction with the cavalry? In view
< i
of the fact that akontistai of the Syracusan side are very often described 
as acting with cavalry in the narrative of Thucydides, I would be more 
inclined to believe the second suggestion.
In 480 B.C. Carthage invaded Sicily in strength. Diodorus informs us
that Gelon led an army of 50,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry against Hamilcar.24
Herodotus says nothing about the course of the fighting in which the
Syracusan forces were victorious but Diodorus gives a fairly detailed account
of the battle of Himera in which the role of the Syracusan cavalry is
stressed; he makes no mention of any light-armed troops on the Syracusan
25side in this account. Polyaenus in 1.27.2 tells a story of how Gelon
dressed up a certain Pediarchus, the commander of his force of archers, and
sent him with a contingent of archers, who had their bows concealed below
their special garments, to offer sacrifice in front of their army. When
26Hamilcar likewise went out to offer sacrifice he was shot down. This tale 
perhaps reflects some tradition that the Syracusan archers had taken part in 
some surprise action during the battle of Himera which Herodotus and Diodorus 
do not record.
It is not until 463 B.C. that we learn of any troops on Sicily acting 
as light-armed infantry. In the fighting in the years between the death of 
Gelon in c. 478 B.C. and 463 B.C., Diodorus simply divides armies into
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pezoi and hippeis and gives no information about how the pezoi were
equipped. In 463 B.C., 7,000 foreign mercenaries who had been given
citizenship of Syracuse by Gelon revolted from the rest of the city 
27population. We are told by Diodorus in XI.73.3 that the mercenaries 
lacked their proper equipment and we can assume that at least a proport­
ion of them fought as light-armed troops with whatever weapons they could 
lay their hands on. It is evident that the foreign mercenaries were 
more efficient soldiers than the other citizens of Syracuse. After a 
hard fight the Syracusans finally defeated the foreign mercenaries in 
461 B.C. 28
In 415 B.C. the Athenians sent their famous expeditionary force 
against Syracuse which was destroyed along with subsequent auxiliary 
forces in 413 B.C. 29 Diodorus in his narrative of the fighting around 
Syracuse in the years 415 - 413 B.C. (Diodorus XIII.2.1 - 19.3) never 
mentions any light-armed troops on the side of the Syracusans and is 
very vague about the Athenian light-armed forces. The obscurity of 
Diodorus1 account of the fighting is dispelled by our primary source for 
the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides - we learn from his history that the
i i t  i
Syracusans had under their command large forces of akontistai and toxotai
i i * »
(Thuc. VI .20.4) and also bodies of sphendonetai and lithoboloi 
(Thuc. VI.69.2). Syracusan akontistai, usually acting in conjunction 
with cavalry, were used to combat ravaging troops (Thuc. VII.42.6) and 
to protect the Syracusan and threaten the Athenian flanks (Thuc. VII.6.2).
> i
The Syracusan akontistai and cavalry also seem in Thucydides VI.67.2 to 
have actually formed a section if not all of a wing. The full potential
* i
of the Syracusan akontistai is revealed in their harassment and defeat of 
the retreating Athenian forces. We furthermore hear in Thucydides of
> i
Syracusan akontistai defending successfully a high mountain pass (VII.79.2)-
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light-armed troops of mainland Greece were surprisingly never used to 
defend mountain barriers at this period.^ In contrast to the frequent
i \
references to the Syracusan akontistai in the narrative of Thucydides we 
hear very little about the Syracusan archers, slingers and stone-throwers. 
We are informed in only one passage about their mode of operation: in
i i ,  i
Thucydides VI.69.2 we learn that the Syracusan toxotai, sphendonetai and 
1 \
lithoboloi rushed out in front of their phalanx block to engage their 
Athenian counterparts. In the ensuing battle of the two phalanxes there 
is no mention of these light-armed troops and we must assume (if we can 
trust the silence of Thucydides here) that they withdrew from the main 
fighting - did they move to protect the wings of their own phalanx or 
retire to its rear and throw missiles over the heads of their own hoplites? 
It seems very likely that a proportion of the Syracusan light troops who 
fought in the conflict of 415 - 13 B.C. were mercenaries, although 
Thucydides does not give us any direct information to this effect33 We 
also hear of other Sicilian city states which possessed forces of light 
troops in the narrative of Thucydides of the Sicilian expedition: Selinus
and Camarina had forces of toxotai and 'akontistai and Gela also had 
akontistai'(Thuc. VI.20.4; VII.33.1).
In 409 B.C. Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, collected together a 
large army and landed in Sicily33 He first marched against the city of 
Selinus and used a great many archers and slingers in his attack on the 
walls.3^ The defenders of Selinus in turn shot missiles (Pe/\*A) at the 
Carthaginians; 33 Nicias specifically pointed out that the city of Selinus, 
in addition to having large forces of cavalry and hoplites, possessed a
1 l 1 1Qfivery large number of toxotai and akontistai00- in the desperate struggle
i i i  *
to defend their walls the toxotai and akontistai of the Selinuntians must
have taken a large part. After heavy fighting the Carthaginians took
T7Selinus and butchered any of the inhabitants whom they caught. °
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In 406 B.C. the new Carthaginian general Himilcon raised a huge
army and invaded Sicily. After taking Acragas, Himilcon turned his
attention to attacking the city of Gela.^ Dionysius the tyrant of
Syracuse raised a large force of 30,000 pezoi and 1,000*hippeis1from
among the Syracusan citizens, mercenaries and allies to help the Geloans.4^
We learn that Dionysius used his hitherto unmentioned'psiloi' to engage
the Carthaginians in skirmishing attacks and to prevent them foraging
41over the countryside. We do not know what proportion of Dionysius' 
troops were light-armed - Snodgrass hypothesises that the majority of 
his pezoi were probably light-armed. We learn that in an attack on 
the Carthaginian camp near Gela, Dionysius placed archers on board his 
ships which sailed just off the shore, and that these gave covering fire 
to the Italiot Greeks who were fleeing on land.45 Dionysius then decided 
to evacuate the citizens of Gela during the night and left 2,000 of his 
'psiloi* in the city to make the Carthaginians believe that the inhabitants 
were still there and also probably to guard his own retreat; the*psiloi' 
later joined up with the main Syracusan for ced In Diodorus XIII. 113.2 
we learn that some of Dionysius' mercenaries were armed with javelins.
In 404 B.C. Dionysius concluded a peace treaty with the Carthaginians.
We next hear of light-armed troops in 403 B.C. when Dionysius
V  I
managed to break into the city of Enna with his force of psiloi - as 
we have seen in mainland Greece, 1 ight-infantry wc.ce.ideally suited for 
surprise attacks.45 In 401 B.C. Dionysius again prepared for war with 
Carthage. For the purpose of building fortificationson Epipolae he 
gathered 60,000 able-bodied peasants from the countryside around Syracuse - 
Dionysius clearly had the manpower potential to form a vast force of light­
armed troops.45 We also learn that Dionysius' workmen invented new types 
of missiles (bele) and mass produced 140,000 daggers, helmets and shields;
* t 47thorakes were also produced for certain prestigious troops - note that
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the majority of troops did not wear breastplates and there is no 
reference to any Syracusan troops wearing greaves; it would appear that 
few Syracusans at this period were equipped with a full panoply of hoplite 
arms. ^
In 398 - 7 B.C. Dionysius moved against the cities in the far west 
of Sicily which were held under Carthaginian dominion. In the fighting 
which followed, in which the Syracusans and their allies were victorious 
over the Carthaginians, there is only one reference to Syracusan light­
armed troops - we are informed that in preparation for a sea battle
1 t \
Dionysius had placed on his ships a great number of toxotai and sphendo- 
netai.49 The Carthaginian Himilcon was held back by the great barrage of 
missiles which these troops shot. Although Dionysius led many campaigns 
between 396 B.C. and his death in 368/7 B.C. we are unfortunately not told 
by Diodorus of the presence of any light-armed troops in the tyrant's 
forces. Diodorus, where he enumerates Dionysius' troops, simply divides
t t i  ithem into pezoi and hippeis as we have found before. Diodorus, or his 
source for this period, does not seem to have been interested in breaking 
down the Sici1ian 'pezoi1 into classes of hoplites and 1ight-armed,as 
Thucydides and Xenophon were,and consequently references to previously 
unmentioned light-armed troops, which have been included in the term'pezoi', 
crop up unexpectedly in Diodorus' narrative of Dionysius' campaigns.^0 
Finley is also unimpressed by Diodorus' set piece battles which seem 
almost conventional, his very high figures for the Sicilian and Carthaginian
CA
forces and his chronology which is weak in places. Diodorus as a 
military historian certainly has his drawbacks - our clearest picture of 
Sicilian light-armed troops and their modes of combat comes from Thucydides' 
narrative of the Syracusan expedition of 415 - 413 B.C.
Archaeological evidence can add very little to our knowledge of 
missile-troops in Sicily in the Classical Period: only a small number of
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arrowheads dating to this period have been published and the clay sling­
shots which have been excavated are of a late date. 52
In conclusion, I would say that there were several differences in 
the armies and equipment of the Sicilian Greeks and the Greeks of main­
land Greece; note that Gelon had under his command a wide range of
light-armed troops which formed almost one quarter of the infantry force
which, according to Herodotus, he was willing to send to the mainland 
Greeks. In our historical sources we are not told of any Greek 
mainland city state at this period of Classical Greek history which could 
put into the field as many specialist light-armed troops as 2,000 slingers,
i i
2,000 archers and 2,000 hippodromoi psiloi. Macan comments on Herodotus
VII.158.4 : "The large proportion of light-armed troops and cavalry in
the forces of Gelon show how far his military establishment was ahead of
of 53the Greeks^old Hellas", and How and Wells comment "The large proportion 
of light-armed troops and cavalry shows the higher level of military 
science in the West. The Sicilian tyrants, making large use of mercen­
aries, can put in the field a well-equipped force of all arms, not the 
mere hoplite - phalanx and ill-armed light troops mustered to meet Xerxes".54
The Sicilian tyrants also used a vast number of foreign mercenaries - 
a practice which was not carried out on the same large scale in mainland 
Greece during the Classical Period.55 Some at least of these mercenaries 
were equipped with light arms (Diodorus XIII.113.2 and cf. XI.73.3).
There were also differences in equipment: it is very probable that
many Syracusan hoplites were not equipped with a full panoply such as was 
worn by most mainland Greek hoplites in the fifth century; in 401 B.C. we 
learn that only certain prestigious troops wore'thorakes' and greaves do 
not appear amongst the pieces of equipment made by armourers at all. The 
fact that the Sicilian panoply was lighter than that of mainland Greece 
was probably due in part to expense but we should also bear in mind the
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possibility that it was due to the more mobile warfare which the Sicilians 
practised with their large forces of light-armed troops and cavalry.
C H A P T E R T E N
THE GREEKS' VIEWS OF LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY
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The view that missile-troops, and in particular archers, were 
cowardly is a recurrent motif in Ancient Greek literature. It would, 
however, be too simplistic to state that our sources uniformly hold this 
view: there is an acceptance of the bow as a weapon by several of the
aristocrats Teucer, Odysseus, Meriones, Philoctetes, Paris, Pandarus, 
Helenus and Dolon are all described on certain occasions as being equipped 
with the bow and in the majority of these passages there is no hint that 
it was regarded as a disreputable weapon. There is,however, an echo of
use of the bow and arrow. Strabo also records what he thought was an 
early agreement between Chalcis and Eretria not to use missile weapons in 
a war over the Lelantine Plain (Strabo 10.1.12); it may be that Archilochus 
in frag.3 (West) refers to the same agreement which apparently limited or 
banned the use of the sling or bow. At any rate the 'Lords of Euboea1 
mentioned in Archilochus frag.3, felt that the battle would be decided by 
aristocratic sword-fighting and not by the use of missile weapons.^
In the ClassicalPeriod the view that archers and other light-troops and 
their tactics were cowardly is expressed in several of our historical sources. 
In contrast, the hoplite and the phalanx formation appear to be accepted as 
the heroic type of soldier and battle formation; hoplites could run away or
heroes in the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer. In the Iliad}the warrior
the belief that the bow was the weapon of a coward in A  385 - 390:
256
fight badly but there is no notion that the 'hop 1ite1 or his tactics were 
considered cowardly - rather, as in the poetry of Tyrtaeus, the hoplite 
was the main combatant in any battle, whilst lighter troops mattered little.
The view that missile-troops and their skirmishing tactics were 
cowardly appears to have been most strongly felt in SpartajWhere there was 
obviously a great emphasis placed on hand-to-hand combat with the spear or 
sword. Dieneces, a Spartan hoplite at Thermopylae in 480 B.C., spoke 
sneeringly to a fellow from Trachis who informed him that the multitude of 
the Persian arrows would obscure the sun - "All the better", exclaimed 
Dieneces, "We'll be able to come to grips with those Persians in the shade" 
(Herod.VII.226.1-2). Callicrates, a Spartan hoplite who was shot in the 
side by a Persian arrow while sitting in his rank at Plataea in 479 B.C., 
is reported to have said: o o ^ 4\e-<- yaoc t o G t o  otl &:tto©c<\/oG^a<xc ;
o C \ V  o f t  OTTO 0<^ T o ^  o t o u  k y
During the Peloponnesian War the Spartans obviously held the same 
opinion of light-armed troops: a Spartan captured on Sphacteria in 425 B.C.
In 423 B.C.^when Brasidas was attacked by Lyncestians and Illyrians, 
he addressed his troops and in his speech poured scorn on their enemies' 
skirmishing tactics: "In action they are not the men they look, if their
(Plut.Mor. 234 E(46)).
spoke sneeringly about the Athenian's use of missile weapons: t ^ t o u v t s ^
T e  e lvo c c  ovtoc^ -to T .^  T e ^ v / e o b ^ c v  o y o C c o y
kctft. tcvo<y eyc>yA.4voo T T o T e . o < s i  g^ ov/ t Co v  ©icuov
Sc <£Vo<. t u j v £ k
c * c ^ a o < \< j j t u jv  e l  A  T e O v g to -T e ^  o iu T u iv  K < x \o c  l<
OCTT€k^>C Vc<TO oCotvL T T o \\o G  o C V C C V o d .  T o V  oCTp  oi|<,TO V ? X^yoov
T o v  o i t f T o v  ; t o o ' j  c k y o i Q o y  £ (.e y c  y  v'uJcs'k.e > r ro c o u y u ^ v o j
oT c o f e N / T o v v c x v ^ v  "Toes \[ &Q{.s k.cA T o ^ e u / u 0(6(. Q e c p CTO.
(Thi ir T\/ /in 0\ 1 A / C I T /(Thuc.IV.40.2).
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opponents will only stand their ground; for they have no regular order, 
and therefore are not ashamed of leaving any post in which they are hard 
pressed; to fly and to advance being alike honourable, no imputation can 
be thrown on their courage. When every man is his own master in battle 
he will readily find a decent excuse for saving himself. They clearly 
think that to frighten us at a safe distance is a better plan than to meet 
us hand-to-hand; else why do they shout instead of fighting? You may 
easily see that all the terrors with which you have invested them are in 
reality nothing; they do but startle the sense of sight and hearing. If 
you repel their tumultuous onset, and, when opportunity offers, withdraw 
again in good order, keeping your ranks, you will sooner arrive at a place 
of safety, and will also learn the lesson that mobs like these, if an 
adversary withstand their first attack, do but threaten at a distance and 
make a flourish of valour". (Jowett: Thuc.IV.126.5-6).
In 395 B.C., when Agesilaus was forced to give up his expedition 
against the Persian king because of the anti-Spartan coalition of Thebes, 
Corinth and Argos which was funded by Persian money, Plutarch asserts that 
he exclaimed that the Persian king was driving him out of Asia with a 
myriad of mere‘toxotai* - a bitter pun on the cowardly archers and the 
Persian coins which had a depiction of a toxotes' stamped on them (Plut. 
Agesilaus,15.6).4
The view that light-troops were cowardly is not expressed by any 
Athenian figure in the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides or Xenophon. 
Thucydides himself doeSjhowever^ speak slightingly about the skirmishing 
tactics of light-armed troops: k o a  o v  c *o -
CL T6. \i @ O j*> <6\oL Kc*Y <5"cJ? £ V ^ o ^ 7 o < l  \<.cxl To'^OTo^t TT^OOyM.cx'^OS/TO 
I < o Y  T I*oTTot^  oVo<r<^ l< o ^  'X j / ' i Y o u c ,  « r ' X \ ^ \ c O v '  G T T o t o u V
(Thuc.VI.69.2).
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It seems probable also that Thucydides wished his readers to think that 
the death of Cleon at Amphipolis was shameful, not only because he was killed 
(or so he asserts) while fleeing^,but also because he fell at the hands of 
a peltast (Thuc.V.10.9).
The Athenian tragedians Sophocles and Euripides also show an awareness 
in their works of the idea that missile-troops were cowardly. In the 
Ajax of Sophocles, Menelaus shows contempt for the bow which Teucer defends:
MEN: C  T O ^ O T n ^  £OLK.£V O U  (SyiUKjaoV cj>y?oV6.TV.
TEY: o u  f!>c£vc<u< f o v  T^v
MEN: It seems that the archer has no small opinion of himself.
TEU: What of it? It is no shameful skill which I have.
MEN: If you were given a shield, would you boast!
TEU: Even 1ightly-armed,1 would be a match for you heavily-armed.
It is clear from line 1122 that Menelaus upbraids Teucer because he, 
as an archer, was not willing to meet his foe in a close fight - the 1 aspis1 
was a hoplite shield, of no use to an archer who needed onehand to hold the 
bow and the other to draw it. Teucer, however, maintains resolutely that 
archery is a special skill and is by no means to be despised; it is almost 
as if Teucer is speaking out against a commonly held conception of archery - 
he claims his 'techne' is not 'banausos'; 'banausos' not only denotes that 
the art is unworthy but also that it is servile - Plato in Laws 644A 
associates 'banausos' with 'aneleutheros'; the bow may have become closely 
connected in the minds of many Athenians with barbarian mercenary or servile 
archers (cf. Aristophanes, Lysistrata 436).
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Euripides in his Heracles sets out two contrasting views, through the 
speeches of Lycus (157 - 164) and Amphitryon (188 - 203), about the
acceptability of archery on the battlefield and reflects, I think, the
confused attitude of the Greeks to'toxotai, who failed to conform to the
Tyrtaean criteria of hoplite valour; yet nevertheless were extremely effective
in inflicting casualties with impunity.
Lycus speaks scathingly of Heracles' use of the bow, the weapon of a 
coward; steadfastness in hoplite ranks during hand-to-hand combat is the 
only true criterion for valour:
X L'“ >
S ’ o i S e v
O  ^ o u  n o t  <*<r n c i  6- <5’ X €' r^ j>0<^  Xocioc X 6’/5'"
o u ^ 1 v^X©fe ^ Y Y U^ c * \ X o <  ^•X*’0 '^
k < X l C C ^ * T O V  o tT X o V  j C^ uy''^  TT|3oyvfel.^po  ^ r ^ *
#.vbf>o<} S* c X f e Y X 0 ^ ° ^ X L
i \ Y  S j  y u e v o o v  \^feTT6.(. T €  k o c v  Tv.^ey>k.6.Tc<L
Scy>o^ Tcx e^'tfx.'/ <x\ok<X T w ^ u v  ^ .
"Heracles who, although of no account, got the reputation of being 
brave by fighting with mere wild beasts, but in other types of fighting he 
was of no prowess - he never carried a shield on his left arm, nor came 
within spear-thrust, but equipped with the bow, that most cowardly weapon, 
he was very well prepared to run away. The bow is no test of a man's
braveness, but the brave man is he who stands firm once he has taken up his
station and looks with unflinching eye upon the enemy spear which cuts a 
swift furrow in his ranks".
Amphitryon understands well the ethos of light-armed combat: the
archer's success was actually due to his non-conformance to the very 
principles which Lycus sets out in lines 161 - 164:
e<5xe CX v OU: >€v •>vLO V e.u'v^ u
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T o  TTcxvcracjjov/ b C uy> ^  c<  ^ ~^0 ^>v\ j i '~\ & c<yA {v i
4*^1 k X u u J V  V U v  T  OCTT ’  i ^ A O O  6 " 0 ( J > 0 ^  y f c v o u .
<X ^ Y  O r r \ t T r | ^  £ o o X o ^  C C TL t Co v  c/ ttX ujv '
Bpocu&octj T e  Xoy^>^\/ o u k  ^ X fcL _r*^ 5 <ru^ yk-^ c^ T *‘
Q a iv ' r t T o v '  c& i ^ u v o c l  } ^ .C (X V  £.^uoV  c * \ k ^ v  |M .o V o \ / *
\co<t tf” cv oiifL /^ ''O ciyo^Oo^LC^
CXuTO^ T6.©Vv^lc6. ^C i. X ^ cX T»-j T iZ > v  T T e X c ^ ^ .
*/ r ^ _ /V ~ t ■*/ •»/
o«yoe Ac T o ^ o i ^  X € t f  S a d ' T o ^ o V j
£ V  y^€.v T o  \ £ > 6 ' T o \ /  } j ^ o p C o o t iS 'T O U ^  occ^fcX^
C * X \o t .^  T o  g C jp x «X J>u£Tc*L  k ^ T S ^ e i V j
£ k o ^  S* c*({>e. £ t u j ^  r r o X c y u ^ o u ^  c £ y a o v € T c *c
Tu<f>\cTu<j 0 ^«jJ ' / T o( <^  OOTcX^cX^ T o ^ C u y U C *  { f o /
T O  (S'di^X.OC. T *  OU 'T o 't'j £ V c A \ /T L O L ^
€.v e 6 ( j > u \ c * k t w j  ^ i i ' - r t  , t o u t o  S’ e v  yuoc^^
< 3 * 0 ( | ) 0 V  ^ K o (\y .6  TcA , ^ j> C b \/T 0 i t i  o \  eyuA o o Kc<k.0u<y
T o  <^tZyac< 3 ’ k  Tuy^n^ Jb^jaL^yUfevov/.
(188 - 203).
"You find fault with that all-wise invention, the bow! Listen then 
to my words and be made wise. A man in heavy armour is a slave of his 
heavy equipment: if he breaks his spear-shaft, he has no means of saving 
his body from death since this weapon is his only means of defence.
And when those who are drawn up beside him are cowardly, he loses his life 
through the cowardice of these very men who are positioned by him. But 
the man who possesses a hand skilled in archery has one great advantage: 
when he has shot a myriad of arrows he can still defend himself with yet more 
arrows so that he does not die; he also stands at a distance and wards off 
the enemy, wounding those of them who watch with unseen shafts and he does 
not expose his own body to the enemy, but is on good guard. Now this is 
supremely wise in battle - to do the enemy most harm, but to preserve one's 
own person, independent of the luck inherent in a close battle."
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The Heracles was written in about 420 B.C. and it seems as if 
Amphitryon speaks with the insight which the expeditions to Aetolia 
(426 B.C.) and Sphacteria (425 B.C.) had given Euripides. Euripides in 
the Iphigenia in Tauris (produced in 413 or 412 B.C.) shows a knowledge of 
the effectiveness of light-armed tactics, although no comment is made in 
the play about the acceptability of these tactics.^ Some herdsmen attacked 
the nobles Orestes and Pylades when Orestes, tormented by the Furies, started 
to slaughter their flocks. A great number of herdsmen gathered together 
and, although they thought that they were no match for the two nobles in a 
normal fight, they pelted them with missiles and struck them when one of 
them fell. The second noble tried to shield his fallen comrade who cried 
out that they were going to die (I. 301f ). One of the herdsmen narrates 
the defeat and capture of the two nobles:
ryA€A ^ I *  o u k T T t T ^ o u ^
c£\\o<j <*WoGg.v tt^o € vccyAevoc. 
ou dr*| to d a v o ^  iTcx^ocxe.Aeo^y^ ^kou^o
n
fcTTou yuoi. j Qagyocvo'/ X^ P
<ii<f I' SctTcA t <X TToXeyuLLUiV
4>Oy^  G.TT i^KTr\ oyxe V \Z<xTTc*<j.
£(. C^)OyoL TCj , ckTtpoc TT K 
tj^c<.\\ov ocuTOvj^  £.1 Se.TOUd^ € caL C*TO |
0<oGt^ TO voV cJTTt.Tk.ON/’•ypoidVtV TT€=Tp°U^. 
ckl t v-^Tox/ ‘Yt kp €*,
OoSec^  To;.
St n/cn/ "T&'Xya'YA^fev/ ooycctGoc,
k 6 k \ u o  £4 - r r tp c ^ c A o '/T t^  l ^ e k o y o jp c v  
TTtTpocdT c^ cxtf-y 'ot'/> , Y 'V  Y oV,°
kotLA&T1-3
(318 - 333)
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In lines 324 - 333 Euripides shows that he understood how effective 
skirmishing tactics could be and also the mode of utilizing light troops: 
the first task of the light-armed was to wear down an enemy's resistance 
by attacking, and retreating when attacked in turn. When the enemy became 
exhausted,the light-armed troops could use their numerical superiority to 
surround their more heavily-armed foes and to pin them down; they could 
then bombard them from a safe distance with missile weapons until they 
either received their surrender or killed them. There are many echoes in 
this piece of the plight of the small force of Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria 
in 425 B.C. and I do not think that it is too fanciful to suggest that 
Euripides had this in mind when he composed this piece - the victory on 
Sphacteria was looked on as one of Athens' greatest and the Athenians were 
very proud of it: a victory monument, which consisted in part of captured
Spartan arms, was set up in the agora. ^
The Athenian tragedians Sophocles (through the mouth of Menelaus in 
the Ajax) and Euripides (through the mouth of Lycus in the Heracles) then 
show an awareness of the belief that archers were cowardly. Euripides, 
through the contrasting speech of Amphitryon in the Heracles, examines the 
effectiveness of the archer's tactics and in the Iphigenia in Tauris, the 
effectiveness of light-armed skirmishing tactics in general.
Aristophanes' comical caricatures of barbarous Thracian peltasts and 
Scythian archers were primarily designed to raise a laugh and it is difficult 
to judge if there was any real hatred in them. The Thracian peltast in the 
agora is depicted as being rapacious and ferocious (Lysistrata 563 - 4), 
whilst the Odomanti in the Acharnians (155f), who are willing to peltasticize 
all Boeotia to the ground, are depicted as being lustful. 7 There appears to 
be no real trace of hatred in these comical portrayals, but Aristophanes 
could not have foreseen the frightening cruelty of these troops, which
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shocked even Thucydides, when he was writing the Acharnians.® Aristophanes 
likewise pokes fun at the Scythian archer-police at Athens: he portrays
them as violent, lustful, drunken and of having set gazes and speaking in
q
comically broken Greek. There are hints in Aristophanes that these
Scythian archers were in reality unpopular (Acharnians 703 - 707; frag. 411) -
they were obviously regarded as totally barbarous and servile. After one
of the oligarchs employed barbarian archers in his bodyguard in 411 B.C.,
1 nthe Athenians must have looked on such archers with great suspicion.
I think we should bear in mind the possiblity that a deeply ingrained 
feeling that missile-troops were cowardly, mirrored in certain pieces of 
Homer, the Greek historians and the tragedians Sophocles and Euripides, may 
have been a factor in the failure of certain states to develop large units 
of native light-armed infantry. Our historical sources show that this 
psychological factor was strongest in Sparta and the fact that Sparta, 
according to Thucydides, instituted a force of archers late (not till after 
Sparta's disastrous defeat on Sphacteria - the fact that we hear nothing 
about its actions in the Peloponnesian War indicates that it was either 
disbanded or of negligible effectiveness) would seem to confirm that this 
factor was of some importance. It may also help to account for why our 
primary sources for the Classical Period apparently fail to mention the 
presence of light-armed troops on certain occasions when we have archaeolog­
ical, inscriptional or literary evidence which would strongly suggest that 
they were present. They, or their sources, seem primarily to have been 
interested in the actions of hoplites in battles and they often seem only 
to mention the presence of light-armed infantry in passing.
C O N C L U S I O N
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As we have seen in chapter one, there is quite a large 
amount of evidence for the use of archers by the Greeks at 
an early date: in the Iliad, Homer frequently refers to 
archers from among both the nobles and the masses.
Aristocratic archers appear to have acted on their own or 
with single infantrymen who protected them with their shields. 
Homer would also lead us to believe that a section of the 
'laoi' were organized into bodies of archers. Only once does 
the poet make clear how he visualized the archers from among 
the masses being used in open battle: he describes the 
Locrian archers operating, in conjunction with a body of 
slingers, by shooting their missiles over the heads of the 
more conventionally armed infantry, who were positioned in 
front of them. There is ,furthermore,archaeological evidence 
which proves that Greek archers were in existence throughout 
the Mycenaean Period and the Dark Age. The evidence for the 
late Mycenaean Period and early Dark Age is, however, fairly 
small.
There is a limited amount of evidence for the use of 
slingers by the Greeks at an early date: the sling is 
mentioned in two passages of the Iliad and in the Locrian 
passage, as mentioned above, Homer clearly visualizes slingers 
operating in a body, in conjunction with archers, by firing 
their sling-shots over the heads of their own conventionally 
armed infantrymen. The depiction of slingers on the silver 
Siege Rhyton and the finds of sling-shots dating to the 
Mycenaean Period indicate that the Mycenaeans had knowledge
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of, and probably made use of, slingers. Sling-shots found 
in Thessaly and on the island of Thera prove that slingers 
were in existence in these two places in the Dark Age.
In the Archaic Period, as we have seen in chapter two, 
there is evidence that a wide range of Greek light-armed 
troops were in existence: the early Greek elegiac and lyric
poets Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, Callinus and Alcaeus all refer 
to various types of light-infantry or their weapons. 
Archilochus of Paros (fl.c. 680 - 640 B.C.) shows a knowledge 
of a wide range of missile-troops: archers, slingers, javelin- 
throwers and probably also stone-throwers. Tyrtaeus of 
Sparta (fl. mid. 7th century B.C.) refers to "gymnetes" and 
"gymnomachoi", who were apparently armed with javelins and 
stones; Tyrtaeus describes these troops running forward in 
front of their ranks in one fragment, and crouching down 
behind shields (it is uncertain whether the shields are their 
own or belong to the hoplites) near to trooDS armed with full 
panoplies in another. Callinus of Ephesus (fl. mid. 7th 
century B.C.) refers to javelin-throwers and Alcaeus of Lesbos 
(fl. c. 600 - 570 B.C.) shows some knowledge of missile-troops 
when he describes the greaves as "a protection against the 
powerful missile."
Archaeological evidence confirms the fact that missile- 
troops played, a part in the battles of the Archaic Period: 
we possess seventh century depictions of archers, stone- 
throwers, javelin-throwers and one portrayal of a slinger. 
Finds of Archaic Greek arrowheads have occurred at Perachora,
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Olympia, Sparta and on the islands of Delos, Chios, Samos, 
Rhodes (at Lindos), Crete and Cyprus and at some of the 
Greek settlements on the coast of Asia Minor, in Cyrene 
Egypt and Syria.
In the later Archaic Period, as we have seen in chapter 
three, several Greek tyrants employed bodies of specialist 
light-armed troops - from ceramic evidence we can tell that 
the Peisistratids at Athens used bodies of Scythian archers 
and peltasts, who were probably Thracians, from c. 540/530 - 
510 B.C. Polycrates of Samos (c. 538 - 522 B.C.) also had 
a large force of 1,000 archers. In chapter nine we have also 
seen that the early tyrants of Sicily, if we are to believe 
the assertions of Polyaenus, had the support of light-armed 
troops: Panaetius of Leontini, Phalaris of Acragas and Theron 
of Selinus. We also learn in the narrative of Herodotus that 
Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, had large specialist bodies of 
light-armed infantry in 481 B.C.; these consisted of archers, 
slingers and light-armed men who ran with the cavalry.
In the early Classical Period, which has been studied 
in chapter four, we have evidence that light-armed troops 
were used by some Greek states in the Persian Wars of 499 - 
479 B.C. Archaeological evidence proves that the Ionian 
Greek defenders of Paphos had the support of archers in 498 
or 497 B.C., and possibly also had a number of slingers and 
j avelin-throwers. Pausapi<?S asserts that the slaves of the 
Athenians fought on their masters' behalf at Marathon in 
490 B.C. and, if they did so, it seems most probable that
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they fought as crude light-infantry. During Xerxes' invasion 
of 480 - 479 B.C. we learn that Athens had a force of archers 
and that these probably fought at both Salamis and Plataea; 
we know very little about these archers, but must bear in 
mind the possibility that they were Cretan mercenaries. 
Archaeological evidence would suggest that Greek archers also 
took part in the defence of Olynthus and we may possibly infer 
from the tale of Timoxenus in Herodotus that the Potidaeans 
had archers who helped in the defence of their city. We also
learn that many Greek states in 480 - 479 B.C. had forces of
non-specialist light-armed infantry: the Spartan helots who
fell at Thermopylae and Plataea (described as 'psiloi' by 
Herodotus) must have acted as crudely-armed skirmishers.
Athenian stone-throwers took part in the attack on the island 
of Psyttaleia after the battle of Salamis. The collective 
Greek forces at the battle of Plataea comprised of roughly 
the same numbers of 'psiloi' as hoplites (Herodotus further 
informs us that each Spartan citizen was accompanied by seven 
light-armed helots). The total force of Greek light-armed
troops present at the battle of Plataea, if we are to believe
Herodotus, amounted to a vast 71,300 men (adding the 1,800 
Thespians to the 69,500). Herodotus unfortunately tells us 
nothing about tbe role of these troops in the battle or about 
their organization, arms or equipment.
The next period we have studied is that of the Peloponnesian 
War (431 - 404 B.C.). As we have seen in chapter four, a 
very wide range of light-armed infantry are mentioned by
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Thucydides in his narrative of the Peloponnesian War: 
specialist archers, slingers, peltasts, javelin-throwers 
and crude stone-throwers and troops armed with a variety of 
make-shift weapons.
In the Thucydidean narrative we hear on most occasions
of archers used by the Athenians: in addition to native
Athenian archers, Athens also made use of Cretan and 
barbarian archers, who were most probably mercenaries. We 
also hear occasionally of other Greek states using archers: 
the forces of the Corinthians, Megarians, Ambraciots and 
Corcyraeans in 432 B.C. contained archers (there is also 
evidence ((inscription)) that there were archers in a 
Corinthian force in 412 - 411 B.C. and that some of the 
Corcyraeans in the democratic faction were armed with the bow 
in 425 B.C. ((Thuc. IV.48.2)) ); in 429 B.C. some of the
allies of Sparta were armed with the bow and in 425 B.C., after
the crushing defeat on Sphacteria, Sparta herself raised a 
corps of archers; in 428 B.C. the Lesbians sent for a force 
of mercenary Scythian archers; in 420 B.C. there were archers 
present in the forces of the Argive Confederacy; in 415 B.C. 
the Syracusans and Camarinaeans possessed forces of archers 
and in 413 B.C. there were probably archers present in a Theban 
force which went to the aid of Mycalessus.
Other specialist troops such as ’sphendonetai', ’peltastai' 
and 'akontistai' generally came from the more backward parts 
of central and northern Greece and also from Asia Minor 
(mercenary slingers also came from the island of Rhodes).
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We find in Thucydides that upland peoples such as the 
Acarnanians, Amphilochians, Aetolians, Ozolian Locrians, 
Thracians and many of the Thessalian tribes,had developed 
large bodies of specialist slingers and javelin-throwers who 
could fight well on high and rugged terrain; these areas had 
lagged behind the rest of Greece in social, political and 
military affairs and we find that the inhabitants of these 
districts lived in scattered hill-top settlements and most 
probably used missile weapons for hunting and protecting their 
flocks, as well as for warfare. Greek city states, who lacked 
their own specialized bodies of light-armed troops, or who 
wished to supplement their own, recruited mercenaries from 
these regions.
As for the cruder types of light-armed troops who were 
armed with make-shift weapons or simply threw stones, we learn 
on several occasions in the Thucydidean narrative that the 
Athenians mobilized large forces of these troops (which probably 
consisted of poorer citizens who could not afford 'hopla' and 
also metics) and also the Spartans, who could draw upon their 
subject populations to fight for them in campaigns which were 
fought some distance from Sparta (helots, who were almost 
certain-ly light-armed, were present at Decelea; helots were 
also equipped as hoplites for certain distant campaigns).
- Light-armed, troops are mentioned very rarely by our 
sources Xenophon and Diodorus in the closing years of the 
Peloponnesian War (411 - 404 B.C.); these two sources are 
much less detailed than Thucydides and appear to be very
270
selective about the details which they give about armies and 
military actions. After the end of the Peloponnesian War, 
as we have seen in chapter six, a wide range of Athenian 
light-armed troops took part in the fighting against the 
Thirty and the Spartans (404 - 403 B.C.): archers, slingers,
stone-throwers, 'psiloi akontistai' and ’peltophoroi.’
In the army of the Ten Thousand in 401 - 400 B.C., as 
we have seen in chapter seven, there were contingents of 
Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers and also large forces of 
other light-armed infantry, who were mainly javelin-throwers: 
we learn in the Anabasis of Xenophon that there were peltasts 
from Olynthus, Thessaly and Thrace.
In the period 400 - 362 B.C., as we have seen in chapter 
eight, missile-troops, and in particular peltasts, took part 
in a large number of actions and we may infer from this that 
their importance in these years had increased. We are specifically 
informed by our sources on only a small number of occasions that 
archers and slingers took part in the fighting of this period: 
in 395 B.C. and 388 B.C. Cretan archers were included in 
Spartan forces and in 394 B.C. archers were present in a 
Corinthian force. In 394 B.C. slingers from the mountain 
villages of Margania, Letrinia and Amphidolia, which were 
situated in the Pisatis (probably in the hills around Pyrgos.), 
were included in a Spartan force. In 389 B.C. Acarn.anian 
slingers attacked with some success a Peloponnesian force on 
hilly terrain. Slingers from the regions around Thessaly, 
according to Diodorus, were present on the Theban side in the
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battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. We must allow for Xenophon’s 
more summary treatment of military affairs than Thucydides; 
since he covers the period c. 401 - 362 B.C. in only five 
books (Hellenicat III - VII); it also seems probable that 
archers and slingers are included on some occasions by 
Xenophon in the term ’peltastai', which he often uses to 
denote all typgg-.of light-armed infantry rather than simply 
true peltasts.
On Sicily, as we have seen in chapter nine, light-armed 
troops, many of whom .must have been mercenaries, played an 
important part in warfare from the seventh to the fourth 
centuries B.C.: crude light-armed infantry, if we are to believe 
the assertions of Polyaenus, were used by several Sicilian 
tyrants of the late seventh and the sixth centuries B.C. - 
Panaetius of Leontini, Phalaris of Acragas and Theron of 
Selinus. In 481 B.C. Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, possessed 
large forces of specialist light-armed infantry: archers,
slingers and ’light-armed infantry who ran with the cavalry’. 
Syracusan ’akontistai’ figure prominently in the Thucydidean 
account of the conflict of 415 - 413 B.C. - there were also 
forces of archers, slingers and stone-throwers present in the 
Syracusan army of these years. The cities of Selinus and 
Camarina also had forces of archers and javelin-throwers and 
Gela Tiad javelin-throwers in the fighting of 415 - 413 B.C.
In the last decade of the fifth century B.C. Sicilian ’toxotai’, 
’akontistai’ and ’psiloi’ took part in the desperate fighting 
against the Carthaginians. In 398 - 397 B.C., when Dionysius
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moved against the cities in the west of Sicily which were 
held under Carthaginian dominion, we are informed that the 
tyrant had forces of 'toxotai' and ’sphendonetai’ in his 
army. Our sources are silent about the presence of light­
armed infantry on Sicily from 396 B.C. to the death of 
Dionysius in 368/7 B.C.
What roles did light-armed troops perform in Greek 
warfare and where were they positioned on the battlefield?
In the fifth century B.C., we learn from the narratives of 
Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus that Greek light-armed 
infantry were used in various types of operations: simple 
attacks, ravaging attacks, attacks on fortified positions, 
ambushes and pursuits. It is not until the period c. 400 - 
362 B.C. that we are specifically informed by any historical 
source that light-infantry from mainland Greece were used to 
guard mountain-passes and to defend fortified positions. 
Light-armed troops, especially when they were used in large 
numbers, on rough terrain, and in conjunction with cavalry, 
often proved successful against hoplites in the roles mentioned 
above; this was mainly because they could use their speed of 
foot and missile weapons to skirmish with hoplites from a 
distance and thus were never compelled to fight at close _ 
quarters with their heavily-armed adversaries.
Where were light-armed troops positioned on a battlefield? 
Homer in the Iliad, possibly based on an Assyrian model, 
informs us that the Locrian archers and slingers were positioned 
behind their more conventionally armed infantry and shot their
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missiles over the heads of these troops at the enemy.
Tyrtaeus in one fragment informs us that the 'gymnetes' 
stood close to their hoplites, and in another that the 
'gymnomachoi' ran forward (presumably in front of the ranks 
of their own hoplites). Although Herodotus tells us that 
there was a vast force of Greek ’psiloi’ present at the 
battle of Plataea in 479 B.C., he incredibly gives us no 
information about where this force was positioned on the 
battlefield. In the period of the Peloponnesian War we are 
given very little information by our sources, Thucydides,
Xenophon and Diodorus, about the positioning of light-armed 
infantry in various battles. However, we are informed that 
at the battle of Delium in 424 B.C., the Boeotian 'psiloi' 
and peltasts were posted on the extremities of their phalanx, 
presumably to protect it from flank attack or to initiate 
attacks on the flanks of their enemies. In several instances 
light-armed troops would appear to have actually formed a 
wing (e.g. Amphilochian 'akontistai' formed part of a wing at 
the battle of Olpae; in Thuc. VI. 67.2, Syracusan akontistai', 
along with cavalry, formed a wing). We also learn in Thucydides 
VI. 69.2 of Athenian and Syracusan light-armed infantry skirmish­
ing in front of their own phalanx blocks.
In the events of 404 - 403 B.C. which led to the expulsion 
-of the Thirty Tyrants from Athens, we are informed on two 
occasions of the position of light-armed troops: in 404 B.C. 
for the battle with the troops of the Thirty on the hill of 
Munychia, Thrasybulus placed his light-infantry behind his
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hoplites so that they could shoot their missiles over the 
heads of their own men at the enemy - since the missile-troops 
were shooting downhill and had a clear view of the enemy, the 
danger of hitting their own men in the back must have been 
negligible. In 403 B.C., in the battle with the Spartans, 
Thrasybulus' light-armed troops skirmished in front of their 
own hoplites.
In the Anabasis of Xenophon we learn that light-armed 
soldiers in the army of the Ten Thousand (401 - 400 B.C.) 
were on several occasions drawn up on the extremities of their 
own wings, either to counter or to take part in a flank attack. 
We are also informed that light-infantry were on other occasions 
positioned in front of a phalanx to soften up the front ranks 
of the enemy with their missile fire. Only in Anabasis IV.8.15 
do we find light-armed troops both positioned on the wings and 
skirmishing in front of the centre of their own phalanx.
In the period c. 400 - 362 B.C. we only once learn of 
light-armed troops arrayed on either wing of a phalanx for 
combat. However, we do learn that light-armed infantry 
advanced in front of their own hoplites on several occasions.
The spectacular victories of light-armed troops over 
hoplites in Aetolia in 426 B.C., on Sphacteria in 425 B.C., 
on Sicily in 413 B.C. and near Corinth in 390 B .Cdemonstrate 
the frightening military potential of these troops."" There is 
much evidence that the mainland Greek city states were beginn­
ing to realize fully the potential of these troops, and in 
particular the javelin-thrower, in the final period which we
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have studied (c. 400 - 362 B.C.)* javelin-throwers and other 
missile-troops are frequently mentioned in this period and we 
have seen that the equipment of the hoplite became lighter 
from around the end of the fifth century, probably because the 
hoplite had to fulfill new roles of acting with, and combating, 
peltasts, whose role in warfare was increasing dramatically.
In view of the fact that light-armed troops had shown themselves 
to be very successful against hoplites in the campaigns in 
Aetolia, and on Sphacteria and Sicily, it is very surprising 
that Athens and Sparta did not raise large forces of regularly 
equipped and organized native light-armed troops in the 
Peloponnesian war (with the exception of the Athenians’ archer 
force, some of whom we know were Athenian citizens ). Athens 
did raise forces of crude light-infantry for certain short 
campaigns from among her citizens and Sparta also armed helots 
as skirmishers for some campaigns, but no attempt was made by 
these and other Greek city states to form fully-trained bodies 
of light-armed troops. Obviously there was a fear in Sparta of 
giving weapons and training to the subject groups since this 
would have presented a danger to Sparta's internal security, 
but there were other factors which acted together in Sparta 
and other Greek city states which prevented the formation of 
large bands of organized native light-infantry. I have argued 
in chapter ten that the psychological factor may have been 
very important: there appears to have been a widely held 
belief, which is reflected in many ancient sources, that missile- 
troops and their tactics were cowardly - this factor appears to
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have been felt most strongly in Sparta. Social and political 
factors also tended to exert a conservative influence in many 
city states: there was no mechanism for the ’polis' to train
and equip large bands of light-armed infantry and the hoplites, 
who paid for their arms and dominated the military, social and 
political affairs of most city states, wanted to preserve their 
privileged position and consequently must have opposed change. 
The crude light-armed troops, who were probably thought to 
have little military value, could not have increased their 
social standing or political rights due to good service on the 
battlefield. The economic factor was also probably important: 
to obtain a fully trained force of light-armed troops, much 
time would have to be spent training the poorer members of a 
city state in the use of missile weapons and in skirmishing 
tactics - the time needed to train an archer or a slinger would 
almost certainly have been greater than the time needed to train 
a hoplite. The majority of the men who would have been needed 
to serve as light-armed troops were needed to cultivate crops 
and guard flocks and it is perhaps to be doubted whether they 
had enough free time to undertake a full training in the use 
of missile weapons and light-armed tactics. All the above 
factors must have interacted to various degrees in the 
different Greek city states to impede the development of large 
units of fully-trained native light-infantry.
This lack of interest in light-armed troops is patently 
evident in our historical sources of the Classical Period,who 
in many cases omit to mention the presence of these troops when
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we have inscriptional or archaeological evidence which would 
strongly suggest that they were present or seem to be very 
selective about the information which they give us about these 
troops: we have archaeological evidence which would suggest
that Greek archers took part in the defence of Old Smyrna in 
c. 600 B.C., Paphos in 498 - 497 B.C. and Olynthus in 480 - 
479 B.C., yet their presence is not mentioned by Herodotus; 
we have inscriptional evidence which would suggest that there 
were peltasts sent, in the Athenian forces, to Melos in 416 B.C. 
and to Sicily (inscription dated to 416/415 B.C.) and that there 
were archers in a Corinthian force at Thasos in 412/411 B.C., 
yet these troops are not mentioned by Thucydides or any other 
source. As mentioned above, all our historical sources of the 
Classical Period appear to be very selective about the occasions 
when they refer (or do not refer!) to light-armed troops and 
about the information which they give us about their actions: 
perhaps the most startling omissions by our sources are of the 
actions of the vast force of 'psiloi' at the battle of Plataea 
in 479 B.C. and of the large forces of Athenian light-armed 
infantry in the final retreat from Syracuse in 413 B.C. Such 
omissions are baffling and we should not conclude by them, as 
some modern commentators have done, that light-armed troops, 
especially specialized troops such as "archers, slingers and 
peltasts, were of negligible military value - the victories of 
light-armed infantry over hoplites in Aetolia in 426 B.C., on 
Sphacteria in 425 B.C., on Sicily in 413 B.C. and near Corinth 
in 390 B .C .,disprove conclusively this fallacy. Whatever the
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reasons for the omissions by our sources, we may be sure that 
light-armed troops took part in many battles in which their 
presence is not specified and that their role in warfare 
throughout our period of study may have been greater than we 
will ever realize.
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16'and 24; R.F.S. Starr, Nuzi (1937) Vol. 1, pp. 475-80; Vol. 2, PI. 126B; H.E. -
Winlock, The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdan in Thebes (1947), p. 163, PI. 29.
15. Syria 20 (1939), pp. 280 - 281 (find dates to the first half of the fourteenth century B.C.)
16. B.M. exhibits WA 132144; WA132143. Lachish was captured by the Assyrians in c.701 B.C.
17. see Athens, Acropolis Museim inv. no. 291 = G. Ahlberg, Fighting on Land and Sea in 
Greek Geometric Art, Acta Instituti Atheniensis Regni Sueciae, Series in 4°, XVI (1971), 
Fig. 4 (an archer is pierced in the abdomen with an arrow and by the position of his 
legs it seems that he is about to fall backwards. Another figure has been wounded in 
the shin by an arrow).
CVA France 18 (Louvre II) III Hb; PI. 5.7 = Ahlberg, Fig.6 (on this krater are depicted 
two men who have been hit in the head by arrows).
CVA France 18 (Louvre 11) III Hb; PI. 8.6 = Ahlberg, Fig.10 (a figure 
transfixed by an arrow in the stcmach is in the process of falling; he tries to pull 
the arrow out with on of his hands).
E. Kunze, Bruchstucke attischer Grabkratere, Neue Beitrage zur klassichen AltertLrnswissen- 
schaft (1954), p. 55, Pi. 9.2 = Ahlberg, Fig. 12 (a warrior who has been hit in the head 
and stomach by two arrows is depicted; he tries to pull the arrow from his stomach and 
is in the act of falling to the ground).
CVA Copenhagen 2 (Mus.Nat. 2) IIIH; PL 73.4b = Ahlberg, Fig. 33 (an archer shoots man 
in head at point blank range).
CVA France 18 (Louvre II) IIIHb; PI. 7.7 = Ahlberg, Fig. 34 (a warrior who has been
hit in the waist by an arrow is depicted in this fragnent. The warrior on the left
who is drawing his sword has been shot through the neck by an arrow).
18. cf also ®  279 (archery of Teucer destroying the Trojan ranks).
19 cf also Iliad 0707-712: a special occasion on which the ordinary Achaeans and Trojans
will not fight with the bow; and see Odyssey e 215-220 - many of Odysseus' ccrrpanions 
were aiming the bow at the enemy.
20. cf K428.
21. Teucer: ©  266f; ©  279; <3> 300f; ©  323-4f; M350; M363; M372; M388; M400-1;
N313-4; 0422f; 0458f; ¥ 862f (archery ccmpetition).
Odysseus: K260 (quiver); K500; K514 - cf Odyssey 0215-220; K262 ; 4> passim;
^15-16; x 82"83; X 116'118*
Meriones: N650-652; ¥  871 (archery ccmpetition).
Philoctetes: B718, cf Odyssey ©219.
Paris: r 17; Z322; ®  81f, A  370f; A  507; N660-3; N671-2.
Pandarus: B827; Z\105f; E97; E171f; E245.
Dolon: K333; K459.
Helenus: N583f
Most of these figures must not simply be regarded as archers since they were equipped 
with more conventional heroic arms in other passages: on the Greek side,Teucer fights 
at the beginning of Z as a spearman and we find him in M in this role. In N177 he 
fights with his spear,and when the string of his bow breaks,he yet again uses his spear 
(0482). Odysseus in the Iliad primarily fights with spear and sword (A496; Z31;
K261; A421f; A  447f; A  661). Meriones in the early part of book N fights primarily 
• as a spearman,and,after using the bcw,he again reverts to using the spear ( -n\342f).
. Only Philoctetes is regarded as foranostly an archer.
On the Trojan side Paris is most often portrayed as an archer, although he is equipped - 
on several occasions with spear and sword. In P 18 he has a sword and thrcwing-spears
as well as a bow (cf Sophocles, Trachiniae, 511-12); he puts on conventional equipment
for his duel with Menelaus (see P137, r1 254, P 334,P 338, P 346),and,when recalled 
to the fight by Hector, he goes out at the end of Z in normal heroic equipment. In 
0341-2 he also makes a spear-cast. Pandarus also is portrayed primarily as an archer,
although he is described as fighting with the spear when he is killed by Dicmedes 
(E238; E280). On the night expedition Dolon takes with him not only a bcw but also 
a spear (K335) and Helenus in N576-7 fights with a large Thracian sword.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Bcw: see above.
Spear: A290; B530; P 18 (2 spears); P 78; P 137; p 179; P 254; P  338; P 345;
TTBT; P 355; P380; H 431; P 436; A  87; A 461; A479; A490; A 496; A  525;
A 527; E15; E17; E40; E45; E50f; E73; E145; E280; E293; E297; E336; E495
(2 spears); E533; E563; E568; E579; E611; E658f; E856; Z11; Z31; Z32; Z44;
Z65; Z104 (2 spears); Z126; Z319-20; H11; H14; H54 H213; H244f; H249f; ©  111; 
K335; K369f; A43; A  95;
A  253f; A  265; A  321; A  338;
©258; ©495; K24; K31; K76 (2 spears); K135; K178
A 108; A 144; A180; A  212 (2 spears); A233; A  251
A 349; A 361; A42 1f;A 435; A447f; A  503; A 541; A577; A821; M117; M128;
M183; M189; M250; M298 (2 spears); M394; M405; M464-5 (2 spears); N159; N177-8; 
N183-4; N190; N241; N296; N370; N397; N403; N438f; N442f; N503; N506-7 and
N509
E38
0420
N516; N529; N542; N557 
S  402-403; 2  443; S  449 
0429; 0482; 0523; 0528
N562; N574; N583; N605; N609; N646; ^12;
3  451; *3 461; 3476; 3  494 ; 0282;
0542 ; 0573; 0650;TTiutf39 (2 spears) tt284; tt309; 
TT315; "TT 317-8; TT319; "^ 323; ^335-6; tt 346; TT399; tt 404 and 406; tt 466; tt 597; 
17608; TT 699; t t  734; TT 801; TT806; ^820; P7f; P44; P296; P304; P344; P347; 
P516; P523 and 525; P574; P598; P604; P607; P608f; T387; Y163; Y  267f; Y 273;
Y386f; Y 423; Y446f; &  17; 67; m  139; 1  145 (2 spears); 3  582; x 243f;
^821.
Sword: A190f; B45; P272; P 344; P 361; E81; E146; E584; H273; © 88; K256;
K26TT K484f; A29; A109; A 146; A 240; A265; A  541; M190; N576-7; N610;
2496; tt 115; "^135; it 332-333; TT337; ^ 473; T252-253; T372; Y 284; Y459f;
1  19f; f  116; f  173; X306f.
Stone: H264; H268-70; ©  321; A265;A541; M380; M445 ; 3  409f; tt 411; TT578; 
T O T ;  Y 285.
Leaf, The Iliad 2, p.46 on N721; cf Lorimer, PM, P.301.
Lion Hunt Dagger, see n. 9T (ch.1).
Terra-cotta group, see Lorimer, PM, PI. 22.3.
see Yadin, AWBL, p. 430 (top) = Korfmann, p. 36 (top PI.); BM, Rocm XIV, panels 8-11. 
cf Xen.HeIl.II.4.15-16; Cyrop, VI.3.24. 
see P. Christison, Bannockburn (1960), p. 25.
see King, Sennacherib and the Ionians, JHS 30 (1910) p. 327f; on the Greek king of
Philistia see E. Meyer, Geschichte des Alterums (1937-9) Vol.3, pp. 42-43; cf W.K. 
Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part 4 (1985), pp.32-33. On the influences of Near 
Eastern battle scenes on fighting scenes on Attic Late Gecmetric pottery see Ahlberg, 
pp. 71-106.
Likewise with Achaeans could have defended the rampart around their ships with a force 
of archers; see M387-389;where Teucer shoots Glaucus frcm the Achaean rampart.
K. Muller, Tiryns Vol.3 (first published 1930; reprint by Deutsches Archaeologisches - 
Institut Athen 1976), pp. 49 and 66-67.
Egyptian archers defending fortified positions,-see: -
1 Painting frcm Beni-hasan, Tcmb 17 (Tcmb of Khety) - c.1900 B.C.: P.E. Newbery, Beni 
Hasan 2 (1894), PL 15 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 158-9.
2 Relief in the Ramesseim at TTiebes (c.1290-1223 B.C.): W. Wreszinski, Atlas zur 
altagyptischen Kulturgeschichte 2 (1935), Taf. 108 = J.B. Pritchard, The Ancient Near 
East in Pictures Relating to the Old Testament (1954), no. 333 = Yadin, AWBL, p.229.
3 Relief frcm Luxor (c.1290-1223 B.C.): Wreszinski, Atlas 2, Taf.84 = Yadin, A1*£L, 
p. 238 (top).
Archers on Assyrian reliefs defending fortified positions:
1 Reliefs frcm the Palace of Ashumasirpal II (883-859 B.C.) at Nimrud -
i. A.H. Layard, Hie Moniments of Nineveh 1 (1849), PI. 13 = E.A.W. Budge, Assyrian
Sculptures in the British Museim (1914), PI. 18.1= H. Frankfort, The Art and 
Architecture of the Ancient Orient (1954), PI. 84 = R.D. Barnett, Assyrian Palace 
Reliefs and their Influence on the Sculptures of Babylonia and Persia (1960), PI. 25 = 
Yadin, AWBL, p. 383, no. 6.13.
ii. Layard 1, PI. 19 = Budge, PI. 24.1 = C.J. Gadd, The Stones of Assyria (1936) p. 135 
(14fc>).
iii. Layard 1, PI. 17 = Budge, PI. 13.1 = Gadd, p. 133 (5A).
iv. Layard 1, PI. 33 = Budge, PI. 13.2 = Gadd, p. 133 (6A).
2 Reliefs frcm the Palace of Tiglath-pileser III (745-727 B.C.) at Nimrud:
i. E. Linger, Die Reliefs Tiglatpilesars III aus Nimrud (1917), Nr.13, Taf.4 = Gadd,
p. 155, PI. 12 = R.D. Barnett and M. Falkner, The Sculptures of Tiglath-Pilser III
(1962), Pis. 31-34 = Yadin, AWBL, p. 408.
ii. Layard 1, PI. 66 = Gadd, p. 158 = Barnett and Falkner, Pis. 90-91.
3 Reliefs frcm the Palace of Sargon II (721-705 B.C.) at Khorsabad: see Yadin, AWBL, 
pp. 416 - 417; Hall V, Gate S, 10 (418) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 418.
Hall V, Gate 0, 6 (423) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 423.
Hall XIV, 12 (422) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 422.
4 Reliefs frcm the Palace of Sennacherib (704-681 B.C.) at Nineveh: Yadin, AkBL, p. 431 
(top).
5 Reliefs frcm the S.W. Palace of Ashurbanipal (c.668-630 B.C.) at Nineveh:
Gadd, p. 196 = Yadin, Al'EL, p.448.
Gadd, p.204 = Yadin, AWBL, p.449.
cf Z433-439; likewise the Trojans could have used their archers to try to clear the
rampart around the Greek ships of defenders with their fire; on the arrowheads see
pp. 39-40.
see p. 39. Archers in Egyptian and Assyrian works of art attacking fortified positions:
1 Tcmb of Khety (c.1900 B.C.): Newberry, PI. 15 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 158-9.
2 Ramesseim (c. 1290 - 1223 B.C.): Wreszinski, Atlas 2, Taf. 108 = Yadin, AWBL, pp.228-9.
3 Relief frcm Medinet Habu, 20th Dynasty, Rameses III (1192-1160 B.C.): H.H. Nelson, 
Medinet Habu 2 (1932), Pis. 88-89 = Wreszinski, Atlas 2, Taf. 151 = Pritchard, ANEP, 
p.116, no.344 = Yadin, AWBL, p.346.
4 Ashumasirpal II (883-859 B.C.), Nimrud:
i. Layard 1, PI. 20 = Budge, PI. 23.2 = Gadd, p. 135 (13B).
ii. Layard 1, PI. 19 = Budge, PI. 24.1 = Gadd, p. 135 (14B).
iii. Layard 1, PI. 17 = Budge, PI. 13.1 = Gadd, p. 133 (5A).
fv. Layard 1, PI. 33 = Budge, PI. 13.2 = Gadd, p. 133 (6A). -
5 Bronze doors of the gates of Shalmaneser III (858-824 B.C.) frcm Balawat:
L.W. King, Bronze Reliefs frcm the Gates of Shalmaneser King of Assyria (1915), 
Pis. 20 and 50 = Barnett, Pis. 140 and 162 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 400-401.
6 Tiglath-pilser III (745-727 B.C.), Nimrud: see eg. Unger, Nr. 13, Taf. 4 = Gadd,
p. 155, PI. 12 = Barnett, PI. 38 = Barnett and Falkner, Pis. 31-34.
7 Sargon II (721-705 B.C.), Khorsabad: Yadin, AWBL, pp. 416-19, 422.
8 Sennacherib (704-681 B.C.), Nineveh: Yadin, AWBL, pp. 430-31 (top).
9 Ashurbanipal (c.668-630 B.C.), Nineveh: Gadd, p. 204, PI. 36 = Yadin, AWBL, p. 499.
34. There is one exception:in ©  81-86 Paris wounds a horse in the head with an arrrw.
35. On Mycenaean works of art and Late Geometric pottery, archers also stand very close to
their targets - this stylistic feature is probably due to a lack of space on the pot 
or other artistic object and to a desire to portray a coherent group of figures.
36. see pp. 22-23.
37. wounds: see n.9. (ch.1).
38. Leaf, Hie Iliad 1, p. 271 on ©267.
39. 1 Ashumasirpal II (883-859 B.C.), Nimrud:
i. Layard 1, PI. 20 = Budge, PI. 23.2 = Gadd, p. 135 (13B) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 388.
ii. Layard 1, PI. 19 = Budge, PI. 24.1 = Gadd, p. 135 (148) = Yadin, AkBL, pp. 388-9.
iii. Layard 1, PI. 18 = Budge. PI. 18.2 = Gadd, p. 136 (15B) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 388.
iv. Layard 1, PI. 17 = Budge, PI. 13.1 = Gadd, p. 133 (5A) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 388.
2 Tiglath-pileser III (745-727 B.C.), Nimrud:
i. Layard 1, PI. 63 = Unger, Nr. 8,11, Taf. 2 = Smith, Assyrian Sculptures in the
British Museun, From Shalmaneser III to Sennacherib (1938), Pis. 13-14 = Barnett,
Pis. 40-41 = Barnett and Falkner, Pis. 37 - 40 = Yadin, AWBL, p.407.
ii. Yadin, AWBL, p. 409 = BM no. 118902.
3 Sargon II (721-705 B.C.), Khorsabad: see Yadin, AWBL, pp. 416 - 19, 422, 424-425.
4 Sennacherib (704-681 B.C.), Nineveh: see Yadin, AWBL, p.431 (top) and pp. 434-5.
5 Ashurbanipal (668-630 B.C.), Nineveh: H.R. Hall, Babylonian and Assyrian Sculptures
in the British Musetm (1928), PI. 40 = Gadd, p. 196 = H. Brunner, Ein assyrisches
Relief milliner agypfischen Festung, Archiv fur Orientforschung 16 (1952-53), p.253f, 
Abb.1. = Pritchard, ANEP, p.5, no. 10 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 462-463.
40. see n.24(0-Lorimer, EM, pp. 297-298.
41. see p.19.
42. see chapter 10.
43. see eg. B692, y188.
44. On the meaning and derivation of see Leaf} j^e y0l. 1, pp. 129-130
on A  242 and Kirk, The Iliad Vol. 1, p. 395 on A  242.
45. see eg. Odyssey 6 215-220; £ 38f.
46. see appendix 2. Hcmer unfortunately gives us no information about the type of bow used
by the 1 laoi1, although it is possible to argue fncrm the efficiency of the Locrians that 
they used the ccnposite bow.
47. For general caTments on the sling injthe Iliad, see Leaf, Hie Iliad Vol. 2,- p. 38 on
N600 and pp. 45-46 on N712-721; Lorimer, hM, p. 301'; Snodgrass, EGQW, p. 167;
Korfmann, p. 35; Foss, p. 2 5 . '
48. The fact that a 'therapon' of Helenus has a sling in his possession does not necessarily
mean that it was a weapon used by lowly men - Patnxlus is described as the attendant of
Achilles in the Iliad.
49. see p. 16.
50. On the sling-cord, see Korfmann, p. 38 and Foss p. 26.
51. e.g. Lorimer, EM, p. 301.
52. On the evolution of the sling see O.R. Sellers, Sling Stones of Biblical Times, The 
Biblical Archaeologist II, 3-4 (1939), pp. 41-44 and most importantly V.G. Childe, The 
Significance of the Sling for Greek Prehistory in Studies Presented to D.M. RobinsdnTt950),
I. pp. 1-5. korfmann (The Sling, p. 42) develops his theories and considers the world 
wide distribution of Prehistoric sling-shots.
53. H. Schliemann, Ilios (1881) p. 437f (on Troy II) and Troja (1889), pp. 118-119,with 
Fig. 47 (on Troy III).
54. G. Fouc^ res, 1 glans1 in Darerberg-Saglio, op.cit. p. 1668f.
55. Cost is Davaras, Guide to Cretan Antiquities (1976), pp. 263 and 343.
56. EMA, inv. no. 1369. For a reproduction of two possible Mycenaean sling-bullets of 
unknown provenance, see G. Perrot and C. Chipiez, La Grk:e primitive, p. 129, Fig. 27.
57. Sir Arthur Evans, The Palace of Minos, Vol. 2 (1928), pp. 344-345,with Fig. 196.
58. Lead bullets v^re found at Olympia, a site which has produced a great many finds of 
archaic date, but their context has not been properly described: Olynpia, Ergebpisse 
der Ausgrabungen, Vol. 4, p. 178.
59. see BSA 31 (1930-31), pp. 9,38 (no. 25), 41 (no. 37) w^ith Fig. 16, no. 25.
60. Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece, p. 275.
61. see Lorimer, EM, p. 142, Fig. 4; E. Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age (1964), pp. 100-
105,with PI. 14; Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 167.
62. On the position of the slings of Hittite slingers on the orthostats from the palace of 
Kapara at Tell Halaf (10th century B.C.): M. Vieyra, Hittite Art (1955), PI. 96; W.F. 
Albright, Anatolian Studies, VI (1956), p. 75f; Yadin, AWBL, p. 364; Korfmann, p. 37.
63. Snodgrass, EG4W, p. 167.
64. Evans, PM2, p. 345 nl.
65. Corinthian alabastron: Ecole franqaise d'Athenes, Delos x (1928) p. 137, Fig. 3;
Spartan Pithos fragnent: see pp. 57-59.
66. Yadin, AWBL, p. 430 (top) = Korfmann, p. 36 (top PI.). For other depictions of Assyrian
slingers see Yadin, AWBL, pp. 452 and 458 (reliefs frcm Ashurbanipal1 s palace at Nineveh)
and see pp. 431, 434-35.
67. Ranges, see pp. 1-2 and 5.
68. see n. 66(0.Egyptian slingers also shown attacking a fortified position on the Tcmb of 
Khety frcm Beni-hasan: see n. 31,1(0-
69. General works on Homeric arms and armour: A. Lang, The World of Hcmer (1910), pp. 60-80; 
Lorimer, l-M, p. 132f; A. Wace and F. Stubbings, A Ccnpamon to Hcmer (1962), pp. 505-518; 
Snodgrass, EG°W, pp. 170-179; Snodgrass, AAG, pp. 11,37,47; Greenhalgh, EQW, chapter 3* 
passim; Luce, Hcmer and the Heroic Age, pp. 101-108; C. King, Military Equipment in
Hcmer (1976); cf on spear: A. Shewan, Hcmeric Essays (1935), pp. 441-443 and on body- 
armour: H. Catling, AA (1970) pp. 441-449] P. Greenhalgh, Antiquity 54 (1980), pp.201-208.
70. see eg. A 566-568 (Aias); M43-50 (Hector); 0615f (Hector); P730f (two Aiantes). 0n- 
the form of the Hcmeric battle see G.S. Kirk, War and the Warrior in the Hcmeric Poems, 
in J-P. Vemant Problernes de la guerre en Gr£ce ancienne (1968); Pritchett, GSW IV, pp.
7-33.
71. J. Griffin, Hcmer, p. 33; cf Pritchett, GSW IV, p. 7.
72. see e.g. P. Oxy. 47 (1980) no. 3316, 1.14; Thuc.VI.69.2.
73. Francois Vase:see JHS 27 (1907) p. 253, Fig. 3.
Black-fig. Kylix: CVA G B 2 (B.M.2) IIIHe; PI. 8.1a.
Pithos frag. : see pp. 57-59.
74. It should however be noted that Pausanias is not a trustworthy source for this early 
period; chapter 2, n. 38.
75. Best, pp. 4-5, 7-12, 15-18; Euripides, Rhesus, 309-313, 375.
76. K438; 474-475; 501-506; Y 484-489.
77. A 532-535; 2L155; B848; K428.
78. K257-258; 335; 458.
79. K133-134.
80. Best, p.8; see esp. CVA Munich 1; 3H, PI. 9.3; Dietrich von Bothmer, Amazons in Greek
Art (1957), PI. 72.5; CVA Baltimore 2; 31, PI. 10.11; W. Kraiker, Die rotfigurigen 
attischen Vasen (1931), PI. 13.78; F. Brenner, Satyrspiele; Bilder griechischer Vasen 
(1944), p. 49, PI. 50.
81. Best, pp. 9-11. This hypotheses is based on J. van Leeuwen, Ilias (1912) on book 5,
453; cf Herodotus VII. 91 - he observes that the Cilicians had X ’txKS'n <-<* made of 
raw oxhide instead of 'aspides1.
82. Lorimer, EM, p. 147, PI. III.1b; H. Miiller-Karpe, Zur spatbronzezeitlichen Bavaffnung in
Mitteleuropa und Griechenland, Germania 40 (1963) p. 258, Pi. 1; p.283, PI. 10.7;
Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 57-58 and AAG, pp. 30-33,with Figs. 10-11.
83. Y 807-808 and cf N576-577. On the 'machaira' see G. Roux, Meurtre dans un sanctuaire
sur 11 amphore de Panaguriste, Arrtike Kunst 7 (1964), pp. 30-40 and Snodgrass, AAG, Fig.50;
cf also Thuc.II.96.2; 98.4.
84. 139f; On the phenomenon of two spears see pp. 33-34.
85. A list of graves in which two or more spearheads have occurred is given in Snodgrass,
EGAW, pp. 136-137; add Ah(1963) pp. 35-40 (Gr.23, Tiryns).
86. see Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 136-9 and AAG, pp. 38-39.
87. Mycenaean Graves (small head found mainly in combination with large head):
i. AE (1904), p. 48, Fig. 11.
ii. BSA37 (1936-7), pp. 187-91.
iii. Archaeology in Greece (1957), p. 11.
Athens, Agora Grave XVII - Hesperia 21 (1952), p. 281, Pis. 75c2 and 75c3; Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 
Athens, Dipylon Grave - AM13 (1888), p. 298, Fig. 5.
88. Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 137-8.
89. cf AA4 (1889) p. 93, no. 8 = Snodgrass, EGAW, PI. 33 = AAG, PI. 28.
90. see e.g. Lorimer, EM, p. 257, n.5 and p. 258, nn.1 and 2; Bulletin des Musees Royaux
(Brussels) Vol. 23 (1951), p. 32, Fig. 1; Brenton, BSA (1953), p. 345; AA78 (1963), 
p. 210f, Figs. 1 and 3.
91. CVA France 25 (Louvre 16) IIIHb; Pis. 27.1 and 2; 52.3 .
CVA France 27 (Louvre 18) IIIHb, PI. 23.1.
CVA Copenhagen 2 (Mus.Nat.2) IIIH; Pis. 72.4b arid 74.1.
cf. G. Perrot and C. Chipez, Histoire de l'Art dans l'Antiquite (1890-1914), Vol. 7, p. 179,
Fig. 63 (man wounded in knee by spear).
92. _ The suggestion that the Mycenaeans may have used javelins is an inference from n.87. -
-93. In A 297-300 the 'kakoi pezoi', sandwiched between the cavalry and first-rate infantry,
are possibly infantrymen of the masses.
94. Egyptian, Anatolian and Assyrian bows: see Yadin, AWBL, pp. 46-48, 62-64, 80-83;
W.E. McLeod, The Bow in Greece with particular reference to the Homeric Poems, Diss.
Harvard Univ. (1966); summary of diss. in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 71 (1966), 
pp. 329-331.
The Egyptians used two types of ccmposte bcw:
1 The triangular type; see e.g. N. de G. Davies, The Tomb of Rekh - mi-Re at Thebes 
(1943), PI. 23; H. Carter and P.E. Newberry, The Tomb of Thoirtmosis IV (1904), Pis. 10- 11 
= Pritchard, ANEP, p. 103, nos. 314-315; N. de G. Davies, The Tcmb of<en-Amun at Thdbes, 
Vol. 1 (1930), Pis. 22-24.
2 The recurved type; see e.g. W. Wreszinski, Atlas zur altagyptischen Kulturgeschichte, 
Vol. 1 (1923), Taf. 1.26 and Vol. 2 (1935), Taf. 104; PrTtchard, ANEP', p. 137,' no. 390'= ' 
J.A. Wilson, The Burden of Egypt (1951), Fig. 21a; B. Van de Walle, Chronique d'Egypte 
XIII (26) (1938), col. 234f, Fig. 3; A. Rowe,-The Four Canaanite Terples of Beth-Shan 
(1940), pp. 27-28, PI. 38 = B. Parker, Cylinder Seals from Palastine, Iraq II (1949), p. 13, 
PI. 4.30; N.M. Davies and A.H. Gardiner, Ancient Egyptian Paintings (1936), Pis. 78 and 82.
95. On the Homeric Bow,see p. 44f
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56. On this transitional phase see Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.180-181; AAG, p.64; cf. AA4 (1889), 
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65. On the stone sling-shots see Nicholls, op.cit., p.129,with n.116.
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(1899), p.346f, TypeTT
70. see Snodgrass, AAG, Fig. 35, Early examples of this type have also been found at Olynpia
and Olynthus: Olyrpia, Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen (1890-1896) Vol.4, p.178, P1.64, no.
1095; Olyipische f-orschungen, Voi.l (1944), p.160f, PI.69b.
OlynthuT'X; Pis ."120-122.---
71. Note that Nicholls(op.cit.,p.131) suggests that they may represent a quiverful of arrows
dedicated to the goddess on seme earlier occasion. But seven is a small nimber of arrows 
to fill a quiver and, as Nicholls himself notes, although the seven arrowheads are 
typologically the sane,they are not identical in size or shape - this would suggest that 
they were not in fact frcm the same quiver.
72. It is possible that the Lydians utilized other types of arrowheads to a lesser extent/-
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see HCT 4, p.56,on V.47.6.
141. Thuc.V.52.2.
142. Thuc.V.57.2.
143. see pp.247 - 248.
144. Thuc.V.64.5.
145. Thuc.V.71.
146. Thuc.V.73.4.
147. cf. Murray, Early Greece, p. 122.
148. see pp.276 - 278.
149. IG12.97; Tod (GHI, no.76) carments "Mutilated though it is, this inscription may be 
confidently brought into connexion with the composition and dispatch of the famous 
Melian expedition" and "The agreements between certain phrases of our decree and the 
account given by the historian can hardly be due to mere coincidence".
150. B.D. Merit! in Robinson Studies Vol.2, pp.298 - 303. For inscriptional evidence for 
the possible use of peltasts in the mid 5th century to 430s B.C. see Bradeen in Phoros: 
Tribute to B.D. Men*'^ (1974), pp.29 - 35; Raubitschek, Grazer Beitrage 9 (1980J7 
pp. 21 - 22 and cf. IG13,60.
151. For the possible use of these 'hippotoxotai' see HCT 4, p.155,on V.54.1.
152. see p.245f.
153. Archers and slingers could be effective against cavalry:
Archers: Herod.IX.22.1; Xen.Hell.IV.7.6.
Slingers: Diodorus^ (V.85.3 (Mantinea 362 B.C.). The Athenian cavalry suffered badly 
due to Thessalian sphendonetai'. See Korfmann, p.40 - a Spanish conquistador ccrrments 
on Peruvian slingers: "With the sling they propel a large stone with such force that 
it could kill a horse."
cf. Best, p.27, n.33: "It is remarkable that Nikias had asked for hoplites, archers, 
and slingers, but not for javelin-throwers and peltasts."
154. Cretan archers: see pp.58 - 59 for early history and cf. Ctesias, Persica, 26.
On the use of Cretan mercenary archers in the Sicilian Expedition see also Thuc.VI.43 
and VII.57.9. The Peloponnesian War did not involve Crete, except for a minor Athenian 
intervention in 429 B.C. (Thuc.II.85.5f). This may have been because the Cretan cities, 
which were dependent econcmically on a subject population (perioikoi), could not afford 
to take part in a war which might weaken Crete and so spark off a revolt of the 'perioikoi1.
For Cretan archers in the later Classical Period see Xen.Anab.I.2.9; III.3.7; III.4.17;
IV.2.28; V.2.32; HeU.IV.2.16; IV.7.6.
On Cretan archers see Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks, p.45 with p.49 (Fig.) - based on M. 
Guarducci, Inscriptiones Creticae, Vol.2, vi, 7, p.88.
Cretan coins frequently portray the bow, quiver and arrowhead: see B.V. Head, Historia 
Nirmorim (1911) [seme of the dates are not accurate]:
1 Aptera (p.458): the half-drachma (c.400-300 B.C.) shows the bow. Later bronze 
coinage has an arrowhead motif.
2 Ceraea (p.460): coinage of the third and second centuries B.C. portrays an arrowhead 
and a spearhead within a wreath.
3 Knossos: coinage of period c.350-200 B.C. depicts a square labyrinth with a spearhead 
or arrowhead on one side (p.461, Fig.243) and a quiver with a strap and a quiver with a 
bow (p.463).
4 Cydonia: stater (c.400-300 B.C.) portraying a naked archer stringing his bcw (p.463)
and tetradrachma (c.200-167 B.C.) depicting the head of Artemis and a bow and quiver
(p.464).
5 Eleuthema: coins (c.450-300 B.C.) showing Apollo and Artenis with the bow (p.464f) 
and others (c.400-300 B.C.) containing an arrowhead motif (p.465).
6 Hyrtacina: coins (c.400-300 B.C.) with arrowhead motif (p.469).
7 Lisus: fourth century coinage depicts a bow and quiver (p.471).
8 Phaestus: coinage of the period c.430-300 B.C. shows Heracles with the bcw and 
quiver (p.471).
9 Polyrheniun: coinage of the period c.330-280 B.C. depicts an arrowhead and bow (p.475).
10 Praesus: coinage of the period c.450-400 B.C. portrays Heracles with the bow and of 
the period c.400-148 B.C. contains an arrowhead motif (p.475).
11 Priansus: coinage of the period c.430-200 B.C. contains an arrowhead motif (p.476).
12 Rhithymna: coinage of the period c.400-300 B.C. shows Apollo with the bow (p.477).
13 Tarra: fourth century coinage contains an arrowhead motif (p.478).
14 Tylisus: coinage of the period c.400-300 B.C. contains an arrowhead motif (p.478).
155. K.J. Beloch (Griechische Geschichte [2nd edition 1912-1927] Vol.2, p.290) questions the 
text and thinks that 700 is a large number for a force which achieved so little.
In 412 B.C. the Peloponnesians tried to win over the island of Rhodes and one of the 
reasons given by Thucydides for this move is its large supply of land forces - the 
Peloponnesians possibly wanted to get supplies of specialist light-armed infantry, such 
as slingers, from the island (Thuc. VI11.44.1).
There were Rhodians who acted as slingers in the army of the Ten Thousand: see p.209f.
156. Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, p.237, no.78 = I.G.12.99.5; cf. I.G.12.97.17 and Bradeen, The
Athenian Agora 17, p.178, no.1028.
157. Lemnians and Imbrians - see Parke, GMS, p.18, n.1; cf. Thuc.VII.27.1-2.
158. see pp.149-150.
159. Thuc.VI.64.1.
160. cf. At the battle of Bannockburn in 1314,Keith with 500 Scottish cavalry charged the large 
force of English archers,who were deployed against the Scots' left flank,and easily 
routed then; this action took place on level ground. See P.Christison, Bannockburn 
(5th edition, 1974), p.25.
161. For what would happen if they broke their formation see Herod. IX.69.
162. On the'plaision formation see HCT 4, p.343,on VI.67.1.
163. On the Syracusan light-armed troops and their disposition see Thuc.VI.67.2.
164. see p.179.
165. Ranges: see Introduction, passim.
166. cf. Modem day rioters throwing stones and bricks can severely harass French and British 
riot police carrying large perspex shields and protective helmets.
167. On Epipolae see HCT 4, p.470f.
168. On the position of Labdalon see HCT 4, pp.473-4.
169. On the Athenian wall and first Syracusan counter-wall see HCT 4, pp.473-6.
170. Thuc.VI.100.2-3.
171. On the harbour area see HCT 4, p.478f.
172. On the second Syracusan counter-wall see HCT 4, pp.481-2.
173. Thuc.VI.102.2.
174. Thuc.VII.1.5.
175. On the third Syracusan counter-wall see HCT 4, pp.476-478.
176. Thuc.VII.4.6.
177. Thuc. Vn* 5.3.
178. For the positioning of the Syracusan 'akontistai1 and cavalry in this battle,see Thuc. 
VII.6.2.
179. Thuc.VII.11.2.
180. On the 'machaira' see Snodgrass, MG, pp.97 - 98,with Fig.50.
Thracian peltasts armed primarily with javelins: see e.g. CVA Deutschland 3 (Mmchen 1); 
3H, Taf.9.3.
Thracian peltatsts with thrusting-spears: see Best, Pis.3,4,7,8 and A and C.
181. see p. 158.
182. Best, p.28.
183. On the pay of the peltasts see Best, pp.27-28.
On Dieitrephes see HCT 4, p.409,on VII.29.1.Pausanias apparently saw a bronze statue of
Dieitrephes struck by arrows in Athens (Paus.I.23,3f) - was he wounded by Theban archers
after the attack on Mycalessus (Thuc.VII.30.2)?
184. Thuc.VII.29; on the apparent revulsion of Thucydides,see HCT 4, p.410,on VII.30.3.
185. see McLeod, Phoenix 19 (1965), p.1. For a grave stele (first half of 4th century B.C.)
of a hunter with a bow in the Archaeological Museun of Thebes,see Demakopoulou and
Konsola, op.cit.,Fig. 25.
186. Thuc.VII.37.2; on the position of the temple of Olympian Zeus,see HCT 4, p.480.
187. Thuc.VII.37.3.
188. cf. p.7f.
189. Thuc.VII.40.5.
190. Thuc.VII.42.
191. Thuc.VII.43.2.
192. HCT 4, p.422,on VII.43.2. B.Jowett, Thucydides (1881) Vol.1, p.515.
193. Diodorus,XIII.11.3.
194. HCT 4, p.422,on VII.43.2.
195. cf. At Bannockburn the English archers, who operated in cpen order six paces apart and
could lay down a concentrated barrage, were quickly routed by the Scottish cavalry.
196. cf. Thuc.VII.48.5.
197. The Athenians were followed by the Lemnians and Imbrians, who were colonists and may have
been influenced by Thracian military tactics (Best, p.21, n.13 and Parke, GMS, p.18, n.1).
Rhodians also accompanied the expedition - they were armed as slingers (VI.43). The 
Messenians, inhabitants of Naupactus, were also present and there is a possibility that 
they were equipped as slingers (see Pausanias,IV.26.1 and IV.11.2f,on Messenian slingers). 
The Cretans and Aetolians served Athens as mercenaries. The Acamanians, who had 
'akontistai', 'sphendonetai' and possibly also 'toxotai', served with Demosthenes (VII. 
31.5 and VII.57.10). The forces supplied by the people of Metapontim and Thurii (VII.
57.11) consisted of javelin-thrcwers (VII.33.4; VII.35.1). The Iapygians mentioned
in VII.57.11 were mercenaries armed as javelin-throwers (VII.33.4). In VII.58 Thucydides
informs us about the allies of the Syracusans. The Camarinaeans mentioned in VI1.58.1 
provided a force of javelin-throwers and archers (VII.33.1) and the Geloans also 
mentioned in VII.58.1 sent a force of javelin-throwers (VII.33.1) Ambraciots, possibly
armed as javelin-throwers, also accompanied the Lacedaemonian force.
198. Thuc.VII.60.4; VII.70.5.
199. Thuc.VII.73 - 74.
200. On the probable mass burial of Athenian dead in the Sicel rock-tombs on Plenmyriunjsee
Paolo Orsi, Scoperte di antichita nel territorio_Siracusano (xvi, Avola; xix Not a), 
Notizie degli Scavi di Antichitci (1891), pp.345-348.
201. Thuc.VII.78.2.
202. Thuc.VII.78.3.
203. see p.111.
204. Thuc.VII.82.
205. Thuc.VII.84.1.
206. Thuc.VII.84.3-5.
207. Thuc.VII.85.
208. Thuc.VIII.25.1.
209. I have inferred that the dead Lacedaemonians were hoplites from the 1 hopla' taken from 
the corpses (VIII.71.2).
210. see chapter 5, n.96.
211. cf. Xen.Hell.1.7.28.
212. see pp.114 - 115.
213. IG 12.8 (1909), no.402.
214. Thuc.VIII.44; Diodorus,XIII.38.5 and XIII.45.1.
215. cf. Xen.Hell.1.1.2-8; Xenophon does not mention missile weapons.
216. On the battle of Cyzicus,see Diodorus, XI11.50.1 - 51.7; Xen.Hell.1.1.14-18.
See also: R.J. Litbnann, The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus, Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 99 (1968), pp.265-72; A.Andrewes, Notion and Kyzikos: 
The Sources Compared, JHS 102 (1982), pp.15 - 25 (esp.p.19f).
217. see pp.173-4.
218. Xen.Hell.1.1.18. On the sources see Andrewes, Notion and Kyzikos (passim).
219. Xen.Hell.I.1.33-34; cf. Diodorus,XIII.72.4; Thuc.VIII.71.2.
220. Best, p.36 suggests that the’psiloi on this occasion may have been non-Athenian; this
suggestion rests on no literary evidence.
221. Xen.Hell.I.1.18.
222. Xen.Hell.I.1.34; Diodorus,XIII.52.1 gives 1,000 hoplites, 100 cavalry and 30 instead of
50 triremes.
223. Xen.Hell.1.2.1, on Thrasyllus1 make-shift peltasts see Best, pp.36-41.
224. e.g. Thuc.: IV.9.1; IV.32.2; VIII.17.1; Xen.Hell.I.1.24.
225. see pp.128-9.
226. Xen.Hell.1.2.2.
227. Xen.Hell.I.2.2-3.
228. Best, p.38.
229. cf. p.9.
230. cf. e.g. p.125, p.141f.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
Xen.Hell.1.2.7.
Xen.Hell.I.2.8-9; Diodorus,XIII.64.1.
On the attack on Selymbria see Plutarch, Alcibiades, 30.2-5; Best, p.48. 
see p.141f.
cf. Xen.Hell.I.3.10; Diodorus,XIII.66.4; Plirt,Alc.30.4-5. 
cf. WACG, p.23.
Diodorus,XIII.73.2.
On this question see: HCT 1, pp.10-15; G.E.M. de Ste Croix, Origins of the Peloponnesian 
War (1972), pp.190 - 196; A.J. Holladay, Hoplites and Heresies, JHS 102 (1982), pp.97 -
103.
cf. Aristotle, Politics, V.2.12, 1303 b 12.
Holladay, op.cit., p.98.
Holladay, op.cit., p.99.
Herod.V.63; Ath.Pol. 19.5; in Gecmetric art the fight beside a beached ship is a ccrrmon 
motif, see p.42,with notes 142 and 143.
cf. the destruction of part of the Persian fleet in stormy weather off the Magnesian coast: 
Bum, pp.388 - 390; Hignett, pp. 169 - 173.
Thuc.I.107.3.
Holladay (Hoplites and Heresies, p.98) thinks that the garrisons of these forts were 
probably hoplites. See also Chandler, The North-West Frontier of Attica, JHS 46 (1926), 
pp. 1-21; HCT 1, pp.13 - 14.
HCT 1, p.13.
Holladay, op.cit., p.101. The Peisistratids at Athens, Polycrates on Samos,and Gelon 
at Syracuse,had developed units of specialist light-anted troops.
see p.263.
cf.Ath.Pol.4.2; 7.3 and 7.4.
HCT 1, p.15.
G.B. Grundy, TTiucydides and the History of his Age (1911), p.311,with n.3; HCT 1, p. 15. 
cf. Holladay, op.cit., p.103.
When Sparta's military affairs were not going well Brasidas used 'perioikoi' and liberated 
helots as hoplites - but these were used for distant campaigns where they could pose 
no threat to Sparta's internal security.
C H A P T E R  S I X
1. General accounts of the Thirty and their expulsion:
J. K. Anderson, Xenonhon (1974) pp. 47-60; P. Krentz,
The Thirty at Athens (1982), esp. chapt 5 'Civil War'
(pp. 89-101) .
2. Diodorus XIV . 32.1; Aeschines 2 (On the Embassy). 148.
3. Xen. Hell. TT. 4.2; Diodorus XIV. 32.1; Arist. Ath.Pol. 37
4. Xen. Hell. TT. 4.2
5. Xen. Hell. 4.4. - 7; cf Diodorus XIV. 33.1
6 . Hoplite armies did not usually press pursuits after
a victory but contented themselves with taking possession 
of the battlefield, stripping the cornses and setting up 
a trophy - see Murray, Early Greece, p.122; cf Plut.,
Moralia, 228E (Lycurgus 30).
7. Xen. Hell. II. 4.7; confiscation of arms Xen. Hell. II. 3.20
8 . see WACG, up. 23, 104-106; see eg. Thuc. VT. 64.1; Aeneas 
Tacticus 16.4-7; Xen. Hell. V. 3.1-2.
9. Xen. Hell. II. 4.10; Diodorus XIV. 33.2.
10. cf Thuc. VTI. 79.2.
11. Thrasybulus in this speech does not make the normal
exhortation to the hoplites to stand firm.
12. Xen. Hell. II- 4.12.
13. Xen. Hell. TT. 4. 19.
14. Xen. Hell. TT. 4.25; of Lysias, XXI, 15-16.
15. Xen. Hell. IT. 4.25-26.
16. Xen. Hell. TT. 4.27.
17. Xen. Hell. IT. 4. 30.
00 
T—1 Xen. 
see: 
C. J
Hell. II. 4.31; on Pausanias' attitude to the exiles 
A. P. Dorjahn, On Pausanias' Battle with Thrasybulus,
. 20 (1925) pp. 368-9; G. Cawkwell, C Q 26(1976) n.74f
19. Xen. Hell. II- 4.31f.oCM On the Soartan 
Hell. VI. 4.17.
'morai' see Lazenby, pp. 5-9 and cf Xen.
21. Xen. Hell. II- 4. 34.
22. Best, p. 43; see pp. 126-133.
23. D. W. Bradeen (for the American School of Classical 
Studies at Athens), The Athenian Agora, Vol 17: Inscriptions - 
The Funerary Monuments (1974), no. 1023. Date of the 
inscription: Bradeen, p. 178 - but note that the slanting
nu would seem to suggest a date in the third quarer of the 
fifth century.
25. On this tomb see: La Rue Van Hook, The Tomb of the 
Spartans in the Kerameikos, A J A 36(1932) pp. 290-292;
F. Willemsen, Zu den Lakedamoniergrabern in Kerameikes,
A M 92 (1977), pp. 117-157; Pritchett, GSW IV, pp. 133-134.
C H A P T E R  S E V E N
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Sculptures in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (1954), no.82 = MTPAX, PI. 10; Beazley, ARV, 
p.1471, no.3 = MTPAX, PI. 19; Damakopoulou and Konsola, op.cit.,pp.74-76,with P1.39; 
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Barclay V. Head, HistoriaNurmorum (1911), p.700; C. Kraay. The Celerrieris Hoard, Nunismati<
Chronicle 1962, p. 14; C. Kraay and M. Hinrer, Greek Coins (1966), p.362 and PI.192;
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